2022-11-13 骑着毛驴到处走 17554

One of the most recent and fast-moving credible rumors to come from the online communities watching the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a new landing helicopter dock (LHD) type vessel dubbed the 076. This 076 class LHD was first brought to the attention of the community in mid-2020, and in a rather unprecedented fashion a number of official request for proposal documents were found, and some credible insiders with established track records began to speak about the details of 076. It then reached a number of overseas and English language news outlets.


The 076 is described as an LHD – following on from, or perhaps complementing, the 075 class LHD – however, it is believed to be capable of conducting fixed wing flight operations via electromagnetic catapult (EMCAT) and arresting gear. Indeed, the greatest difference between the 076 compared to the 075 LHD, or other LHDs such as the U.S. Navy’s Wasp or America classes, is that the 076 is described as providing a similar capability as the F-35B gave to U.S. Navy LHDs, but without using a vertical short take off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft.


As if it was not already rather jarring to consider an LHD equipped with catapults and arresting gear – essentially making such a ship technically a “CATOBAR” carrier (Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery) – those same insiders then revealed the primary fixed wing complement of 076 would consist of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or UCAVs for combat). Specific types of UAVs and UCAVs included a flying wing UCAV (possibly a navalized derivative of the GJ-11, a mockup of which was shown at the 70th anniversary National Day parade in 2019), as well as a conventional high altitude long endurance UAV known as “Wind Shadow,” which has previously been observed at the catapult testing facility at the Chinese Navy’s (PLAN’s) Huangdicun naval air station.


A floodable well deck is also explicitly described, enabling the deployment of vehicles and amphibious craft from ship to land. A well deck is one of the cardinal features expected for a ship with an amphibious assault mission, and its inclusion aboard the 076 points to it still deserving the classic “LHD” designation. Furthermore, credible insiders have spoken of the 076 still as an “amphibious assault ship” like 075.
The aforementioned EMCAT and the arresting gear are the most noteworthy subsystems relevant to flight operations. However, other subsystems documented include a munitions elevator and a flight deck elevator capable of supporting a weight of 30 tons. Also mentioned is a “UAV deck.”


The immediate area of contention for the 076 LHD is whether its fixed wing capability should be secondary to its function as an amphibious assault ship or if it should be primarily be considered a medium aircraft carrier. Similar debates exist for other navies as well, such as the USN, whose LHDs can function as medium aircraft carriers when operating large complements of VSTOL jets like F-35Bs or Harriers.


However, there are also key differences between an LHD and a proper carrier. The flight deck geometry and area of an aircraft carrier are typically far greater than those of an equivalently sized LHD, and feature greater reinforcement and arrested recovery gear as well. Most international LHD designs in the world conversely do not have their flight decks extend significantly beyond the hull width, whereas a carrier’s flight deck does. Larger flight deck area and “carrier” flight deck geometry enables more efficient and higher tempo fixed wing flight operations. The presence of an angled flight deck aboard aircraft carriers is one of the more obvious examples of this.


Aircraft carriers typically require greater top speeds than LHDs, in turn requiring more powerful prime movers. At this stage, it is not known whether the 076 will have an angled flight deck; however the emphasis on its primary LHD role suggests the flight deck will also have more similarities with an LHD than a true aircraft carrier.


Therefore, the current body of evidence suggests the 076 will be an LHD first, and a CATOBAR carrier second, with its CATOBAR provisions seeking to provide fixed wing aerial capabilities to enable the 076 to carry out its amphibious assault role. The 076 might still be capable of fielding an airwing made up of a large fixed wing aerial complement, but may lack the flight deck area to operate as efficiently as a true medium aircraft carrier.


Why Not VSTOL?
One might then ask why the PLAN would seek to integrate these subsystems onto an LHD to operate fixed wing flight aircraft, rather than going the route of the USN and developing a VSTOL fighter such as the F-35B.
Indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that developing a VSTOL fighter is the most sensible and easiest route to provide LHD sized ships with a fixed wing capability. However, the development of a new VSTOL combat aircraft is far from fast or inexpensive, and given the Chinese aerospace industry has never developed a VSTOL combat aircraft in the past, this would represent a significant undertaking. Indeed, while the Chinese aerospace industry has conducted pre-research into VSTOL, the path to develop a viable VSTOL combat aircraft would be long and costly and fraught with risk and delay.

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Furthermore, any VSTOL capable “combat aircraft” must also be sufficiently capable and survivable in the relevant threat environment. For the modern threat environment into the 2020s and decades beyond, such an aircraft would inevitably require a high level of stealth and capable sensors and weapons. Developing a fifth generation strike fighter is within the Chinese aerospace industry’s capability; developing such an aircraft that is also VSTOL capable is something else entirely. Not to mention, such an aircraft would require a sufficiently high performance turbofan .


The procurement potential for a dedicated VSTOL fighter is also somewhat limited. Even generously assuming the PLAN eventually pursues a fleet of 10 LHD ships similar to the Wasp or America class capable of operating a hypothetical VSTOL fighter, the total number of VSTOL fighters needed to outfit 10 such ships would number less than 200. Devoting time, expertise, funds and industry to the development of such a unique aircraft with such a relatively limited production run would not make sense, unless other branches in the PLA also procured this aircraft or if China designed this aircraft with export in mind.


The unmanned nature of UCAVs and UAVs may also mitigate certain disadvantages of operating fixed wing aircraft aboard an LHD sized ship with a suboptimal flight deck. For example, the longer endurance of unmanned aircraft may reduce the need for higher tempo flight operations and sortie rates that manned aircraft could demand, which an LHD would be incapable of executing in the first place. Furthermore, unmanned aircraft tend to be able to attain greater endurance and range than equivalent weight fifth generation manned fighters as a reflection of their different competing requirements; after all, a flying wing UCAV does not need to sustain a pilot, or be capable of sustaining high Gs, nor is it required to attain supersonic speeds.


In other words, a UCAV with competitive and relevant combat radii, endurance, and payload could enjoy a significantly lighter weight compared to a manned fifth generation fighter, reducing the rating (and thus potentially size and power consumption) of the 076’s EM catapult and arresting gear. For example, a full sized aircraft carrier may be required to launch fully loaded, 30-plus ton manned combat aircraft; however, the 076’s catapults may be less powerful and only capable of launching aircraft up to 20 tons
Finally, a fleet of carrier-borne UCAVs and UAVs would be capable of operating from both 076s as well as future catapult aircraft carriers (003 and onwards). This opens up the potential for a larger production run and cross deck operations and flexibility as well.


One of the most controversial questions surrounding the 076 is whether it will be capable of operating the manned aircraft that the PLAN’s future large deck CATOBAR carriers will field, such as the future FC-31 derived carrier-borne fighter. The expected relatively small size and limited geometry of the 076’s flight deck makes it unlikely the ship will routinely operate manned fixed wing aircraft, and the likely downrated catapults and arresting gear means it will be unable to launch and recover manned aircraft at their maximum loads. However, in theory, the 076 could still launch and recover manned aircraft with reduced loads, and offer the option to operate a limited number of manned aircraft in an ad hoc capacity if a specific mission requires it.


Therefore, the current vision of the 076 represents a markedly different way of providing an LHD with fixed wing aviation capability compared to the U.S. Navy and other Western navies that operate F-35B or Harrier jump jets. Comparisons between the 076 and its Western contemporaries will likely be made in the future, as the 076 emerges as a more visible and concrete project; however, it is valuable early on to recognize that the 076’s airwing will not be designed to fulfill the same variety of air-to-air, strike, and ISR missions in the same supersonic capable package that F-35B is. Instead, the 076’s UCAV and UAV aircraft will likely emphasize longer endurance and longer range strike and ISR missions instead. The value of the two approaches can only be assessed in context of each navy’s own respective naval aviation and amphibious assault strategy.


Interesting ideas. I guess since unmanned craft are a lot cheaper than VSTOL and these medium sized carriers than super carriers the idea would be to flood the theatre with them.

有趣的想法。我猜中国人的想法是,建造无人驾驶的战斗机,要比有人驾驶的 VSTOL(短距起飞,垂直降落)战斗机便宜很多,而且建造中型航母要比超级航母便宜很多。

putting catobar on a USS-America sized LHD speaks more to their inability to have credible stovl capability
Instead of solving the problem, they worked around it. If the end result achieves a good balance between cost/benefit, then good for them


For example, you can have drones flying recon, which would be more capable than helicopters. Drones can also serve as air to air refuelers for fixed wing aircraft, or even refuel each other via a buddy system to extend range. Drones can also serve as flying arsenals that can be directed by manned aircraft. Stealthy drones could also pose a credible air to ground threat.
I'm frankly pretty surprised hearing about this, and I wonder if it will actually work out. it shows that the PLAN is very much interested in flying fixed wing aircraft off its LHDs despite their lack of vstol capable jets.


Col G. Lage Dyndal, LtCol T. Arne Berntsen, Pr S. Redse-Johansen
In the case of flying aircraft, we have learned that there are long lead times in educating pilots and operators. One of the greatest changes that will come from the development of autonomous drones is that military forces in the (near) future could develop great fighting power in much shorter timefrxs than previously. It is important to note – and many have – that creating the infrastructure and educating ground crew for operating drones is no cheaper or easier than it is to educate aircrew. However, once in place, the drone crew and operation centres would be able to operate large numbers of drones. Similarly, legacy manned aircraft would be at the centre of a local combat or intelligence system extended with drones serving, for example, in supportive roles for jamming, as weapons-delivery platforms or as a system of multi-sensor platforms. Moving beyond the past limitations of one pilot flying one aircraft or one crew flying one drone to a situation where one crew could control large amounts of drones would quite simply be groundbreaking.


AI can also augment normal actions. You don't need full autonomy, it can take certain actions independently. This is already likely to be feasible today. There definitely needs to a much heavier push to get proper silicon Valley techies into the DoD infrastructure. Unfortunately, political goals hamper this.
It's actually going to be an interesting development. If you have cheap AI enabled drones, you can conceivably have thousands of them (especially if they're on the Chinese coast). China is still far behind the US in pure AI/ML R&D but it's likely that in the future it could be another parallel pole of development.

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Col G. Lage Dyndal, LtCol T. Arne Berntsen, Pr S. Redse-Johansen
Autonomous drones are not capable of reasoning in the human sense. They do not possess human consciousness. The requirements set out above appear to presume a “human in the loop” of the decision cycle. At some point during attack decisions, a human being must decide upon what to attack and how important the target is.
in some circumstances an autonomous weapons system may (lawfully) be “left alone” to operate for hours or days, while in other circumstances all autonomy ought to be shut off to rely on human judgment .


On the other hand, it could also be argued that using autonomous drones is not just acceptable from a moral perspective but even morally preferable to human soldiers. Autonomous drones would be able to process more incoming sensory information than human soldiers and could therefore make more well-informed decisions. And since the judgments of machines would not be clouded by emotions such as fear and rage, it could possibly reduce the risk of war crimes that may otherwise have been committed by human soldiers.