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DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL candidate Andrew Yang has declared, “The automation of our jobs is the central challenge facing us today.” Yang’s message, echoed by another candidate, South Bend mayor Pete Buttigieg, won’t win him the nomination, but it is backed up by several social scientists including Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee and Oxford researchers Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne. In 2013, Frey and Osborne predicted that in “perhaps a decade or two … 47 percent of total U.S. employment” would be at “high risk” of being automated. That could portend what futurist Martin Ford has called a “jobless future” and would call for drastic measures to prevent a social and political cataclysm.

民主党总统候选人安德鲁 · 杨宣称: “工作的自动化是我们今天面临的核心挑战。”
杨的观点得到了另一位候选人南本德（美国印第安纳州北部城市）市长 Pete Buttigieg 的响应，虽然不会为他赢得提名，但是这一观点得到了一些社会科学家的支持，其中包括麻省理工学院的埃里克· 布林约尔松和安德鲁·麦卡菲，以及牛津大学的研究员 卡尔 · 本尼迪克特 · 弗雷和迈克尔 · 奥斯本。
2013年，弗雷和奥斯本预测，“或许在10年或20年内..... 47% 的美国就业人口将面临自动化的“高风险”，这可能预示着未来学家马丁 · 福特( Martin Ford) 所说的“失业的未来” ，并可能因此采取激烈措施来防止一场社会和政治灾难。
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Now Frey has written a long book, The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation, putting his findings in historical context. Frey argues that automation, or what he calls the third industrial revolution, is not only putting jobs at risk, but is the principal source of growing inequality within the American economy. The failure to meet this challenge, Frey warns, is fueling populist and white identity politics, most evident in the 2016 election of Donald Trump.

现在，弗雷写了一本很长的书，《技术陷阱: 自动化时代的资本、劳动和权力》 ，并把他的发现放在了当前的历史背景下。
弗雷认为，自动化，或者他所谓的第三次工业革命，不仅使工作岗位处于危险之中，而且是美国经济日益加剧的不平等的主要根源。
弗雷警告说，未能迎接这一挑战正在助长民粹主义和白人政治，最明显的例子就是2016年唐纳德 · 特朗普当选总统。

FREY’S BOOK is about a third longer than it needs to be. He and his publisher were, perhaps, beguiled by the commercial success of Thomas Piketty’s weighty Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Frey’s book is highly repetitious. And before getting to the heart of the argument, which is the difference between the first, second and third industrial revolutions, you have to wade through chapters about Neolithic and preindustrial technology. But the heart of the argument is interesting and worth pondering.

弗雷的书比实际需要多了三分之一， 他和他的出版商可能被托马斯皮 · 凯蒂《二十一世纪资本论》（Capital in the Twenty-First Century的）商业成功所迷惑，弗雷的书是高度重复的。
在进入争论的核心，也就是第一次、第二次和第三次工业革命之间的区别之前，你必须深入阅读有关新石器时代和前工业时代技术的章节，但这个论点的核心是有趣的，值得深思。

According to Frey, the West has experienced three industrial revolutions that have been impelled by technology. The first, dating from the late eighteenth century, was driven by the steam engine, the railroad and the cotton gin; the second, which extends through the first six decades of the twentieth century, by electricity and the internal combustion engine; and the third, which begins sometime in the 1960s, and is still going on, by computer technology and, most recently, artificial intelligence. Each of these revolutions has had different effects on employment and equality, depending on the kind of technology that was introduced.

根据弗雷的说法，西方经历了三次由技术推动的工业革命。
第一次，可以追溯到18世纪末期，由蒸汽机、铁路和轧棉机驱动的。
第二次，贯穿20世纪前60年，由电力和内燃机驱动的。
第三次，始于20世纪60年代的某个时候，现在仍在继续，由计算机技术和最近的人工智能驱动的。
每一次革命都对就业和平等产生了不同的影响，这取决于所引进的技术类型。

The effect has depended on whether the technology was “enabling” or “replacing”—a distinction that is common among social scientists who write about automation. An enabling technology increases the productivity of existing workers without eliminating their jobs. A good example would be how the typewriter increased the power of a clerk without eliminating the need for clerks, or how computer design increased the productivity of architects without imperiling their jobs. But the ATM replaced and eliminated many bank tellers. Robots, combined with industrial reorganization, have replaced assembly line workers. And so on.

这种影响取决于这项技术是“赋能”还是“取代”——这种区别在写自动化的社会科学家中很常见。
“赋能”型技术可以提高现有工人的生产力，同时又不会消除工作岗位。
一个很好的例子就是打字机，在不减少文员需求的情况下增强了文员的能力，或者电脑设计，在不影响建筑师工作的情况下提高了建筑师的生产力。
但是“取代”型技术不一样，自动取款机取代并淘汰了许多银行出纳员，机器人与工业重组相结合，已经取代了装配线上的工人。
诸如此类。

According to Frey, the first industrial revolution was dominated by “replacing” technology. Weavers and other artisans were replaced by simple machines that could often be operated by children. Some of these former artisans became low-wage farm laborers, while others were unemployed. Overall, wages and labor’s share of national income plummeted. Economic historians call this period the “Engels’ Pause”—a reference to Friedrich Engels’ classic The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, which documented the immiseration of the peasantry and working class under the new technology. Marx’s socialist politics was rooted in this first industrial revolution: it assumed a rebellious working class facing unremitting downward pressure on wages.

根据弗雷的说法，第一次工业革命是由“取代”型技术主导的。
织布工和其他工匠被简单的机器所取代，这些机器通常可以由儿童操作， 这些前工匠中有些人成了低工资的农场工人，而其他人则失业了。
总的来说，工资和劳动力在国民收入中所占的份额直线下降。
经济历史学家称这一时期为恩格斯的“ 暂停期 ”---- 这一时期参考了弗里德里希·恩格斯1844年的经典著作《英国工人阶级的状况》 ，其中记录了在新技术下农民阶级和工人阶级的贫困化。
马克思的社会主义政治植根于第一次工业革命：它假定了一个面临着不断下降的工资压力的、反叛的工人阶级。

The second industrial revolution, Frey argues, was dominated by enabling technology. The key was the rise of the electricity-powered assembly line, the gasoline-powered engine and the new electric office. Productivity rose rapidly, but wages kept pace, and the gap between the wealthy and everyone else actually shrank. The third revolution has taken place in two stages. In the first, which featured robots, many mid-wage, routine industrial jobs disappeared—among those were the assembly line jobs created in the earlier revolution. In the next phase, based on artificial intelligence, many lower-skilled service jobs will disappear. These would include office and administrative support, sales, food preparation and serving, and transportation. Frey thinks the development of autonomous vehicles will soon have a devastating effect on truck drivers, who are the largest single occupational group in many states.

弗雷认为，第二次工业革命是由技术支持主导的。
关键是电动装配线、汽油发动机和新的电气办公室的兴起，生产率迅速上升，但工资水平保持同步，富人和其他人之间的差距实际上缩小了。

第三次革命分两个阶段进行，在第一次以机器人为特色的革命中，许多中等收入的常规工作岗位消失了ーー其中包括早期革命中创造的流水线工作。

在下一个阶段，基于人工智能，许多低技能的服务工作将会消失，包括办公室和行政支持，销售，食品准备和服务，以及运输等。
弗雷认为，自动驾驶汽车的发展将很快对卡车司机产生毁灭性的影响，他们是许多州最大的单一职业群体。
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Factory workers who lost their jobs during the first phase of the third revolution (circa 1970–2010) often had to take lower-paid service sector jobs. The same thing will happen, Frey predicts, with workers who lose their jobs in the phase characterized by artificial intelligence. Frey’s prediction is dire. He writes,

在第三次革命的第一阶段 ( 大约1970年至2010年) 失业的工厂工人，往往不得不从事低薪的服务业工作。
同样的事情也会发生，弗雷预测，工人失去工作的阶段性特点是人工智能，弗雷的预测是可怕的。 他写道：

A truck driver in the Midwest is not likely to become a software engineer in Silicon Valley. He might take up work as a janitor. Or he might find work in grounds maintenance, keeping parks, houses, and businesses attractive … If he became a janitor he would trade a $41,340 job (2016 annual median income) for a $24,190 job. If he manages to become a ground maintenance worker, he would make $26,830 per year. Or he might get a job as a social care worker, earning $46,890 per year. But that would require him to get a college degree.

在美国中西部，一个卡车司机不太可能成为硅谷的软件工程师，更可能会从事看门人的工作，或者他可能会找到庭院维护，看管公园、房屋等工作......如果他成为一个看门人，他的工作将从一份 41,340美元的工作 ( 2016年的年收入中位数) ，换成一份 24,190美元的工作，如果他能成为一名庭院维护工人，他每年可以挣26,830美元，或者他可能会找到一份社区护理工作，年收入46,890美元， 但这需要他获得大学学位。

In this way, the third industrial revolution would resemble the first: it would render a mass of workers obsolete and depress overall wages. And, like the first revolution, the third could precipitate a revolt from the bottom—led initially by right-wing populists like Donald Trump or France’s Marine Le Pen. “The robot revolution is largely a Rust Belt phenomenon, and this is also where Trump made the greatest gains for the Republican Party,” Frey observes.

这样一来，第三次工业革命将类似于第一次：它将使大量工人过时，并压低总体工资。
而且，与第一次革命一样，第三次革命可能会引发一场来自底层的反抗——最初由唐纳德 · 特朗普或法国马琳 · 勒庞等右翼民粹主义者领导。
“ 机器人革命在很大程度上是一种铁锈地带现象，而这也是特朗普为共和党赢得最大利益的地方”弗雷评论道。

SOME OF Frey’s analysis of the political implications of the third revolution seems overdrawn: he claims that the research he did with two other social scientists demonstrated that if the number of robots had not increased since 2012 in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, Hillary Clinton would have won these states and the 2016 election. Overall, however, Frey’s analysis of the Trump vote in the Midwest is pretty astute. Some liberal commentators have attributed Trump’s votes entirely to white racism and identity politics. Frey locates it instead in a broader problem of identity created by “fading opportunity in the labor market.”

弗雷对第三次革命的政治影响的分析似乎有些过分：
他声称，他与另外两位社会科学家的研究表明，如果密歇根州、宾夕法尼亚州和威斯康星州的机器人数量自2012年以来没有增加，希拉里 · 克林顿就会赢得这些州和2016年的选举。
不过，总体而言，弗雷对中西部地区特朗普投票的分析相当精准， 一些自由派评论人士将特朗普的投票完全归咎于白人种族主义和身份认同政治。
弗雷把这个问题归结于一个更广泛的身份认同问题，这个问题是由“劳动力市场上的机会逐渐减少”造成的。

Frey argues that “industrial male workers had to find ways of taking pride in monotonous toil on a factory’s assembly line.” Citing sociologist Michèle Lamont, Frey writes that their solution was to construct an identity as a “disciplined self.” He concludes, “In Rust Belt cities and townships, where joblessness is now widespread, the ‘disciplined self’ identity has become harder to maintain, making dormant grievances come alive.” These include the cultural resentments that liberals have focused on in explaining Trump’s votes. In my own book, The Nationalist Revival, I similarly described the threat to workers’ “way of life” from a decaying industrial base, which carried with it the destruction of neighborhoods, bars, churches, unx halls and of the expectation that one’s children could enjoy the same lifetime employment.

弗雷引用社会学家 mich le Lamont 的话说，“产业男性工人不得不设法以工厂装配线上单调的劳动为荣”，弗雷写道他们的解决方案是建立一个“自律”的身份认同。
他的结论是，“ 在失业现象普遍存在的铁锈地带城镇，‘自律'' 身份已经变得难以维持，潜在的不满情绪开始活跃起来。” 其中包括自由派人士在解释特朗普的投票时所关注的文化怨恨。
在我自己的《民族主义的复兴》(The Nationalist Revival) 一书中，我也同样描述了一个衰败的工业基地对工人“生活方式”的威胁，随之而来的是社区、酒吧、教堂、工会大厅的毁坏，以及子女可以享受同样终身雇佣的期望。

Frey’s analysis of working-class discontent also leads him to dismiss the condescending solution favored by some wealthy Democrats for economic inequality. Yang, former Facebook publicist Chris Hughes and other one-percenters have argued for a universal basic income that would provide the equivalent of a supplementary welfare payment—from $500 to $1000 a month, even to those unable or unwilling to find work.

弗雷对工人阶级不满情绪的分析也使他对一些富有的民主党人青睐的经济不平等的居高临下的解决方案不屑一顾。
安德鲁 · 杨、前 Facebook 公关人员克里斯 · 休斯和其他一些上层收入人士一直主张，全民基本收入应该相当于每月500美元至1000美元的补充福利金，即使对于那些无法或不愿找到工作的人也是如此。

These eupeptic plans run afoul, Frey argues, of the average Americans’ desire to earn a living through work and aversion to those who might not share this legacy of the Protestant Ethic. He quotes his Oxford colleague, Ian Goldin, who contends that “Individuals gain not only income, but meaning, status, skills, networks and friendships through work. Delixing income and work, while rewarding people for staying at home, is what lies behind social decay.” Exactly right.

弗雷认为，这些计划与普通美国人通过工作谋生的愿望相冲突，遭到那些可能不认同新教伦理的人的厌恶。
他引用了其牛津大学同事伊恩 · 戈尔丁的话，戈尔丁认为，“个人不仅能获得收入，还能通过工作获得价值、地位、技能、关系网和友谊， 但如果收入与工作脱钩，同时奖励那些呆在家里不工作的人，是社会衰退的原因。”
这是完全正确的。

In a closing section, Frey enumerates his own proposals for dealing with job displacement owing to the third industrial revolution:
Addressing the social costs of automation, will require major reforms in education, providing relocation vouchers to help people move, reducing barriers to switching jobs, getting rid of zoning restrictions that spur social and economic divisions, boosting the incomes of low-income households through tax credits, providing wage insurance for people who lose their jobs to machines, and investing in early childhood education.

在结束部分，弗雷列举了他自己对于处理第三次工业革命导致的职位流失问题的建议：
解决自动化的社会成本问题，需要在教育领域进行重大改革，提供搬迁补助帮助人们迁移，减少转换工作的障碍，取消刺激社会和经济分化的区域限制，通过税收抵免提高低收入家庭的收入，为因机器而失业的人提供工资保险，以及投资幼儿教育。

While by no means novel, these proposals make perfect sense.
FREY COVERS a lot of ground in his book, and I won’t pretend to match his erudition. But I want to raise a few questions about his historical account of the industrial revolutions and about the overweening role that he assigns to automation in explaining economic equality and inequality.

虽然这些建议并不新奇，但却非常有意义。
弗雷在他的书中涉及了很多领域，我不会假装和他一样博学，但我想就他对工业革命的历史描述，以及他在解释经济平等和不平等时，赋予自动化的过度角色提出几个问题。

First, the history of technology and jobs: I don’t think the distinction between replacing and enabling technology fully accounts for the difference between the revolutions and their effect on jobs and economic equality.
Take the difference between the second and third revolutions. Frey acknowledges in passing that, during the second revolution, technology did dramatically replace employment, especially in agriculture. In 1850, according to some estimates, 64 percent of the country’s workers worked on farms; by 1929, due in large part to the introduction of reapers, tractors and other machinery, it was down to 18.3 percent. It is now below 2 percent, even though total production has continued to increase. During the same period, a host of crafts occupations were also replaced by assembly-line production.

首先，技术和工作的历史：
我不认为“替代”技术和“赋能”技术之间的区别能完全解释工业革命和它们对工作和经济平等的影响之间的区别。
拿第二次和第三次革命的区别来说，弗雷顺便承认，在第二次革命期间，科技确实戏剧性地取代了就业，尤其是在农业领域，据估计，1850年，全国64% 的工人在农场工作，到1929年，由于收割机、拖拉机和其他机械的引进，这一比例下降到了18.3% ，尽管总产量持续增长，但是现在这一比例已经低于2% ，而在同一时期，许多工艺品行业也被装配线生产所取代。
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What made the second industrial revolution such a boon to employment was the introduction of vast new industries. These included automobiles, aircraft, electric machinery, telephones and household appliances. Citing the historian David L. Lewis, Frey notes that by 1986, the auto-industrial complex, which consists of manufacturing, services and construction, employed one out of six Americans. Many of the workers or the children of the workers who were replaced by machinery on the farm or in crafts went to work in these industries.

使第二次工业革命对就业非常有利的一点是大量新产业的引进，其中包括汽车、飞机、电机、电话和家用电器。 弗雷援引历史学家戴维刘易斯的话指出，截至1986年，由制造业、服务业和建筑业组成的汽车工业综合体雇佣了六分之一的美国人，许多被农场或机器取代的手工业工人的子女去这些行业工作。

Now compare the third industrial revolution, which has also produced vast new industries in software, entertainment, robotics, biochemistry, personal computing and telecommunications. Some or most of these new industries are not as labor-intensive as the industries of the second industrial revolution. But there is an added factor: in the United States, many of these industries do much of their manufacturing overseas or south of the Border. MIT economist Daron Acemoglu has said,

现在来比较一下第三次工业革命，它也产生了软件、娱乐、机器人、生物化学、个人计算机和电信等领域的大量新兴产业。
这些新兴产业中的部分或大部分并不像第二次工业革命的产业那样劳动密集型。
但是还有一个额外的因素：
在美国，这些行业的大部分制造业都在海外或者边境以南。

Many of the important products that we have created over the last several decades, over the last two decades in particular, have not added much to the bottom line employment figure. Think of Apple’s iPods and iPads and iPhones; they are amazing innovations and consumers have absolutely rewarded the company by purchasing billions of them … So, there we have an intersection of new technologies that have a very heavy design component and the division of labor can be very finely broken down, and the labor-intensive parts of those products can be manufactured abroad. So, there is a sort of a parallel process to automation that’s increasing efficiency but it’s not really adding to the bottom line employment figure.

麻省理工学院的经济学家达龙 · 阿西莫格鲁说：
过去几十年，特别是过去二十年，我们创造的许多重要产品，并没有增加多少就业。
想想苹果的 ipod、 ipad 和 iphone，它们都是令人惊叹的创新，消费者购买了数十亿台 ipod，这绝对是对公司的巨大回报...... 我们有了一个新技术的交集，它们有着非常沉重的设计组成部分，劳动分工可以非常细致地细分，这些产品的劳动密集型部分可以在国外制造， 所以，有一种自动化的并行过程，它提高了效率，但并没有真正增加就业。

There is an additional factor that the Manhattan Institute’s Oren Cass cites in his analysis of the effect of automation on job growth. From 1947 to 1972, as the second industrial revolution was reaching its climax, manufacturing productivity grew 3.4 percent a year and output grew 4.2 percent a year. Yet from 2000 to 2018, productivity grew 3.1 percent a year—most likely as a result of automation—but output only rose 1.3 percent a year. In this case, the real villain in job loss was not automation, but the lag in manufacturing output. If output had grown as it had in the past, there would not have been the same overall loss in jobs due to automation.

曼哈顿研究所的奥伦 · 卡斯在分析自动化对就业增长的影响时引用了另外一个因素。
从1947年到1972年，随着第二次工业革命达到高潮，制造业生产率每年增长3.4% ，产量每年增长4.2% 。
然而，从2000年到2018年，生产率每年增长3.1% (这很可能是自动化的结果) ，但产量每年仅增长1.3% 。
在这种情况下，导致失业的真正罪魁祸首不是自动化，而是制造业产出的滞后。
如果产出像过去那样增长，就不会因为自动化而造成同样的整体就业损失。

So you have automation as a secondary factor in job loss due to the lack of a corresponding increase in output. The lack of domestic output was partly due to manufacturers shifting their jobs out of the country—in North Carolina, for instance, which Trump won, its furniture industry shifted to Mexico—and to ruinous competition from subsidized industries in Asia that knocked out American firms. In one highly-quoted study, economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson blamed competition from Chinese exports for the loss of up to 2.4 million jobs from 1999 to 2011. The same authors, along with Kaveh Majlesi, also argued that import competition contributed to political polarization and fueled the rise of Trump. Again, it wasn’t just automation that led to the loss of jobs and the rise of right-wing populism.

因此，自动化是由于产出缺乏相应增加而导致失业的次要因素。
国内产出不足的部分原因是制造商将工作转移到了国外( 例如，在北卡罗来纳州，特朗普获胜，该州的家具行业转移到了墨西哥) ，以及来自亚洲补贴行业的毁灭性竞争，这些行业击败了美国公司。
在一项被广泛引用的研究中，经济学家大卫奥特尔、大卫多恩和戈登汉森将1999年至2011年间多达240万个就业岗位的流失归咎于来自中国的出口。
这两位作者和 Kaveh Majlesi 还认为，进口竞争加剧了政治分化，推动了特朗普的崛起。
同样，导致失业和右派民粹主义崛起的不仅仅是自动化。

My second concern with Frey’s analysis has to do with the relationship technology has to wages and rising inequality. Frey attributes rising wages and greater equality during the second revolution primarily to wages keeping in line with rising productivity and skill levels. Child labor was replaced by more skilled adults. But I would add several factors which become relevant in judging why wages haven’t kept pace with productivity during the third revolution.

对于弗雷的分析，我的第二个担忧是关于科技与工资和不断加剧的不平等之间的关系。
弗雷将第二次革命期间工资的增长和更大的平等主要归功于工资与生产力和技能水平的提高保持一致，童工被更有技能的成年人取代。
但是我要补充几个因素，这些因素对于判断为什么在第三次革命期间工资没有跟上生产力的步伐是相关的。

During the second revolution, there was a favorable relationship between supply and demand created by the restrictions on immigration introduced in 1920 and 1924 legislation. The rise of the labor movement in the 1930s, which was particularly strong in the new industries and which, by the 1950s, accounted for a third of the non-farm labor force, buoyed wages; and during the two world wars, American administrations took measures, including progressive taxation, that increased economic equality. (In the 1920s, by contrast, when wartime taxes were repealed and regressive changes introduced, and when a corporate offensive demolished labor unxs, economic inequality rose.)

在第二次革命期间，由于1920年和1924年的立法对移民的限制，在供给和需求之间建立了有利的关系。
20世纪30年代劳工运动兴起，在新兴产业中尤为强劲，到20世纪50年代，占非农业劳动力的三分之一，提高了工资;
在两次世界大战期间，美国政府采取了包括累进税在内的措施，增加了经济平等。
(相比之下，在20世纪20年代，战时税收被废除，递减改革被引入，企业的攻势摧毁了工会，经济不平等加剧。)

If you now look at the third industrial revolution, it becomes clear that there were other factors besides automation that have contributed to growing inequality and wage stagnation. Wage stagnation has coincided with the decline of labor unxs, particularly in the private sector. This decline was not directly the result of automation, but of an employer offensive aided initially by the Reagan administration. Many plants moved south or out of the country in order to avoid unxization. Corporations used strong-arm tactics, some of which were illegal—for instance, firing organizers—to block organizing drives. When unxized labor no longer makes up a significant share in an industry’s employment, unxized firms no longer set the standard for wages—they have to adjust to their competition. By the 1990s, that had become the case in many key industries.

如果你现在看看第三次工业革命，就会清楚地发现，除了自动化，还有其他因素导致了日益严重的不平等和工资停滞。
工资停滞与工会衰退同时发生，尤其是在私营部门，这种下降并不是自动化的直接结果，而是最初得到里根政府援助的雇主攻势的结果。
许多工厂迁往南方或国外，以避免成立工会企业使用强硬手段 ( 其中一些手段是非法的，例如解雇组织者)来阻止组织驱动，当加入工会的劳动力不再在某个行业的就业中占据重要份额时，加入工会的公司就不再制定工资标准，它们必须适应竞争， 到20世纪90年代，这已经成为许多关键行业的普遍情况。

Wage stagnation at the bottom of the income ladder also coincided with the dramatic rise of unskilled immigration, which began after the 1965 immigration bill and accelerated in the 1990s. It depressed the wages of service and construction workers and also made it more difficult to unxize. Employers used legal and illegal immigrants to bust unxs in meatpacking, agriculture, construction and janitorial services. In insisting on the primary role for automation in wage stagnation and inequality, Frey acknowledges that the decline in unxization may have played a lesser role, but he denies any role to the increase in unskilled immigration.

处于收入阶梯底层的民众工资停滞，与非熟练移民的急剧增加同时发生。
非熟练移民始于1965年的移民法案，并在上世纪90年代加速增长，它压低了服务业和建筑工人的工资，也使工会组织更加困难，雇主们利用合法和非法移民来破坏肉类加工、农业、建筑业和清洁服务业的工会。
弗雷坚持认为自动化在工资停滞和不平等方面起着主要作用，他承认工会组织的减少可能起到了较小的作用，但他否认自动化对非熟练移民的增加起到任何作用。

There is, finally, the idea that 47 percent of American jobs will be in “high risk” from automation “in a decade or two.” There is no question that some jobs will be at risk. Some, like telemarketers, tax preparers, brokerage clerks and file clerks, are already on the verge of extinction. But as Cass points out in his analysis, Frey and Osborne appear to equate the replacement of certain tasks within occupations with the replacement of the occupations themselves. An Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development study of American occupations only found 9 percent that were easily automatable. A McKinsey Global Institute study found that while at least 30 percent of activities within 60 percent of jobs could be automated, less than five percent of jobs “could be automated in their entirety.” (McKinsey also cited studies showing that by 2030, 8 to 9 percent of jobs “will be ones that barely exist today.”) Self-driving cars and trucks may be decades rather than a decade or two away from displacing drivers. And other occupations on Frey and Osborne’s list—including models, bicycle repairers, tour guides, cooks and animal breeders—do not appear like obvious candidates for machine replacement.

最后，47% 的美国工作岗位将在“一二十年内”面临自动化带来的“高风险” ，毫无疑问，一些工作将面临风险，像电话推销员、税务代理、经纪人和档案管理员等一些工作岗位已经濒临灭绝。
但是，正如卡斯在他的分析中指出的那样，弗雷和奥斯本似乎把某些职业内部任务的替换等同于职业本身的替换。
经济合作与发展组织对美国职业的研究发现，只有9% 的职业是容易自动化的。
麦肯锡全球研究所的一项研究发现，在60% 的工作岗位范围内，至少有30% 的活动可以实现自动化，但只有不到5% 的工作岗位“可以完全实现自动化” ( 麦肯锡还援引研究称，到2030年，8% 至9% 的工作“将是今天几乎不存在的”。)
自动驾驶汽车和卡车可能需要几十年而不是十年或二十年才能取代司机。
弗雷和奥斯本列出的其他职业——包括模特、自行车修理工、导游、厨师和动物饲养员——似乎并不是机器替换的明显候选者。

FREY’S BOOK is an extremely useful history of the effect of technology on jobs and income inequality, but he oversells the effects of automation. If Americans want to do something about stagnant wages and rising inequality, they have to address factors that don’t directly stem from automation. These include restoring the original function of the National Labor Relations Board, which was to facilitate rather than impede unxization and collective bargaining; repealing right-to-work laws that discourage unxization; passing comprehensive immigration reform, but also restricting the numbers of unskilled immigrants who would compete with unskilled or low-skilled workers who are already here; and removing incentives for American companies to relocate their production out of the country. Pairing these kinds of measures with those that Frey recommends could turn technology from a trap into something of a blessing.

弗雷的书是一部关于技术对就业和收入不平等影响的极其有用的历史总结，但他过分夸大了自动化的影响。
如果美国人想对停滞不前的工资和日益加剧的不平等做点什么，他们必须解决那些并非直接来自自动化的因素。 这些措施包括恢复国家劳动关系委员会的原有职能，该委员会的职能是促进而不是阻碍工会组织和集体协商;
废除阻碍工会组织的工作权法律;
通过全面的移民改革，但也限制非技术移民的数量，这些非技术移民将与已经在美国的非技术或低技术工人竞争; 取消美国公司将生产迁出美国的激励措施，将这些措施与弗雷建议的措施结合起来，可以将技术从一个陷阱变成某种祝福。

原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译：君子冲盈 转载请注明出处

jonathanpulliam
"First, the history of technology and jobs: I don’t think the distinction between replacing and enabling technology fully accounts for the difference between the revolutions and their effect on jobs and economic equality."
There isn''t any distinction - technology is always enabling and replacing at the same time. In the past, wars and imperialism were used to get rid of surplus labor (British starved millions of Irish, Indians and others and exported enough convicts to populate Australia, 1,000,000 people froze to death during French invasion of Russia in 1812, and generally, there wasn''t a day that Europe wasn''t at war somewhere during 1st Industrial Revolution). Likewise, 2nd Industrial Revolution resulted in Great Depression and mass unemployment and took two World Wars and burning down Europe to fully address unemployment brought on by automation.
Since then, the only thing that keeps global economy going is debt (~$250 trillion in total and ticking up). We invent make work jobs that are of negative value (hence debt growth) in order to keep unrest down. But it will not be enough - Central Banks are restarting their money printers already to shovel even more digital currency into the pockets of the rich. Rich don''t generate sufficient demand to sustain global economy though, and demographics in the developed world (the main source of demand) look dismal. No demand = no economy, therefore we will have Basic Income to address this deficiency. Either Basic Income, or World War like in the past. There are no alternatives, and i hope that Basic Income will be the preferred choice.

“ 首先，技术和工作的历史：我不认为“替代”技术和“赋能”技术之间的区别能完全解释工业革命和它们对工作和经济平等的影响之间的区别。 ”
这没有任何区别——技术总是能够同时赋能和替代。
在过去，战争和帝国主义被用来摆脱剩余劳动力。
( 英国饿死了数以百万计的爱尔兰人、印度人和其他人，并输出大量的罪犯到澳大利亚，100万人在1812年法国入侵俄罗斯期间冻死，总的来说，在第一次工业革命期间，欧洲没有一天不处于战争状态)。
同样，第二次工业革命导致了大萧条和大规模的失业，并经历了两次世界大战，摧毁了欧洲，以充分解决自动化带来的失业问题。
从那时起，维持全球经济运转的唯一因素就是债务 ( 总额约为250万亿美元，而且还在增长)。
我们创造负价值的工作岗位( 因此债务增长) 是为了降低不安定性。
但这还不够——各国央行已经重新启动了印钞机，将更多的数字货币塞入富人的口袋。
不过，富裕并不能产生足够的需求来维持全球经济，而发达国家( 需求的主要来源) 的人口状况看起来也很糟糕。 没有需求就没有经济，因此我们用“基本收入”来弥补这一不足——要么是基本收入，要么是像过去那样的世界大战，没有其他选择，我希望基本收入会是首选。

0x7be
You can''t stop technical progress. The social structure should be redefined to accomodate changes in economics.

你不能阻止技术进步， 社会结构应该重新定义，以适应经济的变化。

Emidio Borg
In 1950 CIO President Walter Reuther was being shown through the Ford Motor plant in Cleveland by Henry Ford.
Ford proudly pointed to some new automatically controlled machines and asked Reuther: “How are you going to collect unx dues from these guys?”
Reuther replied: “How are you going to get them to buy Fords?”

1950年，首席信息官沃尔特 · 鲁瑟在亨利 · 福特带领下参观福特汽车在克利夫兰的工厂。
福特嘚瑟地指着一堆崭新的自动化控制机器问鲁瑟： “你打算怎么向这些‘工人’收工会会费? ”
鲁瑟回答说：“你打算怎么让他们买福特? ”
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Ddoid4
All well and good....but just how do you have an economy without people ? A.I., Automation and Robotic are going to buy that
A.I and Automation are going to need doctors, dentists and chefs? Stop blowing smoke up people''s ar*e...this sounds like a recipe for WWIII ! The devil finds work for idle hands is not idle
biblical doctrine.

一切都很好..... 但是，没有人，你怎么能有经济？ 人工智能、自动化和机器人来买单？
AI 需要医生、牙医和厨师吗？
表TM再误导众生了，听起来就像是第三次世界大战的前奏！
“游手好闲，造恶之源 ”
去读读圣经教义。
（The devil finds work for idle hands is not idle 一句谚语，恶魔专找游手好闲者）