煮酒论史：中国发明了火药，却为什么不利用火药？
正文翻译
Why didn't the China utilize gunpowder?
中国为什么不利用火药？
中国为什么不利用火药？
China had invented a way to synthesize and create gunpowder which would have given them a severe warfare advantage if they had found a way to utilize and create cannons. Europe saw the potential that gunpowder had and developed cannons, a way to launch a solid projectile across the battlefield quickly with little effort, ushering more technological developments such as explosives and muskets that would later come. Why didn't China further develop ways to utilize and use gunpowder in warfare?
中国发明了一种合成和制造火药的方法，如果他们找到了一种利用和制造大炮的方法，那将给他们带来巨大的战争优势。欧洲看到了火药的潜力，并开发了加农炮，这是一种不费吹灰之力即可在战场上快速发射固体弹丸的方式，带来了诸如炸药和步枪之类的更多技术发展，这些技术随之出现。中国为什么不进一步发展在战争中使用和利用火药的方法？
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
中国发明了一种合成和制造火药的方法，如果他们找到了一种利用和制造大炮的方法，那将给他们带来巨大的战争优势。欧洲看到了火药的潜力，并开发了加农炮，这是一种不费吹灰之力即可在战场上快速发射固体弹丸的方式，带来了诸如炸药和步枪之类的更多技术发展，这些技术随之出现。中国为什么不进一步发展在战争中使用和利用火药的方法？
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
评论翻译
（明正德手铳）
在永乐（明朝）皇帝对蒙古人的五次重大战役中，只有前两次，他们大量使用了骑兵和蒙古辅助军（未提及枪械部队），设法迫使蒙古人进行会战（并击败了）他们。其他三次确实有大量基于大型步兵纵队使用枪支的战役，而这些纵队必须通过长链补给站和会合点进行补给。在这些情况下，明朝很难拦截蒙古人，只有在满洲，他们的供应状况才更为安全。
后来的明朝皇帝针对蒙古人的战役也没有更好的表现。土木堡危机表明，在大多数情况下，蒙古人只需要避免战斗，并等待中国军队的补给耗尽，然后再进攻它们。在这些情况下，枪支唯一的效用是防御性的，即便在那时，他们也没有阻止蒙古人在从草原上撤退时消灭那些虚弱的中国军队。最终，明朝不得不将黄河的鄂尔多斯河段放弃给蒙古人，并依靠边境设防来遏制草原带来的威胁。毫无疑问，枪支是用来捍卫这些防御工事的，但在进攻性方面，它们对游牧民族用处不大。至少直到西方有更好的枪支可用之前是如此。
参考文献：
中国军事通史->中文
清史稿（清史稿）->古典汉语
大清会典->古典汉语
清朝续文献通考->古典汉语
李约瑟的《中国科学与文明》（中国军事技术专刊）->英语
彼得·珀杜的《中国进军西方》->简体中文
凯·菲力比克的《中国历史上的军民关系》->英文
panicles3
They did, extensively, and were in the business of gunpowder warfare centuries before Europeans -- see the Song dynasty: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_technology_of_the_Song_dynasty#Gunpowder_warfare
他们有，并且广泛地做了，在欧洲人之前的几个世纪里，就从事把火药利用在战争中的业务-见宋朝维基百科：https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_technology_of_the_Song_dynasty#Gunpowder_warfare
They did, extensively, and were in the business of gunpowder warfare centuries before Europeans -- see the Song dynasty: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_technology_of_the_Song_dynasty#Gunpowder_warfare
他们有，并且广泛地做了，在欧洲人之前的几个世纪里，就从事把火药利用在战争中的业务-见宋朝维基百科：https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_technology_of_the_Song_dynasty#Gunpowder_warfare
pzivan
They did, hand grenades were widely used and they had hand cannons and rockets, even before the Europeans, and they quickly adopted the arquebus and European style cannons once they got them.
他们有发展，手榴弹被广泛使用，他们也有收铳和火箭，这些甚至在欧洲人之前，而且一旦他们获取，他们很快就采取了阿奎布斯（钩铳）和欧洲风格的大炮。
They did, hand grenades were widely used and they had hand cannons and rockets, even before the Europeans, and they quickly adopted the arquebus and European style cannons once they got them.
他们有发展，手榴弹被广泛使用，他们也有收铳和火箭，这些甚至在欧洲人之前，而且一旦他们获取，他们很快就采取了阿奎布斯（钩铳）和欧洲风格的大炮。
TheGhostHero
They did more than anyone, with Rockets, fire lance, handgonne, European/native/vietnamese/ottoman/Japanese muskets, native and European cannons, bombs, smoke screen, sea and land mines, cart and even a working da Vinci like tank. Everything is on this blog : http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/?m=0
他们比任何人做得都多，有火箭、火枪、手铳、欧洲/本土/越南/奥斯曼/日本式火枪、本土和欧洲大炮、炸弹、烟雾弹、海陆地雷、手推车，甚至一个像坦克一样工作的达芬奇车。一切都在这个博客上有介绍：http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/?m=0
They did more than anyone, with Rockets, fire lance, handgonne, European/native/vietnamese/ottoman/Japanese muskets, native and European cannons, bombs, smoke screen, sea and land mines, cart and even a working da Vinci like tank. Everything is on this blog : http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/?m=0
他们比任何人做得都多，有火箭、火枪、手铳、欧洲/本土/越南/奥斯曼/日本式火枪、本土和欧洲大炮、炸弹、烟雾弹、海陆地雷、手推车，甚至一个像坦克一样工作的达芬奇车。一切都在这个博客上有介绍：http://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/?m=0
War_Hymn
Why didn't China further develop ways to utilize and use gunpowder in warfare?
As other have mentioned, they did. But the development of firearms in China was inconsistent, and by the 1500s had fell behind that of Europe and the Middle East.
And for good reasons. Early gunpowder weapons were only practical for a few specific roles, mostly as siege or naval armament. During periods when China was fighting a lot of siege or naval battles, use of weapons like firelances and gunpowder bombs were made worthwhile. As was the case when the Song and Jurchens - and later on, Yuan and Ming - were squaring off to dominate the heartland of China with its many fortified cities and strategic waterways. Gunpowder ordnance was useful for attacking and defending fortifications. The same applied to fighting ships on the Yangtze and Yellow rivers. In these roles, the slow rate of fire and bulkiness of these weapons were not too much of an issue relatively to their effectiveness.
正如其他人提到的那样，他们有发展。但是中国的枪支发展并不一致，到了1500年代已经落后于欧洲和中东。
并且有充分的理由相信。中国早期的火药武器仅在某些特定角色上才有用，主要是作为攻城或海军武器。在中国进行大量的攻城战或海战期间，使用火枪和火药炸弹等武器是值得的。就像宋，女真人（后来的元和明）争相占领中国心脏地带一样，这里有许多设防的城市和战略水道。火药弹药对于防御工事的进攻或防御都非常有用。对于长江和黄河上的战舰也是如此。在这些角色中，相对于它们的有效性，这些武器缓慢的射速和笨重并不是太大的问题。
Why didn't China further develop ways to utilize and use gunpowder in warfare?
As other have mentioned, they did. But the development of firearms in China was inconsistent, and by the 1500s had fell behind that of Europe and the Middle East.
And for good reasons. Early gunpowder weapons were only practical for a few specific roles, mostly as siege or naval armament. During periods when China was fighting a lot of siege or naval battles, use of weapons like firelances and gunpowder bombs were made worthwhile. As was the case when the Song and Jurchens - and later on, Yuan and Ming - were squaring off to dominate the heartland of China with its many fortified cities and strategic waterways. Gunpowder ordnance was useful for attacking and defending fortifications. The same applied to fighting ships on the Yangtze and Yellow rivers. In these roles, the slow rate of fire and bulkiness of these weapons were not too much of an issue relatively to their effectiveness.
正如其他人提到的那样，他们有发展。但是中国的枪支发展并不一致，到了1500年代已经落后于欧洲和中东。
并且有充分的理由相信。中国早期的火药武器仅在某些特定角色上才有用，主要是作为攻城或海军武器。在中国进行大量的攻城战或海战期间，使用火枪和火药炸弹等武器是值得的。就像宋，女真人（后来的元和明）争相占领中国心脏地带一样，这里有许多设防的城市和战略水道。火药弹药对于防御工事的进攻或防御都非常有用。对于长江和黄河上的战舰也是如此。在这些角色中，相对于它们的有效性，这些武器缓慢的射速和笨重并不是太大的问题。
But when the main military threat came from highly mobile, nomadic steppe armies like the Mongols, early firearms weren't all that useful for the Chinese and their development slowed or stalled. The Mongols and other steppe polities possessed no cities to besiege or ships to destroy, so what the Chinese could deploy against them offensively was limited. While gunpowder weapons were frighteningly loud and flashy, the nomadic warriors of the steppe soon realized how pathetically short-ranged, slow, and inaccurate most of them were compare to their composite bows, and soon devise effective tactics against them.
但是，当主要的军事威胁来自高度机动的，游牧的草原军队（如蒙古人）时，早期的枪支对中国人来说并没有多大用处，导致其发展速度减慢或停滞。 蒙古和其他草原政权没有城市可以包围，也没有船只可以摧毁，所以中国人对他们的进攻是有限的。虽然火药武器有着可怕的噪音和绚丽的效果，但草原的游牧战士很快意识到，与它们的复合弓相比，它们中的大多数是可悲的短距离，缓慢且不准确的，并且很快制定了有效的战术来对付它们。
但是，当主要的军事威胁来自高度机动的，游牧的草原军队（如蒙古人）时，早期的枪支对中国人来说并没有多大用处，导致其发展速度减慢或停滞。 蒙古和其他草原政权没有城市可以包围，也没有船只可以摧毁，所以中国人对他们的进攻是有限的。虽然火药武器有着可怕的噪音和绚丽的效果，但草原的游牧战士很快意识到，与它们的复合弓相比，它们中的大多数是可悲的短距离，缓慢且不准确的，并且很快制定了有效的战术来对付它们。
When these same steppe entities manage to conquer and takeover China, their cavalry-based military had little long-term need or want for clumsy, unreliable weapons that couldn't be used on horseback. At least, not when all the cities and ports of their conquered foes were already firmly in their hands. As was the case during the dynastic rule of the Mongolian Yuan and Manchurian Qing who were partial to their traditional cavalry tactics/organization; both generally paid little attention in developing or acquiring better firearms after their initial conquest of China.
Europe on the other hand, had military conflicts that were fraught with large-scale siege warfare and naval engagements that provided many opportunities for early guns to make their mark, nurturing steady improvement and innovation. By the 1400s, the Europeans developed corning, which made their gunpowder more powerful and suitable for use in small caliber weapons like arquebuses and pistols.
By the mid 1500s, the Chinese openly acknowledged the superiority of European and even Ottoman guns, and were eager to acquire them through trade. A cannon foundry was even setup in the Portuguese outpost of Macau to cater to Chinese demand for good guns.
当这些同样的草原政权设法征服并接管中国时，他们以骑兵为基础的军队不再有什么长期需要，或想要这些笨拙、不可靠又不能在马背上使用的武器。至少当被征服的敌人的所有城市和港口已经牢牢掌握在手中时，情况确实如此。就像蒙古元和满洲清王朝统治时期的情况一样，他们偏向于他们的传统骑兵的战术/组织；在他们最初征服中国后，在开发或获得更好的火器方面普遍很少受到重视。
另一方面，欧洲的军事冲突充斥着大规模的攻城战和海上交战，这为早期枪支打下烙印提供了许多机会，并促进了稳步的改进和创新。到1400年代，欧洲人开发了加农炮，使火药更强大，更适合用于小口径武器，如钩铳和手枪。
到1500年代中期，中国人公开承认了欧洲乃至奥斯曼枪支的优越性，并渴望通过贸易来获得它们。甚至在澳门的葡萄牙前哨建立了加农炮铸造厂，以满足中国对优质枪支的需求。
Europe on the other hand, had military conflicts that were fraught with large-scale siege warfare and naval engagements that provided many opportunities for early guns to make their mark, nurturing steady improvement and innovation. By the 1400s, the Europeans developed corning, which made their gunpowder more powerful and suitable for use in small caliber weapons like arquebuses and pistols.
By the mid 1500s, the Chinese openly acknowledged the superiority of European and even Ottoman guns, and were eager to acquire them through trade. A cannon foundry was even setup in the Portuguese outpost of Macau to cater to Chinese demand for good guns.
当这些同样的草原政权设法征服并接管中国时，他们以骑兵为基础的军队不再有什么长期需要，或想要这些笨拙、不可靠又不能在马背上使用的武器。至少当被征服的敌人的所有城市和港口已经牢牢掌握在手中时，情况确实如此。就像蒙古元和满洲清王朝统治时期的情况一样，他们偏向于他们的传统骑兵的战术/组织；在他们最初征服中国后，在开发或获得更好的火器方面普遍很少受到重视。
另一方面，欧洲的军事冲突充斥着大规模的攻城战和海上交战，这为早期枪支打下烙印提供了许多机会，并促进了稳步的改进和创新。到1400年代，欧洲人开发了加农炮，使火药更强大，更适合用于小口径武器，如钩铳和手枪。
到1500年代中期，中国人公开承认了欧洲乃至奥斯曼枪支的优越性，并渴望通过贸易来获得它们。甚至在澳门的葡萄牙前哨建立了加农炮铸造厂，以满足中国对优质枪支的需求。
wolflance1
This is not entirely correct, Chinese did consider firearms to be highly effective against the nomads, and sought to have more of them, although instead of making powerful castle-breakers, the development of firearms in China took a different path, one that focused on mobility to keep up with the fast moving cavalry, i.e. smaller, more mobile guns.
That is not to say by using guns they had a definite edge over horse archers (you need at least revolver for that), but it's still a lot better than shooting the nomad horsemen with bows or crossbows.
你说的不完全正确，中国人确实认为枪支对游牧民族非常有效，并力图拥有更多的枪支，尽管中国没有发展出强大的城堡破坏者，而是在发展枪支方面走上了一条不同的道路，他们发展的重点是机动性，以跟上快速移动的骑兵的步伐，即较小的移动式枪支。
但这并不是说他们使用的枪支比弓箭手有一定优势（至少需要使用左轮手枪才有优势），但这仍然比用弓箭或驽来射击游牧骑兵要好得多。
This is not entirely correct, Chinese did consider firearms to be highly effective against the nomads, and sought to have more of them, although instead of making powerful castle-breakers, the development of firearms in China took a different path, one that focused on mobility to keep up with the fast moving cavalry, i.e. smaller, more mobile guns.
That is not to say by using guns they had a definite edge over horse archers (you need at least revolver for that), but it's still a lot better than shooting the nomad horsemen with bows or crossbows.
你说的不完全正确，中国人确实认为枪支对游牧民族非常有效，并力图拥有更多的枪支，尽管中国没有发展出强大的城堡破坏者，而是在发展枪支方面走上了一条不同的道路，他们发展的重点是机动性，以跟上快速移动的骑兵的步伐，即较小的移动式枪支。
但这并不是说他们使用的枪支比弓箭手有一定优势（至少需要使用左轮手枪才有优势），但这仍然比用弓箭或驽来射击游牧骑兵要好得多。
War_Hymn
Even the most portable guns the Chinese had before the introduction of European wheel-lock or flintlock were ill-suited if not impossible to use while on horseback. Example of Chinese matchlock small arms used during the mid-Ming dynasty. There was little chance that Chinese gun-armed infantry could pursue and catch up with the light cavalry forces of their steppe enemies, especially in the hostile environment of Outer Mongolia.
Of the Yongle (Ming) emperor's five major campaigns against the Mongolians, only the first two, which made extensive use of cavalry troops and Mongolian auxiliaries (with no mention of gun-armed troops), managed to force the Mongolians to engage (and defeat them). The other three campaigns that did use guns extensively were based around large infantry columns that had to be supplied through long chains of supply depots and rendezvous points. In those cases, Ming had great difficult in intercepting the Mongolians except in Manchuria where their supply situation was more secure.
The campaigns of later Ming emperors against the Mongolians fared no better. The Tumu Crisis outline that in most cases, the Mongolians simply had to avoid battle and wait for Chinese troops to run out of supplies before attacking them. The only effective use of guns in these cases were defensive, and even then they didn't prevent the Mongols from wiping out debilitated Chinese troops as they were retreating from the steppes. In the end the Ming had to abandon the Ordos portion of the Yellow River to the Mongolians, and relied on border fortification to contain the threat from the steppe. No doubt firearms were used to defend these fortification, but offensively they were of little use against the nomads. At least, not until better firearms from the West became available.
即使中国人在引进欧洲伦枪机或燧发机之前所拥有的最轻便的枪，它们就算不是不可能在骑马时使用，也是不合适的。以明朝中期的火铳为例。中国的持枪步兵几乎没有机会追击和追赶他们草原敌人的轻骑兵，特别是在外蒙古的敌对环境中。
Even the most portable guns the Chinese had before the introduction of European wheel-lock or flintlock were ill-suited if not impossible to use while on horseback. Example of Chinese matchlock small arms used during the mid-Ming dynasty. There was little chance that Chinese gun-armed infantry could pursue and catch up with the light cavalry forces of their steppe enemies, especially in the hostile environment of Outer Mongolia.
Of the Yongle (Ming) emperor's five major campaigns against the Mongolians, only the first two, which made extensive use of cavalry troops and Mongolian auxiliaries (with no mention of gun-armed troops), managed to force the Mongolians to engage (and defeat them). The other three campaigns that did use guns extensively were based around large infantry columns that had to be supplied through long chains of supply depots and rendezvous points. In those cases, Ming had great difficult in intercepting the Mongolians except in Manchuria where their supply situation was more secure.
The campaigns of later Ming emperors against the Mongolians fared no better. The Tumu Crisis outline that in most cases, the Mongolians simply had to avoid battle and wait for Chinese troops to run out of supplies before attacking them. The only effective use of guns in these cases were defensive, and even then they didn't prevent the Mongols from wiping out debilitated Chinese troops as they were retreating from the steppes. In the end the Ming had to abandon the Ordos portion of the Yellow River to the Mongolians, and relied on border fortification to contain the threat from the steppe. No doubt firearms were used to defend these fortification, but offensively they were of little use against the nomads. At least, not until better firearms from the West became available.
即使中国人在引进欧洲伦枪机或燧发机之前所拥有的最轻便的枪，它们就算不是不可能在骑马时使用，也是不合适的。以明朝中期的火铳为例。中国的持枪步兵几乎没有机会追击和追赶他们草原敌人的轻骑兵，特别是在外蒙古的敌对环境中。
（明正德手铳）
在永乐（明朝）皇帝对蒙古人的五次重大战役中，只有前两次，他们大量使用了骑兵和蒙古辅助军（未提及枪械部队），设法迫使蒙古人进行会战（并击败了）他们。其他三次确实有大量基于大型步兵纵队使用枪支的战役，而这些纵队必须通过长链补给站和会合点进行补给。在这些情况下，明朝很难拦截蒙古人，只有在满洲，他们的供应状况才更为安全。
后来的明朝皇帝针对蒙古人的战役也没有更好的表现。土木堡危机表明，在大多数情况下，蒙古人只需要避免战斗，并等待中国军队的补给耗尽，然后再进攻它们。在这些情况下，枪支唯一的效用是防御性的，即便在那时，他们也没有阻止蒙古人在从草原上撤退时消灭那些虚弱的中国军队。最终，明朝不得不将黄河的鄂尔多斯河段放弃给蒙古人，并依靠边境设防来遏制草原带来的威胁。毫无疑问，枪支是用来捍卫这些防御工事的，但在进攻性方面，它们对游牧民族用处不大。至少直到西方有更好的枪支可用之前是如此。
wolflance1
It was a hopeless endeavor to pursue better firearms for use on horseback - until the era of reliable revolver, horseback firearms was simply no match for horse archery. Lighter guns did found plenty of use in wagon fort though, which was the actual answer to steppe horse archer, that otherwise had no effective counter. (I mean to say in my previous answer "keep up with enemy cavalry", in which wagon-mounted guns did an better job compared to heavier artillery trains)
Yongle did employ his firearm regiment to great effect since his very first Mongolian campaign (Ming Shilu). In fact, firearm troops were his vanguard and played a crucial role during his first and second campaign. Firearm troops did fare pretty well against the nomads, given proper support.
OTOH, Tumu crisis was a gigantic disaster of monumentally stupid leadership. The blow was so heavy that a good chunk of Ming military decline, policy shift, and subsequent shrinking of territories can be attributed to the lost of most of its elite troops and military might during that crisis. Thus it should be viewed as a highly unusual incident that drastically shaped the development of Ming military, rather than being shaped by it.
寻求更好的枪械以供在马背上使用是无望的努力-在可靠的左轮手枪时代之前，骑马使用火器根本无法匹敌骑马射箭。较轻的枪支确实在障碍车阵中找到了许多用途，这是早期火枪对阵草原骑兵的实际答案，否则没有其他有效的对策。（我的意思是相比在我先前的回答中说：“跟上敌军骑兵”，车阵火枪兵比重型火炮车表现得更好）
永乐第一次蒙古战役（明实录)以来，永乐确实雇佣了自己的火器兵团。事实上，火器部队就是他的先锋队，在他的第一次和第二次战役中发挥了关键作用。 在适当的支持下，火器部队对游牧民的表现相当不错。
另一方面，土木堡危机是一个愚蠢的领导导致的一场巨大的灾难。这次打击是如此沉重，以致明朝军事衰落、政策转变以及随后的领土缩水很大一部分原因都在于在这场危机中失去了大多数精英部队和军事力量。因此，这应该被看作是一次极为罕见的极大地影响了明朝军事的发展的事件，而不是倒因为果。
It was a hopeless endeavor to pursue better firearms for use on horseback - until the era of reliable revolver, horseback firearms was simply no match for horse archery. Lighter guns did found plenty of use in wagon fort though, which was the actual answer to steppe horse archer, that otherwise had no effective counter. (I mean to say in my previous answer "keep up with enemy cavalry", in which wagon-mounted guns did an better job compared to heavier artillery trains)
Yongle did employ his firearm regiment to great effect since his very first Mongolian campaign (Ming Shilu). In fact, firearm troops were his vanguard and played a crucial role during his first and second campaign. Firearm troops did fare pretty well against the nomads, given proper support.
OTOH, Tumu crisis was a gigantic disaster of monumentally stupid leadership. The blow was so heavy that a good chunk of Ming military decline, policy shift, and subsequent shrinking of territories can be attributed to the lost of most of its elite troops and military might during that crisis. Thus it should be viewed as a highly unusual incident that drastically shaped the development of Ming military, rather than being shaped by it.
寻求更好的枪械以供在马背上使用是无望的努力-在可靠的左轮手枪时代之前，骑马使用火器根本无法匹敌骑马射箭。较轻的枪支确实在障碍车阵中找到了许多用途，这是早期火枪对阵草原骑兵的实际答案，否则没有其他有效的对策。（我的意思是相比在我先前的回答中说：“跟上敌军骑兵”，车阵火枪兵比重型火炮车表现得更好）
永乐第一次蒙古战役（明实录)以来，永乐确实雇佣了自己的火器兵团。事实上，火器部队就是他的先锋队，在他的第一次和第二次战役中发挥了关键作用。 在适当的支持下，火器部队对游牧民的表现相当不错。
另一方面，土木堡危机是一个愚蠢的领导导致的一场巨大的灾难。这次打击是如此沉重，以致明朝军事衰落、政策转变以及随后的领土缩水很大一部分原因都在于在这场危机中失去了大多数精英部队和军事力量。因此，这应该被看作是一次极为罕见的极大地影响了明朝军事的发展的事件，而不是倒因为果。
Thesuperproify2
Thats not entirely true. To put some things into perspective. People often talk about the China being regressive in terms of military technology and shunned gunpowder, but this is not true. In fact, research shows that it might actually be the opposite. At least until the 18th century, Chinese cannons were superior to European ones and their muskets were comparable.
For example, according to the 清朝文献通考 (which lists 85 different kinds of artillery), The Wei Yuan Jiangjun Pao (威遠將軍炮), weighed 280-330 jin (1 jin = ~500 grams), fired ball canisters weighing 20-30 jin, and had a range of 200 paces to 3 li, or around 400 meters to 1.7 km.
如放二百步至二百五十步，用藥一斤﹔三百步增二兩﹔如放二三裡，用藥三斤。
Thats not entirely true. To put some things into perspective. People often talk about the China being regressive in terms of military technology and shunned gunpowder, but this is not true. In fact, research shows that it might actually be the opposite. At least until the 18th century, Chinese cannons were superior to European ones and their muskets were comparable.
For example, according to the 清朝文献通考 (which lists 85 different kinds of artillery), The Wei Yuan Jiangjun Pao (威遠將軍炮), weighed 280-330 jin (1 jin = ~500 grams), fired ball canisters weighing 20-30 jin, and had a range of 200 paces to 3 li, or around 400 meters to 1.7 km.
如放二百步至二百五十步，用藥一斤﹔三百步增二兩﹔如放二三裡，用藥三斤。
If fired [at a distance of] two hundred to two hundred fifty paces, it would require three jin of gunpowder. Three hundred paces would require two additional liang of gunpowder, and two to three li would require three jin of gunpowder.
那不是完全正确的。为了以正视听。人们经常在谈论中国军事技术和火药问题时称其处于倒退状态，但这不是事实。实际上，研究表明事实可能恰恰相反。至少到18世纪，中国的大炮要优于欧洲的大炮，而它们的步枪也是旗鼓相当的。
例如，根据清朝文献通考（列出了85种不同的火炮），威远将军炮重达280-330斤（1斤= 500克），发射的炮体重20至30斤，射程有200步到3英里的范围，或大约400米到1.7公里。
“如放二百步至二百五十步，用药一斤﹔三百步增二两﹔如放二三里，用药三斤。”
翻译过来就是：如果要达到两百到两百五十步的射程，则需要一斤火药。三百步的射程将需要增加二两火药，二到三里的射程将需要三斤火药。
The Zi-Mu cannon (子母炮) weighs 85-95 jin, mounted on 4 wheels and fires balls weighing 8 jin at a distance of around 500 meters. This piece of artillery was advanced because of its high rate of fire due to its nature of having fixed ammunition, though it sacrificed range. It was much lighter than contemporary European cannons which fired similar weights.
那不是完全正确的。为了以正视听。人们经常在谈论中国军事技术和火药问题时称其处于倒退状态，但这不是事实。实际上，研究表明事实可能恰恰相反。至少到18世纪，中国的大炮要优于欧洲的大炮，而它们的步枪也是旗鼓相当的。
例如，根据清朝文献通考（列出了85种不同的火炮），威远将军炮重达280-330斤（1斤= 500克），发射的炮体重20至30斤，射程有200步到3英里的范围，或大约400米到1.7公里。
“如放二百步至二百五十步，用药一斤﹔三百步增二两﹔如放二三里，用药三斤。”
翻译过来就是：如果要达到两百到两百五十步的射程，则需要一斤火药。三百步的射程将需要增加二两火药，二到三里的射程将需要三斤火药。
The Zi-Mu cannon (子母炮) weighs 85-95 jin, mounted on 4 wheels and fires balls weighing 8 jin at a distance of around 500 meters. This piece of artillery was advanced because of its high rate of fire due to its nature of having fixed ammunition, though it sacrificed range. It was much lighter than contemporary European cannons which fired similar weights.
Furthermore, Qing artillery was incredibly mobile. With an emphasis on light artillery, the Qing could easily disassemble their cannons and carry them on mules, horses, and even camels. Heavier cannons would be melted and recast near the battlefield. See Kai Filipiak's Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History.
This mobility meant that Qing armies had much more cannons per soldier compared to contemporary European armies. Each banner was recorded to have 9 Zi-Mu cannons, 2 Wei Yuan Jiangjun cannons, and one Dragon cannon. The size of an average banner was around 7,500. In larger campaigns, there were even more cannons. During the Siege of Albazin (1686), the Qing mobilized 15,000 soldiers equipped with 150 cannons against the Russians. In the battle of Jaomodo in 1696, Emperor Kangxi mobilized 80,000 soldiers with 300 cannons. This soldier:cannon ratio was unseen in Europe at the time.
子母炮重达85-95斤，安装在4个轮子上，并能发射500米左右的射程的重达8斤的球。这门火炮之所以先进，是因为它具有固定弹药的性质，尽管它牺牲了射程，但射速很高。它比发射类似重量的同时代欧洲大炮轻得多。
此外，清军火炮的机动性令人难以置信。清朝着重于轻型炮兵，因此可以轻松拆卸其大炮，把它们扛在骡子、马甚至骆驼上。 较重的大炮将被熔化并在战场附近重新铸造。 参见凯菲利帕克的《中国历史上的军民关系》
这种流动性意味着，与当代欧洲军队相比，清军的每名士兵拥有更多的大炮。据记录，每旗（原文为banner，意为横幅，搜不出在军事里有什么特殊含义，暂且翻译为“旗”）有9门子母大炮，2门威远将军炮和1门龙炮。平均每旗约有7500人。 在更大的战役中，会使用更多的大炮。在包围雅克萨（1686年）期间，清朝动员了15000名士兵，装备了150门大炮对付俄罗斯人。在1696年的昭莫多战役中，康熙皇帝动员了8万名士兵用了300门大炮。 这个士兵：大炮的比例在当时在欧洲是看不见的。
This mobility meant that Qing armies had much more cannons per soldier compared to contemporary European armies. Each banner was recorded to have 9 Zi-Mu cannons, 2 Wei Yuan Jiangjun cannons, and one Dragon cannon. The size of an average banner was around 7,500. In larger campaigns, there were even more cannons. During the Siege of Albazin (1686), the Qing mobilized 15,000 soldiers equipped with 150 cannons against the Russians. In the battle of Jaomodo in 1696, Emperor Kangxi mobilized 80,000 soldiers with 300 cannons. This soldier:cannon ratio was unseen in Europe at the time.
子母炮重达85-95斤，安装在4个轮子上，并能发射500米左右的射程的重达8斤的球。这门火炮之所以先进，是因为它具有固定弹药的性质，尽管它牺牲了射程，但射速很高。它比发射类似重量的同时代欧洲大炮轻得多。
此外，清军火炮的机动性令人难以置信。清朝着重于轻型炮兵，因此可以轻松拆卸其大炮，把它们扛在骡子、马甚至骆驼上。 较重的大炮将被熔化并在战场附近重新铸造。 参见凯菲利帕克的《中国历史上的军民关系》
这种流动性意味着，与当代欧洲军队相比，清军的每名士兵拥有更多的大炮。据记录，每旗（原文为banner，意为横幅，搜不出在军事里有什么特殊含义，暂且翻译为“旗”）有9门子母大炮，2门威远将军炮和1门龙炮。平均每旗约有7500人。 在更大的战役中，会使用更多的大炮。在包围雅克萨（1686年）期间，清朝动员了15000名士兵，装备了150门大炮对付俄罗斯人。在1696年的昭莫多战役中，康熙皇帝动员了8万名士兵用了300门大炮。 这个士兵：大炮的比例在当时在欧洲是看不见的。
The Chinese also reverse engineered a number of European weapons. The early Ming musket, the folanji musket, was reverse-engineered from Portuguese models after the Portuguese were defeated in battle. In their fight against the Manchus, the Ming used Dutch and Portuguese cannons, known as the Hongyipao (literally, "Cannon of the Red Barbarians) to great effect. In fact, these cannons were so effective against the Manchus that the Qing learned to cast them from Ming defectors and started making it themselves.
There were 85 different types of artillery listed during the Qianlong period, some were good and some were bad. Some had equivalents in contemporary European armies, some were exclusive to China. But virtually all Chinese military historians agree that the overall design of Chinese and European cannons followed the same principles and at least in light artillery, the Chinese were ahead due to their cannons' portability, high rate of fire, and the ability to mass manufacture them. Only during the Napoleonic War do we see Europeans fielding armies with a similar soldier to cannon ratio.
For muskets, the Qing Shi Gao noted that in the 18th century, 50% of the infantry stationed in Tibet were muskets.
中国还对欧洲一些武器进行了逆向工程。明朝早期的火枪，即佛郎机步枪是葡萄牙人在战斗中被打败后，从葡萄牙模型反向工程的。在与满洲的战斗中，明朝使用了尼德兰和葡萄牙的加农炮，即红夷大炮（直译为“红色野蛮人”的加农炮），效果非常显着。事实上，这些大炮对付满洲的效果非常明显，清军是从明叛逃者那里开始学会铸造这些大炮的。
乾隆时期共列出了85种不同类型的火炮，有些是好的，有些是坏的。有些在当代欧洲军队中具有同等水平，有些在中国独占。但是几乎所有中国军事史学家都同意，中国和欧洲大炮的总体设计遵循相同的原则，至少在轻型炮兵方面，中国人由于其大炮的便携性，高射速和大规模制造能力而处于领先地位。只有在拿破仑战争期间，我们才能看到欧洲人以相近的士兵与大炮的比例的方式部署军队。
对于步枪，清史稿指出，在18世纪，驻扎在西藏的步兵中有50％是步枪兵。
初制，每番兵千，弓箭三之，鳥槍七之。嗣選唐古特兵三千，鳥槍、刀矛各半。至是新設額兵三千，每千人五成鳥槍，三成弓矢，二成刀矛。
According to this, out of three thousand troops, for every one thousand troops were five hundred muskets, three hundred archers, and two hundred infantry men armed with swords and spears. This was probably for the Green Standard Army. 鳥槍 is Chinese for muskets.
There were 85 different types of artillery listed during the Qianlong period, some were good and some were bad. Some had equivalents in contemporary European armies, some were exclusive to China. But virtually all Chinese military historians agree that the overall design of Chinese and European cannons followed the same principles and at least in light artillery, the Chinese were ahead due to their cannons' portability, high rate of fire, and the ability to mass manufacture them. Only during the Napoleonic War do we see Europeans fielding armies with a similar soldier to cannon ratio.
For muskets, the Qing Shi Gao noted that in the 18th century, 50% of the infantry stationed in Tibet were muskets.
中国还对欧洲一些武器进行了逆向工程。明朝早期的火枪，即佛郎机步枪是葡萄牙人在战斗中被打败后，从葡萄牙模型反向工程的。在与满洲的战斗中，明朝使用了尼德兰和葡萄牙的加农炮，即红夷大炮（直译为“红色野蛮人”的加农炮），效果非常显着。事实上，这些大炮对付满洲的效果非常明显，清军是从明叛逃者那里开始学会铸造这些大炮的。
乾隆时期共列出了85种不同类型的火炮，有些是好的，有些是坏的。有些在当代欧洲军队中具有同等水平，有些在中国独占。但是几乎所有中国军事史学家都同意，中国和欧洲大炮的总体设计遵循相同的原则，至少在轻型炮兵方面，中国人由于其大炮的便携性，高射速和大规模制造能力而处于领先地位。只有在拿破仑战争期间，我们才能看到欧洲人以相近的士兵与大炮的比例的方式部署军队。
对于步枪，清史稿指出，在18世纪，驻扎在西藏的步兵中有50％是步枪兵。
初制，每番兵千，弓箭三之，鳥槍七之。嗣選唐古特兵三千，鳥槍、刀矛各半。至是新設額兵三千，每千人五成鳥槍，三成弓矢，二成刀矛。
According to this, out of three thousand troops, for every one thousand troops were five hundred muskets, three hundred archers, and two hundred infantry men armed with swords and spears. This was probably for the Green Standard Army. 鳥槍 is Chinese for muskets.
In 1839, a prefectural gazetteer noted that the middle battalion of Cheng Prefecture had 117 cavalrymen, 394 guard infantry, and 244 muskets. The left battalion had 115 cavalrymen, 368 guard infantry, and 235 musketeers and 32 cannons. Almost forty percent of the infantry were composed of muskets.
So we see that the Qing military actually had a large number of muskets as part of their infantry.
Picture showing Qing musketeers and cannons against the Mongols.
[Qing illustration showing the 1759 Black River Relief Army] (http://i.imgur.com/XS0dZew.jpg). Note the cannons placed on camels.
References:
Zhongguo Jun Shi Tongshi (中国军事通史) --> Chinese
Qing Shi Gao (清史稿) --> Classical Chinese
Da Qing Hui Dian (大清會典) --> Classical Chinese
Qing Chao Xu Wenxian Tongkao (清朝續文獻通考) --> Classical Chinese
So we see that the Qing military actually had a large number of muskets as part of their infantry.
Picture showing Qing musketeers and cannons against the Mongols.
[Qing illustration showing the 1759 Black River Relief Army] (http://i.imgur.com/XS0dZew.jpg). Note the cannons placed on camels.
References:
Zhongguo Jun Shi Tongshi (中国军事通史) --> Chinese
Qing Shi Gao (清史稿) --> Classical Chinese
Da Qing Hui Dian (大清會典) --> Classical Chinese
Qing Chao Xu Wenxian Tongkao (清朝續文獻通考) --> Classical Chinese
Joseph Needham's Science and Civilisation in China (the volume on Chinese military technology) --> English
Peter Perdue's China Marches West --> English
Kai Filipiak's Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History --> English
“初选，每番兵千，弓箭三之，鸟枪七之。嗣选唐古特兵三千，鸟枪，刀矛各半。至是新设额兵三千，每千人五成鸟枪，三成弓矢，二成刀矛。”
据此可知，在三千名士兵中，每千名士兵中有500名步枪，300名弓箭手和200名手持剑和矛的步兵。这可能是针对绿营的。鸟枪是步枪的中文。
1839年，一份地方志指出，一个叫“cheng”的地方中营中有117名骑兵、394名警卫步兵和244支火枪。左营有115名骑兵，368名警卫步兵，235名火枪手和32门大炮。近40％的步兵由步枪兵组成。
因此，我们可以看到，清军在步兵中实际上装备了大量步枪。
该图显示了清朝的火枪手和大炮对阵蒙古人的场面。
[1759年清军破黑水营之围插图]（http://i.imgur.com/XS0dZew.jpg）。注意大炮放在骆驼上。
Peter Perdue's China Marches West --> English
Kai Filipiak's Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History --> English
“初选，每番兵千，弓箭三之，鸟枪七之。嗣选唐古特兵三千，鸟枪，刀矛各半。至是新设额兵三千，每千人五成鸟枪，三成弓矢，二成刀矛。”
据此可知，在三千名士兵中，每千名士兵中有500名步枪，300名弓箭手和200名手持剑和矛的步兵。这可能是针对绿营的。鸟枪是步枪的中文。
1839年，一份地方志指出，一个叫“cheng”的地方中营中有117名骑兵、394名警卫步兵和244支火枪。左营有115名骑兵，368名警卫步兵，235名火枪手和32门大炮。近40％的步兵由步枪兵组成。
因此，我们可以看到，清军在步兵中实际上装备了大量步枪。
该图显示了清朝的火枪手和大炮对阵蒙古人的场面。
[1759年清军破黑水营之围插图]（http://i.imgur.com/XS0dZew.jpg）。注意大炮放在骆驼上。
参考文献：
中国军事通史->中文
清史稿（清史稿）->古典汉语
大清会典->古典汉语
清朝续文献通考->古典汉语
李约瑟的《中国科学与文明》（中国军事技术专刊）->英语
彼得·珀杜的《中国进军西方》->简体中文
凯·菲力比克的《中国历史上的军民关系》->英文
Thesuperproify2
The Chinese also improved upon almost every technology they got from the Europeans since the arquebus.
For example, Chou Hai Tubian, volume 13, written in 1558, also talked about Chinese arquebuses superior to the Portuguese ones after improvements based on their model. 《筹海图编·鸟咀铳》：“鸟铳之制，自西番流入中国，其来远矣，然造者未尽其妙。嘉靖二十七年，都御史朱纨，遣都指挥卢镗，破双屿，获番酋善铳者，命义士马宪制器，李槐制药，因得其传而造作，比西番犹为精绝云。”
The Chinese also improved upon almost every technology they got from the Europeans since the arquebus.
For example, Chou Hai Tubian, volume 13, written in 1558, also talked about Chinese arquebuses superior to the Portuguese ones after improvements based on their model. 《筹海图编·鸟咀铳》：“鸟铳之制，自西番流入中国，其来远矣，然造者未尽其妙。嘉靖二十七年，都御史朱纨，遣都指挥卢镗，破双屿，获番酋善铳者，命义士马宪制器，李槐制药，因得其传而造作，比西番犹为精绝云。”
"The arquebus arrived in China from the westerners, from far away, but those who made it did not understand its secret. In the twentieth year of Jiajing, the Duyu Shi Zhu Wan, sent the Du Zhihui Lu Tang, defeated them in the islands, acquired European chiefs who were adapt at making the arquebus, and ordered Ma Xian to make these weapons and Li Gui to make the powder. They attained this skill and made it as a result, which was more sophisticated than those of the westerners."
Even the Ming dynasty are making new weapons consistently in the last decades of its existence with new inventions like Winged Tiger guns and Zhao Shizhen's Chedian Chong.
自钩铳以来，中国人还改进了他们从欧洲人那里获得的几乎所有技术。
例如，1558年写的《筹海图编》（第13卷），也谈到了在基于其模型的改进之后，中国的鸟铳优于葡萄牙的鸟铳。
“《筹海图编·鸟咀铳》：“鸟铳之制，自西番流入中国，其来远矣，然造者未尽其妙。嘉靖二十七年，都御史朱纨，遣都指挥卢镗，破双屿，获番酋善铳者，命义士马宪制器，李槐制药，因得其传而造作，比西番犹为精绝云。””
即使是明朝，在其存在的最后几十年中，也不断有新的发明，例如有翼虎枪和赵士祯的掣电铳等新发明。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Even the Ming dynasty are making new weapons consistently in the last decades of its existence with new inventions like Winged Tiger guns and Zhao Shizhen's Chedian Chong.
自钩铳以来，中国人还改进了他们从欧洲人那里获得的几乎所有技术。
例如，1558年写的《筹海图编》（第13卷），也谈到了在基于其模型的改进之后，中国的鸟铳优于葡萄牙的鸟铳。
“《筹海图编·鸟咀铳》：“鸟铳之制，自西番流入中国，其来远矣，然造者未尽其妙。嘉靖二十七年，都御史朱纨，遣都指挥卢镗，破双屿，获番酋善铳者，命义士马宪制器，李槐制药，因得其传而造作，比西番犹为精绝云。””
即使是明朝，在其存在的最后几十年中，也不断有新的发明，例如有翼虎枪和赵士祯的掣电铳等新发明。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
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