我听说欧洲人把美国内战看作是一场“业余”的战争。这真的是一场业余的战争吗？
正文翻译
I heard that the Europeans saw the American Civil War as an 'amateur' war. Was it really an amateur war?
我听说欧洲人把美国内战看作是一场“业余”的战争。这真的是一场业余的战争吗？
I heard that the Europeans saw the American Civil War as an 'amateur' war. Was it really an amateur war?
我听说欧洲人把美国内战看作是一场“业余”的战争。这真的是一场业余的战争吗？
评论翻译
仅举一例。在普法战争中，普鲁士总参谋部在短短3天内进行了一次动员，通过这次动员，原本仅有30多万官兵的军队超过了140万。联盟需要三年多的时间才实现了同样的目标。再加上140万普鲁士军队是作为一个单一的结构作战的，而不是像联盟和联邦的军队那样分散的、独立的相对较小的编队，这种差别就变得非常巨大。
在军事事务方面没有特别有能力的政治家，如林肯总统和战争部长斯坦顿，对军事战略和规划方面的干预只会加剧活动的业余性和混乱。尤其是在北方。
所以也难怪，从军事战略的角度来看，美国内战是完全混乱的。由于缺乏像普鲁士总参谋部那样的统一结构来实施统一的战略和接管整体规划，导致战役和战斗没有服从于一个单一的目标，而是相互分离，这对最后的胜利毫无帮助。因此，赫尔穆特-冯-莫尔茨等将军和其他欧洲观察家们对此都不以为然。他们知道，他们的军队可以连续几天横扫没有组织的美国人。
只有在葛底斯堡战役之后，主要是格兰特将军自己的功劳，北方才强加了类似于全面军事战略的东西。在此之前，交战双方中唯一专业和正确的军事战略是对南方的海上封锁，即蟒蛇计划。但这是海军的工作，我们已经说过，海军与陆军不同，它是真正专业的。
而不是像这样：
正在行军的南方军
欧洲观察员，如普鲁士军官贾斯特-谢伯特，认为美国和南方联盟的军队由于缺乏训练，特别是缺乏对非军职和低级军官的训练而表现平平，当然，这也是事实。他们中的许多人在1861年到1862年被扔进战场时，对自己在做什么几乎一无所知。俗话说，经验是艰苦的老师，而这正是他们中大多数人得到的东西。
战争中最著名的外国观察员，冷流卫队的阿瑟-詹姆斯-里昂-弗里曼特尔中校（他当时正在休假，不是"官方"观察员）对他看到的部队和军官（主要是南方军）更加认可。他对葛底斯堡战役的第一手资料是非常宝贵的。
欧洲人不禁认为，美国公民军队的经验，主要由战后恢复平民身份的军官领导，与大陆的大型、训练有素的军队和后备部队以及职业军官团的做法并不特别相关。他们确实吸取了一些教训；谢伯特指出了铁路在运送部队方面的重要作用。普鲁士人和他们的盟友在几年后的战争中非常有效地使用了铁路。
(顺便说一下，官方观察员的使用是相互的。见下方关于史蒂夫-桑德伯格写的关于以美国军官作为克里米亚战争和普法战争的观察员的评论）。
但他们似乎忽略了美国内战中最重要的教训，那就是当防守方能够运用现代火力时的胜利。这就是为什么战争在彼得堡周围沉淀为九个月的堑壕战的原因，它预示着第一次世界大战的可怕经历，而机枪的出现使其更加可怕。即使是训练有素的部队也躲不过从战壕里用步枪和机枪射击。身上展示的绚丽制服根本无足轻重。
许多欧洲人在第二次世界大战期间一直对美国军队持轻视态度；蒙哥马利在这个问题上特别突出。有些人现在仍然如此。但北约军队的萎缩使美国成为唯一完全有能力的西方军队，甚至美国现在也不再像1990年那样了，当时我们可以派出一支军队，然后召集一个令人难以置信的国际联盟，在四天的地面战争中将萨达姆踢出科威特。
Valentin Todorov
, Religion - Scientific atheist
This is an absolutely true statement. But nowadays it is viewed from the wrong point of view. The emphasis is on outdated tactics, lack of training, especially for officers, and other consequences of the main problem, and not the general reason for the amateur level of military affairs in the United States before, during, and for many years after the Civil War.
What is the big difference between professionals and amateurs in each activity? THE ORGANIZATION. Well, as an organization, the US military was on an amateur level until the First World War.
During the American Civil War, the importance of the military organization increased even more, because then the transition from regular professional armies to mass ones recruited through mobilization took place.
Until the American Civil War, the constantly leading wars, European countries had large regular armies with permanent command structures, unified military doctrine, training, armaments and so on. The United States, with the exception of the Navy, has nothing like that. The regular army is small, with constantly changing structures, hence different training, different armaments and so on.
The biggest problem is that at that time the United States did not have a land military doctrine. Nor a military structure to impose and implement it. Everything that is done for the European military expert seems like improvisation, not a purposeful military strategy.
This is a map of the battlefields, not the overall military action. American Civil War is so messy and chaotic that a complete map of all military action cannot be made
Just one example. In the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian General Staff carried out a mobilization in just 3 days, through which the army of just over 300,000 soldiers and officers exceeded 1,400,000. In three days !!! It takes the unx more than three years to achieve the same. Adding that the 1.4 million-strong Prussian army is fighting as a single structure, rather than scattered, detached relatively small formations such as those of the unx and the Confederation, the difference becomes enormous.
The intervention of politicians not particularly competent in military matters, such as President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, in military strategy and planning only intensifies amateurism and chaos. Especially in the North.
No wonder, from a military-strategic point of view, the American Civil War is total chaos. The lack of a unified structure, such as the Prussian General Staff, to impose a unified strategy and take over overall planning leads to campaigns and battles that are not subordinated to a single goal, are separated from each other and do nothing to help the final victory. Therefore, generals such as Helmuth von Moltke and other European observers were not impressed. They know that their armies will sweep the unorganized Americans for days.
It was only after Gettysburg, largely as General Grant's own merit, that the North imposed something like a comprehensive military strategy. Until then, the only professional and correct military strategy for either of the two warring parties was that of the naval blockade of the South, the Anaconda Plan. But it is the work of the Navy, which we have already said is, unlike the Army, truly professional.
这是一个绝对正确的说法。但如今人们从错误的角度来解读它。当时人们强调的是过时的战术、缺乏训练，特别是军官的训练，以及其他主要问题的后果，而不是说美国在内战前、内战期间和内战后许多年里军事事务处于业余水平的原因。
在各项活动中，专业人员和业余人员的最大区别是什么？组织度。那么，作为一个组织，可以说美国军队在第一次世界大战之前都处于业余水平。
在美国内战期间，军事组织的重要性更加突出，因为那时发生了从正规职业军队向通过动员招募的大众军队的过渡。
在美国内战之前，不断主导战争的欧洲国家拥有庞大的正规军，拥有永久性的指挥机构、统一的军事理论、训练、军备等等。美国，除了海军之外，没有这样的东西。正规军规模小，结构不断变化，因此各自的训练水平不同，武器装备也不同，等等。
最大的问题是，当时美国没有一个陆军军事学说。也没有一个军事结构来强加和实施它。为欧洲军事专家所做的一切似乎都是即兴之作，而不是有目的的军事战略。
这是一张战场的地图，而不是整体的军事行动。美国内战是如此的凌乱和混乱，以至于无法做出一张完整的所有军事行动的地图
, Religion - Scientific atheist
This is an absolutely true statement. But nowadays it is viewed from the wrong point of view. The emphasis is on outdated tactics, lack of training, especially for officers, and other consequences of the main problem, and not the general reason for the amateur level of military affairs in the United States before, during, and for many years after the Civil War.
What is the big difference between professionals and amateurs in each activity? THE ORGANIZATION. Well, as an organization, the US military was on an amateur level until the First World War.
During the American Civil War, the importance of the military organization increased even more, because then the transition from regular professional armies to mass ones recruited through mobilization took place.
Until the American Civil War, the constantly leading wars, European countries had large regular armies with permanent command structures, unified military doctrine, training, armaments and so on. The United States, with the exception of the Navy, has nothing like that. The regular army is small, with constantly changing structures, hence different training, different armaments and so on.
The biggest problem is that at that time the United States did not have a land military doctrine. Nor a military structure to impose and implement it. Everything that is done for the European military expert seems like improvisation, not a purposeful military strategy.
This is a map of the battlefields, not the overall military action. American Civil War is so messy and chaotic that a complete map of all military action cannot be made
Just one example. In the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian General Staff carried out a mobilization in just 3 days, through which the army of just over 300,000 soldiers and officers exceeded 1,400,000. In three days !!! It takes the unx more than three years to achieve the same. Adding that the 1.4 million-strong Prussian army is fighting as a single structure, rather than scattered, detached relatively small formations such as those of the unx and the Confederation, the difference becomes enormous.
The intervention of politicians not particularly competent in military matters, such as President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, in military strategy and planning only intensifies amateurism and chaos. Especially in the North.
No wonder, from a military-strategic point of view, the American Civil War is total chaos. The lack of a unified structure, such as the Prussian General Staff, to impose a unified strategy and take over overall planning leads to campaigns and battles that are not subordinated to a single goal, are separated from each other and do nothing to help the final victory. Therefore, generals such as Helmuth von Moltke and other European observers were not impressed. They know that their armies will sweep the unorganized Americans for days.
It was only after Gettysburg, largely as General Grant's own merit, that the North imposed something like a comprehensive military strategy. Until then, the only professional and correct military strategy for either of the two warring parties was that of the naval blockade of the South, the Anaconda Plan. But it is the work of the Navy, which we have already said is, unlike the Army, truly professional.
这是一个绝对正确的说法。但如今人们从错误的角度来解读它。当时人们强调的是过时的战术、缺乏训练，特别是军官的训练，以及其他主要问题的后果，而不是说美国在内战前、内战期间和内战后许多年里军事事务处于业余水平的原因。
在各项活动中，专业人员和业余人员的最大区别是什么？组织度。那么，作为一个组织，可以说美国军队在第一次世界大战之前都处于业余水平。
在美国内战期间，军事组织的重要性更加突出，因为那时发生了从正规职业军队向通过动员招募的大众军队的过渡。
在美国内战之前，不断主导战争的欧洲国家拥有庞大的正规军，拥有永久性的指挥机构、统一的军事理论、训练、军备等等。美国，除了海军之外，没有这样的东西。正规军规模小，结构不断变化，因此各自的训练水平不同，武器装备也不同，等等。
最大的问题是，当时美国没有一个陆军军事学说。也没有一个军事结构来强加和实施它。为欧洲军事专家所做的一切似乎都是即兴之作，而不是有目的的军事战略。
这是一张战场的地图，而不是整体的军事行动。美国内战是如此的凌乱和混乱，以至于无法做出一张完整的所有军事行动的地图
仅举一例。在普法战争中，普鲁士总参谋部在短短3天内进行了一次动员，通过这次动员，原本仅有30多万官兵的军队超过了140万。联盟需要三年多的时间才实现了同样的目标。再加上140万普鲁士军队是作为一个单一的结构作战的，而不是像联盟和联邦的军队那样分散的、独立的相对较小的编队，这种差别就变得非常巨大。
在军事事务方面没有特别有能力的政治家，如林肯总统和战争部长斯坦顿，对军事战略和规划方面的干预只会加剧活动的业余性和混乱。尤其是在北方。
所以也难怪，从军事战略的角度来看，美国内战是完全混乱的。由于缺乏像普鲁士总参谋部那样的统一结构来实施统一的战略和接管整体规划，导致战役和战斗没有服从于一个单一的目标，而是相互分离，这对最后的胜利毫无帮助。因此，赫尔穆特-冯-莫尔茨等将军和其他欧洲观察家们对此都不以为然。他们知道，他们的军队可以连续几天横扫没有组织的美国人。
只有在葛底斯堡战役之后，主要是格兰特将军自己的功劳，北方才强加了类似于全面军事战略的东西。在此之前，交战双方中唯一专业和正确的军事战略是对南方的海上封锁，即蟒蛇计划。但这是海军的工作，我们已经说过，海军与陆军不同，它是真正专业的。
Christopher Bowers
“The intervention of politicians not particularly competent in military matters, such as President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, in military strategy and planning only intensifies amateurism and chaos. Especially in the North.”
The Confederacy was notoriously hamstrung by military interference from a prickly and incompetent Jefferson Davis and others. The demands of Southern politicians at both the national and state level are behind many of the self-defeating strategic choices the South writ large made.
In any case, the statement that the unx did not have a strategy (other than Anaconda) until Grant was put in charge is not accurate. You are conflating the term “strategy” with the term “plan.”
Lincoln absolutely had a grand strategy that he adhered to unswervingly throughout the war, of relentlessly attacking the Confederacy and seizing its territory and means of commerce. This is in contrast to other potential strategies the unx could have pursued, such as defensive warfare on land and blockade only. He fired numerous generals who did not pursue his strategy, and - pointedly - installed Grant because he was a good fit for this aggressive strategy. Lincoln’s strategy was a good one; it worked.
What Lincoln did not have was a campaign plan (different than a strategy). That is what Grant provided and is the mark of military professionalism.
“在军事事务方面没有特别有能力的政治家，如林肯总统和战争部长斯坦顿，对军事战略和规划方面的干预只会加剧活动的业余性和混乱。尤其是在北方。”
南方联盟因刺头和无能的杰斐逊-戴维斯等人的军事干预而受到臭名昭著的束缚。南方政客在国家和州一级提出的要求，是整个南方所做的许多自取灭亡的战略选择的幕后之手。
在任何情况下，在格兰特被任命为负责人之前，联邦没有一个战略（除了蟒蛇）的说法是不准确的。你把"战略"一词和"计划"混为一谈了。
林肯绝对有一个大战略，他在整个战争期间都坚定不移地坚持这个战略，即无情地攻击联邦，夺取其领土和破坏其商业。这与联邦可以采取的其他潜在战略，如陆上防御战和只进行封锁，形成鲜明对比。他解雇了许多没有推行他的战略的将军，并且--尖锐地--安插了格兰特，因为他很适合这种侵略性战略。林肯的战略是一个很好的战略：它成功了。
林肯所不具备的是策划一个战役的计划（与战略不同）。这正是格兰特所提供的，也是军事职业化的标志。
“The intervention of politicians not particularly competent in military matters, such as President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, in military strategy and planning only intensifies amateurism and chaos. Especially in the North.”
The Confederacy was notoriously hamstrung by military interference from a prickly and incompetent Jefferson Davis and others. The demands of Southern politicians at both the national and state level are behind many of the self-defeating strategic choices the South writ large made.
In any case, the statement that the unx did not have a strategy (other than Anaconda) until Grant was put in charge is not accurate. You are conflating the term “strategy” with the term “plan.”
Lincoln absolutely had a grand strategy that he adhered to unswervingly throughout the war, of relentlessly attacking the Confederacy and seizing its territory and means of commerce. This is in contrast to other potential strategies the unx could have pursued, such as defensive warfare on land and blockade only. He fired numerous generals who did not pursue his strategy, and - pointedly - installed Grant because he was a good fit for this aggressive strategy. Lincoln’s strategy was a good one; it worked.
What Lincoln did not have was a campaign plan (different than a strategy). That is what Grant provided and is the mark of military professionalism.
“在军事事务方面没有特别有能力的政治家，如林肯总统和战争部长斯坦顿，对军事战略和规划方面的干预只会加剧活动的业余性和混乱。尤其是在北方。”
南方联盟因刺头和无能的杰斐逊-戴维斯等人的军事干预而受到臭名昭著的束缚。南方政客在国家和州一级提出的要求，是整个南方所做的许多自取灭亡的战略选择的幕后之手。
在任何情况下，在格兰特被任命为负责人之前，联邦没有一个战略（除了蟒蛇）的说法是不准确的。你把"战略"一词和"计划"混为一谈了。
林肯绝对有一个大战略，他在整个战争期间都坚定不移地坚持这个战略，即无情地攻击联邦，夺取其领土和破坏其商业。这与联邦可以采取的其他潜在战略，如陆上防御战和只进行封锁，形成鲜明对比。他解雇了许多没有推行他的战略的将军，并且--尖锐地--安插了格兰特，因为他很适合这种侵略性战略。林肯的战略是一个很好的战略：它成功了。
林肯所不具备的是策划一个战役的计划（与战略不同）。这正是格兰特所提供的，也是军事职业化的标志。
Stanislas Kowalski
A defensive strategy on land wouldn't have made sense, considering the nature of the war. The Confederacy fought to gain independence, not to invade the North. Staying on the defensive was more or less granting them what they wanted, even with a naval blockade. It's just natural that Lincoln wanted to quell the rebellion as far as possible. He needed a total victory.
In other terms, the North fought to win and crush the enemy, whereas the South fought to avoid defeat long enough, until the North would give up.
考虑到战争的性质，在陆地上采取防御性战略是没有意义的。南方联盟的战斗是为了获得独立，而不是为了入侵北方。保持防守或多或少会让他们得到他们想要的东西，即使有海上封锁。所以林肯肯定会想尽可能快地平息叛乱，这很自然。他需要一场彻底的胜利。
换句话说，北方的战斗是为了赢得胜利和粉碎敌人，而南方的战斗则是为了避免足够长的失败，直到北方放弃。
A defensive strategy on land wouldn't have made sense, considering the nature of the war. The Confederacy fought to gain independence, not to invade the North. Staying on the defensive was more or less granting them what they wanted, even with a naval blockade. It's just natural that Lincoln wanted to quell the rebellion as far as possible. He needed a total victory.
In other terms, the North fought to win and crush the enemy, whereas the South fought to avoid defeat long enough, until the North would give up.
考虑到战争的性质，在陆地上采取防御性战略是没有意义的。南方联盟的战斗是为了获得独立，而不是为了入侵北方。保持防守或多或少会让他们得到他们想要的东西，即使有海上封锁。所以林肯肯定会想尽可能快地平息叛乱，这很自然。他需要一场彻底的胜利。
换句话说，北方的战斗是为了赢得胜利和粉碎敌人，而南方的战斗则是为了避免足够长的失败，直到北方放弃。
Stephen Ede
A defensive strategy on land would indeed have made little sense.
But if they had attempted such a strategy that would not be the first or last time a country attempted a strategy that made little sense.
The argument for such a strategy would be when combined with a naval blockade that it required little in the way of casualties unless the Confederacy attacked, in which case their is the assumed advantage of defense.
Over time the Confederacy would be economically starved and would surrender (or States with borders with the unx would simply switch sides) and the Confederacy would collapse.
Which on the surface is not entirely daft. I suspect it wouldn’t have worked to well because of the inability to maintain a solid defensive line against Confederate attacks.
陆地上的防御性战略确实没有什么意义。
但是，如果他们试图采取这样的战略，这将不会是第一次或最后一次有国家试图去采取一些没有意义的战略。
这种战略的论据是，当与海上封锁相结合时，它几乎不需要什么伤亡，除非南方联盟发动进攻，在这种情况下，他们就会有防御的假定优势。
随着时间的推移，南方邦联将在经济上陷入饥饿，并将投降（或与北方联邦接壤的州将简单地转换立场），南方邦联将崩溃。
从表面上看，这并不完全是愚蠢的。虽然我怀疑这不会取得多好的效果，因为没有能力维持一条坚实的防线来抵御联邦的进攻。
A defensive strategy on land would indeed have made little sense.
But if they had attempted such a strategy that would not be the first or last time a country attempted a strategy that made little sense.
The argument for such a strategy would be when combined with a naval blockade that it required little in the way of casualties unless the Confederacy attacked, in which case their is the assumed advantage of defense.
Over time the Confederacy would be economically starved and would surrender (or States with borders with the unx would simply switch sides) and the Confederacy would collapse.
Which on the surface is not entirely daft. I suspect it wouldn’t have worked to well because of the inability to maintain a solid defensive line against Confederate attacks.
陆地上的防御性战略确实没有什么意义。
但是，如果他们试图采取这样的战略，这将不会是第一次或最后一次有国家试图去采取一些没有意义的战略。
这种战略的论据是，当与海上封锁相结合时，它几乎不需要什么伤亡，除非南方联盟发动进攻，在这种情况下，他们就会有防御的假定优势。
随着时间的推移，南方邦联将在经济上陷入饥饿，并将投降（或与北方联邦接壤的州将简单地转换立场），南方邦联将崩溃。
从表面上看，这并不完全是愚蠢的。虽然我怀疑这不会取得多好的效果，因为没有能力维持一条坚实的防线来抵御联邦的进攻。
Andy Wiskonsky
Imperial Germany (declared at the end of the Franco-Prussian War had a territory of about 210,000 square miles and a population of about 41 million. The United States had a territory of about 3,100,000 square miles in 1860 with about 31 million people. Railroad building was growing explosively in densely populated Western and Central Europe 1860–1890.
Yes, the European countries had far more centralized and professional militaries in the 19th century, even into the early 20th century, as compared to the USA. Comparing mobilization times while not considering space and population densities is rather limited in vision.
德意志帝国（在普法战争结束时宣布成立）的领土约为21万平方英里，人口约为4100万。美国在1860年的领土面积约为3,100,000平方英里，人口约为3100万。1860-1890年，在人口稠密的西欧和中欧，铁路建设呈爆炸性增长。
是的，与美国相比，欧洲国家在19世纪，甚至到20世纪初，都拥有更加集中和专业的军队。但是在不考虑空间和人口密度的情况下比较动员时间，视野相当有限。
Imperial Germany (declared at the end of the Franco-Prussian War had a territory of about 210,000 square miles and a population of about 41 million. The United States had a territory of about 3,100,000 square miles in 1860 with about 31 million people. Railroad building was growing explosively in densely populated Western and Central Europe 1860–1890.
Yes, the European countries had far more centralized and professional militaries in the 19th century, even into the early 20th century, as compared to the USA. Comparing mobilization times while not considering space and population densities is rather limited in vision.
德意志帝国（在普法战争结束时宣布成立）的领土约为21万平方英里，人口约为4100万。美国在1860年的领土面积约为3,100,000平方英里，人口约为3100万。1860-1890年，在人口稠密的西欧和中欧，铁路建设呈爆炸性增长。
是的，与美国相比，欧洲国家在19世纪，甚至到20世纪初，都拥有更加集中和专业的军队。但是在不考虑空间和人口密度的情况下比较动员时间，视野相当有限。
Jan Meyer
Even so the population density in the American East is comparable or even higher than the density in Germany.
The US had neither the will nor the skill nor the desire nor the tools to do a mass mobilization.
即便如此，美国东部的人口密度与德国的人口密度相当，甚至更高。
当时的美国既没有大规模动员的意愿、能力，也没有动员的工具。
Even so the population density in the American East is comparable or even higher than the density in Germany.
The US had neither the will nor the skill nor the desire nor the tools to do a mass mobilization.
即便如此，美国东部的人口密度与德国的人口密度相当，甚至更高。
当时的美国既没有大规模动员的意愿、能力，也没有动员的工具。
Andy Wiskonsky
In 1860, the entire population of the US was 31 million. Assuming that this was all in states east of the Mississippi River, which have an area of about 800,000 sq miles, gives an average density of about 39 persons per sq mile.
At the start of the Franco-Prussian War, what became Imperial Germany had a population of 41 million on an area of 210,000 sq miles for an average density of 195 persons per sq mile. This is 500% higher than the density of people in the US.
1860年，美国的全部人口为3100万。假设这都是密西西比河以东各州的人口，这些州的面积约为80万平方英里，平均密度约为每平方英里39人。
在普法战争开始时，后来的帝国德国有4100万人口，面积为21万平方英里，平均密度为每平方英里195人。这比美国的人口密度高出500%。
In 1860, the entire population of the US was 31 million. Assuming that this was all in states east of the Mississippi River, which have an area of about 800,000 sq miles, gives an average density of about 39 persons per sq mile.
At the start of the Franco-Prussian War, what became Imperial Germany had a population of 41 million on an area of 210,000 sq miles for an average density of 195 persons per sq mile. This is 500% higher than the density of people in the US.
1860年，美国的全部人口为3100万。假设这都是密西西比河以东各州的人口，这些州的面积约为80万平方英里，平均密度约为每平方英里39人。
在普法战争开始时，后来的帝国德国有4100万人口，面积为21万平方英里，平均密度为每平方英里195人。这比美国的人口密度高出500%。
Richard Lobb
, Lifelong student of history
By their standards, sure: they thought an army should look like this:
Not like this:
Confederate troops on the march.
European observers such as Justus Scheibert, a Prussian army officer, felt that the US and CS armies were handicapped by a lack of training, especially for noncomissioned and junior officers, and of course this was true. Many of them had very little idea what they were doing when thrown into battle in 1861 on into 1862. Experience, they say, is a hard teacher, and that’s what most of them got.
The most famous foreign observer of the war, Lt. Col. Arthur James Lyon Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards (who was on leave and was not an “official” observer) was much more sympathetic to the troops and officers he saw, primarily Confederates. His firsthand account of the battle of Gettysburg is invaluable.
The Europeans could not help but think that the experiences of the American citizen-armies, led largely by officers who returned to civilian status after the war, were not especially relevant to Continental practice of large, well-trained armies and reserve forces and a professional officer corps. They did draw some lessons; Scheibert pointed out the important role of railroads in moving troops. The Prussians and their allies used railroads very effectively in their wars a few years later.
(By the way, the use of official observers was mutual. See the comment below by Steve Sandberg on U.S. officers as observers of the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars.)
But they seemed to have missed perhaps the most important lesson of the American Civil War, which was the triumph of the defense when it could employ modern firepower. This was why the war settled into nine months of trench warfare around Petersburg, and it presaged the awful experience of World War I, which was made even more terrible by the machine gun. Even lightly trained troops can fire rifles and machine guns from a trench. The splendid uniforms shown above were no match for that.
Many Europeans held the American military in low esteem right through the Second World War; Montgomery was unbearable on the subject. Some still do. But the shrinkage of NATO militaries has left the US as the only fully capable western military, and even the US is not what it was in 1990, when we dispatched an army, and rallied an incredible international coalition, to kick Saddam out of Kuwait in a four-day ground war.
按照他们的标准，当然：他们认为一支军队应该像这样：
, Lifelong student of history
By their standards, sure: they thought an army should look like this:
Not like this:
Confederate troops on the march.
European observers such as Justus Scheibert, a Prussian army officer, felt that the US and CS armies were handicapped by a lack of training, especially for noncomissioned and junior officers, and of course this was true. Many of them had very little idea what they were doing when thrown into battle in 1861 on into 1862. Experience, they say, is a hard teacher, and that’s what most of them got.
The most famous foreign observer of the war, Lt. Col. Arthur James Lyon Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards (who was on leave and was not an “official” observer) was much more sympathetic to the troops and officers he saw, primarily Confederates. His firsthand account of the battle of Gettysburg is invaluable.
The Europeans could not help but think that the experiences of the American citizen-armies, led largely by officers who returned to civilian status after the war, were not especially relevant to Continental practice of large, well-trained armies and reserve forces and a professional officer corps. They did draw some lessons; Scheibert pointed out the important role of railroads in moving troops. The Prussians and their allies used railroads very effectively in their wars a few years later.
(By the way, the use of official observers was mutual. See the comment below by Steve Sandberg on U.S. officers as observers of the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars.)
But they seemed to have missed perhaps the most important lesson of the American Civil War, which was the triumph of the defense when it could employ modern firepower. This was why the war settled into nine months of trench warfare around Petersburg, and it presaged the awful experience of World War I, which was made even more terrible by the machine gun. Even lightly trained troops can fire rifles and machine guns from a trench. The splendid uniforms shown above were no match for that.
Many Europeans held the American military in low esteem right through the Second World War; Montgomery was unbearable on the subject. Some still do. But the shrinkage of NATO militaries has left the US as the only fully capable western military, and even the US is not what it was in 1990, when we dispatched an army, and rallied an incredible international coalition, to kick Saddam out of Kuwait in a four-day ground war.
按照他们的标准，当然：他们认为一支军队应该像这样：
而不是像这样：
正在行军的南方军
欧洲观察员，如普鲁士军官贾斯特-谢伯特，认为美国和南方联盟的军队由于缺乏训练，特别是缺乏对非军职和低级军官的训练而表现平平，当然，这也是事实。他们中的许多人在1861年到1862年被扔进战场时，对自己在做什么几乎一无所知。俗话说，经验是艰苦的老师，而这正是他们中大多数人得到的东西。
战争中最著名的外国观察员，冷流卫队的阿瑟-詹姆斯-里昂-弗里曼特尔中校（他当时正在休假，不是"官方"观察员）对他看到的部队和军官（主要是南方军）更加认可。他对葛底斯堡战役的第一手资料是非常宝贵的。
欧洲人不禁认为，美国公民军队的经验，主要由战后恢复平民身份的军官领导，与大陆的大型、训练有素的军队和后备部队以及职业军官团的做法并不特别相关。他们确实吸取了一些教训；谢伯特指出了铁路在运送部队方面的重要作用。普鲁士人和他们的盟友在几年后的战争中非常有效地使用了铁路。
(顺便说一下，官方观察员的使用是相互的。见下方关于史蒂夫-桑德伯格写的关于以美国军官作为克里米亚战争和普法战争的观察员的评论）。
但他们似乎忽略了美国内战中最重要的教训，那就是当防守方能够运用现代火力时的胜利。这就是为什么战争在彼得堡周围沉淀为九个月的堑壕战的原因，它预示着第一次世界大战的可怕经历，而机枪的出现使其更加可怕。即使是训练有素的部队也躲不过从战壕里用步枪和机枪射击。身上展示的绚丽制服根本无足轻重。
许多欧洲人在第二次世界大战期间一直对美国军队持轻视态度；蒙哥马利在这个问题上特别突出。有些人现在仍然如此。但北约军队的萎缩使美国成为唯一完全有能力的西方军队，甚至美国现在也不再像1990年那样了，当时我们可以派出一支军队，然后召集一个令人难以置信的国际联盟，在四天的地面战争中将萨达姆踢出科威特。
Steve Sandberg
The custom of foreign neutral military observers went in both directions, too. Captain George B. McClellan, the future commander of the Army of the Potomac, was an official US observer of the Crimean War in 1855. And after the Civil War, General Philip Sheridan monitored the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 from the Prussian side. On one occasion, observing a battle in the company of both Kaiser Wilhelm I and Chancellor Bismarck, Sheridan warned Bismarck to get the Kaiser away from an exposed position. Wilhelm refused and, sure enough, within a few minutes the party came under French shelling. Bismarck was very impressed.
Sheridan was distinctly unimpressed with the French, criticizing them for moving too slowly and passing up promising opportunities to attack. He complimented the quality and bravery of the Prussian infantry and the efficiency of their general staff, but criticized their use of cavalry and eventually reported back to President Grant that “there is nothing to be learned here professionally.” (Roy Morris, Sheridan: The Life and Wars of General Phil Sheridan).
外国中立军事观察员的习惯也是双向的。乔治-B-麦克莱伦上尉，即未来的波托马克军团司令，是1855年克里米亚战争的美国官方观察员。而南北战争结束后，菲利普-谢里丹将军在普鲁士一侧观察了1870年的普法战争。有一次，谢里丹在德皇威廉一世和俾斯麦总理的陪同下观察一场战斗，他警告俾斯麦让德皇离开一个暴露的位置。威廉拒绝了，果然，在几分钟之内，他们一行就遭到了法国人的炮击。俾斯麦对此印象非常深刻。
谢里丹对法军的印象明显不好，批评他们行动太慢，放弃了本来有希望的进攻机会。他赞扬了普鲁士步兵的质量和勇敢以及他们总参谋部的效率，但批评了他们对骑兵的使用，并最终向格兰特总统汇报说，"在这里没有什么可以专业地学习的"。(罗伊-莫里斯，谢里丹：菲尔-谢里丹将军的生活和战争）。
The custom of foreign neutral military observers went in both directions, too. Captain George B. McClellan, the future commander of the Army of the Potomac, was an official US observer of the Crimean War in 1855. And after the Civil War, General Philip Sheridan monitored the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 from the Prussian side. On one occasion, observing a battle in the company of both Kaiser Wilhelm I and Chancellor Bismarck, Sheridan warned Bismarck to get the Kaiser away from an exposed position. Wilhelm refused and, sure enough, within a few minutes the party came under French shelling. Bismarck was very impressed.
Sheridan was distinctly unimpressed with the French, criticizing them for moving too slowly and passing up promising opportunities to attack. He complimented the quality and bravery of the Prussian infantry and the efficiency of their general staff, but criticized their use of cavalry and eventually reported back to President Grant that “there is nothing to be learned here professionally.” (Roy Morris, Sheridan: The Life and Wars of General Phil Sheridan).
外国中立军事观察员的习惯也是双向的。乔治-B-麦克莱伦上尉，即未来的波托马克军团司令，是1855年克里米亚战争的美国官方观察员。而南北战争结束后，菲利普-谢里丹将军在普鲁士一侧观察了1870年的普法战争。有一次，谢里丹在德皇威廉一世和俾斯麦总理的陪同下观察一场战斗，他警告俾斯麦让德皇离开一个暴露的位置。威廉拒绝了，果然，在几分钟之内，他们一行就遭到了法国人的炮击。俾斯麦对此印象非常深刻。
谢里丹对法军的印象明显不好，批评他们行动太慢，放弃了本来有希望的进攻机会。他赞扬了普鲁士步兵的质量和勇敢以及他们总参谋部的效率，但批评了他们对骑兵的使用，并最终向格兰特总统汇报说，"在这里没有什么可以专业地学习的"。(罗伊-莫里斯，谢里丹：菲尔-谢里丹将军的生活和战争）。
Andre-Philipps Andre-Philipps
Sheridan’s report, and his entire behaviour during his time as an observer in the Franco-Prussian War was frankly deplorably unprofessional. The man spent half the conflict playing tourist in various european capitals instead, and then wrote a “report” that was literally less than a single page.
He completely dismissed any bit of tactics or operational concepts that didn’t fit his own without even bothering to analyze them properly. He was entirely dismissive of the French to the point of literally bemoaning the absence of a number of tactics that were in fact regularily used by the French, which he simply didn’t notice because he didn’t even bother to look. And then he made some vague criticisms of “unprofessional staff work” without any actual analysis or detail, which reeks of hypocrisy from a man notorious for rank nepotism when it came to choosing his own staff.
谢里丹的报告，以及他在担任普法战争观察员期间的整个行为，坦率地说是令人遗憾地不专业的。这个人在冲突期间花了一半的时间在欧洲各国首都旅游，然后写了一份字面上不到一页的"报告"。
他完全否定了任何不符合他自己理念的战术或作战概念，甚至懒得好好分析它们。他对法国人完全不屑一顾，甚至哀叹法国人没有使用某些战术--事实上法国人经常使用，只是他根本没有注意到这些战术，因为他甚至懒得看。然后他对"不专业的工作人员的工作"提出了一些模糊的批评，没有任何实际的分析或细节，这对于一个在选择自己的工作人员时因严重的裙带关系而臭名昭著的人来说充满了虚伪的味道。
Sheridan’s report, and his entire behaviour during his time as an observer in the Franco-Prussian War was frankly deplorably unprofessional. The man spent half the conflict playing tourist in various european capitals instead, and then wrote a “report” that was literally less than a single page.
He completely dismissed any bit of tactics or operational concepts that didn’t fit his own without even bothering to analyze them properly. He was entirely dismissive of the French to the point of literally bemoaning the absence of a number of tactics that were in fact regularily used by the French, which he simply didn’t notice because he didn’t even bother to look. And then he made some vague criticisms of “unprofessional staff work” without any actual analysis or detail, which reeks of hypocrisy from a man notorious for rank nepotism when it came to choosing his own staff.
谢里丹的报告，以及他在担任普法战争观察员期间的整个行为，坦率地说是令人遗憾地不专业的。这个人在冲突期间花了一半的时间在欧洲各国首都旅游，然后写了一份字面上不到一页的"报告"。
他完全否定了任何不符合他自己理念的战术或作战概念，甚至懒得好好分析它们。他对法国人完全不屑一顾，甚至哀叹法国人没有使用某些战术--事实上法国人经常使用，只是他根本没有注意到这些战术，因为他甚至懒得看。然后他对"不专业的工作人员的工作"提出了一些模糊的批评，没有任何实际的分析或细节，这对于一个在选择自己的工作人员时因严重的裙带关系而臭名昭著的人来说充满了虚伪的味道。
Will Coleman
Good answer. Enjoyed reading it.
You could argue that by 1865, the United States unx forces were the most capable army in the world. I would even say that as an armed forces, the United States would not see that level of military competence again until World War II
好答案。享受的阅读。
你可以说，在1865年，美国联邦部队是世界上最有能力的军队。我甚至会说，作为一支武装部队，美国直到第二次世界大战才会再次看到这种水平的军事能力
Good answer. Enjoyed reading it.
You could argue that by 1865, the United States unx forces were the most capable army in the world. I would even say that as an armed forces, the United States would not see that level of military competence again until World War II
好答案。享受的阅读。
你可以说，在1865年，美国联邦部队是世界上最有能力的军队。我甚至会说，作为一支武装部队，美国直到第二次世界大战才会再次看到这种水平的军事能力
Dima Chebotarev
An attempt to wishful thinking. The rabble that the US army represented in the 19th century would have lost the war to any great European power.
Even during World War II, the German tank ace Otto Carius, in his memoir, did not consider the Americans to be worthy opponents.
And he always emphasized that he needed at least a few battalions from the eastern front to knock the shit out of the Yankees. Actually, Montgomery’s contempt for the US army only confirms my words. The United States has a relatively dominant position, only thanks to the collapse of the USSR. In the next 10-20 years, the US will lose this status.
一厢情愿的想法。美国军队在19世纪所代表的乌合之众会在战争中输给任何一个欧洲大国。
即使在二战期间，德国坦克王牌奥托-卡里乌斯在其回忆录中也不认为美国人是个值得尊敬的对手。
而且他总是强调，他只要从东线抽调几个营的兵力，就能把美国佬打得落花流水。实际上，蒙哥马利对美军的蔑视只是证实了我的话。美国能有一个相对的主导地位，只是由于苏联的崩溃。在未来10-20年内，美国将失去这种地位。
An attempt to wishful thinking. The rabble that the US army represented in the 19th century would have lost the war to any great European power.
Even during World War II, the German tank ace Otto Carius, in his memoir, did not consider the Americans to be worthy opponents.
And he always emphasized that he needed at least a few battalions from the eastern front to knock the shit out of the Yankees. Actually, Montgomery’s contempt for the US army only confirms my words. The United States has a relatively dominant position, only thanks to the collapse of the USSR. In the next 10-20 years, the US will lose this status.
一厢情愿的想法。美国军队在19世纪所代表的乌合之众会在战争中输给任何一个欧洲大国。
即使在二战期间，德国坦克王牌奥托-卡里乌斯在其回忆录中也不认为美国人是个值得尊敬的对手。
而且他总是强调，他只要从东线抽调几个营的兵力，就能把美国佬打得落花流水。实际上，蒙哥马利对美军的蔑视只是证实了我的话。美国能有一个相对的主导地位，只是由于苏联的崩溃。在未来10-20年内，美国将失去这种地位。
Richard Lobb
Oh, give me a break. Carius was in contact with American units for two months and failed to prevent the breakout from Remagen, despite all those big fat tank destroyers he had, which couldn’t move by day because the Mustangs and Thunderbolts would have hit them. No matter what he thought of Americans, in the end he surrendered to . . . Americans.
呵呵，得了吧。卡里乌斯与美国部队接触了两个月，未能阻止盟军从雷马根的突围，尽管他有那么多的大胖坦克，这些坦克在白天无法移动，因为野马和霹雳会击中它们。不管他对美国人的看法如何，最后他还是投降了......向美国人。
Oh, give me a break. Carius was in contact with American units for two months and failed to prevent the breakout from Remagen, despite all those big fat tank destroyers he had, which couldn’t move by day because the Mustangs and Thunderbolts would have hit them. No matter what he thought of Americans, in the end he surrendered to . . . Americans.
呵呵，得了吧。卡里乌斯与美国部队接触了两个月，未能阻止盟军从雷马根的突围，尽管他有那么多的大胖坦克，这些坦克在白天无法移动，因为野马和霹雳会击中它们。不管他对美国人的看法如何，最后他还是投降了......向美国人。
Richard Lobb
From what I can glean of Carius’s book from reviews and commentary, he was trapped inside the Ruhr pocket while it was being mopped up by American units. He seems insulted that more Americans did not offer themselves to be killed, but in fact the Ruhr campaign was something of a sideshow to the main Allied offensive. General Bradley, in his memoirs, thought the campaign went well, praising his officers for “drillbook precision” in capturing the many towns in the Ruhr that formed the industrial heartland of Germany. But it was obviously not a major engagement at the very end of the war. Why the Americans should have suffered unnecessary casualties in wrapping up the Ruhr, Carius does not say.
Carius also complains bitterly of his treatment while a POW. The Allies indeed held hundreds of thousands of German servicemen in camps under conditions that were less than ideal, partly because supply lines were still precarious and millions of civilian refugees needed help, too. Carius survived and lived another 70 years, dying in 2015.
His pride was undoubtedly hurt by the fact that he had to surrender to the hated Americans and then had to endure being their prisoner. This seems to have warped his understanding of his two months’ fight with US soldiers.
以我从书评和评论中了解到的情况来看，当鲁尔区被美国部队扫荡时，他被困在了鲁尔区的口袋里。他似乎对没有没能让更多的美国人捐躯感到羞辱，但事实上，鲁尔战役对于盟军的主要攻势来说，只是一个附属品。布拉德利将军在他的回忆录中认为这场战役进行得很顺利，赞扬他的军官在攻占构成德国工业中心区的鲁尔区的许多城镇时做到了"进退有度"。但这显然不是一场在战争末期的重大交战。为什么美国人在包揽鲁尔区时要遭受不必要的伤亡，卡留斯没有说。
卡里乌斯还痛苦地抱怨了他在当战俘时的待遇。盟军确实将数十万德国军人关押在条件不太理想的难民营中，部分原因是供应线仍然不稳定，数百万平民难民也需要帮助。卡里乌斯活了下来，又活了70年，于2015年去世。
他的自尊心无疑受到了伤害，因为他不得不向可恨的美国人投降，然后不得不忍受成为他们的俘虏。这似乎扭曲了他对自己与美国士兵两个月的战斗的理解。
From what I can glean of Carius’s book from reviews and commentary, he was trapped inside the Ruhr pocket while it was being mopped up by American units. He seems insulted that more Americans did not offer themselves to be killed, but in fact the Ruhr campaign was something of a sideshow to the main Allied offensive. General Bradley, in his memoirs, thought the campaign went well, praising his officers for “drillbook precision” in capturing the many towns in the Ruhr that formed the industrial heartland of Germany. But it was obviously not a major engagement at the very end of the war. Why the Americans should have suffered unnecessary casualties in wrapping up the Ruhr, Carius does not say.
Carius also complains bitterly of his treatment while a POW. The Allies indeed held hundreds of thousands of German servicemen in camps under conditions that were less than ideal, partly because supply lines were still precarious and millions of civilian refugees needed help, too. Carius survived and lived another 70 years, dying in 2015.
His pride was undoubtedly hurt by the fact that he had to surrender to the hated Americans and then had to endure being their prisoner. This seems to have warped his understanding of his two months’ fight with US soldiers.
以我从书评和评论中了解到的情况来看，当鲁尔区被美国部队扫荡时，他被困在了鲁尔区的口袋里。他似乎对没有没能让更多的美国人捐躯感到羞辱，但事实上，鲁尔战役对于盟军的主要攻势来说，只是一个附属品。布拉德利将军在他的回忆录中认为这场战役进行得很顺利，赞扬他的军官在攻占构成德国工业中心区的鲁尔区的许多城镇时做到了"进退有度"。但这显然不是一场在战争末期的重大交战。为什么美国人在包揽鲁尔区时要遭受不必要的伤亡，卡留斯没有说。
卡里乌斯还痛苦地抱怨了他在当战俘时的待遇。盟军确实将数十万德国军人关押在条件不太理想的难民营中，部分原因是供应线仍然不稳定，数百万平民难民也需要帮助。卡里乌斯活了下来，又活了70年，于2015年去世。
他的自尊心无疑受到了伤害，因为他不得不向可恨的美国人投降，然后不得不忍受成为他们的俘虏。这似乎扭曲了他对自己与美国士兵两个月的战斗的理解。
Solomon Greyson
Not really. The Prussian Army of the period was still superior. The Prussian army of 71 could probably defeat the combination of the unx and CSA armies.
不能这么说。那个时期的普鲁士军队仍然很强。71年的普鲁士军队很可能联邦和联盟的军队加起来都不够他们打。
Not really. The Prussian Army of the period was still superior. The Prussian army of 71 could probably defeat the combination of the unx and CSA armies.
不能这么说。那个时期的普鲁士军队仍然很强。71年的普鲁士军队很可能联邦和联盟的军队加起来都不够他们打。
Oliver Berendes
I would follow John Keegan who said that the US Army in 1864/65 would have beaten any european army in the field.
Both armies might not have looked flashy, but the U.S. was able to put a million man into the field, provision the troops with all it needed in abundance and would still have been able to put a second million in the field.
And the US had enough production capacity in 1865 to wage war on a large scale.
Perhaps only after 1871, a German army would have been able to beat the US. But in real, both nations were nit able to move it´s troops across the Atlantic to fight. This was reserved for the 20th Century.
我赞同约翰-基根的观点，即1864/65年的美国军队能在战场上击败任何欧洲军队。
这两支军队可能看起来并不华丽，但美国能够将一百万人投入战场，为部队提供所需的一切，并且仍然能够将第二百万人投入战场。
而且美国在1865年有足够的生产能力来大规模发动战争。
也许只有在1871年之后，一支德国军队才有可能击败美国。但实际上，这两个国家都无法将其军队运过大西洋去作战。这是给20世纪的保留项目。
I would follow John Keegan who said that the US Army in 1864/65 would have beaten any european army in the field.
Both armies might not have looked flashy, but the U.S. was able to put a million man into the field, provision the troops with all it needed in abundance and would still have been able to put a second million in the field.
And the US had enough production capacity in 1865 to wage war on a large scale.
Perhaps only after 1871, a German army would have been able to beat the US. But in real, both nations were nit able to move it´s troops across the Atlantic to fight. This was reserved for the 20th Century.
我赞同约翰-基根的观点，即1864/65年的美国军队能在战场上击败任何欧洲军队。
这两支军队可能看起来并不华丽，但美国能够将一百万人投入战场，为部队提供所需的一切，并且仍然能够将第二百万人投入战场。
而且美国在1865年有足够的生产能力来大规模发动战争。
也许只有在1871年之后，一支德国军队才有可能击败美国。但实际上，这两个国家都无法将其军队运过大西洋去作战。这是给20世纪的保留项目。
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