为什么纳粹德国没有从拿破仑试图入侵俄国的错误中吸取教训?（二）
正文翻译
How come Nazi Germany didn’t learn from Napoleon’s blunder of trying to invade Russia?
为什么纳粹德国没有从拿破仑试图入侵俄国的错误中吸取教训?
How come Nazi Germany didn’t learn from Napoleon’s blunder of trying to invade Russia?
为什么纳粹德国没有从拿破仑试图入侵俄国的错误中吸取教训?
评论翻译
图：布列斯特-立托夫斯克条约，1917年
德国及其盟友奥地利在前一场战争中彻底击败了俄国。俄罗斯被迫在领土上做出巨大让步，包括乌克兰、波兰和波罗的海的大部分领土。俄国被打败了，被掏空了，一代人甚至更久都无法从损失中恢复过来。
只有在协约国手中击败了德国，俄国才得以收复最关键的失地。德国人只是想当然地认为，当他们的将军和陆军元帅还是中尉和上尉时，他们就已经可以再次重演一战时的场景。
Alexander Lovatt
Hitler had the same strategic problem as Napoleon. If he was going to dominate Europe he needed to neutralise Russia. The problem is that neither man appreciated the immensity of Russia and the severity of its climate. Neither had sufficient resources to achieve their aim.
希特勒和拿破仑有同样的战略问题。如果他想统治欧洲他就必须消灭俄国。问题是，两人都没有意识到俄罗斯的辽阔和气候的严峻。两国都没有足够的资源来实现他们的目标。
Hitler had the same strategic problem as Napoleon. If he was going to dominate Europe he needed to neutralise Russia. The problem is that neither man appreciated the immensity of Russia and the severity of its climate. Neither had sufficient resources to achieve their aim.
希特勒和拿破仑有同样的战略问题。如果他想统治欧洲他就必须消灭俄国。问题是，两人都没有意识到俄罗斯的辽阔和气候的严峻。两国都没有足够的资源来实现他们的目标。
Ronald Isaacs
Primarily it's Hitler's fault. He was suffering from the “victory disease” of overconfidence. He knew of Stalins murderous purges of the Red Army officer corps and he saw the difficulty they had with little Finland. From that he figured it would be easy.
Later he came about as close to an apology as a megalomaniac dictator can. He said if he would have known the Soviet unx had 20,000 plus operational tanks he would not have invaded. Another fact he didn't mention was he underestimated the sheer size of the Red Army. I've read something like 300+ Red Army divisions were identified by 1943, that's a full 100 divisions more than what the OKW estimated. Like being off by an entire moderately strong countries Army!!!
这主要是希特勒的错。他患了过度自信的“胜利病”。他知道斯大林对红军军官团的血腥清洗，也看到了他们在小芬兰遇到的困难。从这一点来看，他认为这很容易。
后来，作为一个狂妄自大的独裁者，他几乎要道歉了。他说，如果他知道苏联有2万多辆可用坦克，他就不会入侵了。另一个他没有提及的事实是他低估了红军的规模。据我所知，到1943年，大约有300多个师被确定为红军，这比OKW估计的还要多整整100个师。就像被整个中等强大的国家军队打败了一样！
Primarily it's Hitler's fault. He was suffering from the “victory disease” of overconfidence. He knew of Stalins murderous purges of the Red Army officer corps and he saw the difficulty they had with little Finland. From that he figured it would be easy.
Later he came about as close to an apology as a megalomaniac dictator can. He said if he would have known the Soviet unx had 20,000 plus operational tanks he would not have invaded. Another fact he didn't mention was he underestimated the sheer size of the Red Army. I've read something like 300+ Red Army divisions were identified by 1943, that's a full 100 divisions more than what the OKW estimated. Like being off by an entire moderately strong countries Army!!!
这主要是希特勒的错。他患了过度自信的“胜利病”。他知道斯大林对红军军官团的血腥清洗，也看到了他们在小芬兰遇到的困难。从这一点来看，他认为这很容易。
后来，作为一个狂妄自大的独裁者，他几乎要道歉了。他说，如果他知道苏联有2万多辆可用坦克，他就不会入侵了。另一个他没有提及的事实是他低估了红军的规模。据我所知，到1943年，大约有300多个师被确定为红军，这比OKW估计的还要多整整100个师。就像被整个中等强大的国家军队打败了一样！
John Dewar Gleissner
Hitler was blinded by ideological and racial hatred of Jews and Bolsheviks, thought the Soviet unx would collapse due to its inherent weaknesses, and believed he was a man of destiny whose will was paramount.
Hitler’s blitzkrieg European conquests before June 22, 1941 went rapidly, much faster than most of his generals thought possible, and never degenerated into a war of attrition. Because Hitler successfully overcame his top generals’ pre-invasion obxtions, he received or took much of the credit for those early successes, swelling his confidence beyond reason.
Hitler did not fully realize his summer blitzkrieg warfare would be limited by the immense terrain, poor roads, dust, wet and winter weather, the huge population of the Soviet unx and his attempt to invade, without substantial reserves, with the longest warfront in history, which got longer the farther the Germans drove into Russia.
希特勒被对犹太人和布尔什维克的意识形态和种族仇恨蒙蔽了双眼，认为苏联会因为其固有的弱点而崩溃，并相信自己是一个命定的人，他的意志是至高无上的。
希特勒在1941年6月22日之前对欧洲的闪电战进展迅速，比他的大多数将军想象的要快得多，而且从未退化为消耗战。由于希特勒成功地克服了他的高级将领在入侵前的反对意见，他获得早期成功的大部分功劳，使他的信心大增。
希特勒没有完全意识到，他的夏季闪电战将受到巨大地形、糟糕的道路、尘土、潮湿和冬天的天气、苏联庞大的人口和他的入侵企图的限制，没有大量的储备，面对历史上最长的战线，德国人越深入俄罗斯，战线就越长。
Hitler was blinded by ideological and racial hatred of Jews and Bolsheviks, thought the Soviet unx would collapse due to its inherent weaknesses, and believed he was a man of destiny whose will was paramount.
Hitler’s blitzkrieg European conquests before June 22, 1941 went rapidly, much faster than most of his generals thought possible, and never degenerated into a war of attrition. Because Hitler successfully overcame his top generals’ pre-invasion obxtions, he received or took much of the credit for those early successes, swelling his confidence beyond reason.
Hitler did not fully realize his summer blitzkrieg warfare would be limited by the immense terrain, poor roads, dust, wet and winter weather, the huge population of the Soviet unx and his attempt to invade, without substantial reserves, with the longest warfront in history, which got longer the farther the Germans drove into Russia.
希特勒被对犹太人和布尔什维克的意识形态和种族仇恨蒙蔽了双眼，认为苏联会因为其固有的弱点而崩溃，并相信自己是一个命定的人，他的意志是至高无上的。
希特勒在1941年6月22日之前对欧洲的闪电战进展迅速，比他的大多数将军想象的要快得多，而且从未退化为消耗战。由于希特勒成功地克服了他的高级将领在入侵前的反对意见，他获得早期成功的大部分功劳，使他的信心大增。
希特勒没有完全意识到，他的夏季闪电战将受到巨大地形、糟糕的道路、尘土、潮湿和冬天的天气、苏联庞大的人口和他的入侵企图的限制，没有大量的储备，面对历史上最长的战线，德国人越深入俄罗斯，战线就越长。
Hitler thought his invasion was different from Napoleon’s because Hitler (a) had air power and internal combustion engines in his modern planes, vehicles and tanks, (b) thought the war on the Eastern Front would be over by winter, (c) minimized the importance and weariness of the bulk of his army that marched and had horses carry equipment, (d) did not account for the tanks getting so far ahead of the marchers, (e) underestimated how hard the Red Army would fight, and (f) did not think that Stalin would have time to draft, train and equip soldiers from the Soviet manpower reserves of 14,000,000 available warriors.
Hitler never agreed with his top generals as to the primary obxtive. His generals wanted to drive on Moscow; Hitler made the German Army spread out along the entire front.
希特勒认为他的入侵不同于拿破仑，因为希特勒：
1. 拥有空中力量和现代飞机、车辆和坦克；2. 认为东线战争将在冬天结；3. 大军行军由马匹来运输装备，最大限度地减少了他的大军的负担。4. 没有考虑到坦克跑在大部队前面这么远；5. 低估了红军的战斗强度；6. 认为斯大林没有时间从苏联1400万可用的战士储备中征召、训练和装备士兵。
在主要目标上，希特勒从未与他的高级将领达成一致。他的将军们想进攻莫斯科;希特勒让德军沿着整个战线展开。
Hitler never agreed with his top generals as to the primary obxtive. His generals wanted to drive on Moscow; Hitler made the German Army spread out along the entire front.
希特勒认为他的入侵不同于拿破仑，因为希特勒：
1. 拥有空中力量和现代飞机、车辆和坦克；2. 认为东线战争将在冬天结；3. 大军行军由马匹来运输装备，最大限度地减少了他的大军的负担。4. 没有考虑到坦克跑在大部队前面这么远；5. 低估了红军的战斗强度；6. 认为斯大林没有时间从苏联1400万可用的战士储备中征召、训练和装备士兵。
在主要目标上，希特勒从未与他的高级将领达成一致。他的将军们想进攻莫斯科;希特勒让德军沿着整个战线展开。
Michael Beraka
This is an underrated question, and shows you exactly the difference between intelligence and cleverness.
The ‘moralistic’ theology of the West would have the world believe that a man like Hitler—a nihilist who truly believed—was impossible, a contradiction in terms. Nobody that wanton could be bright—mafioso are generally treated abusively in fiction (The Godfather and the Sopranos are the exceptions that prove the rule). And indeed, the idea that only an idiot would be a ‘nihilist’ was shared by both the pre and post Christian Greek inheritance of Europe. Hitler was not a happy man, and yet many of us would chose absolute power over happiness. In fact, it wouldn’t even be a question; most people would sell out whatever beliefs they convince themselves they hold in all of two seconds if they ever came anywhere near the corridors of real power—exactly this point is why the protagonist of House of Cards breaks the normally taboo rule of crossing the “4th wall”: talking to the audience. They are pulling for him, even though he’s proud to be the bad guy, because they get to be insiders, as long as he continues his rise.
这是一个被低估的问题，它恰恰向你展示了智力和聪明之间的区别。
西方的“道德主义”神学会让世界相信，一个像希特勒这样的人，一个世人皆以为的虚无主义者是不可能成功的。但这在措辞上是矛盾的。在小说中，黑手党通常受到虐待(《教父》和《黑道家族》是证明这一规律的例外)。
希特勒不是一个幸福的人，然而我们中的许多人会选择绝对的权力而不是幸福。事实上，这甚至都不是一个问题。大多数人一旦接近真正权力的走廊，就会在两秒钟内出卖自己的信念。这就是为什么《纸牌屋》的主角打破了通常禁忌的规则，越过“第四堵墙”: 与观众交谈。他们推举他，尽管他以做坏人为荣，因为只要他继续攀升，他们就能成为圈内人士。
This is an underrated question, and shows you exactly the difference between intelligence and cleverness.
The ‘moralistic’ theology of the West would have the world believe that a man like Hitler—a nihilist who truly believed—was impossible, a contradiction in terms. Nobody that wanton could be bright—mafioso are generally treated abusively in fiction (The Godfather and the Sopranos are the exceptions that prove the rule). And indeed, the idea that only an idiot would be a ‘nihilist’ was shared by both the pre and post Christian Greek inheritance of Europe. Hitler was not a happy man, and yet many of us would chose absolute power over happiness. In fact, it wouldn’t even be a question; most people would sell out whatever beliefs they convince themselves they hold in all of two seconds if they ever came anywhere near the corridors of real power—exactly this point is why the protagonist of House of Cards breaks the normally taboo rule of crossing the “4th wall”: talking to the audience. They are pulling for him, even though he’s proud to be the bad guy, because they get to be insiders, as long as he continues his rise.
这是一个被低估的问题，它恰恰向你展示了智力和聪明之间的区别。
西方的“道德主义”神学会让世界相信，一个像希特勒这样的人，一个世人皆以为的虚无主义者是不可能成功的。但这在措辞上是矛盾的。在小说中，黑手党通常受到虐待(《教父》和《黑道家族》是证明这一规律的例外)。
希特勒不是一个幸福的人，然而我们中的许多人会选择绝对的权力而不是幸福。事实上，这甚至都不是一个问题。大多数人一旦接近真正权力的走廊，就会在两秒钟内出卖自己的信念。这就是为什么《纸牌屋》的主角打破了通常禁忌的规则，越过“第四堵墙”: 与观众交谈。他们推举他，尽管他以做坏人为荣，因为只要他继续攀升，他们就能成为圈内人士。
But I digress. Hitler was obsessed with Napoleon’s failure in Russia. He ultimately came to believe that he made an idol of the capital ; and that the “Oriental” Russians did not have this pride and dignity attachment to the land; but rather a Mongol-esque austerity and pragmatism. Hitler was the completion of the Protestantism in European political and spiritual life that outlasted Christian Faith—above all, he was a puritanical opponent of idolatry. And like Kevin Spacey’s character, mocking the politicians and journalists clamoring for a presidential “pen” from a famous bill signing, he has contempt for people who think power exists in trinkets. All there is is power, and power can’t be hoarded.
我跑题了。
希特勒痴迷于拿破仑在俄国的失败。他最终相信自己会与众不同。“东方”的俄罗斯人对这片土地没有这样的自豪感和尊严感，有的是蒙古式的节俭和实用主义。在欧洲的政治和精神生活中，希特勒是超越基督教信仰的新教的完人——最重要的是，他是一个反对偶像崇拜的清教徒。就像凯文·史派西饰演的角色一样，他嘲笑那些吵着要总统的“笔”的政客和记者们，嘲笑那些认为权力存在于饰品中的人。那里只有权力，而权力是无法囤积的。
我跑题了。
希特勒痴迷于拿破仑在俄国的失败。他最终相信自己会与众不同。“东方”的俄罗斯人对这片土地没有这样的自豪感和尊严感，有的是蒙古式的节俭和实用主义。在欧洲的政治和精神生活中，希特勒是超越基督教信仰的新教的完人——最重要的是，他是一个反对偶像崇拜的清教徒。就像凯文·史派西饰演的角色一样，他嘲笑那些吵着要总统的“笔”的政客和记者们，嘲笑那些认为权力存在于饰品中的人。那里只有权力，而权力是无法囤积的。
This is all well and good middlebrow Nietzscheanism—but the whole point of studying philosophy, of knowing enough about theology to actually understand the problem with idolatry, is to avoid making theorems out of incidents. Hitler wanted the oil fields in the Caucasus; but the situation and the world were immeasurably different from Napoleon’s time. Aside from squandering the strongest weapon the Nazis had, the aura of invincibility, inevitability, the futility of resistance (exactly the same one shared by Napoleon), by routing his own advance; Hitler did not factor in the importance of communications in the 20th century, of which Moscow was of course the center.
这是非常好的尼采之道，但学习哲学，了解足够多的神学知识以真正理解偶像崇拜的问题的全部要点，会让人无法从事件中总结出教训。希特勒想要高加索地区的油田，但是当时的形势和世界与拿破仑时代已经有了显著的不同。除了浪费纳粹所拥有的最强大的武器，不可战胜的光环，徒劳的抵抗(拿破仑也拥有同样的光环)，挫败了自己的前进，希特勒没有考虑到20世纪通讯的重要性，莫斯科当然是通讯的中心。
这是非常好的尼采之道，但学习哲学，了解足够多的神学知识以真正理解偶像崇拜的问题的全部要点，会让人无法从事件中总结出教训。希特勒想要高加索地区的油田，但是当时的形势和世界与拿破仑时代已经有了显著的不同。除了浪费纳粹所拥有的最强大的武器，不可战胜的光环，徒劳的抵抗(拿破仑也拥有同样的光环)，挫败了自己的前进，希特勒没有考虑到20世纪通讯的重要性，莫斯科当然是通讯的中心。
Ultimately, he did the exact same thing as Napoleon. The difference in his campaign was cosmetic, incidental; he didn’t *really* have clear obxtives; he bet the ranch on the lightning swiftness of the campaign, and then obstructed exactly this for a hazy goal. He never *really appraised things soberly; his delusions were too intertwined with the source of his (very veritable) political and strategic strength. People that are obsessed with being clever usually end up looking foolish.
最终，他做了和拿破仑一样的事，他们的区别不过是表面和偶然的。他没有清晰的目标。
他把整个宝都押在了这场战役的闪电般的迅捷上，结果恰恰是目标的模糊而阻挠了这场战役。他从不真正冷静地评价事物，他的妄想与他(非常真实的)政治和战略实力的来源纠缠在一起。
沉迷于变得聪明的人通常最终会看起来很愚蠢。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
最终，他做了和拿破仑一样的事，他们的区别不过是表面和偶然的。他没有清晰的目标。
他把整个宝都押在了这场战役的闪电般的迅捷上，结果恰恰是目标的模糊而阻挠了这场战役。他从不真正冷静地评价事物，他的妄想与他(非常真实的)政治和战略实力的来源纠缠在一起。
沉迷于变得聪明的人通常最终会看起来很愚蠢。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Tomaž Vargazon
Napoleon’s blunder of trying to invade Russia was quite irrelevant.
They were basing their plans on a more recent result of an invasion of Russia.
Germany, with their Austrian allies, utterly defeated Russia in the previous war. Russia was forced to make huge territorial concessions, including most of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics. Russia was defeated and eviscerated, it could not recover from the loss in a generation or more.
It was only the defeat of Germany at the hands of the Entente that allowed Russia to recover the most critical of the lost territories. Germany simply assumed they would be able to do again what they were already able to do when their generals and field marshalls were still lieutenants and captains.
拿破仑试图入侵俄国的错误完全无关紧要。他们（希特勒）的计划是基于最近入侵俄国的结果。
Napoleon’s blunder of trying to invade Russia was quite irrelevant.
They were basing their plans on a more recent result of an invasion of Russia.
Germany, with their Austrian allies, utterly defeated Russia in the previous war. Russia was forced to make huge territorial concessions, including most of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics. Russia was defeated and eviscerated, it could not recover from the loss in a generation or more.
It was only the defeat of Germany at the hands of the Entente that allowed Russia to recover the most critical of the lost territories. Germany simply assumed they would be able to do again what they were already able to do when their generals and field marshalls were still lieutenants and captains.
拿破仑试图入侵俄国的错误完全无关紧要。他们（希特勒）的计划是基于最近入侵俄国的结果。
图：布列斯特-立托夫斯克条约，1917年
德国及其盟友奥地利在前一场战争中彻底击败了俄国。俄罗斯被迫在领土上做出巨大让步，包括乌克兰、波兰和波罗的海的大部分领土。俄国被打败了，被掏空了，一代人甚至更久都无法从损失中恢复过来。
只有在协约国手中击败了德国，俄国才得以收复最关键的失地。德国人只是想当然地认为，当他们的将军和陆军元帅还是中尉和上尉时，他们就已经可以再次重演一战时的场景。
It wasn’t an unreasonable assumption at all. The lines of advance in WW2 went above and beyond the limits of Brest-Litovsk, the only difference was that Communist Russia under Stalin fought like they had nothing to lose, in no small part because they didn’t. In WW1 they fought for an empire that didn’t care about them, the alternative was to live in a different empire that also didn’t care about them. In WW2 the option was an empire that didn’t care about them and death. That was the key motor of incessant Soviet resistance that enabled the state to survive the war.
Napoleon didn’t even factor into it. Not only that but the way Napoleon was defeated - through starvation, exposure and exhaustion - was entirely avoided. When winter came the Wehrmacht thrived, the Red Army was most successful during the rainy season, when long distance resupply and air operations were difficult if not outright impossible.
They didn’t learn from Napoleon, because Napoleon had little to teach them.
这并不是一个不合理的假设。二战的推进线超出了《布列斯特-立托夫斯克条约》的限制，唯一的区别是斯大林领导下的共产主义俄罗斯在战斗中没有遭受任何损失。在第一次世界大战中，他们为一个不关心他们的帝国而战，另一种选择是生活在一个同样不关心他们的帝国。在二战中，选择变成了一边是不在乎他们和他们的死的帝国（而另一边不是）。这是苏联不断抵抗的关键动力，使国家能够在战争中幸存下来。
拿破仑的案例在这里完全没有可比性。不仅如此，拿破仑战败的方式——饥饿、暴露和疲惫，（德国）也完全避免了。当冬季到来时，德国国防军行动自如。但红军在雨季大获成功，因为此时即使不是完全不可能，（德军方面）也很难进行远程补给和空中作战。
他们没有向拿破仑学习，因为拿破仑没有什么可以教给他们的。
Napoleon didn’t even factor into it. Not only that but the way Napoleon was defeated - through starvation, exposure and exhaustion - was entirely avoided. When winter came the Wehrmacht thrived, the Red Army was most successful during the rainy season, when long distance resupply and air operations were difficult if not outright impossible.
They didn’t learn from Napoleon, because Napoleon had little to teach them.
这并不是一个不合理的假设。二战的推进线超出了《布列斯特-立托夫斯克条约》的限制，唯一的区别是斯大林领导下的共产主义俄罗斯在战斗中没有遭受任何损失。在第一次世界大战中，他们为一个不关心他们的帝国而战，另一种选择是生活在一个同样不关心他们的帝国。在二战中，选择变成了一边是不在乎他们和他们的死的帝国（而另一边不是）。这是苏联不断抵抗的关键动力，使国家能够在战争中幸存下来。
拿破仑的案例在这里完全没有可比性。不仅如此，拿破仑战败的方式——饥饿、暴露和疲惫，（德国）也完全避免了。当冬季到来时，德国国防军行动自如。但红军在雨季大获成功，因为此时即使不是完全不可能，（德军方面）也很难进行远程补给和空中作战。
他们没有向拿破仑学习，因为拿破仑没有什么可以教给他们的。
Joe Goldberg
The Germans correctly attributed Napoleon’s failure in Russia to be due to impossible logistics in the world of 1800.
The German INCORRECTLY thought that the superior logistical support allowed by railroads, trucks, and aircraft would solve Napoleon’s problem in Russia. They were right as to modern logistical support in Western Europe but the German’s were wrong as to modern logistical support in the USSR which STILL looked a lot like when Napoleon invaded.
德国人正确地将拿破仑在俄国的失败归因于1800年代无法实现的后勤保障。
但德国人错误地认为，铁路、卡车和飞机所提供的优越后勤支持可以解决拿破仑在俄国的问题。他们对西欧的现代后勤支持的看法是正确的，但德国人对苏联的现代后勤支持的看法是错误的，苏联看起来和拿破仑入侵时很像。
The Germans correctly attributed Napoleon’s failure in Russia to be due to impossible logistics in the world of 1800.
The German INCORRECTLY thought that the superior logistical support allowed by railroads, trucks, and aircraft would solve Napoleon’s problem in Russia. They were right as to modern logistical support in Western Europe but the German’s were wrong as to modern logistical support in the USSR which STILL looked a lot like when Napoleon invaded.
德国人正确地将拿破仑在俄国的失败归因于1800年代无法实现的后勤保障。
但德国人错误地认为，铁路、卡车和飞机所提供的优越后勤支持可以解决拿破仑在俄国的问题。他们对西欧的现代后勤支持的看法是正确的，但德国人对苏联的现代后勤支持的看法是错误的，苏联看起来和拿破仑入侵时很像。
Kaspar Pena
It’s odd because the Germans didn’t actually do that well logistically. Their army relied far too much on horsepower and the Russian railroad gauges were different than the German ones, so the Nazis had basically construct new rail lines rather than seamlessly switching over.
这很奇怪，因为德国人在后勤方面做得并不好。他们的军队过于依赖马匹，而且俄国的铁路轨距与德国的不同，所以纳粹基本上是在建造新的铁路线路，而不是无缝切换。
It’s odd because the Germans didn’t actually do that well logistically. Their army relied far too much on horsepower and the Russian railroad gauges were different than the German ones, so the Nazis had basically construct new rail lines rather than seamlessly switching over.
这很奇怪，因为德国人在后勤方面做得并不好。他们的军队过于依赖马匹，而且俄国的铁路轨距与德国的不同，所以纳粹基本上是在建造新的铁路线路，而不是无缝切换。
Sergey Bobyk
Actually ww1 Russian Imperial army hold the ground a lot better then Red Army in WW2. Germans and Austrians never get in too deep well into 1917. Russians holded. So called victory came as a direct result of Revolution when Army simply went home in millions taking with them weapons. Lenin as well in his first edicts demobilised everyone.
Genius. Country at war and he sending last loyal men home. Germans woken up and found empty trenches.
In 1918 Germans took more than in all 4 previous years althogether. Not because of own process but because there simply was no any opposition. They could move in as deep as their hearts wished and only logistics and necessary manpower was a constraints.
事实上，一战期间沙俄军队比二战时红军抵抗得更好。
1917年，德国人和奥地利人从未深入俄罗斯，俄罗斯人守住了。所谓的（德国和奥地利的）胜利是（布尔什维克）革命的直接结果，当时数百万（沙俄）军队带着武器回家。列宁还在他的第一个法令中遣散了所有沙俄军队。
真是个天才，国家处于战争，他却让忠诚的人归家。德军醒来后发现对面战壕空无一人。
1918年德国人拿到的战争赔款比之前4年的总和还要多。不是因为自己打赢的，而是因为根本没有任何敌人。他们可以随心所欲地深入，只有后勤和必要的人力是限制。
Actually ww1 Russian Imperial army hold the ground a lot better then Red Army in WW2. Germans and Austrians never get in too deep well into 1917. Russians holded. So called victory came as a direct result of Revolution when Army simply went home in millions taking with them weapons. Lenin as well in his first edicts demobilised everyone.
Genius. Country at war and he sending last loyal men home. Germans woken up and found empty trenches.
In 1918 Germans took more than in all 4 previous years althogether. Not because of own process but because there simply was no any opposition. They could move in as deep as their hearts wished and only logistics and necessary manpower was a constraints.
事实上，一战期间沙俄军队比二战时红军抵抗得更好。
1917年，德国人和奥地利人从未深入俄罗斯，俄罗斯人守住了。所谓的（德国和奥地利的）胜利是（布尔什维克）革命的直接结果，当时数百万（沙俄）军队带着武器回家。列宁还在他的第一个法令中遣散了所有沙俄军队。
真是个天才，国家处于战争，他却让忠诚的人归家。德军醒来后发现对面战壕空无一人。
1918年德国人拿到的战争赔款比之前4年的总和还要多。不是因为自己打赢的，而是因为根本没有任何敌人。他们可以随心所欲地深入，只有后勤和必要的人力是限制。
Andreas König
That’s pretty much entirely wrong.
The Russian Imperial Army dissolved thanks to the first Russian Revolution in 1917, the one in February which forced the Tsar to abdicate and which established a Provisional Republic… not because of the Red Revolution in October or because they “send them home”. The Kerensky Offensive in July 1917 was the final nail in the coffin for the Russian Army, whatever was left retreated 240km behind the front → “The only limit to the German advance was the lack of the logistical means to occupy more territory”.
Also, “genius” move by the Tsar to “just” let his people starve and feed them with bullets when they cry for bread… perhaps domestic policies become far more important in times of war, unless you love a good Revolution or two.
Furthermore your comparison is really skewed.
这是完全错误的。
沙俄军队的解散要感谢1917年的第一次俄国革命，这场革命发生在2月，迫使沙皇退位，并建立了临时共和国，不是因为10月的红色革命，也不是因为他们（布尔什维克人）“送他们回家”。 1917年7月的克伦斯基攻势是俄军的最后一颗钉在棺材上的钉子，不管剩下什么，都撤退到前线后方240公里，导致德军前进并占领领地的唯一限制是缺乏后勤。
此外，沙皇的“天才”举动是“只是”让他的人民挨饿，当他们哭喊着要面包时用子弹喂他们……兴许，战争时期，国内政策远比和平时期更加重要，除非你想要遭遇革命。
That’s pretty much entirely wrong.
The Russian Imperial Army dissolved thanks to the first Russian Revolution in 1917, the one in February which forced the Tsar to abdicate and which established a Provisional Republic… not because of the Red Revolution in October or because they “send them home”. The Kerensky Offensive in July 1917 was the final nail in the coffin for the Russian Army, whatever was left retreated 240km behind the front → “The only limit to the German advance was the lack of the logistical means to occupy more territory”.
Also, “genius” move by the Tsar to “just” let his people starve and feed them with bullets when they cry for bread… perhaps domestic policies become far more important in times of war, unless you love a good Revolution or two.
Furthermore your comparison is really skewed.
这是完全错误的。
沙俄军队的解散要感谢1917年的第一次俄国革命，这场革命发生在2月，迫使沙皇退位，并建立了临时共和国，不是因为10月的红色革命，也不是因为他们（布尔什维克人）“送他们回家”。 1917年7月的克伦斯基攻势是俄军的最后一颗钉在棺材上的钉子，不管剩下什么，都撤退到前线后方240公里，导致德军前进并占领领地的唯一限制是缺乏后勤。
此外，沙皇的“天才”举动是“只是”让他的人民挨饿，当他们哭喊着要面包时用子弹喂他们……兴许，战争时期，国内政策远比和平时期更加重要，除非你想要遭遇革命。
Furthermore your comparison is really skewed.
The Russian Empire was far larger than the Soviet unx and the Russians had the element of surprise, they mobilized first and invaded German territory in East Prussia for instance… The German Army had to travel a far larger distance, first defending their own territory, then invading Russian-Poland.
Meanwhile WW2 Soviet Russia was more or less taken by surprise, their army in the middle of reconstruction and Poland was already divided… Of course Germany has the initiative and takes more land in WW2….
You also fail to take into account that during WW1, the Central Powers were fighting everywhere at the same time… Nazi Germany had the luxury to focus on one enemy at a time, atleast until they invaded Soviet Russia.
再者，你的比较是错误的：
沙俄帝国比苏联大得多，俄罗斯人有出其不意的能力，比如，他们首先动员起来入侵德国在东普鲁士的领土。而德国军队必须行进更长距离的行军，首先保卫自己的领土，然后才能入侵俄罗斯/波兰。与此同时，二战期间的苏联或多或少受到了惊吓，他们的军队正在重建，波兰已经分裂了，当然德国在二战中拥有主动权，占领了更多的土地……
你也没有考虑到在第一次世界大战期间，同盟国同时在各地作战。而纳粹德国有奢侈的时间专注于一个敌人，至少在他们入侵苏联之前是这样。
当然，当敌人被打败到面临革命、大规模逃兵和军队解散的地步时，你会获得最大的收益……在第一次世界大战期间，协约国(除了1914年的俄罗斯)从未占领过任何德国领土，只有在战争快结束时，当停战协议签署时，协约国才占领了德国领土。这个结果是可以预料到的，德国军队解体，德国也发生了两次革命，尽管只有一次成功。
The Russian Empire was far larger than the Soviet unx and the Russians had the element of surprise, they mobilized first and invaded German territory in East Prussia for instance… The German Army had to travel a far larger distance, first defending their own territory, then invading Russian-Poland.
Meanwhile WW2 Soviet Russia was more or less taken by surprise, their army in the middle of reconstruction and Poland was already divided… Of course Germany has the initiative and takes more land in WW2….
You also fail to take into account that during WW1, the Central Powers were fighting everywhere at the same time… Nazi Germany had the luxury to focus on one enemy at a time, atleast until they invaded Soviet Russia.
再者，你的比较是错误的：
沙俄帝国比苏联大得多，俄罗斯人有出其不意的能力，比如，他们首先动员起来入侵德国在东普鲁士的领土。而德国军队必须行进更长距离的行军，首先保卫自己的领土，然后才能入侵俄罗斯/波兰。与此同时，二战期间的苏联或多或少受到了惊吓，他们的军队正在重建，波兰已经分裂了，当然德国在二战中拥有主动权，占领了更多的土地……
你也没有考虑到在第一次世界大战期间，同盟国同时在各地作战。而纳粹德国有奢侈的时间专注于一个敌人，至少在他们入侵苏联之前是这样。
当然，当敌人被打败到面临革命、大规模逃兵和军队解散的地步时，你会获得最大的收益……在第一次世界大战期间，协约国(除了1914年的俄罗斯)从未占领过任何德国领土，只有在战争快结束时，当停战协议签署时，协约国才占领了德国领土。这个结果是可以预料到的，德国军队解体，德国也发生了两次革命，尽管只有一次成功。
Sergey Bobyk
Revolution in Feb 1917 destroyed Army. Chain of command was broken , any subordination or discipline gone overnight, soldiers habitually shot their officers with impunity and desert home. Soldiers demanded “full democracy” or vote about who should command, should they gone to attack or not or should they obey whatsoever any orders. Any punishmens or even verbal orders was banned. Human rights idiocy in fighting Army !!! Kerensky was actually the root of it. He simply did not trusted old army and especially officers corp. Correctly, as mutiny of August shown. Lenin with his gang of agitators helped spreading rumours of land grabs of latifundias for free at home. For own goals of course. To organise armed coup Army had to be destroyed first at any cost or Bolsheviks would be hang by nightfall in October.
1917年2月的革命摧毁了沙俄陆军。指挥系统被破坏，任何从属关系或纪律都在一夜之间消失，士兵们习惯性地射杀他们的军官而不受惩罚，逃之夭夭。士兵们要求“完全民主”或投票决定由谁来指挥，他们是否应该进攻，或者他们是否应该服从任何命令。任何惩罚甚至口头命令都是被禁止的。军队里面讲人权纯粹就是白痴行为！
克伦斯基是导致这一切的根源。他就是不相信旧军队，特别是军官集团，正如八月的兵变所显示的那样。列宁和他的一帮煽动者帮助传播了在国内免费夺取大庄园土地的谣言。这当然是为了自己的目标。要组织武装政变，必须不惜一切代价首先消灭军队，否则布尔什维克就会在十月黄昏前被绞死。
Revolution in Feb 1917 destroyed Army. Chain of command was broken , any subordination or discipline gone overnight, soldiers habitually shot their officers with impunity and desert home. Soldiers demanded “full democracy” or vote about who should command, should they gone to attack or not or should they obey whatsoever any orders. Any punishmens or even verbal orders was banned. Human rights idiocy in fighting Army !!! Kerensky was actually the root of it. He simply did not trusted old army and especially officers corp. Correctly, as mutiny of August shown. Lenin with his gang of agitators helped spreading rumours of land grabs of latifundias for free at home. For own goals of course. To organise armed coup Army had to be destroyed first at any cost or Bolsheviks would be hang by nightfall in October.
1917年2月的革命摧毁了沙俄陆军。指挥系统被破坏，任何从属关系或纪律都在一夜之间消失，士兵们习惯性地射杀他们的军官而不受惩罚，逃之夭夭。士兵们要求“完全民主”或投票决定由谁来指挥，他们是否应该进攻，或者他们是否应该服从任何命令。任何惩罚甚至口头命令都是被禁止的。军队里面讲人权纯粹就是白痴行为！
克伦斯基是导致这一切的根源。他就是不相信旧军队，特别是军官集团，正如八月的兵变所显示的那样。列宁和他的一帮煽动者帮助传播了在国内免费夺取大庄园土地的谣言。这当然是为了自己的目标。要组织武装政变，必须不惜一切代价首先消灭军队，否则布尔什维克就会在十月黄昏前被绞死。
That's why Germany had some success. Opposing Army melted home. And in November 1917 Lenin dissolved last remains. Front was literally open.
Personally I can take performance of Russian Army as from August1914-Feb1917 separately. After, there was no Russia as unified state and no Army. But not because of German strength.
But in 4 years Germany failed to move much past Poland and Western Ukraine (colonies) and war never reached Metropolia. Russians hold.
这就是为什么德国取得了一些成功。对方军队在自己打自己。1917年11月，列宁解散了最后的旧军队，导致战争前线洞门大开。
就我个人而言，我可以把俄罗斯军队从1914年8月到1917年2月的表现分开来看。之后，统一的俄罗斯不复存在，军队也不复存在。但这并不是因为德国导致的。
但在（二战的）4年的时间里，德国没能越过波兰和西乌克兰(殖民地)，战争也从未波及大城市。俄罗斯人守住了。
Personally I can take performance of Russian Army as from August1914-Feb1917 separately. After, there was no Russia as unified state and no Army. But not because of German strength.
But in 4 years Germany failed to move much past Poland and Western Ukraine (colonies) and war never reached Metropolia. Russians hold.
这就是为什么德国取得了一些成功。对方军队在自己打自己。1917年11月，列宁解散了最后的旧军队，导致战争前线洞门大开。
就我个人而言，我可以把俄罗斯军队从1914年8月到1917年2月的表现分开来看。之后，统一的俄罗斯不复存在，军队也不复存在。但这并不是因为德国导致的。
但在（二战的）4年的时间里，德国没能越过波兰和西乌克兰(殖民地)，战争也从未波及大城市。俄罗斯人守住了。
Vladimir Smirnov
“Of course you make the most gains when the enemy was beaten to the point of Revolution, mass desertion and dissolvement of the Army…”
Russian Army started decaying since the First Russian Revolution of 1905. Tsar Nicolas saw entering the war in 1914 as an option out of the coming internal revolt, but he was gravely mistaken. Due to the powerful strife for change in Russia, the Russian Empire would have transformed into something new even without the war of 1914–1918. Germany just happened to rip the benefit of Russia’s internal disarray. And yes, Lenin issued the “Decree of Peace” in November 1917 in response to the masses’ request to abandon the useless war, so naturally Germans took full advantage of the absence of their opponent in the trenches.
“当然，当敌人被打败到面临革命、大规模逃兵和军队解散的地步时，你会获得最大的收益……”
俄国军队从1905年第一次革命开始衰落。沙皇尼古拉认为1914年参战是为了应对即将到来的国内叛乱，但他大错特错了。由于俄国内部强烈的变革斗争，即使没有1914-1918年的战争，沙俄也会转变成新的国家。德国只是碰巧从俄罗斯的内部混乱中获益。是的，列宁在1917年11月颁布了《和平法令》，以响应群众要求放弃这场无用的战争，所以德国人自然充分利用了他们的对手不在战壕里的机会。
“Of course you make the most gains when the enemy was beaten to the point of Revolution, mass desertion and dissolvement of the Army…”
Russian Army started decaying since the First Russian Revolution of 1905. Tsar Nicolas saw entering the war in 1914 as an option out of the coming internal revolt, but he was gravely mistaken. Due to the powerful strife for change in Russia, the Russian Empire would have transformed into something new even without the war of 1914–1918. Germany just happened to rip the benefit of Russia’s internal disarray. And yes, Lenin issued the “Decree of Peace” in November 1917 in response to the masses’ request to abandon the useless war, so naturally Germans took full advantage of the absence of their opponent in the trenches.
“当然，当敌人被打败到面临革命、大规模逃兵和军队解散的地步时，你会获得最大的收益……”
俄国军队从1905年第一次革命开始衰落。沙皇尼古拉认为1914年参战是为了应对即将到来的国内叛乱，但他大错特错了。由于俄国内部强烈的变革斗争，即使没有1914-1918年的战争，沙俄也会转变成新的国家。德国只是碰巧从俄罗斯的内部混乱中获益。是的，列宁在1917年11月颁布了《和平法令》，以响应群众要求放弃这场无用的战争，所以德国人自然充分利用了他们的对手不在战壕里的机会。
Then in March 2018 the Bolsheviks found themselves in dire necessity to sign a truce in Brest with Germans who advanced deep into the Russian territory.
The example of WW1 played a dirty joke with Germans at the time of WW2. They thought WW2 would be as easy for them as WW1: Russia would be in disarray again, etc. Though this time Russia was not, and the result is well known: WW2 ended when Russian tanks rolled into Berlin.
Germans needed to be better students of history, for Napoleon was their primary teacher. And remains ad infinitum.
然后在1918年3月，布尔什维克发现他们非常有必要在布列斯特与深入俄罗斯领土的德国人签署停战协议。
一战的例子在二战期间和德国人开了一个肮脏的玩笑。他们认为第二次世界大战对他们来说和第一次世界大战一样容易：俄罗斯会再次陷入混乱。尽管这一次俄罗斯没有，而且结果是众所周知的：二战结束时，俄罗斯坦克开进了柏林。
德国人需要成为更好的历史学生，因为拿破仑是他们的主要老师。并且不可懈怠。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
The example of WW1 played a dirty joke with Germans at the time of WW2. They thought WW2 would be as easy for them as WW1: Russia would be in disarray again, etc. Though this time Russia was not, and the result is well known: WW2 ended when Russian tanks rolled into Berlin.
Germans needed to be better students of history, for Napoleon was their primary teacher. And remains ad infinitum.
然后在1918年3月，布尔什维克发现他们非常有必要在布列斯特与深入俄罗斯领土的德国人签署停战协议。
一战的例子在二战期间和德国人开了一个肮脏的玩笑。他们认为第二次世界大战对他们来说和第一次世界大战一样容易：俄罗斯会再次陷入混乱。尽管这一次俄罗斯没有，而且结果是众所周知的：二战结束时，俄罗斯坦克开进了柏林。
德国人需要成为更好的历史学生，因为拿破仑是他们的主要老师。并且不可懈怠。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
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