网友讨论：蒙古人对联合作战战术的影响
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Mohsin77
A while ago I listened to Dan Carlin's podcast on the Mongols (Wrath of the Khans), and he provided a lot of good historical info on how modern maneuver warfare, developed during WWII, was actually inspired by the Mongols.
I read a US Army paper on this a while back as well. However, I have not gone into the primary sources (e.g. Liddell Hart, J.F.C Fuller and the Russian and German military theorists) which focused on the development of these tactics in the inter-war period. Also, as far as I've heard, Guderian, Rommel and Patton studied Mongolian tactics as well, and tried to apply them.
刚才我听了丹·卡林关于蒙古人(可汗的愤怒)的播客，他提供了很多很好的历史资料，说明二战期间发展起来的现代机动战争，实际上是受到蒙古人的启发。
我之前也读过一篇美国陆军的论文。然而，我没有深入研究第一手的资料来源(例如里德尔·哈特，J.F.C富勒，以及俄国和德国的军事理论家)，这些资料集中在两次世界大战期间这些战术的发展上。此外，据我所知，古德里安、隆美尔和巴顿也学习了蒙古的战术，并试图运用。
A while ago I listened to Dan Carlin's podcast on the Mongols (Wrath of the Khans), and he provided a lot of good historical info on how modern maneuver warfare, developed during WWII, was actually inspired by the Mongols.
I read a US Army paper on this a while back as well. However, I have not gone into the primary sources (e.g. Liddell Hart, J.F.C Fuller and the Russian and German military theorists) which focused on the development of these tactics in the inter-war period. Also, as far as I've heard, Guderian, Rommel and Patton studied Mongolian tactics as well, and tried to apply them.
刚才我听了丹·卡林关于蒙古人(可汗的愤怒)的播客，他提供了很多很好的历史资料，说明二战期间发展起来的现代机动战争，实际上是受到蒙古人的启发。
我之前也读过一篇美国陆军的论文。然而，我没有深入研究第一手的资料来源(例如里德尔·哈特，J.F.C富勒，以及俄国和德国的军事理论家)，这些资料集中在两次世界大战期间这些战术的发展上。此外，据我所知，古德里安、隆美尔和巴顿也学习了蒙古的战术，并试图运用。
If anyone knows any books that detail this, please let me know.
As far as I've heard, basically they took Mongolian Tactics and subbed as follows:
Cavalry Archer >> Tank
Lancer >> Mech Infantry
Catapults >> Artillery/Aircraft
And all of this was tied together by radio, which allowed breaking up large formations into smaller ones, which allowed for coordination of independent operations.
如果有人知道任何关于这方面的书，请告诉我。
据我所知，基本上他们采用了蒙古战术，并将其改为：
弓箭手骑兵——坦克
枪骑兵——机械化步兵
投石车——火炮/飞机
所有这些都是通过无线电联系在一起的，无线电可以将大的编队分解成小的编队，从而可以协调独立的行动。
As far as I've heard, basically they took Mongolian Tactics and subbed as follows:
Cavalry Archer >> Tank
Lancer >> Mech Infantry
Catapults >> Artillery/Aircraft
And all of this was tied together by radio, which allowed breaking up large formations into smaller ones, which allowed for coordination of independent operations.
如果有人知道任何关于这方面的书，请告诉我。
据我所知，基本上他们采用了蒙古战术，并将其改为：
弓箭手骑兵——坦克
枪骑兵——机械化步兵
投石车——火炮/飞机
所有这些都是通过无线电联系在一起的，无线电可以将大的编队分解成小的编队，从而可以协调独立的行动。
gelgoog
I do not know about that. There are some similarities in that the Mongols typically used hit and run tactics and tried to encircle their opponents. They typically avoided direct confrontations. They would siege a city and wait for it to starve to death instead of directly attacking it. At least until they got Chinese siege engines. Also, I don't know about catapults. I mean I know the Mongols and Tatars used them but IIRC the Mongols also used cannon which they got from China. In fact that's likely how cannon got into Europe. With Mongol influence. The Chinese crossbow also reached Europe around the same time. The Romans had the ballista but it isn't the same thing.
我不了解相关资料。蒙古人通常使用打了就跑的战术，并试图包围他们的对手，这有一些相似之处。他们通常避免直接对抗。他们会包围一座城市，等着它饿死，而不是直接攻城。至少在他们得到中国的攻城机之前是如此。另外，我对投石机也不了解。我的意思是，我知道蒙古人和鞑靼人用过，但如果我没记错，蒙古人也使用从中国获得的大炮。事实上，大炮很可能就是这样进入欧洲的。受蒙古的影响。中国的弩也在同一时间到达欧洲。罗马人有弩车，但它们不是一回事。
I do not know about that. There are some similarities in that the Mongols typically used hit and run tactics and tried to encircle their opponents. They typically avoided direct confrontations. They would siege a city and wait for it to starve to death instead of directly attacking it. At least until they got Chinese siege engines. Also, I don't know about catapults. I mean I know the Mongols and Tatars used them but IIRC the Mongols also used cannon which they got from China. In fact that's likely how cannon got into Europe. With Mongol influence. The Chinese crossbow also reached Europe around the same time. The Romans had the ballista but it isn't the same thing.
我不了解相关资料。蒙古人通常使用打了就跑的战术，并试图包围他们的对手，这有一些相似之处。他们通常避免直接对抗。他们会包围一座城市，等着它饿死，而不是直接攻城。至少在他们得到中国的攻城机之前是如此。另外，我对投石机也不了解。我的意思是，我知道蒙古人和鞑靼人用过，但如果我没记错，蒙古人也使用从中国获得的大炮。事实上，大炮很可能就是这样进入欧洲的。受蒙古的影响。中国的弩也在同一时间到达欧洲。罗马人有弩车，但它们不是一回事。
There are also European, or at least Mediterranean, traditions with cavalry warfare. For example the Egyptian Battle of Kadesh is studied quite a lot.
The thing is while most large empires in the classical period had cavalry not that many made it the backbone of their armed forces.
You could say only in the Byzantine and late Roman period did Europe see more cavalry armies in order to patrol what was now a larger empire with a smaller force. However I have never heard much about these so I guess a lot of knowledge about that era was lost.
欧洲，或者至少是地中海，也有骑兵战的传统。例如，埃及卡迪什战役被大量研究。
问题是，虽然在古典时期，大多数大帝国都有骑兵，但并没有那么多的人将其作为武装力量的支柱。
你可以说，只有在拜占庭和罗马晚期，欧洲才有了更多的骑兵部队，为了用更小的部队巡逻现在这个更大的帝国。然而，我从来没有听说过这些，所以我猜很多关于那个时代的知识已经丢失了。
The thing is while most large empires in the classical period had cavalry not that many made it the backbone of their armed forces.
You could say only in the Byzantine and late Roman period did Europe see more cavalry armies in order to patrol what was now a larger empire with a smaller force. However I have never heard much about these so I guess a lot of knowledge about that era was lost.
欧洲，或者至少是地中海，也有骑兵战的传统。例如，埃及卡迪什战役被大量研究。
问题是，虽然在古典时期，大多数大帝国都有骑兵，但并没有那么多的人将其作为武装力量的支柱。
你可以说，只有在拜占庭和罗马晚期，欧洲才有了更多的骑兵部队，为了用更小的部队巡逻现在这个更大的帝国。然而，我从来没有听说过这些，所以我猜很多关于那个时代的知识已经丢失了。
Mohsin77
Yes, they got many technologies from the Chinese. Catapults and Siege weapons, gun powder/cannons etc. If it weren't for Chinese technology, their siege capability would have been insufficient to continue expanding into Eurasia.
Apparently the most important aspect the inter-war Euro theorists got from the Mongols, was breaking up large formations into smaller ones, and being able to coordinate over large areas, which allowed for rapid maneuverability of elements in a coordinated way. This required meritocracy in the chain of command and responsibility given to lower ranking officers to operate independently. This is what allowed the Mongols to encircle their opponents etc. A purely mounted force proved the importance of manoeuvrability as well, which is what led to the emphasis on mounted infantry and tank formations, and also the air forces, hence combined arms.
是的，他们从中国人那里获得了很多技术。投石机和攻城武器，火药/大炮等。如果不是中国的技术，他们的围城能力将不足以继续向欧亚大陆扩张。
显然，欧洲理论家从蒙古人那里得到的最重要的方面是，将大编队分解成小编队，并能够在大范围内进行协调，这使得各要素能够以协调的方式快速机动。这就需要在指挥链中实行精英管理，并赋予下级军官独立运作的责任。这就是蒙古人能包围敌人的原因。纯粹的机动部队也证明了机动性的重要性，这导致了对骑兵和坦克编队以及空军的重视，因此产生了联合作战。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Yes, they got many technologies from the Chinese. Catapults and Siege weapons, gun powder/cannons etc. If it weren't for Chinese technology, their siege capability would have been insufficient to continue expanding into Eurasia.
Apparently the most important aspect the inter-war Euro theorists got from the Mongols, was breaking up large formations into smaller ones, and being able to coordinate over large areas, which allowed for rapid maneuverability of elements in a coordinated way. This required meritocracy in the chain of command and responsibility given to lower ranking officers to operate independently. This is what allowed the Mongols to encircle their opponents etc. A purely mounted force proved the importance of manoeuvrability as well, which is what led to the emphasis on mounted infantry and tank formations, and also the air forces, hence combined arms.
是的，他们从中国人那里获得了很多技术。投石机和攻城武器，火药/大炮等。如果不是中国的技术，他们的围城能力将不足以继续向欧亚大陆扩张。
显然，欧洲理论家从蒙古人那里得到的最重要的方面是，将大编队分解成小编队，并能够在大范围内进行协调，这使得各要素能够以协调的方式快速机动。这就需要在指挥链中实行精英管理，并赋予下级军官独立运作的责任。这就是蒙古人能包围敌人的原因。纯粹的机动部队也证明了机动性的重要性，这导致了对骑兵和坦克编队以及空军的重视，因此产生了联合作战。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
taxiya
All nomadic people in east Asia use the tactic as the Mongols, and Mongols are NOT the first, nor the unique. The land that is called Mongolia today has seen many such people. First the Xiongnu around 300s BC, then Xianbei (up to 300AD), Tujue (to 500AD), Khitan and Jurchen (up to 1100AD) then came the Mongols. They all heavily rely on cavalry, and hit and run. The Chinese dynasties are familiar with the tactic and actively employing it.
东亚所有的游牧民族都像蒙古人一样使用这种战术，蒙古人不是第一个，也不是唯一的。在今天被称为蒙古的土地上，有许多这样的人。首先是公元前300年的匈奴，然后是鲜卑(公元300年)，突厥(公元500年)，契丹和女真(公元1100年)，然后是蒙古人。他们都非常依赖骑兵，打了就跑。中国各朝代都熟悉这一策略，并积极运用。
All nomadic people in east Asia use the tactic as the Mongols, and Mongols are NOT the first, nor the unique. The land that is called Mongolia today has seen many such people. First the Xiongnu around 300s BC, then Xianbei (up to 300AD), Tujue (to 500AD), Khitan and Jurchen (up to 1100AD) then came the Mongols. They all heavily rely on cavalry, and hit and run. The Chinese dynasties are familiar with the tactic and actively employing it.
东亚所有的游牧民族都像蒙古人一样使用这种战术，蒙古人不是第一个，也不是唯一的。在今天被称为蒙古的土地上，有许多这样的人。首先是公元前300年的匈奴，然后是鲜卑(公元300年)，突厥(公元500年)，契丹和女真(公元1100年)，然后是蒙古人。他们都非常依赖骑兵，打了就跑。中国各朝代都熟悉这一策略，并积极运用。
Basically in this part of world, it is nothing unique, and everybody was doing it since 300s BC so long as one could feed enough horses.
What makes Mongol tactic a big name outside of east and central Asia is rather because, for the first time Europe and neighbouring ME countries were devastated by a foreign power, and MOST importantly, it is the first time that Europeans and Arabs were facing the tactic they have never seen before.
基本上，在世界的这个地方，这没什么特别的，每个人从公元前300年就开始这样做，只要有人能喂饱马。
让蒙古的战术在东亚和中亚以外的地方名声大噪的，而是因为欧洲和邻近的中东国家第一次被一个外国势力摧毁，最重要的是，这是欧洲人和阿拉伯人第一次面对他们从未见过的战术。
What makes Mongol tactic a big name outside of east and central Asia is rather because, for the first time Europe and neighbouring ME countries were devastated by a foreign power, and MOST importantly, it is the first time that Europeans and Arabs were facing the tactic they have never seen before.
基本上，在世界的这个地方，这没什么特别的，每个人从公元前300年就开始这样做，只要有人能喂饱马。
让蒙古的战术在东亚和中亚以外的地方名声大噪的，而是因为欧洲和邻近的中东国家第一次被一个外国势力摧毁，最重要的是，这是欧洲人和阿拉伯人第一次面对他们从未见过的战术。
Mohsin77
My Islamic civilization was hit very hard by the Mongols as well, but there is definitely something we have to learn from them.
A lot of steppe nomads have always attacked civilized empires throughout history, but no one was as successful as the Horde. They even defeated all other cavalry based armies like the Khwarizmian Empire, which also had its roots in the Steppe. The Mongols perfected the art of war, I think. They basically fought all the strongest empires in the world, kingdoms much greater in strength, and won decisively. So I would definitely consider them unique.
我所在的伊斯兰文明也受到蒙古人的沉重打击，但我们一定要向他们学习一些东西。
纵观历史，许多草原游牧民族总是攻击文明帝国，但没有人能像部落那样成功。他们甚至击败了所有其他以骑兵为基础的军队，比如花剌子模帝国，它也起源于大草原。我认为蒙古人完善了战争艺术。他们基本上是和世界上最强大的帝国作战，那些强大得多的王国，并取得了决定性的胜利。所以我肯定会认为他们是独一无二的。
My Islamic civilization was hit very hard by the Mongols as well, but there is definitely something we have to learn from them.
A lot of steppe nomads have always attacked civilized empires throughout history, but no one was as successful as the Horde. They even defeated all other cavalry based armies like the Khwarizmian Empire, which also had its roots in the Steppe. The Mongols perfected the art of war, I think. They basically fought all the strongest empires in the world, kingdoms much greater in strength, and won decisively. So I would definitely consider them unique.
我所在的伊斯兰文明也受到蒙古人的沉重打击，但我们一定要向他们学习一些东西。
纵观历史，许多草原游牧民族总是攻击文明帝国，但没有人能像部落那样成功。他们甚至击败了所有其他以骑兵为基础的军队，比如花剌子模帝国，它也起源于大草原。我认为蒙古人完善了战争艺术。他们基本上是和世界上最强大的帝国作战，那些强大得多的王国，并取得了决定性的胜利。所以我肯定会认为他们是独一无二的。
siegecrossbow
Nomadic cavalry don't have the logistics problems that most agrarian civilizations had. Livestocks and tents are mobile whereas farms and houses are not. You can't station a large military force to anticipate nomadic attacks without a long supply line.
游牧骑兵不像大多数农耕文明那样有后勤问题。牲畜和帐篷可以移动，而农场和房屋则不能。如果没有长长的补给线，你不可能部署一支庞大的军队来应对游牧民族的攻击。
Nomadic cavalry don't have the logistics problems that most agrarian civilizations had. Livestocks and tents are mobile whereas farms and houses are not. You can't station a large military force to anticipate nomadic attacks without a long supply line.
游牧骑兵不像大多数农耕文明那样有后勤问题。牲畜和帐篷可以移动，而农场和房屋则不能。如果没有长长的补给线，你不可能部署一支庞大的军队来应对游牧民族的攻击。
gelgoog
Europe also had incidents with cavalry before. For example the Scythians, the Parthian Empire (one of Rome's traditional enemies), or the Huns.
The thing with the Mongols is that they had the organization to make that vast empire and the will to expand.
欧洲以前也与骑兵发生过冲突。例如斯基泰人，帕提亚帝国(罗马的传统敌人之一)，或者匈奴人。
蒙古人的厉害之处在于，他们拥有建立庞大帝国的组织和扩张的意愿。
Europe also had incidents with cavalry before. For example the Scythians, the Parthian Empire (one of Rome's traditional enemies), or the Huns.
The thing with the Mongols is that they had the organization to make that vast empire and the will to expand.
欧洲以前也与骑兵发生过冲突。例如斯基泰人，帕提亚帝国(罗马的传统敌人之一)，或者匈奴人。
蒙古人的厉害之处在于，他们拥有建立庞大帝国的组织和扩张的意愿。
james smith esq
I would think that this individual:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavus_Adolphus_of_Sweden#Military_innovator（译注:1611-1632年在位的瑞典国王）
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
I would think that this individual:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavus_Adolphus_of_Sweden#Military_innovator（译注:1611-1632年在位的瑞典国王）
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
had more influence on the Western theory and practice of Combined Arms than did the Mongols.
Your observation about meritocracy in the chain of command, while significant, is one that Western practice does NOT emulate. The Mongol inclination towards meritocracy probably derived from their Shamanistic tradition whereas the Western prefernce for rigid vertical heirarchies probably derives from their priestly tradition.
我认为这个人:
（译注:维基百科链接介绍的是，1611-1632年在位的瑞典国王——古斯塔夫·阿道夫）
对西方联合作战理论和实践的影响比蒙古人更大。
你对指挥链中的精英管理的观察，虽然重要，但西方的实践并没有效仿。蒙古人倾向于精英统治，可能源于他们的萨满教传统，而西方人倾向于僵化的垂直世袭制，可能源于他们的祭司传统。
Your observation about meritocracy in the chain of command, while significant, is one that Western practice does NOT emulate. The Mongol inclination towards meritocracy probably derived from their Shamanistic tradition whereas the Western prefernce for rigid vertical heirarchies probably derives from their priestly tradition.
我认为这个人:
（译注:维基百科链接介绍的是，1611-1632年在位的瑞典国王——古斯塔夫·阿道夫）
对西方联合作战理论和实践的影响比蒙古人更大。
你对指挥链中的精英管理的观察，虽然重要，但西方的实践并没有效仿。蒙古人倾向于精英统治，可能源于他们的萨满教传统，而西方人倾向于僵化的垂直世袭制，可能源于他们的祭司传统。
Mohsin77
That seems disputed. In the wiki article you quoted, it states:
"However, recent historians have challenged his reputation. B. H. Liddell Hart says it is an exaggeration to credit him with a uniquely disciplined conscxt army, or call his the first military state to fight a protracted war on the continent. He argues that he improved existing techniques and used them brilliantly. Richard Brzezinski says his legendary status was based on inaccurate myths created by later historians. Many of his innovations were developed by his senior staff."
Citation: Jorgensen (2001) p 229
这似乎有争议。在你引用的维基文章中说:
“然而，最近的历史学家对他的声誉提出了质疑。B·H·里德尔·哈特说，认为他有一支独特的纪律严明的征兵部队，或称他是非洲大陆上第一个进行持久战的军事国家，都是夸张之词。哈特认为，他改进了现有的技术，并出色地运用了它们。理查德·布热津斯基说，他的传奇地位是建立在后来的历史学家创造的不准确的神话之上的。他的许多创新是由他的高级职员开创的。”
That seems disputed. In the wiki article you quoted, it states:
"However, recent historians have challenged his reputation. B. H. Liddell Hart says it is an exaggeration to credit him with a uniquely disciplined conscxt army, or call his the first military state to fight a protracted war on the continent. He argues that he improved existing techniques and used them brilliantly. Richard Brzezinski says his legendary status was based on inaccurate myths created by later historians. Many of his innovations were developed by his senior staff."
Citation: Jorgensen (2001) p 229
这似乎有争议。在你引用的维基文章中说:
“然而，最近的历史学家对他的声誉提出了质疑。B·H·里德尔·哈特说，认为他有一支独特的纪律严明的征兵部队，或称他是非洲大陆上第一个进行持久战的军事国家，都是夸张之词。哈特认为，他改进了现有的技术，并出色地运用了它们。理查德·布热津斯基说，他的传奇地位是建立在后来的历史学家创造的不准确的神话之上的。他的许多创新是由他的高级职员开创的。”
The stuff mentioned in the article which is credited to Gustavus was all used by the Mongols against Europe centuries before this guy came along. So the title of "innovator" can't be applied to him. And Hart is one of the historian-military theorists I mentioned in the OP.
文章中提到的被认为是古斯塔夫斯的东西，在古斯塔夫斯出现之前的几个世纪，蒙古人就已经运用来对付欧洲了。因此，“革新者”的称号不能用在他身上。哈特是我提到的历史军事理论家之一。
文章中提到的被认为是古斯塔夫斯的东西，在古斯塔夫斯出现之前的几个世纪，蒙古人就已经运用来对付欧洲了。因此，“革新者”的称号不能用在他身上。哈特是我提到的历史军事理论家之一。
You said:
“Your observation about meritocracy in the chain of command, while significant, is one that Western practice does NOT emulate. The Mongol inclination towards meritocracy probably derived from their Shamanistic tradition whereas the Western prefernce for rigid vertical heirarchies probably derives from their priestly tradition.”
Not by WWII. The German Officer Corps (it started with the Prussians under Moltke) had already instituted a meritocratic system in the leadership, and the rest of Europe followed suit, as far as I know.
你说：
“你对指挥链中的精英管理的观察，虽然重要，但西方的实践并没有效仿。蒙古人倾向于精英统治，可能源于他们的萨满教传统，而西方人倾向于僵化的垂直世袭制，可能源于他们的祭司传统。”
并不是到二战时才使用。德国军官军团(从毛奇领导下的普鲁士军队开始)已经在领导层中建立了一套精英制度，据我所知，欧洲其他国家也在效仿。
“Your observation about meritocracy in the chain of command, while significant, is one that Western practice does NOT emulate. The Mongol inclination towards meritocracy probably derived from their Shamanistic tradition whereas the Western prefernce for rigid vertical heirarchies probably derives from their priestly tradition.”
Not by WWII. The German Officer Corps (it started with the Prussians under Moltke) had already instituted a meritocratic system in the leadership, and the rest of Europe followed suit, as far as I know.
你说：
“你对指挥链中的精英管理的观察，虽然重要，但西方的实践并没有效仿。蒙古人倾向于精英统治，可能源于他们的萨满教传统，而西方人倾向于僵化的垂直世袭制，可能源于他们的祭司传统。”
并不是到二战时才使用。德国军官军团(从毛奇领导下的普鲁士军队开始)已经在领导层中建立了一套精英制度，据我所知，欧洲其他国家也在效仿。
The arguments I've heard from Carlin, were that it was in the inter-war period, after WWI, where Mongol influence took hold in Europe. This was due in-part to the events of WWI itself, where manoeuvrability was completely taken away by the obsolescence of cavalry (due to the machine gun.) So as the experts thought about how to regain maneuverability, they eventually rediscovered the Mongol Army's achievements, which is hard to believe that it took them this long... since it was no doubt the most successful army ever (even today.)
我从卡林那里听到的观点是，在两次世界大战之间的时期，即一战后（二战前），蒙古人的影响在欧洲站稳了脚跟。这部分是由于一战本身的事件，由于骑兵（因为机关枪）陈旧过时，机动性优势完全丧失了。因此，当专家们思考如何重新获得机动性时，他们最终重新发现了蒙古军队的成就，很难相信他们花了这么长时间……因为它无疑是有史以来(即使是到今天)最成功的军队。
我从卡林那里听到的观点是，在两次世界大战之间的时期，即一战后（二战前），蒙古人的影响在欧洲站稳了脚跟。这部分是由于一战本身的事件，由于骑兵（因为机关枪）陈旧过时，机动性优势完全丧失了。因此，当专家们思考如何重新获得机动性时，他们最终重新发现了蒙古军队的成就，很难相信他们花了这么长时间……因为它无疑是有史以来(即使是到今天)最成功的军队。
I suspect Mongolian contributions have been ignored by everyone mostly because they are politically incorrect... No one likes the Mongols (in the East or the West). Of course they were horrible and genocidal, but their actual military accomplishments are undeniable. I mean, it's shocking how so far ahead of their time they really were, when you study their campaigns across Eurasia. Everyone hears about the armies of Alexander, and Rome etc. But what the Mongols accomplished militarily, nothing even comes close.
p.s. I highly recommend that podcast series that details all of this.
我怀疑蒙古人的贡献被所有人忽视，主要是因为他们在政治上不正确。没有人喜欢蒙古人(无论是在东方或西方)。当然，他们非常可怕，进行种族灭绝，但他们的实际军事成就是不可否认的。我的意思是，当你研究他们在欧亚大陆的战役时，你会发现他们是多么的超前。每个人都听说过亚历山大和罗马的军队。但蒙古人在军事上的成就，无与伦比。
p.s. I highly recommend that podcast series that details all of this.
我怀疑蒙古人的贡献被所有人忽视，主要是因为他们在政治上不正确。没有人喜欢蒙古人(无论是在东方或西方)。当然，他们非常可怕，进行种族灭绝，但他们的实际军事成就是不可否认的。我的意思是，当你研究他们在欧亚大陆的战役时，你会发现他们是多么的超前。每个人都听说过亚历山大和罗马的军队。但蒙古人在军事上的成就，无与伦比。
james smith esq
Well, first of all, your premise of inter-war influence is contingent upon the historiography of Mongol tactics up until that point. Do you have that bibliography; a bibliography of the historiography of Mongol tactics, written up to ~1936.
Did I actually quote that article? No, I didn't!
首先，你的战间期影响的前提，取决于在此之前蒙古战术的历史记载。你们有参考书目吗?写于1936年的蒙古战术史学的参考书目。
我真的引用了那篇文章吗?并没有!
Well, first of all, your premise of inter-war influence is contingent upon the historiography of Mongol tactics up until that point. Do you have that bibliography; a bibliography of the historiography of Mongol tactics, written up to ~1936.
Did I actually quote that article? No, I didn't!
首先，你的战间期影响的前提，取决于在此之前蒙古战术的历史记载。你们有参考书目吗?写于1936年的蒙古战术史学的参考书目。
我真的引用了那篇文章吗?并没有!
Much history is disputed, this comes with the discipline. The points in the article that are disputed directly have less to do with G A's influence upon the evolution of combined arms tactics and more to do with other historical precedents; this is stated, explicitly! Citations of primary sources (and not historians interpretations thereof) would either support or undermine the assertion that he may have taken credit for contributions of his subordinates, but these are not presented. And, Hart and other historians are NOT, as you suggest, primary sources; they are researchers and interpreters thereof! Additionally, Hart was as much military-myth reproducer as he was military historian!
很多历史是有争议的，这与学科有关。文章中存在争议的观点与古斯塔夫·阿道夫（即前面提到的瑞典国王）对联合战术演变的影响关系不大，更多的是与其他历史先例有关；这是明确声明的!对第一手资料的引用(而不是历史学家对其的解释)，要么支持要么破坏他可能将下属的贡献归功于自己的断言，但这些都没有呈现出来。并且，哈特和其他历史学家并不是你所说的第一手资料；他们是研究人员和解释者!
此外，哈特既是军事历史学家，也是军事神话的复制者!
很多历史是有争议的，这与学科有关。文章中存在争议的观点与古斯塔夫·阿道夫（即前面提到的瑞典国王）对联合战术演变的影响关系不大，更多的是与其他历史先例有关；这是明确声明的!对第一手资料的引用(而不是历史学家对其的解释)，要么支持要么破坏他可能将下属的贡献归功于自己的断言，但这些都没有呈现出来。并且，哈特和其他历史学家并不是你所说的第一手资料；他们是研究人员和解释者!
此外，哈特既是军事历史学家，也是军事神话的复制者!
From the article: [...] "His innovative tactical integration of infantry, cavalry, logistics and particularly his use of artillery, earned him the title of the "Father of Modern Warfare"." [...] Really, the Mongols integrated infantry into their tactics during their European campaigns? Please provide a bibliography of the historiography of Mongol infantry tactics during the invasions of Europe.
文章中写道:“他创新性地整合了步兵、骑兵、后勤，尤其是对炮兵的运用，为他赢得了‘现代战争之父’的称号。”真的吗，蒙古人在欧洲战役中把步兵纳入了战术?请提供一份关于入侵欧洲期间蒙古步兵战术的史学参考书目。
文章中写道:“他创新性地整合了步兵、骑兵、后勤，尤其是对炮兵的运用，为他赢得了‘现代战争之父’的称号。”真的吗，蒙古人在欧洲战役中把步兵纳入了战术?请提供一份关于入侵欧洲期间蒙古步兵战术的史学参考书目。
Mohsin77
You said:
“Well, first of all, your premise of inter-war influence is contingent upon the historiography of Mongol tactics up til that point. Do you have that bibliography; a bibliography of the historiography of Mongol tactics, written up to ~1936.”
Funny, coming from a guy who started by quoting Wikipedia. And in case you missed the title of this thread, I'm the one asking for sources here, and it's obvious to me you can't help me and are wasting my time. But to humor you (just this time), here's a paper from a US Army journal:
"Genghis Khan and 13th-Century AirLand Battle" - Captain Dana J. H. Pittard, US Army
URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-sext-Articles/Genghis-Khan/
你说：
“首先，你的战间期影响的前提，取决于在此之前蒙古战术的历史记载。你们有参考书目吗?写于1936年的蒙古战术史学的参考书目。”
有意思，这话居然出自一个引用维基百科的人之口。如果你偏离了这个帖子的标题，我是在这里寻求资源的人，对我来说，很明显你帮不了我，在浪费我的时间。但为了逗你开心(仅此一次)，这里有一篇来自美国陆军杂志的论文:
《成吉思汗与13世纪的空降作战》——作者美国陆军上尉，Dana J. H. Pittard
链接：https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-sext-Articles/Genghis-Khan/
You said:
“Well, first of all, your premise of inter-war influence is contingent upon the historiography of Mongol tactics up til that point. Do you have that bibliography; a bibliography of the historiography of Mongol tactics, written up to ~1936.”
Funny, coming from a guy who started by quoting Wikipedia. And in case you missed the title of this thread, I'm the one asking for sources here, and it's obvious to me you can't help me and are wasting my time. But to humor you (just this time), here's a paper from a US Army journal:
"Genghis Khan and 13th-Century AirLand Battle" - Captain Dana J. H. Pittard, US Army
URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-sext-Articles/Genghis-Khan/
你说：
“首先，你的战间期影响的前提，取决于在此之前蒙古战术的历史记载。你们有参考书目吗?写于1936年的蒙古战术史学的参考书目。”
有意思，这话居然出自一个引用维基百科的人之口。如果你偏离了这个帖子的标题，我是在这里寻求资源的人，对我来说，很明显你帮不了我，在浪费我的时间。但为了逗你开心(仅此一次)，这里有一篇来自美国陆军杂志的论文:
《成吉思汗与13世纪的空降作战》——作者美国陆军上尉，Dana J. H. Pittard
链接：https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-sext-Articles/Genghis-Khan/
taxiya
I don't know the rest of the world, but in east Asia, all the opponents at the time were at their OWN weakest points. They are weak by all means compared to any other earlier Chinese dynasties, not only to the Mongols of 12th century. Jin had been fighting Xi Xia and Southern Song for more than a hundred years by the time it was finally defeated by the JOINT attack of Mongol and Southern Song.
The Mongols are one who perfected mobile warfare, but they were not the only one nor the earliest one practicing mobile warfare in a large scale. Their achievement were heavily but not solely due to the weak and divided opponents who were already crumbling under their own weights.
我不知道世界其他地方的情况，但在东亚，当时所有的对手都处于自己的最薄弱环节。无论从哪方面来说，他们都比中国的其他朝代弱，不仅比12世纪的蒙古弱。金朝与西夏和南宋交战了一百多年，最后在蒙古和南宋的联合进攻下被打败。
蒙古人是运动战的完善者，但他们不是唯一的，也不是最早大规模进行运动战的。他们的成就在很大程度上(但不仅仅是)由于对手的软弱和分裂，这些对手已经在自身的重压下摇摇欲坠。
The other steppe originated Empire were not steppe people anymore by the time they settled and built their Empire. The Yuan emperor who retreated to the steppe from Beijing was seen by Mongols to be too sinicized to be Mongols. As siege has said, settled farming empire has too much to protect and care than nomadic herder whose only asset is his horse, bow and arrows. I must also add that, a nomadic raider loose nothing if defeated in a fight, he can come back any time, a farmer will loose everything if defeated even if he is alive. A Chinese saying is perfect analogy "光脚的不怕穿鞋的","Bare footed is more daring than shoe wearer" because they have nothing to loose, but everything to gain. Everything else equal (strength and will), the probability theory will favour the former than later to win. That is what happened in 12th to 13th century.
其他草原起源的帝国在他们定居并建立自己的帝国时已经不再是草原人了。从北京撤退到草原的元朝皇帝，被蒙古人认为太中国化了已不是蒙古人。正如@siege所说，定居的农耕帝国要保护和照顾的东西太多了，而游牧民族的唯一资产就是他的马、弓和箭。我还要补充一点，一个游牧的掠夺者如果在战斗中失败了，什么都不会失去，他可以随时回来，一个（抵抗的）农民如果落败了，即使他还活着也会失去一切。中国谚语 "光脚的不怕穿鞋的"是一个绝佳的比喻，因为他们没有什么可以失去的，却可以得到一切。其他一切都相等(力量和意志)，概率论更倾向于前者而不是后者获胜。这就是12到13世纪发生的事情。
I don't know the rest of the world, but in east Asia, all the opponents at the time were at their OWN weakest points. They are weak by all means compared to any other earlier Chinese dynasties, not only to the Mongols of 12th century. Jin had been fighting Xi Xia and Southern Song for more than a hundred years by the time it was finally defeated by the JOINT attack of Mongol and Southern Song.
The Mongols are one who perfected mobile warfare, but they were not the only one nor the earliest one practicing mobile warfare in a large scale. Their achievement were heavily but not solely due to the weak and divided opponents who were already crumbling under their own weights.
我不知道世界其他地方的情况，但在东亚，当时所有的对手都处于自己的最薄弱环节。无论从哪方面来说，他们都比中国的其他朝代弱，不仅比12世纪的蒙古弱。金朝与西夏和南宋交战了一百多年，最后在蒙古和南宋的联合进攻下被打败。
蒙古人是运动战的完善者，但他们不是唯一的，也不是最早大规模进行运动战的。他们的成就在很大程度上(但不仅仅是)由于对手的软弱和分裂，这些对手已经在自身的重压下摇摇欲坠。
The other steppe originated Empire were not steppe people anymore by the time they settled and built their Empire. The Yuan emperor who retreated to the steppe from Beijing was seen by Mongols to be too sinicized to be Mongols. As siege has said, settled farming empire has too much to protect and care than nomadic herder whose only asset is his horse, bow and arrows. I must also add that, a nomadic raider loose nothing if defeated in a fight, he can come back any time, a farmer will loose everything if defeated even if he is alive. A Chinese saying is perfect analogy "光脚的不怕穿鞋的","Bare footed is more daring than shoe wearer" because they have nothing to loose, but everything to gain. Everything else equal (strength and will), the probability theory will favour the former than later to win. That is what happened in 12th to 13th century.
其他草原起源的帝国在他们定居并建立自己的帝国时已经不再是草原人了。从北京撤退到草原的元朝皇帝，被蒙古人认为太中国化了已不是蒙古人。正如@siege所说，定居的农耕帝国要保护和照顾的东西太多了，而游牧民族的唯一资产就是他的马、弓和箭。我还要补充一点，一个游牧的掠夺者如果在战斗中失败了，什么都不会失去，他可以随时回来，一个（抵抗的）农民如果落败了，即使他还活着也会失去一切。中国谚语 "光脚的不怕穿鞋的"是一个绝佳的比喻，因为他们没有什么可以失去的，却可以得到一切。其他一切都相等(力量和意志)，概率论更倾向于前者而不是后者获胜。这就是12到13世纪发生的事情。
Mongols is the one who made a big name using that tactic, but they won the wars by opportunities presented by history. Note, the opportunity here does not mean random luck, but certainty of socio-economical development of human history. The opportunities weren't there for earlier steppe people and never after when firearms were introduced. The same Mongol warriors practicing the same tactics were eventually destroyed by the Qing who was heavily equipped with cannons and muskets in the 18th century.
P.S. in a way that "opportunity" is the meaning of the concept of "Mandate of Heaven", or "God's will".
蒙古人是用这种战术出名的人，但他们是通过历史提供的机会赢得战争的。注意，这里的机遇不是偶然的运气，而是人类历史社会经济发展的必然。对于早期的草原人来说，机会并不存在，而在枪支被引入战争后，草原人就再也没机会了。同样的蒙古战士采用同样的战术，最终在18世纪被装备了大炮和步枪的清朝摧毁。
附：在某种程度上，“机会”是“天命”概念的含义，或“上帝的意志”。
P.S. in a way that "opportunity" is the meaning of the concept of "Mandate of Heaven", or "God's will".
蒙古人是用这种战术出名的人，但他们是通过历史提供的机会赢得战争的。注意，这里的机遇不是偶然的运气，而是人类历史社会经济发展的必然。对于早期的草原人来说，机会并不存在，而在枪支被引入战争后，草原人就再也没机会了。同样的蒙古战士采用同样的战术，最终在18世纪被装备了大炮和步枪的清朝摧毁。
附：在某种程度上，“机会”是“天命”概念的含义，或“上帝的意志”。
Mohsin77
That's an interesting point, and it does stretch to lessons in everyday life as well. This is why there are no world champion boxers from affluent backgrounds (at least that's what I heard Lennox Lewis say recently.) However, the situation here is slightly different, because the Mongols were playing chess, while everyone else was still playing checkers. Or maybe I should say they were playing Go, while everyone else was playing Chess? lol.
这是一个有趣的观点，它也延伸到日常生活中的经验。这就是为什么没有来自富裕家庭背景的世界拳击冠军(至少我最近听到伦诺克斯·刘易斯是这么说的)。然而，这里的情况略有不同，因为蒙古人在下国际象棋，而其他人还在下跳棋。或者我应该说他们在玩围棋，而其他人都在玩国际象棋?哈哈
That's an interesting point, and it does stretch to lessons in everyday life as well. This is why there are no world champion boxers from affluent backgrounds (at least that's what I heard Lennox Lewis say recently.) However, the situation here is slightly different, because the Mongols were playing chess, while everyone else was still playing checkers. Or maybe I should say they were playing Go, while everyone else was playing Chess? lol.
这是一个有趣的观点，它也延伸到日常生活中的经验。这就是为什么没有来自富裕家庭背景的世界拳击冠军(至少我最近听到伦诺克斯·刘易斯是这么说的)。然而，这里的情况略有不同，因为蒙古人在下国际象棋，而其他人还在下跳棋。或者我应该说他们在玩围棋，而其他人都在玩国际象棋?哈哈
It's true their constitutions were much harder, and they had much less to lose etc. It is also true that some of the opponents they faced were going through a low phase in their history. However, what's really worth focusing on (I think) are the innovations that they brought to tactics and strategy in maneuver warfare. Because these can be implemented by all armies, and indeed have been, to some extent.
确实，他们的体质更强，他们的损失也更少，等等。他们所面对的一些对手在他们的历史上经历了低靡的阶段，这也是事实。然而，真正值得关注的(我认为)是他们在机动战争中为战术和战略带来的创新。因为这些可以被所有的军队运用，而且确实在某种程度上已经被运用了。
确实，他们的体质更强，他们的损失也更少，等等。他们所面对的一些对手在他们的历史上经历了低靡的阶段，这也是事实。然而，真正值得关注的(我认为)是他们在机动战争中为战术和战略带来的创新。因为这些可以被所有的军队运用，而且确实在某种程度上已经被运用了。
We can say it was "God's will" and the "Mandate of Heaven," and I'm a believer in that. But once you get knocked down, you still have to dust yourself off, pick up the pieces, and figure out what you did wrong... basically learn from your mistakes and improve (... which is easier said than done, of course.)
我们可以说这是“上帝的意志”和“天命”，我相信这一点。但一旦你被击倒，你仍然要掸去灰尘，收拾残局，并找出你做错了什么……从你的错误中学习并提高当然，说起来容易做起来难。)
我们可以说这是“上帝的意志”和“天命”，我相信这一点。但一旦你被击倒，你仍然要掸去灰尘，收拾残局，并找出你做错了什么……从你的错误中学习并提高当然，说起来容易做起来难。)
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