二战中代价高昂的太平洋岛屿战役可以避免吗？
正文翻译
John Walmsley
Unfortunately, the American sacrifices in the Pacific WWII theater have never quite received the attention of the larger-scale European conflict. As they say, hindsight is often 20-20, but I've read that perhaps the island battles like the poorly planned Tarawa landing, where hundreds of American troops were required to walk several hundred-yards in low-tide water under withering Japanese fire could have been avoided. Likewise, the terrible cost in Marine lives to take Iwo Jima, a 10-square mile of rock and dirt that took five weeks to almost literally dig out 1083 survivors of approximately 23,000 fanatical Japanese defenders. (BTW, this incredible battle reminds one of the fierce Russian resistance of the Sevastopol fortress in the Crimea.) Richard Humble, author of Famous Land Battles, quotes one source as saying that had Iwo Jima been invaded at the time of the Mariana Islands invasion it could have been "...occupied in one or two days." All of this is conjecture, but would it have been possible to bypass these remote islands and more directly and earlier engage the Japanese forces in the Philippines and Okinawa?
楼主：
遗憾的是，美国人在二战太平洋战场上的牺牲从来没有像更大规模的欧洲战场那样受到关注。俗话说事后诸葛亮往往都是马后炮，但我在书中读到也许像计划不周的塔拉瓦登陆战这样的岛屿战役是可以避免的，在那次登陆战中，数百名美军需要顶着日军猛烈的炮火，在低潮的海水中步行数百码。同样，为了攻占硫磺岛，海军陆战队付出了惨重的伤亡，在这片 10 平方英里的岩石和泥土中，几乎用了 5 周时间才从大约 23 000 名狂热的日本守军中挖出 1083 名幸存者。(顺便说一句，这场不可思议的战斗让人想起俄罗斯人对克里米亚塞瓦斯托波尔要塞的激烈抵抗）。《著名的陆战》作者理查德·汉伯援引一位消息人士的说法，认为如果在进攻马里亚纳群岛时同时进攻硫磺岛，它可能“......在一两天内就被占领”。所有这些都是猜测，但是否有可能绕过这些偏远岛屿，更直接、更早地与日本军队在菲律宾和冲绳的交战呢？
备注：塔拉瓦战役，亦称为塔拉瓦环礁战役，美军代号为“电击行动”，是一场发生于基里巴斯吉尔伯特群岛的战役，参战双方国为美国与日本，是属于第二次世界大战太平洋战争的一部分，战事从1943年11月20日开始，一直持续至11月23日美军完全控制塔拉瓦为止。这也是二战中美军在中太平洋战区的第一次军事攻击行动。
这场战役也是美军在两栖登陆作战中首次面临日军猛烈的还击。因为美军在之前的登岛作战中几乎没有遭到日军的强力抵抗。参与本次作战的4500名日本守军在战前获得充足的补给及准备，在这场战斗中几乎与美军战到了最后一兵一卒，使美军在这次登岛作战付出了惨痛代价，在开战后76小时内共有1696名美国士兵因此阵亡（上一次日军造成美军如此重大伤亡的夺岛战役是为期半年的瓜达尔卡纳尔岛战役），最终双方在这场战斗中，共有6400人因此身亡。
John Walmsley
Unfortunately, the American sacrifices in the Pacific WWII theater have never quite received the attention of the larger-scale European conflict. As they say, hindsight is often 20-20, but I've read that perhaps the island battles like the poorly planned Tarawa landing, where hundreds of American troops were required to walk several hundred-yards in low-tide water under withering Japanese fire could have been avoided. Likewise, the terrible cost in Marine lives to take Iwo Jima, a 10-square mile of rock and dirt that took five weeks to almost literally dig out 1083 survivors of approximately 23,000 fanatical Japanese defenders. (BTW, this incredible battle reminds one of the fierce Russian resistance of the Sevastopol fortress in the Crimea.) Richard Humble, author of Famous Land Battles, quotes one source as saying that had Iwo Jima been invaded at the time of the Mariana Islands invasion it could have been "...occupied in one or two days." All of this is conjecture, but would it have been possible to bypass these remote islands and more directly and earlier engage the Japanese forces in the Philippines and Okinawa?
楼主：
遗憾的是，美国人在二战太平洋战场上的牺牲从来没有像更大规模的欧洲战场那样受到关注。俗话说事后诸葛亮往往都是马后炮，但我在书中读到也许像计划不周的塔拉瓦登陆战这样的岛屿战役是可以避免的，在那次登陆战中，数百名美军需要顶着日军猛烈的炮火，在低潮的海水中步行数百码。同样，为了攻占硫磺岛，海军陆战队付出了惨重的伤亡，在这片 10 平方英里的岩石和泥土中，几乎用了 5 周时间才从大约 23 000 名狂热的日本守军中挖出 1083 名幸存者。(顺便说一句，这场不可思议的战斗让人想起俄罗斯人对克里米亚塞瓦斯托波尔要塞的激烈抵抗）。《著名的陆战》作者理查德·汉伯援引一位消息人士的说法，认为如果在进攻马里亚纳群岛时同时进攻硫磺岛，它可能“......在一两天内就被占领”。所有这些都是猜测，但是否有可能绕过这些偏远岛屿，更直接、更早地与日本军队在菲律宾和冲绳的交战呢？
备注：塔拉瓦战役，亦称为塔拉瓦环礁战役，美军代号为“电击行动”，是一场发生于基里巴斯吉尔伯特群岛的战役，参战双方国为美国与日本，是属于第二次世界大战太平洋战争的一部分，战事从1943年11月20日开始，一直持续至11月23日美军完全控制塔拉瓦为止。这也是二战中美军在中太平洋战区的第一次军事攻击行动。
这场战役也是美军在两栖登陆作战中首次面临日军猛烈的还击。因为美军在之前的登岛作战中几乎没有遭到日军的强力抵抗。参与本次作战的4500名日本守军在战前获得充足的补给及准备，在这场战斗中几乎与美军战到了最后一兵一卒，使美军在这次登岛作战付出了惨痛代价，在开战后76小时内共有1696名美国士兵因此阵亡（上一次日军造成美军如此重大伤亡的夺岛战役是为期半年的瓜达尔卡纳尔岛战役），最终双方在这场战斗中，共有6400人因此身亡。
评论翻译
Grandstander
The assault on Iwo Jima was for the purpose of capturing an air base that could be used to land B-29's which were in trouble and unlikely to make it back to the Marianas' bases. In Japanese hands, Iwo also served as as an early warning lookout post which could alx the home islands that a B-29 raid was on its way, as well as having an airfield from which fighters could be launched against the Superfortresses. It wasn't a question bypassing it, there was genuine strategic value associated with capturing it. Whether what was gained justified the high casualties endured, would be another debate.
攻击硫磺岛的目的是夺取一个空军基地，用来降落那些陷入困境、不可能返回马里亚纳群岛基地的 B-29 战斗机。在日军方面，硫磺岛还是一个预警瞭望哨所，可以向本岛发出 B-29 空袭即将来临的警报，同时还拥有一个机场，可以从那里出动战斗机对付超级堡垒战斗机。这不是绕过它的问题，夺取它具有真正的战略价值。至于所取得的战果是否需要付出如此巨大的伤亡，那将是另一场争论了。
The assault on Iwo Jima was for the purpose of capturing an air base that could be used to land B-29's which were in trouble and unlikely to make it back to the Marianas' bases. In Japanese hands, Iwo also served as as an early warning lookout post which could alx the home islands that a B-29 raid was on its way, as well as having an airfield from which fighters could be launched against the Superfortresses. It wasn't a question bypassing it, there was genuine strategic value associated with capturing it. Whether what was gained justified the high casualties endured, would be another debate.
攻击硫磺岛的目的是夺取一个空军基地，用来降落那些陷入困境、不可能返回马里亚纳群岛基地的 B-29 战斗机。在日军方面，硫磺岛还是一个预警瞭望哨所，可以向本岛发出 B-29 空袭即将来临的警报，同时还拥有一个机场，可以从那里出动战斗机对付超级堡垒战斗机。这不是绕过它的问题，夺取它具有真正的战略价值。至于所取得的战果是否需要付出如此巨大的伤亡，那将是另一场争论了。
Irishtom29
Well Tarawa was a learning experience and the Navy did take the lessons to heart. It can be argued that the invasion of the Palau Islands was a wasted effort as the war had swept by and the invasion of Leyte and American carrier dominance made it unneccesary. One can argue (as King did) that the invasion of the Phillipines itself was a wasted effort and that even granting the need to take Luzon that MacArthur's sending Eichelberger to retake the southern Philipines was a strategic dead end and poor use of resources.
塔拉瓦是一次学习的经历，海军也确实将这教训铭记于心。可以说，进攻帕劳群岛是白费力气的，因为战争已经一触即发，进攻莱特岛和美国航母的优势使进攻变得没有必要。有些争论（就像金所做的那样），入侵菲律宾本身就是白费力气，即使承认有必要夺取吕宋岛，麦克阿瑟派艾切尔伯格去夺回菲律宾南部也是战略上的死胡同，是对资源的拙劣利用。
Well Tarawa was a learning experience and the Navy did take the lessons to heart. It can be argued that the invasion of the Palau Islands was a wasted effort as the war had swept by and the invasion of Leyte and American carrier dominance made it unneccesary. One can argue (as King did) that the invasion of the Phillipines itself was a wasted effort and that even granting the need to take Luzon that MacArthur's sending Eichelberger to retake the southern Philipines was a strategic dead end and poor use of resources.
塔拉瓦是一次学习的经历，海军也确实将这教训铭记于心。可以说，进攻帕劳群岛是白费力气的，因为战争已经一触即发，进攻莱特岛和美国航母的优势使进攻变得没有必要。有些争论（就像金所做的那样），入侵菲律宾本身就是白费力气，即使承认有必要夺取吕宋岛，麦克阿瑟派艾切尔伯格去夺回菲律宾南部也是战略上的死胡同，是对资源的拙劣利用。
cpg35223
Really, compared to the United States' European campaigns, the Pacific war was run on a shoestring. So I think the U.S. really got a great deal for a relatively small expenditure.
真的，与美国在欧洲战场相比，太平洋战争的经费十分拮据。因此，我认为美国确实以相对较少的开支获得了巨大的收益。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Really, compared to the United States' European campaigns, the Pacific war was run on a shoestring. So I think the U.S. really got a great deal for a relatively small expenditure.
真的，与美国在欧洲战场相比，太平洋战争的经费十分拮据。因此，我认为美国确实以相对较少的开支获得了巨大的收益。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
nitroae23
Liberation of the Phillipines was a definite for two reasons.Postwar,we needed to show that we kept our (or Macarthurs) promise.Two,southern thrust Solomons,New Guinea and the P.I.'s was an army show.Whereas the central pacific campaign Gilberts,Marshalls was a navy responsibility.Navy and Army were like oil and vinegar back then,and we had the resources to conduct both operations.However,make no mistake about it,the lack of seaborne resources in the ETO killed us at Anzio, and our lack of air transport due to U.S. commitments to the CBI doomed Market Garden.
解放菲律宾是必然的，原因有二:
一, 战后，我们需要证明我们信守了自己（或马卡休斯）的承诺。
二, 南部索罗门群岛、新几内亚和太平洋岛屿是一场军队表演。
而中太平洋战役吉尔伯茨和马绍尔群岛则由海军负责。那时，海军和陆军就像油和醋，我们有资源开展两边的行动。然而，毫无疑问，在东线作战中缺乏海运资源是我们在安齐奥战役中的致命伤。由于美国对中缅印战区的承诺，我们缺乏空运，这注定了市场花园的失败。
Liberation of the Phillipines was a definite for two reasons.Postwar,we needed to show that we kept our (or Macarthurs) promise.Two,southern thrust Solomons,New Guinea and the P.I.'s was an army show.Whereas the central pacific campaign Gilberts,Marshalls was a navy responsibility.Navy and Army were like oil and vinegar back then,and we had the resources to conduct both operations.However,make no mistake about it,the lack of seaborne resources in the ETO killed us at Anzio, and our lack of air transport due to U.S. commitments to the CBI doomed Market Garden.
解放菲律宾是必然的，原因有二:
一, 战后，我们需要证明我们信守了自己（或马卡休斯）的承诺。
二, 南部索罗门群岛、新几内亚和太平洋岛屿是一场军队表演。
而中太平洋战役吉尔伯茨和马绍尔群岛则由海军负责。那时，海军和陆军就像油和醋，我们有资源开展两边的行动。然而，毫无疑问，在东线作战中缺乏海运资源是我们在安齐奥战役中的致命伤。由于美国对中缅印战区的承诺，我们缺乏空运，这注定了市场花园的失败。
harry chickpea
IIRC, there were at least a couple of Japanese held islands that were bypassed. They held no airbase or significant offensive capabilities, and were allowed to rot without supplies when nearby more important ones were taken.
确切地说，至少有几个由日本占领的岛屿被绕过了。这些岛屿没有空军基地或显著的进攻能力，因此在附近更为重要的地点被攻占时，它们被置之不理，任由其在缺乏补给的情况下荒废。
IIRC, there were at least a couple of Japanese held islands that were bypassed. They held no airbase or significant offensive capabilities, and were allowed to rot without supplies when nearby more important ones were taken.
确切地说，至少有几个由日本占领的岛屿被绕过了。这些岛屿没有空军基地或显著的进攻能力，因此在附近更为重要的地点被攻占时，它们被置之不理，任由其在缺乏补给的情况下荒废。
68vette
There is a great show on the History channel all this week. It's called WW2 in HD. They discuss this topic in some detail and describe the importance of taking many of the islands because of the airfields on these islands. They were important not only to get our air power closer to Japan and to support our naval operations, but also to protect the shipping lanes to Australia. The topic was brought up about the number of lives some of these islands cost and that maybe we should have just bombed the daylights out of them, but as we have learned in modern air combat, bombing alone doesn't always work.
这周在历史频道有一档很棒的节目，名为《高清二战》。他们详细讨论了这个话题，描述了占领许多岛屿的重要性，因为这些岛屿上有机场。这些岛屿的重要性不仅在于将我们的空中力量更靠近日本，支持我们的海军行动，还在于保护通往澳大利亚的航道。有人提到了占领这些岛屿所付出的生命代价，也许我们本可以选择直接对它们进行大规模轰炸，但正如我们在现代空战中学到的那样，光靠轰炸并不总是能取得成功。
There is a great show on the History channel all this week. It's called WW2 in HD. They discuss this topic in some detail and describe the importance of taking many of the islands because of the airfields on these islands. They were important not only to get our air power closer to Japan and to support our naval operations, but also to protect the shipping lanes to Australia. The topic was brought up about the number of lives some of these islands cost and that maybe we should have just bombed the daylights out of them, but as we have learned in modern air combat, bombing alone doesn't always work.
这周在历史频道有一档很棒的节目，名为《高清二战》。他们详细讨论了这个话题，描述了占领许多岛屿的重要性，因为这些岛屿上有机场。这些岛屿的重要性不仅在于将我们的空中力量更靠近日本，支持我们的海军行动，还在于保护通往澳大利亚的航道。有人提到了占领这些岛屿所付出的生命代价，也许我们本可以选择直接对它们进行大规模轰炸，但正如我们在现代空战中学到的那样，光靠轰炸并不总是能取得成功。
texdav
quote to cpg35223
Yep'it was decided by FDR and Churchill that europe would get the msot support and be concentrated on since it really endanger more of western society really.Its rewlly atonishing when you look at the war prodcution of teh USA compared to any other power in the war to fight on two fronts.
回复CPG35223 关于与美国在欧洲战场相比，太平洋战争的经费十分拮据。
是的，这是由美国总统罗斯福和丘吉尔决定的，欧洲将得到最多的支持，并集中力量应对欧洲，因为它确实会危及更多的西方社会。相比其他国家而言，美国在两线作战中的战争表现都令人肃然起敬。
quote to cpg35223
Yep'it was decided by FDR and Churchill that europe would get the msot support and be concentrated on since it really endanger more of western society really.Its rewlly atonishing when you look at the war prodcution of teh USA compared to any other power in the war to fight on two fronts.
回复CPG35223 关于与美国在欧洲战场相比，太平洋战争的经费十分拮据。
是的，这是由美国总统罗斯福和丘吉尔决定的，欧洲将得到最多的支持，并集中力量应对欧洲，因为它确实会危及更多的西方社会。相比其他国家而言，美国在两线作战中的战争表现都令人肃然起敬。
Irishtom29
QUOTE: 68VETTE
But those lanes are only important if you make the decision that Australia is worth defending which in hindsight in probably wasn't as the Japanese were incapable of taking much of it anyway.
针对68VETTE 内容（它们的重要性不仅使我们的空中力量更接近日本，而且还能支持我们海军的行动，保护通往澳大利亚的航道。）回复：
但是，只有在你认为澳大利亚值得保卫的情况下，这些航道才是重要的，而事后看来，澳大利亚可能并不值得保卫，因为日本人根本没有能力占领澳大利亚的大部分地区。
QUOTE: 68VETTE
But those lanes are only important if you make the decision that Australia is worth defending which in hindsight in probably wasn't as the Japanese were incapable of taking much of it anyway.
针对68VETTE 内容（它们的重要性不仅使我们的空中力量更接近日本，而且还能支持我们海军的行动，保护通往澳大利亚的航道。）回复：
但是，只有在你认为澳大利亚值得保卫的情况下，这些航道才是重要的，而事后看来，澳大利亚可能并不值得保卫，因为日本人根本没有能力占领澳大利亚的大部分地区。
Our can argue sensibly that our main drive should've been the old Plan Orange, straight across the central Pacific and only going south far enough to guard the flanks of such a drive. Concentrate on the center and let the Japanese fritter away their strength in useless operations.
我们可以理智地认为，我们的主攻方向应该是旧的 "橙色计划"，直接横穿太平洋中部，并且只南下到足以守住主攻方向的侧翼。集中力量于中央，让日本人在无意义的行动中消耗他们的力量。
我们可以理智地认为，我们的主攻方向应该是旧的 "橙色计划"，直接横穿太平洋中部，并且只南下到足以守住主攻方向的侧翼。集中力量于中央，让日本人在无意义的行动中消耗他们的力量。
Of course on the other hand the southern operations did kill a great many Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen and as such served us well. And it was in the southern operations that the Navy gained the fighting and operational skills it needed, often at great cost.
当然，另一方面，南方作战也确实杀死了大量日本士兵、水手和飞行员，因此对我们大有裨益。
海军正是在南方的行动中获得了所需的战斗和作战技能，同时也付出巨大的代价。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
当然，另一方面，南方作战也确实杀死了大量日本士兵、水手和飞行员，因此对我们大有裨益。
海军正是在南方的行动中获得了所需的战斗和作战技能，同时也付出巨大的代价。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
I think it was a mistake to kill Yamamoto though; I think he's as overrated as Rommel and served us better by being in command than by being dead.
不过，我认为杀死山本是个错误；我认为他和隆美尔一样被高估了，他担任指挥比死了对我们更好。
不过，我认为杀死山本是个错误；我认为他和隆美尔一样被高估了，他担任指挥比死了对我们更好。
68vette
quote Irishtom29
In the summer of 1942, the Japanese had to be stopped in their drive to cut off Australia by severing the US shipping lanes. Despite Australian fears, the Japanese never intended to invade the Australian mainland. While an invasion was considered by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters in February 1942, it was judged to be beyond the Japanese military's capabilities and no planning or other preparations were undertaken. Instead, in March 1942 the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States by capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. This plan was frustrated by the Japanese defeat in the Battle of the Coral Sea and was postponed indefinitely after the Battle of Midway. While these battles ended the threat to Australia, the Australian government continued to warn that an invasion was possible until mid-1943. Australia remained an important source of supplies to US forces in the Pacific until the end of the war. The Pacific Theater was divided into North, Central, and South Pacific under command of the Navy (Nimitz) and the Southwest Pacific (Australia to Philippines) under the Army (MacArthur). These areas shared the remaining 15% of war production with the China area. Nimitz had two major war aims in 1942. Protect Hawaii and the West Coast of the US with Midway Island as his first line of defense and to protect the shipping lanes to Australia. A Japanese move down the Solomons would allow them to control the Java Sea and threaten America bases in New Hebrides and Australia itself.
回应Irishtom29楼上内容：
在1942年夏季，为了阻止日本切断澳大利亚的通道，尤其是通过切断美国的航运航线，必须制止他们的行动。虽然澳大利亚人担心，但日本人从未打算入侵澳大利亚本土。1942 年 2 月，日本帝国总司令部曾考虑过发动侵略，但认为这超出了日本军队的能力，因此没有进行任何计划或其他准备。相反，1942 年 3 月，日本军方采取将澳大利亚与美国隔绝开来的战略，通过占领新几内亚的莫尔斯比港、所罗门群岛、斐济、萨摩亚和新喀里多尼亚，。这一计划因珊瑚海海战中日本的失败而受挫，并在中途岛海战后被无限期推迟。虽然这些战役结束了对澳大利亚的威胁，但澳大利亚政府直到 1943 年年中仍警告说，入侵是可能的。直到战争结束，澳大利亚一直是太平洋美军的重要补给来源。太平洋战区分为北太平洋、中太平洋和南太平洋这些由海军（尼米兹）指挥，而西南太平洋（澳大利亚至菲律宾）由陆军（麦克阿瑟）指挥。这些地区与中国地区分享剩余15%的战争资源。1942 年，尼米兹有两大战争目标。以中途岛为第一道防线，保护夏威夷和美国西海岸，并保护通往澳大利亚的航道。日本在所罗门群岛的行动将使他们能够控制爪哇海，并威胁到美国在新赫布里底群岛和澳大利亚本土的基地。
quote Irishtom29
In the summer of 1942, the Japanese had to be stopped in their drive to cut off Australia by severing the US shipping lanes. Despite Australian fears, the Japanese never intended to invade the Australian mainland. While an invasion was considered by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters in February 1942, it was judged to be beyond the Japanese military's capabilities and no planning or other preparations were undertaken. Instead, in March 1942 the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States by capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. This plan was frustrated by the Japanese defeat in the Battle of the Coral Sea and was postponed indefinitely after the Battle of Midway. While these battles ended the threat to Australia, the Australian government continued to warn that an invasion was possible until mid-1943. Australia remained an important source of supplies to US forces in the Pacific until the end of the war. The Pacific Theater was divided into North, Central, and South Pacific under command of the Navy (Nimitz) and the Southwest Pacific (Australia to Philippines) under the Army (MacArthur). These areas shared the remaining 15% of war production with the China area. Nimitz had two major war aims in 1942. Protect Hawaii and the West Coast of the US with Midway Island as his first line of defense and to protect the shipping lanes to Australia. A Japanese move down the Solomons would allow them to control the Java Sea and threaten America bases in New Hebrides and Australia itself.
回应Irishtom29楼上内容：
在1942年夏季，为了阻止日本切断澳大利亚的通道，尤其是通过切断美国的航运航线，必须制止他们的行动。虽然澳大利亚人担心，但日本人从未打算入侵澳大利亚本土。1942 年 2 月，日本帝国总司令部曾考虑过发动侵略，但认为这超出了日本军队的能力，因此没有进行任何计划或其他准备。相反，1942 年 3 月，日本军方采取将澳大利亚与美国隔绝开来的战略，通过占领新几内亚的莫尔斯比港、所罗门群岛、斐济、萨摩亚和新喀里多尼亚，。这一计划因珊瑚海海战中日本的失败而受挫，并在中途岛海战后被无限期推迟。虽然这些战役结束了对澳大利亚的威胁，但澳大利亚政府直到 1943 年年中仍警告说，入侵是可能的。直到战争结束，澳大利亚一直是太平洋美军的重要补给来源。太平洋战区分为北太平洋、中太平洋和南太平洋这些由海军（尼米兹）指挥，而西南太平洋（澳大利亚至菲律宾）由陆军（麦克阿瑟）指挥。这些地区与中国地区分享剩余15%的战争资源。1942 年，尼米兹有两大战争目标。以中途岛为第一道防线，保护夏威夷和美国西海岸，并保护通往澳大利亚的航道。日本在所罗门群岛的行动将使他们能够控制爪哇海，并威胁到美国在新赫布里底群岛和澳大利亚本土的基地。
Grandstander
Quote:Irishtom29
My thinking runs along these lines as well. Despite Yamamoto's reputation, his only great victory was the Pearl Harbor attack, an assault on an enemy before it unaware that a state of war existed. It worked because he had the element of total surprise on his side, something he wasn't going to be able to do again.
回复Irishtom29 内容关于（不过，我认为杀死山本是个错误；我认为他和隆美尔一样被高估了，他担任指挥比死了对我们更好。）
俺也是这么想的。尽管山本五十六声名显赫，但他唯一的伟大胜利是偷袭珍珠港，在敌人还没有意识到进入战争状态时就发动了进攻。这一招之所以奏效，是因为他不讲武德的偷袭，而他后续也再无法复制这种不讲武德的偷袭。
Quote:Irishtom29
My thinking runs along these lines as well. Despite Yamamoto's reputation, his only great victory was the Pearl Harbor attack, an assault on an enemy before it unaware that a state of war existed. It worked because he had the element of total surprise on his side, something he wasn't going to be able to do again.
回复Irishtom29 内容关于（不过，我认为杀死山本是个错误；我认为他和隆美尔一样被高估了，他担任指挥比死了对我们更好。）
俺也是这么想的。尽管山本五十六声名显赫，但他唯一的伟大胜利是偷袭珍珠港，在敌人还没有意识到进入战争状态时就发动了进攻。这一招之所以奏效，是因为他不讲武德的偷袭，而他后续也再无法复制这种不讲武德的偷袭。
And as a reluctant warrior who was against the idea of taking on the US, had he lived, I can't help suspecting that his influential voice might have persuaded the nation to have surrendered earlier. He was about the only man in the nation with the status and stature to stand up to the army fanatics who wanted to fight to extinction.
作为一名反对与美国作战的武士，如果他还活着，我不禁怀疑以他的影响力可能会说服国家早些投降。他大约是全国唯一一个有地位和身份的人，能够站出来对抗那些想打到灭亡的军队狂热分子。
作为一名反对与美国作战的武士，如果他还活着，我不禁怀疑以他的影响力可能会说服国家早些投降。他大约是全国唯一一个有地位和身份的人，能够站出来对抗那些想打到灭亡的军队狂热分子。
robertbrianbush
quote nitroae23
McArthur also felt that we had a moral responsibility to prioritize the liberatiin of the Phillipines and to do so as quickly as possible due to it still being American soil at the time and the fact that it's inhabitants were American nationals.
引用 Nitroae23 解放菲律宾是必然的内容
麦克阿瑟还认为，我们在道义上有责任优先解放菲律宾，而且要尽快解放，因为当时菲律宾仍是美国领土，而且菲律宾居民是美国国民。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
quote nitroae23
McArthur also felt that we had a moral responsibility to prioritize the liberatiin of the Phillipines and to do so as quickly as possible due to it still being American soil at the time and the fact that it's inhabitants were American nationals.
引用 Nitroae23 解放菲律宾是必然的内容
麦克阿瑟还认为，我们在道义上有责任优先解放菲律宾，而且要尽快解放，因为当时菲律宾仍是美国领土，而且菲律宾居民是美国国民。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
msgsing
Well there was a lot of space between us and the Japanese home islands where the troops were trained and war materials were manufactured. Millions of square miles of ocean between us and the enemy's heartland.
我们和日本本土之间有很大的空间，而且日本本土是军队接受训练和生产战争物资的地方。我们和敌人的核心地带之间隔着数百万平方英里的海洋。
Well there was a lot of space between us and the Japanese home islands where the troops were trained and war materials were manufactured. Millions of square miles of ocean between us and the enemy's heartland.
我们和日本本土之间有很大的空间，而且日本本土是军队接受训练和生产战争物资的地方。我们和敌人的核心地带之间隔着数百万平方英里的海洋。
We had to use a stepping stone campaign to seize some important Japanese held islands and establish air bases and assemble and train ground troops. Some islands were bypassed. Tarawa was a mistake but in the end the enemy was defeated.
我们必须通过一个逐步推进的战术，夺取一些由日本控制的重要岛屿，建立空军基地，并组织和训练地面部队。一些岛屿被绕过。塔拉瓦是一个错误，但最终敌人被击败。
我们必须通过一个逐步推进的战术，夺取一些由日本控制的重要岛屿，建立空军基地，并组织和训练地面部队。一些岛屿被绕过。塔拉瓦是一个错误，但最终敌人被击败。
ScottsdaleMark
I also think given that the Pacific theater was given less priority, it wasn't all bad to use the slow-play approach of island-hopping to give the nation and the Navy time to build up industrial production, numbers of carriers and planes, operational experience, etc., while working our way across the Pacific.
我也认为，鉴于太平洋战区的优先级较低，采用跳岛这种慢打方式，让国家和海军有时间积累工业生产、航母和飞机数量、作战经验等，同时努力横跨太平洋，也并非全是坏事。
I also think given that the Pacific theater was given less priority, it wasn't all bad to use the slow-play approach of island-hopping to give the nation and the Navy time to build up industrial production, numbers of carriers and planes, operational experience, etc., while working our way across the Pacific.
我也认为，鉴于太平洋战区的优先级较低，采用跳岛这种慢打方式，让国家和海军有时间积累工业生产、航母和飞机数量、作战经验等，同时努力横跨太平洋，也并非全是坏事。
Given the Japanese were the lower priority, I think the conservative approach made sense. Now, it can be argued we were also pretty conservative in Europe as well given how long we waited to invade Europe itself vis a vis what Churchill, etc., wanted. We spent a lot of time bombing and fighting in Africa and Italy instead of taking on Germany on the continent. But that's another discussion and obviously it worked out in the end.
鉴于日本人的优先级较低，我认为保守的做法是合理的。现在，可以说我们在欧洲也相当保守，因为相对于丘吉尔等人的要求，我们等了很久才入侵欧洲。我们花了大量时间在非洲和意大利进行轰炸和战斗，而不是在欧洲大陆对付德国。但这是另一个话题，而且很明显，我们最终成功了。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
鉴于日本人的优先级较低，我认为保守的做法是合理的。现在，可以说我们在欧洲也相当保守，因为相对于丘吉尔等人的要求，我们等了很久才入侵欧洲。我们花了大量时间在非洲和意大利进行轰炸和战斗，而不是在欧洲大陆对付德国。但这是另一个话题，而且很明显，我们最终成功了。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
When you're playing from a position of ever-increasing strength and expertise, I can understand the desire to be conservative rather than rushing in too quickly without the ability to sustain and build upon early successes. AKA what happened to the Japanese within a year of their sneak attack, Midway happened and they were on the defensive.
当你在实力和专业技能不断增强的情况下作战时，我可以理解你希望采取保守策略，而不是在没有能力维持和巩固早期成果的情况下仓促出击。又如日本人在偷袭中途岛后一年内的遭遇，他们处于守势。
当你在实力和专业技能不断增强的情况下作战时，我可以理解你希望采取保守策略，而不是在没有能力维持和巩固早期成果的情况下仓促出击。又如日本人在偷袭中途岛后一年内的遭遇，他们处于守势。
Frihed89
quote John Walmsley
What alternative would you have suggested: a route through China from South Asia? I think the two prong campaign, through Papua New Guinea and the Bismarks by MacArthur, and the island hoping campaign by the USN and USMC was the only real alternative. There were arguments about which islands to invade and some invasions may have been a bad idea. However, there really were only these two roads to Japan.
回应 John Walmsley 内容所有这些都是猜测，但是否有可能绕过这些偏远岛屿，更直接、更早地与驻扎在菲律宾和冲绳的日军交战？
你会提出什么替代方案：从南亚经由中国？我认为，麦克阿瑟通过巴布亚新几内亚和比斯马克群岛发起的双管齐下战役，以及美国海军和美国海军陆战队发起的岛屿希望战役是唯一真正的替代方案。在入侵哪些岛屿的问题上存在争论，有些入侵可能是个坏主意。然而，通往日本的道路确实只有这两条。
quote John Walmsley
What alternative would you have suggested: a route through China from South Asia? I think the two prong campaign, through Papua New Guinea and the Bismarks by MacArthur, and the island hoping campaign by the USN and USMC was the only real alternative. There were arguments about which islands to invade and some invasions may have been a bad idea. However, there really were only these two roads to Japan.
回应 John Walmsley 内容所有这些都是猜测，但是否有可能绕过这些偏远岛屿，更直接、更早地与驻扎在菲律宾和冲绳的日军交战？
你会提出什么替代方案：从南亚经由中国？我认为，麦克阿瑟通过巴布亚新几内亚和比斯马克群岛发起的双管齐下战役，以及美国海军和美国海军陆战队发起的岛屿希望战役是唯一真正的替代方案。在入侵哪些岛屿的问题上存在争论，有些入侵可能是个坏主意。然而，通往日本的道路确实只有这两条。
karstic
Why not bomb Japan with long range bombers from China? The US had the technology, Chinese were allies.
为什么不用中国的远程轰炸机轰炸日本？美国有技术，中国是盟友。
Why not bomb Japan with long range bombers from China? The US had the technology, Chinese were allies.
为什么不用中国的远程轰炸机轰炸日本？美国有技术，中国是盟友。
Unsettomati
Because Japan occupied most of eastern China. The only places it didn't occupy were either well inland (and behind Japanese-occupied territory) or relatively small and insecure pockets in the east. Bases in the west would have been extremely difficult to supply and missions would have entailed flying over hundreds of miles of Japanese-occupied China (and maybe Korea). Bases in the east would have been way too close to Japanese lines and the supply chain would run right through Japanese waters - and it would have entailed securing the Ryukyu Islands, of which Okinawa was one. And already possessing Okinawa, there would be no reason to use bases in China.
回复楼上：
因为日本占领了中国东部的大部分地区。它唯一没有占领的地方要么在内陆（日本占领区的后方），要么在东部相对较小且不安全的小块地区。西部基地的补给极为困难，而且执行任务需要飞越数百英里的日占中国（也许还有朝鲜）。东部的基地离日本防线太近，供应链会直接穿过日本水域--这就需要确保琉球群岛的安全，而冲绳就是其中之一。已经拥有冲绳，就没有理由再在中国使用基地。
Because Japan occupied most of eastern China. The only places it didn't occupy were either well inland (and behind Japanese-occupied territory) or relatively small and insecure pockets in the east. Bases in the west would have been extremely difficult to supply and missions would have entailed flying over hundreds of miles of Japanese-occupied China (and maybe Korea). Bases in the east would have been way too close to Japanese lines and the supply chain would run right through Japanese waters - and it would have entailed securing the Ryukyu Islands, of which Okinawa was one. And already possessing Okinawa, there would be no reason to use bases in China.
回复楼上：
因为日本占领了中国东部的大部分地区。它唯一没有占领的地方要么在内陆（日本占领区的后方），要么在东部相对较小且不安全的小块地区。西部基地的补给极为困难，而且执行任务需要飞越数百英里的日占中国（也许还有朝鲜）。东部的基地离日本防线太近，供应链会直接穿过日本水域--这就需要确保琉球群岛的安全，而冲绳就是其中之一。已经拥有冲绳，就没有理由再在中国使用基地。
Bombing from bases in Soviet territory might have been practical, but Stalin was far too paranoid to ever allow that. In any case, the USSR was neutral in the Pacific War until the very end, and from a strategic point of view (aside from his paranoia) there was little reason for Stalin to enter the war until he had to do so (the agreement to do so within 90 days of the end of the war in Europe was extracted from him at Yalta).
从苏联境内的基地进行轰炸也许是可行的，但斯大林过于偏执，根本不允许这样做。无论如何，苏联在太平洋战争中一直保持中立，直到战争结束，而且从战略角度来看（除了他的偏执），斯大林在不得不参战之前没有什么理由参战（在雅尔塔，他被要求在欧战结束后 90 天内参战的协议）。
从苏联境内的基地进行轰炸也许是可行的，但斯大林过于偏执，根本不允许这样做。无论如何，苏联在太平洋战争中一直保持中立，直到战争结束，而且从战略角度来看（除了他的偏执），斯大林在不得不参战之前没有什么理由参战（在雅尔塔，他被要求在欧战结束后 90 天内参战的协议）。
ScoPro
Well, part of the Aleutian campaign could've been avoided. After the Battle of Attu in 1943, the Japanese secretly withdrew it's 2,500 troops from the island of Kiska.
回复harry chickpea 内容：我记得，至少有几个日本人占据的岛屿被绕过了。
阿留申战役的一部分本来是可以避免的。1943 年阿图战役后，日军从基斯卡岛秘密撤出了 2500 名士兵。
Well, part of the Aleutian campaign could've been avoided. After the Battle of Attu in 1943, the Japanese secretly withdrew it's 2,500 troops from the island of Kiska.
回复harry chickpea 内容：我记得，至少有几个日本人占据的岛屿被绕过了。
阿留申战役的一部分本来是可以避免的。1943 年阿图战役后，日军从基斯卡岛秘密撤出了 2500 名士兵。
Given the stiff resistance put up by the Emperor's troops on Attu, the US & Canadians invaded Kiska with a large force that wound up losing 92 killed & 200+ wounded - without a shot being fired by the Japanese who were long gone.
鉴于天皇的军队在阿图岛展开了顽强的抵抗，美国和加拿大军队率领大规模部队入侵基斯卡岛时，结果有 92 人阵亡，200 多人受伤。然而日军早已逃之夭夭，一枪未发。
鉴于天皇的军队在阿图岛展开了顽强的抵抗，美国和加拿大军队率领大规模部队入侵基斯卡岛时，结果有 92 人阵亡，200 多人受伤。然而日军早已逃之夭夭，一枪未发。
But that didn't prevent the US 7th Division from fighting the Canadians by mistake in a nasty bit of friendly fire. The Canucks managed to kill 28 Americans while only 4 of their own bought the farm. Also a US destroyer hit a mine and a number of allies were killed or hurt in accidents during the operation.
但就这前车之鉴，还是发生了一场友军误击事件，美第七师误伤了加拿大军队。加拿大人成功干掉了 28名美国大兵，而他们自己只有4人伤亡。此外，一艘美国驱逐舰触雷，导致在行动中发生的事故中有多名盟军伤亡。
但就这前车之鉴，还是发生了一场友军误击事件，美第七师误伤了加拿大军队。加拿大人成功干掉了 28名美国大兵，而他们自己只有4人伤亡。此外，一艘美国驱逐舰触雷，导致在行动中发生的事故中有多名盟军伤亡。
US troops managed to capture one starving dog, which was promptly rescued & adopted by a GI.
美军成功捕获了一只饥饿的狗，它很快被一名大兵救起并收养。
美军成功捕获了一只饥饿的狗，它很快被一名大兵救起并收养。
My Dad - after the Battle of Attu
我的父亲--阿图战役之后
我的父亲--阿图战役之后
Taiko
I would say perhaps the most famous Japanese installations bypassed, at least from an assault by ground forces was Rabaul which held major anchorages and airbases during 1943 battles to be surrounded and left to whither away for the rest of the war.
我想说的是，至少在地面部队的进攻中，被绕过的最著名的日军防御工事也许是拉包尔，它在 1943 年的战斗中占据了主要的锚地和空军基地，但在战争的余下时间里却被包围，任其枯萎。
I would say perhaps the most famous Japanese installations bypassed, at least from an assault by ground forces was Rabaul which held major anchorages and airbases during 1943 battles to be surrounded and left to whither away for the rest of the war.
我想说的是，至少在地面部队的进攻中，被绕过的最著名的日军防御工事也许是拉包尔，它在 1943 年的战斗中占据了主要的锚地和空军基地，但在战争的余下时间里却被包围，任其枯萎。
Andrew in Minnesota
You're right.
你是对的
You're right.
你是对的
The Imperial Japanese Navy wanted to invade Australia. The Imperial Japanese Army opposed this. The differences were apparently that the IJN thought the invasion and subsequent garrisoning could be accomplished with a comparatively small troop commitment, and the IJA thought this was more or less insane. They settled on a plan to simply cut off Australia from American forces, and some contingency plans were drawn up, those these required that basically everything Japan had on the burners went its way. At any rate, after the Coral Sea and Midway it was obvious to all that it could not happen in any case.
日本帝国海军想要入侵澳大利亚。日本帝国陆军对此表示反对。分歧显然在于日本帝国海军认为只需投入相对较少的兵力就能完成入侵和随后的驻军，而日本帝国陆军则认为这多少有点病。他们最终确定了一项计划，即直接切断澳大利亚与美军的联系，并制定了一些应急计划，但这些计划几乎要求日本所有的一切都必须按计划进行。无论如何，在珊瑚海和中途岛海战之后，所有人都清楚，无论如何这都是不可能实现了。
日本帝国海军想要入侵澳大利亚。日本帝国陆军对此表示反对。分歧显然在于日本帝国海军认为只需投入相对较少的兵力就能完成入侵和随后的驻军，而日本帝国陆军则认为这多少有点病。他们最终确定了一项计划，即直接切断澳大利亚与美军的联系，并制定了一些应急计划，但这些计划几乎要求日本所有的一切都必须按计划进行。无论如何，在珊瑚海和中途岛海战之后，所有人都清楚，无论如何这都是不可能实现了。
But it is true that there were Japanese elements advocating invasion, and that some planning to that end did take place.
但确实有日本人主张侵略，也确实为此进行了一些策划。
但确实有日本人主张侵略，也确实为此进行了一些策划。
villageidiot1
There have been several discussions on here over the years about whether other isllnds such as Iwo Jima could've been bypassed. A book that was recommended in regard to Iwo Jima was The Ghosts of Iwo Jima by Dr. Robert S. Burrell, who taught Marine Corps history at the U.S. Naval Academy.
回复Taiko内容我想说的是，至少在地面部队的进攻
关于是否可以绕过硫磺岛等其他岛屿，多年来这里进行过几次讨论。有关硫磺岛的一本推荐的书是《硫磺岛的幽灵》（The Ghosts of Iwo Jima），该书是由曾在美国海军学院教授海军陆战队历史的 Robert S. Burrell 博士所著。
There have been several discussions on here over the years about whether other isllnds such as Iwo Jima could've been bypassed. A book that was recommended in regard to Iwo Jima was The Ghosts of Iwo Jima by Dr. Robert S. Burrell, who taught Marine Corps history at the U.S. Naval Academy.
回复Taiko内容我想说的是，至少在地面部队的进攻
关于是否可以绕过硫磺岛等其他岛屿，多年来这里进行过几次讨论。有关硫磺岛的一本推荐的书是《硫磺岛的幽灵》（The Ghosts of Iwo Jima），该书是由曾在美国海军学院教授海军陆战队历史的 Robert S. Burrell 博士所著。
I also wonder if the Philippines could've been bypassed. The Americans took over 62,000 casualties taking these islands and the Philippine people suffered huge losses especially in the battle over Manila that destroyed the city. Taking the Philippines took longer than any battle in the Pacific.
我还想知道菲律宾是否可以绕过。美军在攻占这些岛屿时伤亡超过 62000 人，菲律宾人民也遭受了巨大损失，尤其是在摧毁马尼拉市的战斗中。攻占菲律宾所花费的时间比太平洋上任何一场战役都要长。
我还想知道菲律宾是否可以绕过。美军在攻占这些岛屿时伤亡超过 62000 人，菲律宾人民也遭受了巨大损失，尤其是在摧毁马尼拉市的战斗中。攻占菲律宾所花费的时间比太平洋上任何一场战役都要长。
Taiko
Admiral King and others would have bypassed the Philippines in favor of Taiwan to flank the islands. By then MacArthur's, who made an art out of by passing Japanese strongholds elsewhere made the speech that had become US policy.
回复楼上：
阿道明·金（Admiral King）等人曾考虑绕过菲律宾，选择台湾（地区）来侧翼这些岛屿。当时，麦克阿瑟（MacArthur）已经成功绕过日本在其他地方的坚固据点，他发表了一篇演讲，该演讲后来成为了美国的政策。
Admiral King and others would have bypassed the Philippines in favor of Taiwan to flank the islands. By then MacArthur's, who made an art out of by passing Japanese strongholds elsewhere made the speech that had become US policy.
回复楼上：
阿道明·金（Admiral King）等人曾考虑绕过菲律宾，选择台湾（地区）来侧翼这些岛屿。当时，麦克阿瑟（MacArthur）已经成功绕过日本在其他地方的坚固据点，他发表了一篇演讲，该演讲后来成为了美国的政策。
msgsing
One of the main reasons Iwo was captured was that it provided an emergency landing site for heavily damaged B29 bombers. As for the Philippines this was something McArthur pushed to avenge his defeat at the hands of the Japanese.
夺取硫磺岛的主要原因之一是它为严重受损的 B29 轰炸机提供了一个紧急着陆场。至于菲律宾，这是麦克阿瑟为报败于日军之仇而推动的。
One of the main reasons Iwo was captured was that it provided an emergency landing site for heavily damaged B29 bombers. As for the Philippines this was something McArthur pushed to avenge his defeat at the hands of the Japanese.
夺取硫磺岛的主要原因之一是它为严重受损的 B29 轰炸机提供了一个紧急着陆场。至于菲律宾，这是麦克阿瑟为报败于日军之仇而推动的。
jbgusa
My own view is that we should have resorted to nukes earlier. Truman had the stomach and decisiveness; FDR, a veritable Quisling, did not.
我个人的观点是，我们本应更早地使用核武器。杜鲁门有魄力和决断力，而罗斯福这个名副其实的奎斯林却没有。
My own view is that we should have resorted to nukes earlier. Truman had the stomach and decisiveness; FDR, a veritable Quisling, did not.
我个人的观点是，我们本应更早地使用核武器。杜鲁门有魄力和决断力，而罗斯福这个名副其实的奎斯林却没有。
I read Flags of Our Fathers by James D. Bradley, Ron Powers which detailed the Iwo Jima campaign. The book itself is a gripping page turner. There is more to my emotions connected with its reading. I was going to write "immensely enjoyable" concerning the book, but there was way too much gore for that. And warning, it's not bedtime reading. However, aside from the battlefield scenes it is a book that needs to be read.
我读了詹姆斯-D-布拉德利和罗恩-鲍尔斯合著的《父辈的旗帜》，其中详细介绍了硫磺岛战役。这本书本身就扣人心弦。在阅读过程中，我还有更多的感触。我本想写 "非常愉快 "来形容这本书，但书中的血腥场面实在太多了。需要提醒的是，这不是睡前读物。不过，除了战场上的场景，这是一本必读书籍。
我读了詹姆斯-D-布拉德利和罗恩-鲍尔斯合著的《父辈的旗帜》，其中详细介绍了硫磺岛战役。这本书本身就扣人心弦。在阅读过程中，我还有更多的感触。我本想写 "非常愉快 "来形容这本书，但书中的血腥场面实在太多了。需要提醒的是，这不是睡前读物。不过，除了战场上的场景，这是一本必读书籍。
The protagonist, the author's father, John or "Jack" Bradley was one of six that were in the iconic picture of the raising of the flag at Iwo Jima. As it happens the flag raising was one of the few relatively mellow interludes at Iwo Jima. Thus Jack Bradley did not regard himself as a hero. Nor did all but one of the flag raisers.
本书的主人公，作者的父亲约翰-布拉德利（John or "Jack" Bradley）是硫磺岛升旗标志性照片中的六人之一。碰巧的是，升旗是硫磺岛为数不多的相对平静的间歇。因此，杰克-布拉德利并没有把自己当作英雄。除了一名升旗手之外，其他升旗手也没有把自己当作英雄。
本书的主人公，作者的父亲约翰-布拉德利（John or "Jack" Bradley）是硫磺岛升旗标志性照片中的六人之一。碰巧的是，升旗是硫磺岛为数不多的相对平静的间歇。因此，杰克-布拉德利并没有把自己当作英雄。除了一名升旗手之外，其他升旗手也没有把自己当作英雄。
The military aspect is important; if not for the soldiers who fought, died and faced indescribable brutality we might not be blessed with the freedoms we take too much for granted. Freedom isn't free. The next time anyone tells you that America is not a great country, though with blemishes, or you think that yourself, do yourself a favor; read this book or, as applicable, hand someone a copy.
军事方面是重要的；如果没有那些战斗、牺牲和面对无法形容的残暴的士兵，我们可能就不会享有我们认为理所当然的自由。自由不是免费的。下一次，如果有人告诉你美国不是一个伟大的国家，尽管有瑕疵，或者你自己也这么认为，请帮自己一个忙，读一读这本书，或者在适当的时候，给别人递上一本。
军事方面是重要的；如果没有那些战斗、牺牲和面对无法形容的残暴的士兵，我们可能就不会享有我们认为理所当然的自由。自由不是免费的。下一次，如果有人告诉你美国不是一个伟大的国家，尽管有瑕疵，或者你自己也这么认为，请帮自己一个忙，读一读这本书，或者在适当的时候，给别人递上一本。
I also read Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944…by Max Hastings. I am going to give it five stars on Goodreads, with reservations and an explanation.
我还读过《报应》： 马克斯-黑斯廷斯（Max Hastings）著的《1944 年的日本之战》。我将在 Goodreads 上给这本书打五星，但有保留意见和解释。
我还读过《报应》： 马克斯-黑斯廷斯（Max Hastings）著的《1944 年的日本之战》。我将在 Goodreads 上给这本书打五星，但有保留意见和解释。
This book and Flags of Our Fathers by James D. Bradley, Ron Powers are my major reading about the Pacific Theater of WW II. It was tough reading both because of the amount of detail and internal contradictions. For example, he spills much ink on the argument that the British re-conquest of Burma (now Myanmar) and MacArthur's re-conquest of the Philippines were wastes of time and blood. The argument runs that more or less bankrupt Britain did nothing to advance Allied obxtives by the fighting in Burma. Similarly he argues that MacArthur was almost madly obsessed with retaking the Philippines. He details how wasteful and costly the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf was deadly and useless. He makes great cases for both propositions, as well as the idea that MacArthur was a vain showboater. Flags of Our Fathers does a great job analyzing bushido, of the ancient Samurai code of honor.
这本书和詹姆斯-布拉德利（James D. Bradley）、罗恩-鲍尔斯（Ron Powers）所著的《父辈的旗帜》（Flags of Our Fathers）是我关于二战太平洋战场的主要读物。这两本书都很难读，因为其中有大量细节和内部矛盾。例如，他大篇幅论述了英国重新征服缅甸（现缅甸）和麦克阿瑟重新征服菲律宾是浪费时间和鲜血。他的论点是，几乎破产的英国在缅甸的战斗对推进盟军的目标毫无帮助。同样，他认为麦克阿瑟几乎疯狂地痴迷于夺回菲律宾。他详细描述了莱特湾海战是多么的浪费和昂贵，是多么的致命和无用。他为这两个命题以及麦克阿瑟是个虚荣的炫耀者的观点提供了很好的论据。父辈的旗帜》对武士道（古代武士的荣誉准则）进行了很好的分析。
这本书和詹姆斯-布拉德利（James D. Bradley）、罗恩-鲍尔斯（Ron Powers）所著的《父辈的旗帜》（Flags of Our Fathers）是我关于二战太平洋战场的主要读物。这两本书都很难读，因为其中有大量细节和内部矛盾。例如，他大篇幅论述了英国重新征服缅甸（现缅甸）和麦克阿瑟重新征服菲律宾是浪费时间和鲜血。他的论点是，几乎破产的英国在缅甸的战斗对推进盟军的目标毫无帮助。同样，他认为麦克阿瑟几乎疯狂地痴迷于夺回菲律宾。他详细描述了莱特湾海战是多么的浪费和昂贵，是多么的致命和无用。他为这两个命题以及麦克阿瑟是个虚荣的炫耀者的观点提供了很好的论据。父辈的旗帜》对武士道（古代武士的荣誉准则）进行了很好的分析。
Johnny Wadd
I am not going to address the question about the Pacific Campaign island hoping strategy as it's just so much "monday morning quarterback"-ing for me.
回复楼上：
我不打算回答关于太平洋战役岛屿希望战略的问题，因为这对我来说就是马后炮。
I am not going to address the question about the Pacific Campaign island hoping strategy as it's just so much "monday morning quarterback"-ing for me.
回复楼上：
我不打算回答关于太平洋战役岛屿希望战略的问题，因为这对我来说就是马后炮。
A note on "Flag of Our Fathers" however. I read the book myself and was distressed to learn that a couple years ago the military, after painstaking research, concluded that John Bradley was NOT one of the flag raisers. His son accepted that conclusion. Nevertheless, it was a great book and good movie. I was more touched on the fate of the other flag raiser Ira Hayes however.
不过，关于《父辈的旗帜》，有一点需要说明。几年前，军方经过艰苦的研究得出结论，约翰-布拉德利不是升旗手之一。他的儿子接受了这一结论。不过，这是一本好书，也是一部好电影。不过，我对另一位升旗手艾拉-海耶斯的命运更有感触。
不过，关于《父辈的旗帜》，有一点需要说明。几年前，军方经过艰苦的研究得出结论，约翰-布拉德利不是升旗手之一。他的儿子接受了这一结论。不过，这是一本好书，也是一部好电影。不过，我对另一位升旗手艾拉-海耶斯的命运更有感触。
I would suggest an even more grim book on a soldiers account of the Pacific Campaign, this one in Peleliu and Okinawa - Eugene Sledge's "With the Old Breed" (also dramatized in the miniseries "The Pacific"). Almost indescribable horrors that these soldiers fought through, the miniseries only captured some of it.
我建议您阅读尤金·斯莱奇（Eugene Sledge）的《与老兵们在一起》，这是一本关于太平洋战役，具体发生在贝里琉和冲绳岛的士兵经历的更加残酷的书籍。这本书也被拍成迷你剧《太平洋》。士兵们在这些战役中经历了几乎无法形容的恐怖，而迷你剧只能呈现其中的一小部分。
我建议您阅读尤金·斯莱奇（Eugene Sledge）的《与老兵们在一起》，这是一本关于太平洋战役，具体发生在贝里琉和冲绳岛的士兵经历的更加残酷的书籍。这本书也被拍成迷你剧《太平洋》。士兵们在这些战役中经历了几乎无法形容的恐怖，而迷你剧只能呈现其中的一小部分。
msgsing
There were two flag raising, both ceremonial. Bradley was at the first one but not at the second. Someone at the command level wanted a bigger flag and up it went. This was the much more publicized raising that hit the papers back home with dramatic photos and film footage in the newsreels.
回复楼上：
有两次升旗，都是仪式性的。布拉德利参加了第一次升旗，但没有参加第二次。指挥层有人想要一面更大的旗帜，于是就升旗了。这一次的升旗仪式更加广为人知，国内的报纸上刊登了大量的照片和新闻片中的电影镜头。
There were two flag raising, both ceremonial. Bradley was at the first one but not at the second. Someone at the command level wanted a bigger flag and up it went. This was the much more publicized raising that hit the papers back home with dramatic photos and film footage in the newsreels.
回复楼上：
有两次升旗，都是仪式性的。布拉德利参加了第一次升旗，但没有参加第二次。指挥层有人想要一面更大的旗帜，于是就升旗了。这一次的升旗仪式更加广为人知，国内的报纸上刊登了大量的照片和新闻片中的电影镜头。
Bradly was a brave guy. As a navy medic he aided many wounded Marines under heavy Japanese fire. He was wounded and was awarded the Navy Cross for valor just below the Medal of Honor. In some of the pictures of him back in the states he is on crutches.
布拉德利是个勇敢的人。作为一名海军军医，他在日军的猛烈炮火下救助了许多受伤的海军陆战队员。他因英勇负伤，被授予仅次于荣誉勋章的海军十字勋章。在他回到美国后的一些照片中，他拄着拐杖。
布拉德利是个勇敢的人。作为一名海军军医，他在日军的猛烈炮火下救助了许多受伤的海军陆战队员。他因英勇负伤，被授予仅次于荣誉勋章的海军十字勋章。在他回到美国后的一些照片中，他拄着拐杖。
Why he represented himself as being in the more publicized flag raising is a mystery. He was under fire at the first raising. Wounded and just wanted to get back home. What would you do in that situation?
他为何选择代表自己参与备受瞩目的升旗仪式是一个谜。事实上，他在第一次升旗时就身处火线，甚至受伤了，只是渴望尽快回家。在这种情况下，你会怎么做呢？
他为何选择代表自己参与备受瞩目的升旗仪式是一个谜。事实上，他在第一次升旗时就身处火线，甚至受伤了，只是渴望尽快回家。在这种情况下，你会怎么做呢？
Johnny Wadd
Yeah. Bradley was not the flag raiser in the famous Rosenthal photograph (2nd flag raising). It was a case of mistaken identity for 70 years. He was at the first raising.
回复Msgsing内容有两次升旗，都是仪式性的。
是的。布拉德利并不是著名的罗森塔尔照片（第二次升旗）中的升旗手。70年来，人们一直认错人。他参加了第一次升旗。
Yeah. Bradley was not the flag raiser in the famous Rosenthal photograph (2nd flag raising). It was a case of mistaken identity for 70 years. He was at the first raising.
回复Msgsing内容有两次升旗，都是仪式性的。
是的。布拉德利并不是著名的罗森塔尔照片（第二次升旗）中的升旗手。70年来，人们一直认错人。他参加了第一次升旗。
Your conclusion is probably correct, at the time he just wanted to go home and out of the combat zone for that war bond drive. Combine that with the pressure from the marine higher ups to pick the surviving flag raisers quickly in all the confusion (3 I think were KIA); that they may have picked the wrong person was inconsequential. Rene Gagnon who also attended the war bonds trip was also misidentified.
你的结论可能是正确的，当时他可能只是渴望尽早回家，远离战区，参加战争债券的筹款活动。加上来自海军陆战队高层的压力，他们在混乱中需要迅速选择出生还的升旗手（我记得有3人阵亡）；或许他们选错了人，但这并不那么重要。雷内-盖格南（Rene Gagnon）也参与了战争债券之旅，但他的身份也被弄错了。
你的结论可能是正确的，当时他可能只是渴望尽早回家，远离战区，参加战争债券的筹款活动。加上来自海军陆战队高层的压力，他们在混乱中需要迅速选择出生还的升旗手（我记得有3人阵亡）；或许他们选错了人，但这并不那么重要。雷内-盖格南（Rene Gagnon）也参与了战争债券之旅，但他的身份也被弄错了。
It also explains Bradley's reluctance to ever discuss the flag raising after the war.
这也解释了布拉德利为何不愿在战后讨论升旗问题。
这也解释了布拉德利为何不愿在战后讨论升旗问题。
bus man
Yep. Kiska was encased in pea-soup fog, making it well-neigh impossible to see what was going on more than a few feet in front of you. And since the invaders had no idea that the enemy had already departed, it was easy to mistake a vague shadow and muffled voices ahead of you as a target instead of an ally. I must say, though, I'm always glad when I read about them saving that dog. What's one dog compared to almost 300 casualties, but still, it makes me happy that he lived.
没错。基斯卡被浓雾笼罩，几乎无法看清前方几英尺以外的情况。由于入侵者不知道敌人已经离开，所以很容易把前方模糊的影子和低沉的声音误认为是目标而不是盟友。但我必须说，每当我读到他们救了那只狗的故事时，我总是很高兴。与近 300 人的伤亡相比，一只狗又算得了什么，但它能活着还是让我感到高兴。
Yep. Kiska was encased in pea-soup fog, making it well-neigh impossible to see what was going on more than a few feet in front of you. And since the invaders had no idea that the enemy had already departed, it was easy to mistake a vague shadow and muffled voices ahead of you as a target instead of an ally. I must say, though, I'm always glad when I read about them saving that dog. What's one dog compared to almost 300 casualties, but still, it makes me happy that he lived.
没错。基斯卡被浓雾笼罩，几乎无法看清前方几英尺以外的情况。由于入侵者不知道敌人已经离开，所以很容易把前方模糊的影子和低沉的声音误认为是目标而不是盟友。但我必须说，每当我读到他们救了那只狗的故事时，我总是很高兴。与近 300 人的伤亡相比，一只狗又算得了什么，但它能活着还是让我感到高兴。
The Japanese evacuation of Kiska must stand as one of the bravest, best conceived, flawlessly executed, and downright luckiest evacuations of all time. Credit where credit is due.
日军撤离基斯卡岛的行动可谓是历史上最为勇敢、构思最周密、执行最完美、也是最幸运的撤离之一。功劳当归功，这是不可否认的。
日军撤离基斯卡岛的行动可谓是历史上最为勇敢、构思最周密、执行最完美、也是最幸运的撤离之一。功劳当归功，这是不可否认的。
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