RT：美国是不是不再爱印度了?
正文翻译
New Delhi may remain Washington’s partner in some areas, but it will never be the proxy the Americans want
在某些领域，新德里可能仍然是华盛顿的伙伴，但它永远不会成为美国人想要的代理人。
After India pursued a deal with Iran on the Chabahar Port, the US responded by threatening New Delhi with sanctions, leading to India’s foreign minister accusing Washington of “bullying.” This rift has exposed the growing geopolitical incompatibility between the two countries over the past several years, even as the US championed India as a critical strategic partner against China.
在印度寻求与伊朗就恰巴哈尔港达成协议后，美国以制裁威胁新德里作为回应，导致印度外交部长指责华盛顿“欺凌”。这种裂痕暴露了两国在过去几年里日益加剧的地缘政治不协，尽管美国支持印度成为对抗中国的关键战略伙伴。
Since 2017, the US has promoted India as one of its key partners. It even went so far as to rename an entire region “the Indo-Pacific,” eyeing New Delhi as a key strategic asset in its longstanding strategic ambition of containing the rise of China.
自2017年以来，美国将印度提升为其重要合作伙伴之一。它甚至将整个地区重新命名为“印太”，将新德里视为其遏制中国崛起的长期战略野心的关键战略资产。
Thus, India was celebrated for its commitment to democracy, its potential as a new economic and manufacturing giant, and became part of a grouping known as “The Quad,” alongside Australia and Japan. New Delhi itself was happy to capitalize on these strategic overtures to enable its own economic and political rise as a great power. As the West soured on China, Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw that India’s time had come.
因此，印度因其对民主的承诺、作为一个新的经济和制造业巨人的潜力而受到赞扬，并与澳大利亚和日本一起成为被称为“四方”的集团的一部分。新德里自己也很乐意利用这些战略提议，使自己的经济和政治崛起成为一个大国。随着西方对中国的嫌恶，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪意识到，印度的好时候已经到来。
All of a sudden, however, this newly found optimism for India melted away, despite Western economic engagement with the country growing. New Delhi appears increasingly estranged from US obxtives, even to the point that “The Quad” was recently marginalized in favor of a new grouping, dubbed “The Squad” with the militantly pro-US Philippines under Ferdinand Macros Jr taking India’s place. It is as if the US believes Manilla will do more to cooperate on anti-China obxtives than New Delhi, such as joint military exercises. Thus, from close proximity, India appears to be falling into relative estrangement. What happened?
然而，尽管西方与印度的经济往来不断增加，但突然之间，这种新发现的对印度的乐观情绪消失了。新德里似乎越来越疏远美国的目标，甚至到了“四国”最近被边缘化的地步，取而代之的是一个被称为“小队”的新组织，由小费迪南德·马科斯领导的好斗且亲美的菲律宾取代了印度。美国似乎认为，在反华目标上，菲律宾会比印度更愿意合作，比如联合军演。因此，从近距离来看，印度似乎正在陷入相对疏远。发生了什么事?
First, India has an independent and strictly self-interested foreign policy. It might be willing to lean towards the US for its own gain, but that does not make it an “ally.” The US can subdue many countries into following its foreign policy obxtives, such as Britain, the Baltic states, or the Philippines, but India only joins in if it sees fit. Talk of New Delhi being part of an ideological cause for “democracy and freedom” is nonsense, and its leadership has never seen such cooperation in this way, despite its grievances with China. India has no commitment to US unipolarity like Britain or Australia would support, and instead seeks to rise as a power in its own right in a multipolar world.
首先，印度奉行独立、严格利己的外交政策。为了自己的利益，它可能愿意向美国倾斜，但这并不能使它成为一个“盟友”。美国可以让许多国家服从其外交政策目标，比如英国、波罗的海国家或菲律宾，但印度只有在它认为合适的情况下才会加入。谈论新德里是“民主和自由”意识形态事业的一部分是无稽之谈，尽管它对中国不满，但其领导层从未以这种方式进行过这种合作。印度不像英国或澳大利亚那样单向的支持美国，而是寻求在多极世界中本身作为一个大国实现崛起。
In doing so, India actively takes positions of disagreement with the US and its allies when it is necessary to do so. Over the past two years, these points of disagreement between New Delhi and the West have surged due to unavoidable changes in the international environment, which have increased geopolitical conflict. India has had an interest in balancing the rise of China, because it recognizes that it can benefit economically from supply-chain and manufacturing realignments. However, when US-led foreign policy begins to attempt to crush all multipolarity for its own benefit, this becomes a strategic problem for India and creates a divergence in the two nations’ obxtives. One particular example is the war in Ukraine.
在这样做的过程中，印度在必要时积极采取与美国及其盟友不同的立场。在过去两年中，由于国际环境不可避免的变化，地缘政治冲突加剧，新德里与西方之间的这些分歧点激增。平衡中国的崛起符合印度的利益，因为它认识到自己可以从供应链和制造业的重组中获得经济利益。然而，当美国领导的外交政策开始试图为了自己的利益而粉碎所有多极化时，这就成为印度的一个战略问题，并造成两国目标的分歧。一个特别的例子是乌克兰战争。
The US has sought to use the war as a means to attempt to economically and militarily cripple Russia, as nonsensical as this has been proven, thus seeking to eliminate one of India’s key strategic partners in the field of energy and armaments. Why would India comply with the US-led sanctions regime? It did not, and even pursued currency changes to avoid it. Ukrainian victory would strategically weaken and isolate India, forcing it into a Western dependency scenario. Worse still, the war has ushered in an improvement in US relations with Pakistan following the removal and jailing of anti-US Prime Minister Imran Khan. The US, of course, tried to ignore and reconcile these differences for quite a while, even as it leaned on India’s shoulder. But then a second issue emerged in this newly fraught geopolitical environment: the Israel-Gaza war.
美国试图利用这场战争作为一种手段，试图在经济和军事上削弱俄罗斯——这已经被证明是荒谬的——从而试图消灭印度在能源和军备领域的关键战略伙伴之一。为什么印度要遵守美国领导的制裁制度? 它没有这样做，甚至通过货币改革来避免这种情况。乌克兰的胜利将在战略上削弱和孤立印度，迫使其成为西方的附庸。更糟糕的是，在反美总理伊姆兰·汗下台并入狱后，这场战争导致了美国与巴基斯坦关系的改善。当然，在相当长的一段时间里，美国一直试图忽视和调和这些分歧，即便是在依靠印度的时候。但是，在这个新的令人担忧的地缘政治环境中，第二个问题出现了:以色列-加沙战争。
Many Indians support Israel because of the Hindu nationalist dislike for Islam. However, New Delhi also frxs itself as a champion of the Global South, and recognizes that it would lose credibility in toeing the Western line of unconditional support for Israel’s campaign of genocidal destruction. More importantly though, the situation has also entailed increased Western conflict with Iran, which is another strategic partner of India, a country with which it has historical and cultural ties, and is another critical energy supplier. As US tensions with Iran grow, India will not follow suit on Western pressure.
许多印度人支持以色列，因为印度民族主义者不喜欢伊斯兰教。然而，新德里也将自己定位为全球南方的捍卫者，并认识到，如果遵从西方无条件支持以色列种族灭绝破坏运动的路线，它将失去信誉。更重要的是，这种情况也导致西方与伊朗的冲突增加，伊朗是印度的另一个战略伙伴，与印度有着历史和文化联系，也是另一个重要的能源供应国。随着美国与伊朗的紧张关系加剧，印度不会屈从于西方的压力。
Then finally, to top it all off, a recent Biden gaffe ruffled feathers in India wen he called the nation “xenophobic.” All of this has had the effect of recalibrating India’s balancing act on its foreign policy and distancing itself from the US.
最后，最糟糕的是，拜登最近的一次失态激怒了印度，他称印度“排外”。所有这些都对印度产生了影响，令其重新调整其外交政策的平衡行为，并与美国保持距离。
In conclusion, New Delhi may be a US partner in some areas, but it is not a US proxy. The two countries have very different visions for the emerging new world order. India cannot accept US subjugation or the removal of its own strategic partners from the chessboard, which has quickly stifled Washington’s starry-eyed vision of India being the newest global champion of freedom and democracy, in pursuit of a unipolar world.
总之，新德里在某些领域可能是美国的合作伙伴，但不是美国的代理人。两国对正在形成的世界新秩序有着截然不同的看法。印度不能接受美国的征服，也不能接受将自己的战略伙伴从棋盘上移除，这迅速扼杀了华盛顿的不切实际的愿景，即印度在追求单极世界的过程中成为最新的全球自由和民主捍卫者。
New Delhi may remain Washington’s partner in some areas, but it will never be the proxy the Americans want
在某些领域，新德里可能仍然是华盛顿的伙伴，但它永远不会成为美国人想要的代理人。
After India pursued a deal with Iran on the Chabahar Port, the US responded by threatening New Delhi with sanctions, leading to India’s foreign minister accusing Washington of “bullying.” This rift has exposed the growing geopolitical incompatibility between the two countries over the past several years, even as the US championed India as a critical strategic partner against China.
在印度寻求与伊朗就恰巴哈尔港达成协议后，美国以制裁威胁新德里作为回应，导致印度外交部长指责华盛顿“欺凌”。这种裂痕暴露了两国在过去几年里日益加剧的地缘政治不协，尽管美国支持印度成为对抗中国的关键战略伙伴。
Since 2017, the US has promoted India as one of its key partners. It even went so far as to rename an entire region “the Indo-Pacific,” eyeing New Delhi as a key strategic asset in its longstanding strategic ambition of containing the rise of China.
自2017年以来，美国将印度提升为其重要合作伙伴之一。它甚至将整个地区重新命名为“印太”，将新德里视为其遏制中国崛起的长期战略野心的关键战略资产。
Thus, India was celebrated for its commitment to democracy, its potential as a new economic and manufacturing giant, and became part of a grouping known as “The Quad,” alongside Australia and Japan. New Delhi itself was happy to capitalize on these strategic overtures to enable its own economic and political rise as a great power. As the West soured on China, Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw that India’s time had come.
因此，印度因其对民主的承诺、作为一个新的经济和制造业巨人的潜力而受到赞扬，并与澳大利亚和日本一起成为被称为“四方”的集团的一部分。新德里自己也很乐意利用这些战略提议，使自己的经济和政治崛起成为一个大国。随着西方对中国的嫌恶，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪意识到，印度的好时候已经到来。
All of a sudden, however, this newly found optimism for India melted away, despite Western economic engagement with the country growing. New Delhi appears increasingly estranged from US obxtives, even to the point that “The Quad” was recently marginalized in favor of a new grouping, dubbed “The Squad” with the militantly pro-US Philippines under Ferdinand Macros Jr taking India’s place. It is as if the US believes Manilla will do more to cooperate on anti-China obxtives than New Delhi, such as joint military exercises. Thus, from close proximity, India appears to be falling into relative estrangement. What happened?
然而，尽管西方与印度的经济往来不断增加，但突然之间，这种新发现的对印度的乐观情绪消失了。新德里似乎越来越疏远美国的目标，甚至到了“四国”最近被边缘化的地步，取而代之的是一个被称为“小队”的新组织，由小费迪南德·马科斯领导的好斗且亲美的菲律宾取代了印度。美国似乎认为，在反华目标上，菲律宾会比印度更愿意合作，比如联合军演。因此，从近距离来看，印度似乎正在陷入相对疏远。发生了什么事?
First, India has an independent and strictly self-interested foreign policy. It might be willing to lean towards the US for its own gain, but that does not make it an “ally.” The US can subdue many countries into following its foreign policy obxtives, such as Britain, the Baltic states, or the Philippines, but India only joins in if it sees fit. Talk of New Delhi being part of an ideological cause for “democracy and freedom” is nonsense, and its leadership has never seen such cooperation in this way, despite its grievances with China. India has no commitment to US unipolarity like Britain or Australia would support, and instead seeks to rise as a power in its own right in a multipolar world.
首先，印度奉行独立、严格利己的外交政策。为了自己的利益，它可能愿意向美国倾斜，但这并不能使它成为一个“盟友”。美国可以让许多国家服从其外交政策目标，比如英国、波罗的海国家或菲律宾，但印度只有在它认为合适的情况下才会加入。谈论新德里是“民主和自由”意识形态事业的一部分是无稽之谈，尽管它对中国不满，但其领导层从未以这种方式进行过这种合作。印度不像英国或澳大利亚那样单向的支持美国，而是寻求在多极世界中本身作为一个大国实现崛起。
In doing so, India actively takes positions of disagreement with the US and its allies when it is necessary to do so. Over the past two years, these points of disagreement between New Delhi and the West have surged due to unavoidable changes in the international environment, which have increased geopolitical conflict. India has had an interest in balancing the rise of China, because it recognizes that it can benefit economically from supply-chain and manufacturing realignments. However, when US-led foreign policy begins to attempt to crush all multipolarity for its own benefit, this becomes a strategic problem for India and creates a divergence in the two nations’ obxtives. One particular example is the war in Ukraine.
在这样做的过程中，印度在必要时积极采取与美国及其盟友不同的立场。在过去两年中，由于国际环境不可避免的变化，地缘政治冲突加剧，新德里与西方之间的这些分歧点激增。平衡中国的崛起符合印度的利益，因为它认识到自己可以从供应链和制造业的重组中获得经济利益。然而，当美国领导的外交政策开始试图为了自己的利益而粉碎所有多极化时，这就成为印度的一个战略问题，并造成两国目标的分歧。一个特别的例子是乌克兰战争。
The US has sought to use the war as a means to attempt to economically and militarily cripple Russia, as nonsensical as this has been proven, thus seeking to eliminate one of India’s key strategic partners in the field of energy and armaments. Why would India comply with the US-led sanctions regime? It did not, and even pursued currency changes to avoid it. Ukrainian victory would strategically weaken and isolate India, forcing it into a Western dependency scenario. Worse still, the war has ushered in an improvement in US relations with Pakistan following the removal and jailing of anti-US Prime Minister Imran Khan. The US, of course, tried to ignore and reconcile these differences for quite a while, even as it leaned on India’s shoulder. But then a second issue emerged in this newly fraught geopolitical environment: the Israel-Gaza war.
美国试图利用这场战争作为一种手段，试图在经济和军事上削弱俄罗斯——这已经被证明是荒谬的——从而试图消灭印度在能源和军备领域的关键战略伙伴之一。为什么印度要遵守美国领导的制裁制度? 它没有这样做，甚至通过货币改革来避免这种情况。乌克兰的胜利将在战略上削弱和孤立印度，迫使其成为西方的附庸。更糟糕的是，在反美总理伊姆兰·汗下台并入狱后，这场战争导致了美国与巴基斯坦关系的改善。当然，在相当长的一段时间里，美国一直试图忽视和调和这些分歧，即便是在依靠印度的时候。但是，在这个新的令人担忧的地缘政治环境中，第二个问题出现了:以色列-加沙战争。
Many Indians support Israel because of the Hindu nationalist dislike for Islam. However, New Delhi also frxs itself as a champion of the Global South, and recognizes that it would lose credibility in toeing the Western line of unconditional support for Israel’s campaign of genocidal destruction. More importantly though, the situation has also entailed increased Western conflict with Iran, which is another strategic partner of India, a country with which it has historical and cultural ties, and is another critical energy supplier. As US tensions with Iran grow, India will not follow suit on Western pressure.
许多印度人支持以色列，因为印度民族主义者不喜欢伊斯兰教。然而，新德里也将自己定位为全球南方的捍卫者，并认识到，如果遵从西方无条件支持以色列种族灭绝破坏运动的路线，它将失去信誉。更重要的是，这种情况也导致西方与伊朗的冲突增加，伊朗是印度的另一个战略伙伴，与印度有着历史和文化联系，也是另一个重要的能源供应国。随着美国与伊朗的紧张关系加剧，印度不会屈从于西方的压力。
Then finally, to top it all off, a recent Biden gaffe ruffled feathers in India wen he called the nation “xenophobic.” All of this has had the effect of recalibrating India’s balancing act on its foreign policy and distancing itself from the US.
最后，最糟糕的是，拜登最近的一次失态激怒了印度，他称印度“排外”。所有这些都对印度产生了影响，令其重新调整其外交政策的平衡行为，并与美国保持距离。
In conclusion, New Delhi may be a US partner in some areas, but it is not a US proxy. The two countries have very different visions for the emerging new world order. India cannot accept US subjugation or the removal of its own strategic partners from the chessboard, which has quickly stifled Washington’s starry-eyed vision of India being the newest global champion of freedom and democracy, in pursuit of a unipolar world.
总之，新德里在某些领域可能是美国的合作伙伴，但不是美国的代理人。两国对正在形成的世界新秩序有着截然不同的看法。印度不能接受美国的征服，也不能接受将自己的战略伙伴从棋盘上移除，这迅速扼杀了华盛顿的不切实际的愿景，即印度在追求单极世界的过程中成为最新的全球自由和民主捍卫者。
评论翻译
New Delhi may remain Washington’s partner in some areas, but it will never be the proxy the Americans want
在某些领域，新德里可能仍然是华盛顿的伙伴，但它永远不会成为美国人想要的代理人。
After India pursued a deal with Iran on the Chabahar Port, the US responded by threatening New Delhi with sanctions, leading to India’s foreign minister accusing Washington of “bullying.” This rift has exposed the growing geopolitical incompatibility between the two countries over the past several years, even as the US championed India as a critical strategic partner against China.
在印度寻求与伊朗就恰巴哈尔港达成协议后，美国以制裁威胁新德里作为回应，导致印度外交部长指责华盛顿“欺凌”。这种裂痕暴露了两国在过去几年里日益加剧的地缘政治不协，尽管美国支持印度成为对抗中国的关键战略伙伴。
Since 2017, the US has promoted India as one of its key partners. It even went so far as to rename an entire region “the Indo-Pacific,” eyeing New Delhi as a key strategic asset in its longstanding strategic ambition of containing the rise of China.
自2017年以来，美国将印度提升为其重要合作伙伴之一。它甚至将整个地区重新命名为“印太”，将新德里视为其遏制中国崛起的长期战略野心的关键战略资产。
Thus, India was celebrated for its commitment to democracy, its potential as a new economic and manufacturing giant, and became part of a grouping known as “The Quad,” alongside Australia and Japan. New Delhi itself was happy to capitalize on these strategic overtures to enable its own economic and political rise as a great power. As the West soured on China, Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw that India’s time had come.
因此，印度因其对民主的承诺、作为一个新的经济和制造业巨人的潜力而受到赞扬，并与澳大利亚和日本一起成为被称为“四方”的集团的一部分。新德里自己也很乐意利用这些战略提议，使自己的经济和政治崛起成为一个大国。随着西方对中国的嫌恶，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪意识到，印度的好时候已经到来。
All of a sudden, however, this newly found optimism for India melted away, despite Western economic engagement with the country growing. New Delhi appears increasingly estranged from US obxtives, even to the point that “The Quad” was recently marginalized in favor of a new grouping, dubbed “The Squad” with the militantly pro-US Philippines under Ferdinand Macros Jr taking India’s place. It is as if the US believes Manilla will do more to cooperate on anti-China obxtives than New Delhi, such as joint military exercises. Thus, from close proximity, India appears to be falling into relative estrangement. What happened?
然而，尽管西方与印度的经济往来不断增加，但突然之间，这种新发现的对印度的乐观情绪消失了。新德里似乎越来越疏远美国的目标，甚至到了“四国”最近被边缘化的地步，取而代之的是一个被称为“小队”的新组织，由小费迪南德·马科斯领导的好斗且亲美的菲律宾取代了印度。美国似乎认为，在反华目标上，菲律宾会比印度更愿意合作，比如联合军演。因此，从近距离来看，印度似乎正在陷入相对疏远。发生了什么事?
First, India has an independent and strictly self-interested foreign policy. It might be willing to lean towards the US for its own gain, but that does not make it an “ally.” The US can subdue many countries into following its foreign policy obxtives, such as Britain, the Baltic states, or the Philippines, but India only joins in if it sees fit. Talk of New Delhi being part of an ideological cause for “democracy and freedom” is nonsense, and its leadership has never seen such cooperation in this way, despite its grievances with China. India has no commitment to US unipolarity like Britain or Australia would support, and instead seeks to rise as a power in its own right in a multipolar world.
首先，印度奉行独立、严格利己的外交政策。为了自己的利益，它可能愿意向美国倾斜，但这并不能使它成为一个“盟友”。美国可以让许多国家服从其外交政策目标，比如英国、波罗的海国家或菲律宾，但印度只有在它认为合适的情况下才会加入。谈论新德里是“民主和自由”意识形态事业的一部分是无稽之谈，尽管它对中国不满，但其领导层从未以这种方式进行过这种合作。印度不像英国或澳大利亚那样单向的支持美国，而是寻求在多极世界中本身作为一个大国实现崛起。
In doing so, India actively takes positions of disagreement with the US and its allies when it is necessary to do so. Over the past two years, these points of disagreement between New Delhi and the West have surged due to unavoidable changes in the international environment, which have increased geopolitical conflict. India has had an interest in balancing the rise of China, because it recognizes that it can benefit economically from supply-chain and manufacturing realignments. However, when US-led foreign policy begins to attempt to crush all multipolarity for its own benefit, this becomes a strategic problem for India and creates a divergence in the two nations’ obxtives. One particular example is the war in Ukraine.
在这样做的过程中，印度在必要时积极采取与美国及其盟友不同的立场。在过去两年中，由于国际环境不可避免的变化，地缘政治冲突加剧，新德里与西方之间的这些分歧点激增。平衡中国的崛起符合印度的利益，因为它认识到自己可以从供应链和制造业的重组中获得经济利益。然而，当美国领导的外交政策开始试图为了自己的利益而粉碎所有多极化时，这就成为印度的一个战略问题，并造成两国目标的分歧。一个特别的例子是乌克兰战争。
The US has sought to use the war as a means to attempt to economically and militarily cripple Russia, as nonsensical as this has been proven, thus seeking to eliminate one of India’s key strategic partners in the field of energy and armaments. Why would India comply with the US-led sanctions regime? It did not, and even pursued currency changes to avoid it. Ukrainian victory would strategically weaken and isolate India, forcing it into a Western dependency scenario. Worse still, the war has ushered in an improvement in US relations with Pakistan following the removal and jailing of anti-US Prime Minister Imran Khan. The US, of course, tried to ignore and reconcile these differences for quite a while, even as it leaned on India’s shoulder. But then a second issue emerged in this newly fraught geopolitical environment: the Israel-Gaza war.
美国试图利用这场战争作为一种手段，试图在经济和军事上削弱俄罗斯——这已经被证明是荒谬的——从而试图消灭印度在能源和军备领域的关键战略伙伴之一。为什么印度要遵守美国领导的制裁制度? 它没有这样做，甚至通过货币改革来避免这种情况。乌克兰的胜利将在战略上削弱和孤立印度，迫使其成为西方的附庸。更糟糕的是，在反美总理伊姆兰·汗下台并入狱后，这场战争导致了美国与巴基斯坦关系的改善。当然，在相当长的一段时间里，美国一直试图忽视和调和这些分歧，即便是在依靠印度的时候。但是，在这个新的令人担忧的地缘政治环境中，第二个问题出现了:以色列-加沙战争。
Many Indians support Israel because of the Hindu nationalist dislike for Islam. However, New Delhi also frxs itself as a champion of the Global South, and recognizes that it would lose credibility in toeing the Western line of unconditional support for Israel’s campaign of genocidal destruction. More importantly though, the situation has also entailed increased Western conflict with Iran, which is another strategic partner of India, a country with which it has historical and cultural ties, and is another critical energy supplier. As US tensions with Iran grow, India will not follow suit on Western pressure.
许多印度人支持以色列，因为印度民族主义者不喜欢伊斯兰教。然而，新德里也将自己定位为全球南方的捍卫者，并认识到，如果遵从西方无条件支持以色列种族灭绝破坏运动的路线，它将失去信誉。更重要的是，这种情况也导致西方与伊朗的冲突增加，伊朗是印度的另一个战略伙伴，与印度有着历史和文化联系，也是另一个重要的能源供应国。随着美国与伊朗的紧张关系加剧，印度不会屈从于西方的压力。
Then finally, to top it all off, a recent Biden gaffe ruffled feathers in India wen he called the nation “xenophobic.” All of this has had the effect of recalibrating India’s balancing act on its foreign policy and distancing itself from the US.
最后，最糟糕的是，拜登最近的一次失态激怒了印度，他称印度“排外”。所有这些都对印度产生了影响，令其重新调整其外交政策的平衡行为，并与美国保持距离。
In conclusion, New Delhi may be a US partner in some areas, but it is not a US proxy. The two countries have very different visions for the emerging new world order. India cannot accept US subjugation or the removal of its own strategic partners from the chessboard, which has quickly stifled Washington’s starry-eyed vision of India being the newest global champion of freedom and democracy, in pursuit of a unipolar world.
总之，新德里在某些领域可能是美国的合作伙伴，但不是美国的代理人。两国对正在形成的世界新秩序有着截然不同的看法。印度不能接受美国的征服，也不能接受将自己的战略伙伴从棋盘上移除，这迅速扼杀了华盛顿的不切实际的愿景，即印度在追求单极世界的过程中成为最新的全球自由和民主捍卫者。
New Delhi may remain Washington’s partner in some areas, but it will never be the proxy the Americans want
在某些领域，新德里可能仍然是华盛顿的伙伴，但它永远不会成为美国人想要的代理人。
After India pursued a deal with Iran on the Chabahar Port, the US responded by threatening New Delhi with sanctions, leading to India’s foreign minister accusing Washington of “bullying.” This rift has exposed the growing geopolitical incompatibility between the two countries over the past several years, even as the US championed India as a critical strategic partner against China.
在印度寻求与伊朗就恰巴哈尔港达成协议后，美国以制裁威胁新德里作为回应，导致印度外交部长指责华盛顿“欺凌”。这种裂痕暴露了两国在过去几年里日益加剧的地缘政治不协，尽管美国支持印度成为对抗中国的关键战略伙伴。
Since 2017, the US has promoted India as one of its key partners. It even went so far as to rename an entire region “the Indo-Pacific,” eyeing New Delhi as a key strategic asset in its longstanding strategic ambition of containing the rise of China.
自2017年以来，美国将印度提升为其重要合作伙伴之一。它甚至将整个地区重新命名为“印太”，将新德里视为其遏制中国崛起的长期战略野心的关键战略资产。
Thus, India was celebrated for its commitment to democracy, its potential as a new economic and manufacturing giant, and became part of a grouping known as “The Quad,” alongside Australia and Japan. New Delhi itself was happy to capitalize on these strategic overtures to enable its own economic and political rise as a great power. As the West soured on China, Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw that India’s time had come.
因此，印度因其对民主的承诺、作为一个新的经济和制造业巨人的潜力而受到赞扬，并与澳大利亚和日本一起成为被称为“四方”的集团的一部分。新德里自己也很乐意利用这些战略提议，使自己的经济和政治崛起成为一个大国。随着西方对中国的嫌恶，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪意识到，印度的好时候已经到来。
All of a sudden, however, this newly found optimism for India melted away, despite Western economic engagement with the country growing. New Delhi appears increasingly estranged from US obxtives, even to the point that “The Quad” was recently marginalized in favor of a new grouping, dubbed “The Squad” with the militantly pro-US Philippines under Ferdinand Macros Jr taking India’s place. It is as if the US believes Manilla will do more to cooperate on anti-China obxtives than New Delhi, such as joint military exercises. Thus, from close proximity, India appears to be falling into relative estrangement. What happened?
然而，尽管西方与印度的经济往来不断增加，但突然之间，这种新发现的对印度的乐观情绪消失了。新德里似乎越来越疏远美国的目标，甚至到了“四国”最近被边缘化的地步，取而代之的是一个被称为“小队”的新组织，由小费迪南德·马科斯领导的好斗且亲美的菲律宾取代了印度。美国似乎认为，在反华目标上，菲律宾会比印度更愿意合作，比如联合军演。因此，从近距离来看，印度似乎正在陷入相对疏远。发生了什么事?
First, India has an independent and strictly self-interested foreign policy. It might be willing to lean towards the US for its own gain, but that does not make it an “ally.” The US can subdue many countries into following its foreign policy obxtives, such as Britain, the Baltic states, or the Philippines, but India only joins in if it sees fit. Talk of New Delhi being part of an ideological cause for “democracy and freedom” is nonsense, and its leadership has never seen such cooperation in this way, despite its grievances with China. India has no commitment to US unipolarity like Britain or Australia would support, and instead seeks to rise as a power in its own right in a multipolar world.
首先，印度奉行独立、严格利己的外交政策。为了自己的利益，它可能愿意向美国倾斜，但这并不能使它成为一个“盟友”。美国可以让许多国家服从其外交政策目标，比如英国、波罗的海国家或菲律宾，但印度只有在它认为合适的情况下才会加入。谈论新德里是“民主和自由”意识形态事业的一部分是无稽之谈，尽管它对中国不满，但其领导层从未以这种方式进行过这种合作。印度不像英国或澳大利亚那样单向的支持美国，而是寻求在多极世界中本身作为一个大国实现崛起。
In doing so, India actively takes positions of disagreement with the US and its allies when it is necessary to do so. Over the past two years, these points of disagreement between New Delhi and the West have surged due to unavoidable changes in the international environment, which have increased geopolitical conflict. India has had an interest in balancing the rise of China, because it recognizes that it can benefit economically from supply-chain and manufacturing realignments. However, when US-led foreign policy begins to attempt to crush all multipolarity for its own benefit, this becomes a strategic problem for India and creates a divergence in the two nations’ obxtives. One particular example is the war in Ukraine.
在这样做的过程中，印度在必要时积极采取与美国及其盟友不同的立场。在过去两年中，由于国际环境不可避免的变化，地缘政治冲突加剧，新德里与西方之间的这些分歧点激增。平衡中国的崛起符合印度的利益，因为它认识到自己可以从供应链和制造业的重组中获得经济利益。然而，当美国领导的外交政策开始试图为了自己的利益而粉碎所有多极化时，这就成为印度的一个战略问题，并造成两国目标的分歧。一个特别的例子是乌克兰战争。
The US has sought to use the war as a means to attempt to economically and militarily cripple Russia, as nonsensical as this has been proven, thus seeking to eliminate one of India’s key strategic partners in the field of energy and armaments. Why would India comply with the US-led sanctions regime? It did not, and even pursued currency changes to avoid it. Ukrainian victory would strategically weaken and isolate India, forcing it into a Western dependency scenario. Worse still, the war has ushered in an improvement in US relations with Pakistan following the removal and jailing of anti-US Prime Minister Imran Khan. The US, of course, tried to ignore and reconcile these differences for quite a while, even as it leaned on India’s shoulder. But then a second issue emerged in this newly fraught geopolitical environment: the Israel-Gaza war.
美国试图利用这场战争作为一种手段，试图在经济和军事上削弱俄罗斯——这已经被证明是荒谬的——从而试图消灭印度在能源和军备领域的关键战略伙伴之一。为什么印度要遵守美国领导的制裁制度? 它没有这样做，甚至通过货币改革来避免这种情况。乌克兰的胜利将在战略上削弱和孤立印度，迫使其成为西方的附庸。更糟糕的是，在反美总理伊姆兰·汗下台并入狱后，这场战争导致了美国与巴基斯坦关系的改善。当然，在相当长的一段时间里，美国一直试图忽视和调和这些分歧，即便是在依靠印度的时候。但是，在这个新的令人担忧的地缘政治环境中，第二个问题出现了:以色列-加沙战争。
Many Indians support Israel because of the Hindu nationalist dislike for Islam. However, New Delhi also frxs itself as a champion of the Global South, and recognizes that it would lose credibility in toeing the Western line of unconditional support for Israel’s campaign of genocidal destruction. More importantly though, the situation has also entailed increased Western conflict with Iran, which is another strategic partner of India, a country with which it has historical and cultural ties, and is another critical energy supplier. As US tensions with Iran grow, India will not follow suit on Western pressure.
许多印度人支持以色列，因为印度民族主义者不喜欢伊斯兰教。然而，新德里也将自己定位为全球南方的捍卫者，并认识到，如果遵从西方无条件支持以色列种族灭绝破坏运动的路线，它将失去信誉。更重要的是，这种情况也导致西方与伊朗的冲突增加，伊朗是印度的另一个战略伙伴，与印度有着历史和文化联系，也是另一个重要的能源供应国。随着美国与伊朗的紧张关系加剧，印度不会屈从于西方的压力。
Then finally, to top it all off, a recent Biden gaffe ruffled feathers in India wen he called the nation “xenophobic.” All of this has had the effect of recalibrating India’s balancing act on its foreign policy and distancing itself from the US.
最后，最糟糕的是，拜登最近的一次失态激怒了印度，他称印度“排外”。所有这些都对印度产生了影响，令其重新调整其外交政策的平衡行为，并与美国保持距离。
In conclusion, New Delhi may be a US partner in some areas, but it is not a US proxy. The two countries have very different visions for the emerging new world order. India cannot accept US subjugation or the removal of its own strategic partners from the chessboard, which has quickly stifled Washington’s starry-eyed vision of India being the newest global champion of freedom and democracy, in pursuit of a unipolar world.
总之，新德里在某些领域可能是美国的合作伙伴，但不是美国的代理人。两国对正在形成的世界新秩序有着截然不同的看法。印度不能接受美国的征服，也不能接受将自己的战略伙伴从棋盘上移除，这迅速扼杀了华盛顿的不切实际的愿景，即印度在追求单极世界的过程中成为最新的全球自由和民主捍卫者。
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