话题讨论：为什么美国海军的造船能力这么拉了？
正文翻译
After decades of strategic drift and costly acquisition failures, the U.S. Navy is sailing straight into a storm it can’t avoid.
在经历了几十年的战略漂移和代价高昂的采购失败后，美国海军正直接驶向一场无法躲避的风暴。
As evidenced by the Biden administration’s latest budget request, fiscal constraints are forcing the Navy to cut procurement requests, delay modernization programs, and retire ships early. The Navy’s budget for the 2025 fiscal year calls for decommissioning 19 ships—including three nuclear-powered attack submarines and four guided-missile cruisers—while procuring only six new vessels. The full scope of what military analysts have long warned would be the “Terrible ’20s” is now evident: The expensive upgrading of the U.S. nuclear triad, simultaneous modernization efforts across the services, and the constraint of rising government debt are compelling the Pentagon to make tough choices about what it can and cannot pay for.
正如拜登政府最近的预算请求所证明的那样，财政限制迫使海军削减采购请求，推迟现代化项目，并提前退役船只。美国海军2025财年的预算要求退役19艘舰艇，其中包括3艘核动力攻击潜艇和4艘导弹巡洋舰，同时只采购6艘新舰艇。军事分析人士长期以来所警告的“可怕的20年代”的全部范围现在一眼可见：美国核三位一体的昂贵升级，同时各军种的现代化努力，以及不断上升的政府债务的约束，迫使五角大楼在它能支付和不能支付的问题上做出艰难的选择。
Workforce shortages and supply chain issues are also limiting shipbuilding capacity. The defense industrial base is still struggling to recover from post-Cold War budget cuts that dramatically shrank U.S. defense manufacturing. The Navy needs more shipyard capacity, but finding enough qualified workers for the yards remains the biggest barrier to expanding production. The shipbuilding industry is struggling to attract talent, losing out to fast food restaurants that offer better pay and benefits for entry-level employees. At bottom, it is a lack of welders, not widgets, that must be overcome if the U.S. Navy is to grow its fleet.
劳动力短缺和供应链问题也限制了造船能力。国防工业基础依然难以从冷战后大幅缩减的美国国防制造业预算削减中恢复过来。海军需要更多的造船厂产能，但为船厂找到足够的合格工人仍然是扩大生产的最大障碍。造船业难以吸引人才，输给了为初级员工提供更高薪酬和福利的快餐店。归根结底，如果美国海军要扩大其舰队，就必须克服的问题是缺乏焊工，而不是小部件。
As defense analyst David Alman outlined in a prize-winning essay for the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, the United States simply can’t win a warship race with China. The United States effectively gave up on commercial shipbuilding during the Reagan administration in the name of free trade. In the decades that followed, generous state subsidies helped China dominate commercial shipbuilding, and Beijing’s requirement that the sector be dual-use resulted in an industry that can shift to production and ship repair for the military during a conflict, much as U.S. shipyards did during World War II. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China now has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. China built almost half the world’s new ships in 2022, whereas U.S. shipyards produced just 0.13 percent.
正如国防分析家大卫·阿尔曼在为《美国海军研究所学报》撰写的获奖文章中所概述的那样，美国根本无法赢得与中国的军舰竞赛。在里根政府时期，美国实际上以自由贸易的名义放弃了商业造船业。在随后的几十年里，慷慨的国家补贴帮助中国主导了商业造船业，中国政府对该行业军民两用的要求导致该行业可以在冲突期间转向为军方生产和修理船只，就像美国造船厂在二战期间所做的那样。美国海军情报局估计，中国现在的造船能力是美国的232倍。2022年，中国建造了全球近一半的新船，而美国造船厂只生产了0.13%。
Policymakers also need to make hard choices and limit naval deployments. Though the Navy is shrinking, its missions aren’t. A high operational tempo, manpower shortfalls, and an aging fleet are fueling a readiness crisis that is burning out sailors and ships.
决策者还需要做出艰难的选择，限制海军部署。尽管海军规模正在缩小，但其任务却没有缩小。高作战速度、人力短缺和舰队老化加剧了战备危机，导致水兵和舰船耗尽。
The preeminence of presence missions also has more subtle consequences. After 20 years of largely uncontested deployments to the Middle East, the U.S. Navy now has an opponent who shoots back: Yemen’s Houthis. But increased experience in missile and drone defense is outweighed by a dexerious drain on precision munitions. In the conflict with the Houthis, the Navy burned through more Tomahawk land attack missiles in one day than it purchased in all of 2023. Meanwhile, the Houthis can replace all equipment destroyed by U.S. attacks with just two shiploads from Iran, according to Gen. Michael Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command.
驻留任务的突出地位也有更微妙的后果。美国海军在中东地区进行了20年的基本无争议部署后，现在有了一个反击的对手:也门的胡塞武装。但是，在导弹和无人机防御方面增加的经验被有害的精确弹药消耗所抵消。在与胡塞武装的冲突中，美国海军一天内消耗的战斧(Tomahawk)对地攻击导弹比2023年全年购买的还要多。与此同时，据美国中央司令部司令库利拉说，胡塞武装只需从伊朗运来两艘船的武器，就能替换被美军摧毁的所有装备。
The costs of maintaining global presence are magnified by the state of Navy recruiting and retention. The service’s recruiting woes are undeniable. The Navy missed all of its recruiting goals in 2023, some by as much as 35 percent. The service projects a shortfall of 6,700 recruits this year, according to its chief personnel officer.
维持全球存在的成本被海军的招募和保留状况放大了。不可否认的是，该军种的招聘困境。海军未能实现2023年的所有征兵目标，其中一些目标的降幅高达35%。美国陆军首席人事官表示，预计今年的新兵缺口为6700人。
The United States can’t match the size of China’s fleet in the near or medium term. Deindustrialization, poor procurement choices, and a myopic fixation on the U.S. presence in the Middle East have seen to that. All that said, the U.S. Navy still retains several significant advantages in a potential conflict with China: submarine dominance, overall tonnage, blue-water experience, and support from capable allies. A major increase in joint munitions purchases and an end to the readiness drain of presence deployments to secondary theaters will enhance the Navy’s edge during the potential peak window for a Chinese move on Taiwan over the next decade. The alternative is grim. If conventional deterrence fails, it risks military defeat for the United States or something even more dangerous: nuclear confrontation between the world’s two superpowers.
在近期或中期，美国无法与中国的舰队规模匹敌。去工业化、糟糕的采购选择，以及对美国在中东存在的短视，都导致了这一点。总而言之，在与中国的潜在冲突中，美国海军仍然保留了几个重要的优势：潜艇优势，总吨位，蓝水经验，以及有能力的盟友的支持。联合军需品采购的大幅增加，以及结束将战备耗尽的存在部署到次要战区，将增强海军在未来十年中国大陆对台行动的潜在高峰窗口期间的优势。另一种选择是严峻的。如果常规威慑失败，美国将面临军事失败的风险，或者出现更危险的情况：世界两个超级大国之间的核对抗。
After decades of strategic drift and costly acquisition failures, the U.S. Navy is sailing straight into a storm it can’t avoid.
在经历了几十年的战略漂移和代价高昂的采购失败后，美国海军正直接驶向一场无法躲避的风暴。
As evidenced by the Biden administration’s latest budget request, fiscal constraints are forcing the Navy to cut procurement requests, delay modernization programs, and retire ships early. The Navy’s budget for the 2025 fiscal year calls for decommissioning 19 ships—including three nuclear-powered attack submarines and four guided-missile cruisers—while procuring only six new vessels. The full scope of what military analysts have long warned would be the “Terrible ’20s” is now evident: The expensive upgrading of the U.S. nuclear triad, simultaneous modernization efforts across the services, and the constraint of rising government debt are compelling the Pentagon to make tough choices about what it can and cannot pay for.
正如拜登政府最近的预算请求所证明的那样，财政限制迫使海军削减采购请求，推迟现代化项目，并提前退役船只。美国海军2025财年的预算要求退役19艘舰艇，其中包括3艘核动力攻击潜艇和4艘导弹巡洋舰，同时只采购6艘新舰艇。军事分析人士长期以来所警告的“可怕的20年代”的全部范围现在一眼可见：美国核三位一体的昂贵升级，同时各军种的现代化努力，以及不断上升的政府债务的约束，迫使五角大楼在它能支付和不能支付的问题上做出艰难的选择。
Workforce shortages and supply chain issues are also limiting shipbuilding capacity. The defense industrial base is still struggling to recover from post-Cold War budget cuts that dramatically shrank U.S. defense manufacturing. The Navy needs more shipyard capacity, but finding enough qualified workers for the yards remains the biggest barrier to expanding production. The shipbuilding industry is struggling to attract talent, losing out to fast food restaurants that offer better pay and benefits for entry-level employees. At bottom, it is a lack of welders, not widgets, that must be overcome if the U.S. Navy is to grow its fleet.
劳动力短缺和供应链问题也限制了造船能力。国防工业基础依然难以从冷战后大幅缩减的美国国防制造业预算削减中恢复过来。海军需要更多的造船厂产能，但为船厂找到足够的合格工人仍然是扩大生产的最大障碍。造船业难以吸引人才，输给了为初级员工提供更高薪酬和福利的快餐店。归根结底，如果美国海军要扩大其舰队，就必须克服的问题是缺乏焊工，而不是小部件。
As defense analyst David Alman outlined in a prize-winning essay for the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, the United States simply can’t win a warship race with China. The United States effectively gave up on commercial shipbuilding during the Reagan administration in the name of free trade. In the decades that followed, generous state subsidies helped China dominate commercial shipbuilding, and Beijing’s requirement that the sector be dual-use resulted in an industry that can shift to production and ship repair for the military during a conflict, much as U.S. shipyards did during World War II. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China now has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. China built almost half the world’s new ships in 2022, whereas U.S. shipyards produced just 0.13 percent.
正如国防分析家大卫·阿尔曼在为《美国海军研究所学报》撰写的获奖文章中所概述的那样，美国根本无法赢得与中国的军舰竞赛。在里根政府时期，美国实际上以自由贸易的名义放弃了商业造船业。在随后的几十年里，慷慨的国家补贴帮助中国主导了商业造船业，中国政府对该行业军民两用的要求导致该行业可以在冲突期间转向为军方生产和修理船只，就像美国造船厂在二战期间所做的那样。美国海军情报局估计，中国现在的造船能力是美国的232倍。2022年，中国建造了全球近一半的新船，而美国造船厂只生产了0.13%。
Policymakers also need to make hard choices and limit naval deployments. Though the Navy is shrinking, its missions aren’t. A high operational tempo, manpower shortfalls, and an aging fleet are fueling a readiness crisis that is burning out sailors and ships.
决策者还需要做出艰难的选择，限制海军部署。尽管海军规模正在缩小，但其任务却没有缩小。高作战速度、人力短缺和舰队老化加剧了战备危机，导致水兵和舰船耗尽。
The preeminence of presence missions also has more subtle consequences. After 20 years of largely uncontested deployments to the Middle East, the U.S. Navy now has an opponent who shoots back: Yemen’s Houthis. But increased experience in missile and drone defense is outweighed by a dexerious drain on precision munitions. In the conflict with the Houthis, the Navy burned through more Tomahawk land attack missiles in one day than it purchased in all of 2023. Meanwhile, the Houthis can replace all equipment destroyed by U.S. attacks with just two shiploads from Iran, according to Gen. Michael Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command.
驻留任务的突出地位也有更微妙的后果。美国海军在中东地区进行了20年的基本无争议部署后，现在有了一个反击的对手:也门的胡塞武装。但是，在导弹和无人机防御方面增加的经验被有害的精确弹药消耗所抵消。在与胡塞武装的冲突中，美国海军一天内消耗的战斧(Tomahawk)对地攻击导弹比2023年全年购买的还要多。与此同时，据美国中央司令部司令库利拉说，胡塞武装只需从伊朗运来两艘船的武器，就能替换被美军摧毁的所有装备。
The costs of maintaining global presence are magnified by the state of Navy recruiting and retention. The service’s recruiting woes are undeniable. The Navy missed all of its recruiting goals in 2023, some by as much as 35 percent. The service projects a shortfall of 6,700 recruits this year, according to its chief personnel officer.
维持全球存在的成本被海军的招募和保留状况放大了。不可否认的是，该军种的招聘困境。海军未能实现2023年的所有征兵目标，其中一些目标的降幅高达35%。美国陆军首席人事官表示，预计今年的新兵缺口为6700人。
The United States can’t match the size of China’s fleet in the near or medium term. Deindustrialization, poor procurement choices, and a myopic fixation on the U.S. presence in the Middle East have seen to that. All that said, the U.S. Navy still retains several significant advantages in a potential conflict with China: submarine dominance, overall tonnage, blue-water experience, and support from capable allies. A major increase in joint munitions purchases and an end to the readiness drain of presence deployments to secondary theaters will enhance the Navy’s edge during the potential peak window for a Chinese move on Taiwan over the next decade. The alternative is grim. If conventional deterrence fails, it risks military defeat for the United States or something even more dangerous: nuclear confrontation between the world’s two superpowers.
在近期或中期，美国无法与中国的舰队规模匹敌。去工业化、糟糕的采购选择，以及对美国在中东存在的短视，都导致了这一点。总而言之，在与中国的潜在冲突中，美国海军仍然保留了几个重要的优势：潜艇优势，总吨位，蓝水经验，以及有能力的盟友的支持。联合军需品采购的大幅增加，以及结束将战备耗尽的存在部署到次要战区，将增强海军在未来十年中国大陆对台行动的潜在高峰窗口期间的优势。另一种选择是严峻的。如果常规威慑失败，美国将面临军事失败的风险，或者出现更危险的情况：世界两个超级大国之间的核对抗。
评论翻译
After decades of strategic drift and costly acquisition failures, the U.S. Navy is sailing straight into a storm it can’t avoid.
在经历了几十年的战略漂移和代价高昂的采购失败后，美国海军正直接驶向一场无法躲避的风暴。
As evidenced by the Biden administration’s latest budget request, fiscal constraints are forcing the Navy to cut procurement requests, delay modernization programs, and retire ships early. The Navy’s budget for the 2025 fiscal year calls for decommissioning 19 ships—including three nuclear-powered attack submarines and four guided-missile cruisers—while procuring only six new vessels. The full scope of what military analysts have long warned would be the “Terrible ’20s” is now evident: The expensive upgrading of the U.S. nuclear triad, simultaneous modernization efforts across the services, and the constraint of rising government debt are compelling the Pentagon to make tough choices about what it can and cannot pay for.
正如拜登政府最近的预算请求所证明的那样，财政限制迫使海军削减采购请求，推迟现代化项目，并提前退役船只。美国海军2025财年的预算要求退役19艘舰艇，其中包括3艘核动力攻击潜艇和4艘导弹巡洋舰，同时只采购6艘新舰艇。军事分析人士长期以来所警告的“可怕的20年代”的全部范围现在一眼可见：美国核三位一体的昂贵升级，同时各军种的现代化努力，以及不断上升的政府债务的约束，迫使五角大楼在它能支付和不能支付的问题上做出艰难的选择。
Workforce shortages and supply chain issues are also limiting shipbuilding capacity. The defense industrial base is still struggling to recover from post-Cold War budget cuts that dramatically shrank U.S. defense manufacturing. The Navy needs more shipyard capacity, but finding enough qualified workers for the yards remains the biggest barrier to expanding production. The shipbuilding industry is struggling to attract talent, losing out to fast food restaurants that offer better pay and benefits for entry-level employees. At bottom, it is a lack of welders, not widgets, that must be overcome if the U.S. Navy is to grow its fleet.
劳动力短缺和供应链问题也限制了造船能力。国防工业基础依然难以从冷战后大幅缩减的美国国防制造业预算削减中恢复过来。海军需要更多的造船厂产能，但为船厂找到足够的合格工人仍然是扩大生产的最大障碍。造船业难以吸引人才，输给了为初级员工提供更高薪酬和福利的快餐店。归根结底，如果美国海军要扩大其舰队，就必须克服的问题是缺乏焊工，而不是小部件。
As defense analyst David Alman outlined in a prize-winning essay for the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, the United States simply can’t win a warship race with China. The United States effectively gave up on commercial shipbuilding during the Reagan administration in the name of free trade. In the decades that followed, generous state subsidies helped China dominate commercial shipbuilding, and Beijing’s requirement that the sector be dual-use resulted in an industry that can shift to production and ship repair for the military during a conflict, much as U.S. shipyards did during World War II. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China now has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. China built almost half the world’s new ships in 2022, whereas U.S. shipyards produced just 0.13 percent.
正如国防分析家大卫·阿尔曼在为《美国海军研究所学报》撰写的获奖文章中所概述的那样，美国根本无法赢得与中国的军舰竞赛。在里根政府时期，美国实际上以自由贸易的名义放弃了商业造船业。在随后的几十年里，慷慨的国家补贴帮助中国主导了商业造船业，中国政府对该行业军民两用的要求导致该行业可以在冲突期间转向为军方生产和修理船只，就像美国造船厂在二战期间所做的那样。美国海军情报局估计，中国现在的造船能力是美国的232倍。2022年，中国建造了全球近一半的新船，而美国造船厂只生产了0.13%。
Policymakers also need to make hard choices and limit naval deployments. Though the Navy is shrinking, its missions aren’t. A high operational tempo, manpower shortfalls, and an aging fleet are fueling a readiness crisis that is burning out sailors and ships.
决策者还需要做出艰难的选择，限制海军部署。尽管海军规模正在缩小，但其任务却没有缩小。高作战速度、人力短缺和舰队老化加剧了战备危机，导致水兵和舰船耗尽。
The preeminence of presence missions also has more subtle consequences. After 20 years of largely uncontested deployments to the Middle East, the U.S. Navy now has an opponent who shoots back: Yemen’s Houthis. But increased experience in missile and drone defense is outweighed by a dexerious drain on precision munitions. In the conflict with the Houthis, the Navy burned through more Tomahawk land attack missiles in one day than it purchased in all of 2023. Meanwhile, the Houthis can replace all equipment destroyed by U.S. attacks with just two shiploads from Iran, according to Gen. Michael Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command.
驻留任务的突出地位也有更微妙的后果。美国海军在中东地区进行了20年的基本无争议部署后，现在有了一个反击的对手:也门的胡塞武装。但是，在导弹和无人机防御方面增加的经验被有害的精确弹药消耗所抵消。在与胡塞武装的冲突中，美国海军一天内消耗的战斧(Tomahawk)对地攻击导弹比2023年全年购买的还要多。与此同时，据美国中央司令部司令库利拉说，胡塞武装只需从伊朗运来两艘船的武器，就能替换被美军摧毁的所有装备。
The costs of maintaining global presence are magnified by the state of Navy recruiting and retention. The service’s recruiting woes are undeniable. The Navy missed all of its recruiting goals in 2023, some by as much as 35 percent. The service projects a shortfall of 6,700 recruits this year, according to its chief personnel officer.
维持全球存在的成本被海军的招募和保留状况放大了。不可否认的是，该军种的招聘困境。海军未能实现2023年的所有征兵目标，其中一些目标的降幅高达35%。美国陆军首席人事官表示，预计今年的新兵缺口为6700人。
The United States can’t match the size of China’s fleet in the near or medium term. Deindustrialization, poor procurement choices, and a myopic fixation on the U.S. presence in the Middle East have seen to that. All that said, the U.S. Navy still retains several significant advantages in a potential conflict with China: submarine dominance, overall tonnage, blue-water experience, and support from capable allies. A major increase in joint munitions purchases and an end to the readiness drain of presence deployments to secondary theaters will enhance the Navy’s edge during the potential peak window for a Chinese move on Taiwan over the next decade. The alternative is grim. If conventional deterrence fails, it risks military defeat for the United States or something even more dangerous: nuclear confrontation between the world’s two superpowers.
在近期或中期，美国无法与中国的舰队规模匹敌。去工业化、糟糕的采购选择，以及对美国在中东存在的短视，都导致了这一点。总而言之，在与中国的潜在冲突中，美国海军仍然保留了几个重要的优势：潜艇优势，总吨位，蓝水经验，以及有能力的盟友的支持。联合军需品采购的大幅增加，以及结束将战备耗尽的存在部署到次要战区，将增强海军在未来十年中国大陆对台行动的潜在高峰窗口期间的优势。另一种选择是严峻的。如果常规威慑失败，美国将面临军事失败的风险，或者出现更危险的情况：世界两个超级大国之间的核对抗。
After decades of strategic drift and costly acquisition failures, the U.S. Navy is sailing straight into a storm it can’t avoid.
在经历了几十年的战略漂移和代价高昂的采购失败后，美国海军正直接驶向一场无法躲避的风暴。
As evidenced by the Biden administration’s latest budget request, fiscal constraints are forcing the Navy to cut procurement requests, delay modernization programs, and retire ships early. The Navy’s budget for the 2025 fiscal year calls for decommissioning 19 ships—including three nuclear-powered attack submarines and four guided-missile cruisers—while procuring only six new vessels. The full scope of what military analysts have long warned would be the “Terrible ’20s” is now evident: The expensive upgrading of the U.S. nuclear triad, simultaneous modernization efforts across the services, and the constraint of rising government debt are compelling the Pentagon to make tough choices about what it can and cannot pay for.
正如拜登政府最近的预算请求所证明的那样，财政限制迫使海军削减采购请求，推迟现代化项目，并提前退役船只。美国海军2025财年的预算要求退役19艘舰艇，其中包括3艘核动力攻击潜艇和4艘导弹巡洋舰，同时只采购6艘新舰艇。军事分析人士长期以来所警告的“可怕的20年代”的全部范围现在一眼可见：美国核三位一体的昂贵升级，同时各军种的现代化努力，以及不断上升的政府债务的约束，迫使五角大楼在它能支付和不能支付的问题上做出艰难的选择。
Workforce shortages and supply chain issues are also limiting shipbuilding capacity. The defense industrial base is still struggling to recover from post-Cold War budget cuts that dramatically shrank U.S. defense manufacturing. The Navy needs more shipyard capacity, but finding enough qualified workers for the yards remains the biggest barrier to expanding production. The shipbuilding industry is struggling to attract talent, losing out to fast food restaurants that offer better pay and benefits for entry-level employees. At bottom, it is a lack of welders, not widgets, that must be overcome if the U.S. Navy is to grow its fleet.
劳动力短缺和供应链问题也限制了造船能力。国防工业基础依然难以从冷战后大幅缩减的美国国防制造业预算削减中恢复过来。海军需要更多的造船厂产能，但为船厂找到足够的合格工人仍然是扩大生产的最大障碍。造船业难以吸引人才，输给了为初级员工提供更高薪酬和福利的快餐店。归根结底，如果美国海军要扩大其舰队，就必须克服的问题是缺乏焊工，而不是小部件。
As defense analyst David Alman outlined in a prize-winning essay for the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, the United States simply can’t win a warship race with China. The United States effectively gave up on commercial shipbuilding during the Reagan administration in the name of free trade. In the decades that followed, generous state subsidies helped China dominate commercial shipbuilding, and Beijing’s requirement that the sector be dual-use resulted in an industry that can shift to production and ship repair for the military during a conflict, much as U.S. shipyards did during World War II. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China now has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. China built almost half the world’s new ships in 2022, whereas U.S. shipyards produced just 0.13 percent.
正如国防分析家大卫·阿尔曼在为《美国海军研究所学报》撰写的获奖文章中所概述的那样，美国根本无法赢得与中国的军舰竞赛。在里根政府时期，美国实际上以自由贸易的名义放弃了商业造船业。在随后的几十年里，慷慨的国家补贴帮助中国主导了商业造船业，中国政府对该行业军民两用的要求导致该行业可以在冲突期间转向为军方生产和修理船只，就像美国造船厂在二战期间所做的那样。美国海军情报局估计，中国现在的造船能力是美国的232倍。2022年，中国建造了全球近一半的新船，而美国造船厂只生产了0.13%。
Policymakers also need to make hard choices and limit naval deployments. Though the Navy is shrinking, its missions aren’t. A high operational tempo, manpower shortfalls, and an aging fleet are fueling a readiness crisis that is burning out sailors and ships.
决策者还需要做出艰难的选择，限制海军部署。尽管海军规模正在缩小，但其任务却没有缩小。高作战速度、人力短缺和舰队老化加剧了战备危机，导致水兵和舰船耗尽。
The preeminence of presence missions also has more subtle consequences. After 20 years of largely uncontested deployments to the Middle East, the U.S. Navy now has an opponent who shoots back: Yemen’s Houthis. But increased experience in missile and drone defense is outweighed by a dexerious drain on precision munitions. In the conflict with the Houthis, the Navy burned through more Tomahawk land attack missiles in one day than it purchased in all of 2023. Meanwhile, the Houthis can replace all equipment destroyed by U.S. attacks with just two shiploads from Iran, according to Gen. Michael Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command.
驻留任务的突出地位也有更微妙的后果。美国海军在中东地区进行了20年的基本无争议部署后，现在有了一个反击的对手:也门的胡塞武装。但是，在导弹和无人机防御方面增加的经验被有害的精确弹药消耗所抵消。在与胡塞武装的冲突中，美国海军一天内消耗的战斧(Tomahawk)对地攻击导弹比2023年全年购买的还要多。与此同时，据美国中央司令部司令库利拉说，胡塞武装只需从伊朗运来两艘船的武器，就能替换被美军摧毁的所有装备。
The costs of maintaining global presence are magnified by the state of Navy recruiting and retention. The service’s recruiting woes are undeniable. The Navy missed all of its recruiting goals in 2023, some by as much as 35 percent. The service projects a shortfall of 6,700 recruits this year, according to its chief personnel officer.
维持全球存在的成本被海军的招募和保留状况放大了。不可否认的是，该军种的招聘困境。海军未能实现2023年的所有征兵目标，其中一些目标的降幅高达35%。美国陆军首席人事官表示，预计今年的新兵缺口为6700人。
The United States can’t match the size of China’s fleet in the near or medium term. Deindustrialization, poor procurement choices, and a myopic fixation on the U.S. presence in the Middle East have seen to that. All that said, the U.S. Navy still retains several significant advantages in a potential conflict with China: submarine dominance, overall tonnage, blue-water experience, and support from capable allies. A major increase in joint munitions purchases and an end to the readiness drain of presence deployments to secondary theaters will enhance the Navy’s edge during the potential peak window for a Chinese move on Taiwan over the next decade. The alternative is grim. If conventional deterrence fails, it risks military defeat for the United States or something even more dangerous: nuclear confrontation between the world’s two superpowers.
在近期或中期，美国无法与中国的舰队规模匹敌。去工业化、糟糕的采购选择，以及对美国在中东存在的短视，都导致了这一点。总而言之，在与中国的潜在冲突中，美国海军仍然保留了几个重要的优势：潜艇优势，总吨位，蓝水经验，以及有能力的盟友的支持。联合军需品采购的大幅增加，以及结束将战备耗尽的存在部署到次要战区，将增强海军在未来十年中国大陆对台行动的潜在高峰窗口期间的优势。另一种选择是严峻的。如果常规威慑失败，美国将面临军事失败的风险，或者出现更危险的情况：世界两个超级大国之间的核对抗。
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