网帖翻译

Dan Bradbury
People need to understand the firm, unshifting schist upon which the alliance between the UK and the USA sits and why little short of culture-obliterating events could change that. There are likely no two nations on Earth (certainly, none of any relevant power) that compare to the closeness of the United States and the United Kingdom. The only other alliances that compare are —and with a overlapping culture and concerns— those between the two concerned in this answer and Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
But what about that history? The US and the UK have stood back to back in battle against enemies in the two greatest wars in human history. They share a common language and a quaint cultural enmity towards the other; the kind of faux abrasiveness one observes between close paternal cousins who jostle about and compare sexual prowess or athletic achievement. Every barb, every insult, every smug rejoinder confirms the unique closeness and unspoken love rather than an indicator of any actual enmity.
The Second World War cemented that. It hasn't changed since.

人们必须理解英国和美国联盟所基于的坚实、不可动摇的基础，以及为何除非发生文化灭绝级别的事件，否则这种联盟不太可能改变。在地球上可能没有两个国家——当然没有具有任何相关实力的国家——能够与美国和英国之间的紧密程度相媲美。其他可以比较的联盟只有加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰之间的联盟，它们的文化和关注点都是重叠的。
然而，历史上美国和英国在人类历史上最大规模的两场战争中并肩作战，共同对抗敌人。他们共享同一种语言，并且彼此之间有一种奇特的文化敌对情绪；这类似于亲密的堂兄弟之间那种表面上的摩擦，他们互相推搡，比较彼此的性能力或运动成就。每一次挑衅、每一次侮辱、每一次自满的回击，实际上都确认了他们之间独特的亲密无间和不言而喻的爱意，而不是真正的敌意。
第二次世界大战加强了这种关系，自那以后，这一点从未改变。

Churchill was never loved in Parliament anything like he was by the public or the press; to his peers he was a necessary evil of focused anger and pinpoint aggressiveness to counter the Nazi threat. The First Lord of the Admiralty took far too much pleasure in beating the drums of war for those in Parliament. Even after Hitler invaded Poland, Lord Halifax was the preferred candidate. But Halifax never showed interest in it (nor was it in fashion for a Lord to assume the head of government). Churchill practically begged for it to the chagrin of his fellow parliamentarians, who saw such garish campaigning as positively American, and therefore gauche (and apropos, given Churchill's near ancestry).
Churchill's open contempt (indeed, hostility) for Chamberlain cost him politically, nearly to the point of ensuring he'd never be elevated. But as history demonstrated, there was no cost Churchill would not incur to achieve victory against the Nazis. Brutality, it was determined, should be countered by a type of brutality that only England could fashion and had repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to engineer on the rare occasions history called for it. Churchill was not Parliament's first choice, but events sexted the man more than Parliament and more than England

丘吉尔在议会中从未像公众或媒体那样受到广泛爱戴；在他的同僚看来，他是对抗纳粹威胁的必要之恶，集中愤怒和精确的侵略性来对抗纳粹的威胁。海军大臣对于为议会成员敲响战争的战鼓表现得过于热衷。即使在希特勒入侵波兰之后，议会更倾向于哈利法克斯勋爵。但哈利法克斯从未表现出兴趣（贵族担任政府首脑也不合潮流）。丘吉尔几乎是恳求得到这个职位，这让他的议会同事们感到不快，因为他们觉得这种过于显眼的竞选手法非常具有美国风格，因而显得不够得体（而且，鉴于丘吉尔接近美国的血统，这看起来尤其恰当）。
丘吉尔对内侍的公开蔑视（甚至敌意）在政治上让他付出了代价，几乎到了确保他永远不会被提升的地步。但历史表明，为了战胜纳粹，丘吉尔愿意付出任何代价。英国政府决定，应该用一种只有英国才能驾驭的残暴来对抗这种残暴，而且在历史罕见的情况下，英国一再展示出驾驭这种残暴的能力。丘吉尔本不是议会的首选，丘吉尔不是议会最初的人选，但是是时势而非议会，更不是英格兰本身，选择了他。

The Empire won; the Germans, Italians and Japanese lost. It came at great cost.
At the conclusion of World War II, the British Empire was hocked to the Americans. As mentioned, there was nothing that Churchill --thus the Empire-- would not to do remain in the war and defeat the Nazis. But after the war, that was another story. The Lend-Lease Act put Great Britain into deep debt with the United States. In a parallel universe, the massive, crumbling Empire that the United Kingdom administered, with which she enjoyed a super-special trading agreement that lined her coffers (and made lazy her industries) would be able to pay back the debt within a generation. But the US pounded the final nail into the coffin of the Empire (and the French one to boot): the Atlantic Charter. To get money, both empires had to open the floodgates to American-style capitalism and competition.
In 1945, nothing could compete on the open market with American industry. Nothing could compete in numbers; nothing could compete in quality; nothing could compete in technology. The Atlantic Charter opened the doors of Europe to American cinema that quickly destroyed their local markets. Their stores were flooded with American fashion, TVs, radios, cars and everything in between. That wasn't to last either, but the point is, Britain's one and only way to remain a viable global power was its special relationship with the nations in the Commonwealth-Empire. After that ended, Britain had no choice but to fall into the arms of America.

帝国赢了；德国人、意大利人和日本人输了，这是以巨大的代价换来的。
第二次世界大战结束时，大英帝国欠了美国巨额债务。正如所提到的，为了继续参战并打败纳粹，没有什么是丘吉尔——因此是帝国——不愿意做的。但战争结束后，情况就不同了。《租借法案》使英国对美国负债累累。在一个可能的平行世界中，英国曾经管理着一个庞大但逐渐衰败的帝国，并且通过一项特殊的贸易协定获得巨大利益，这项协定不仅填满了国库，也让它的相关产业变得缺乏竞争力。在那个世界里，英国本有能力在一代人的时间里偿还所有债务。然而，美国通过大西洋宪章为英国（以及法国）的帝国敲响了终结的钟声。为了获得资金支持，这两个帝国不得不开放市场，接受美式资本主义和竞争的冲击。
1945年，在公开市场上，没有什么能与美国工业竞争。没有什么能在数量上与之竞争;没有什么能在质量上与之竞争;在技术方面，没有什么能与之竞争。大西洋宪章为美国电影打开了欧洲的大门，这些电影很快摧毁了它们的本地市场。他们的商店里充斥着美国的时尚、电视、收音机、汽车和所有介于其中的商品。这也没能持续多久，但关键是，英国保持全球强国地位的唯一途径是它与英联邦国家的特殊关系。战争结束后，英国别无选择，只能投入美国的怀抱。

It wasn't that easy though. Until the Suez Canal incident, the Brits were under two delusions that quickly ended: that they could write checks (in any denomination) that Uncle Sam would happily cash and that Britain still had the mettle to meddle. It didn't. The propinquity (in perfidy, display, function and time) of the Suez Canal incident to uprisings in Hungary, gave the Soviets political cover to crush that nascent plea for freedom. And how could Europe or America protest!? Eisenhower was incredibly displeased and he showed that displeasure with the greatest threat possible: he threatened to destroy the Pound Sterling.
The Brits acquiesced. The invasion collapsed. The Israelis withdrew. The French (oh how they fumed) remade its entire military and foreign policy after that. A 20-year rift in relations between France and the UK ensued. The UK was offered a special deal on nuclear missiles. The French fumed. The US put nukes in Germany. The French fumed. The French counterpunched by keeping the UK out of the EEC until de Gaulle was dead. They remained allies, but it wasn't until Thatcher and Mitterrand that the breach was closed.

但这并不容易。直到苏伊士运河事件之前，英国人还抱有两个幻想，很快这些幻想就破灭了：他们可以开出任何面额的支票，山姆大叔都乐意兑现，而英国仍然有干预的勇气。事实并非如此，苏伊士运河事件的发生与匈牙利的起义在时间上非常接近，为苏联提供了政治上的掩护去压制那刚刚兴起的自由诉求。欧洲或美国又如何能够提出抗议呢？艾森豪威尔极其不悦，并且用最严厉的手段表达了他的不满：他威胁要摧毁英镑的货币价值。
英国人默许了。入侵失败了，以色列人撤退了。法国人（哦，他们多么愤怒）在那之后重新塑造了整个军事和外交政策。英法之间随之而来的是20年的关系裂痕。英国获得了一项特殊协议，获得了核导弹。法国人愤怒了。美国在德国部署了核武器。法国人愤怒了，作为反击，法国将英国排除在欧洲经济共同体之外，直到戴高乐去世。他们仍然是盟友，但直到撒切尔和密特朗时期，这一裂痕才得以弥合。

But Britain thought more pragmatically on the matter of its place and its relationship with America. Knowing that the UK would never again be a superpower, it was decided from that point on (i.e. post licking of Suez wounds), British foreign policy would be to (a) fashion a relationship of such cordiality between the US and the UK that when the needs of the UK arose, the US would want to acquiesce; (b) that Britain would never again act outside of Washington's expressed interest; and (c) that Britain would forever inform the US of all its policy initiatives.
It has largely worked. Britain, far from being the US's lackey, has fashioned itself into the only tail in history with the potential to wag the whole goddamned dog. And while there are still festering wounds from Iraq, the fact remains that the US never pushed the UK to act and Blair --no one's pushover-- happened to believe both in the mission and British committment to the alliance with the US.

但英国在考虑自己的地位和与美国的关系时更加务实。明白英国不再拥有超级大国地位，自那以后（也就是苏伊士运河的伤痛平复之后），英国的外交策略便重新定位：(a) 与美国建立一种亲切友好的关系，确保在关键时刻能够得到美国的支持；(b) 英国的行动将不再违背华盛顿所明确表达的利益；(c) 英国将始终向美国通报其所有政策动向。
这一策略在很大程度上取得了成功。英国并没有沦为美国的傀儡，已经将自己塑造成了历史上唯一有潜力颠覆整个大局的“小卒”。尽管伊拉克战争造成的创伤仍在，但实际情况是，美国从未强迫英国采取行动，而布莱尔——他不是轻易屈服的人——恰好既认同这一使命，也坚信英国对与美国联盟的承诺。

But the alliance remains strong, despite (well deserved) upset by the British people (and far too little on behalf of the American people). The US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the only multiple nations that share their entire intelligence network, indeed, to the point where there is absolutely no distinction between where the technical ownership of one begins and the other ends.
Post 9/11, the US and UK (+3) are the two closest allies on the planet. That there are differing perspectives and mutual annoyances (Bush and Blair were further apart politically but closer than can be understood; Obama and Cameron are nearly identical politically speaking, yet are known to not share any friendship), is of little concern. Expect the relationship to continue that way for the remainder of our lives.

但是，尽管英国人民(以及美国人民的呼声太少)感到不安(这是理所应当的)，美英同盟依然坚固。美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰是唯一共享整个情报网络的多个国家，事实上，这些国家的技术所有权从哪里开始，从哪里结束，绝对没有区别。
9/11之后，美国和英国(+3)是这个星球上最亲密的两个盟友。有不同的观点和共同的烦恼(布什和布莱尔在政治上的分歧更大，但却比人们所能理解的更近;奥巴马和卡梅伦在政治上几乎是一模一样的，但众所周知他们没有任何友谊)，这没什么可担心的。期待这种关系在我们的余生中继续下去。

Edwyn Nicholson
What are some good things in the relationship between the US and the UK? I know there's a lot of hate on Quora but let's talk about positives.
The UK and US have much in common.
Important Defence Allies
Important Intelligence Allies
Important Trade Partners
Shared Political Ideology (Capitalist Democracy)
Shared Culture (Film, Music, Television, Literature, etc)
Shared Language
Shared History

美国和英国之间关系中的一些积极方面是什么？我知道在Quora上有很多仇恨言论，但我们来谈谈积极的方面。
英国和美国有许多共同点：
重要的国防盟友
重要的情报盟友
重要的贸易伙伴
共享的政治理念（资本主义民主）
共享的文化（电影、音乐、电视、文学等）
共享的语言
共享的历史

Trevor
How close are the US and the UK?
Well the fact that most Americans will tell you they'd die for their UK brothers and sisters speaks volumes and believe it or not (regardless of the anti American stereotypes) the UK would die for Americans as well and we have both done this for eachother
The only other national anthem that has ever played at Buckingham palace from another country was the star spangled banner, as a way to show their support during the tragedy of 9/11. I mean that speaks for itself.
Top it off with the fact that America shares all if not most of it's top secret military secrets with UK, because of the deep trust they have. Hence why so many bases are based in UK. If anything happened to UK Americans would be right there already.
People say we are divided by a commom language but that has two sides. In essence America is born out of the blood of the English and though language is vastly different for a shared language, it's also what helps tie us closer together.

美国和英国有多亲近？
事实上，大多数美国人会告诉你，他们会为他们的英国兄弟姐妹牺牲，这本身就说明了很多事情。不管你信不信（不管反美的刻板印象如何），英国也会为美国人牺牲，我们彼此都这么做过。
在白金汉宫，除了英国国歌之外，唯一演奏过的外国国歌是美国的《星条旗》，这是在9/11悲剧期间表达他们支持的方式。我的意思是，这一点本身就很能说明问题。
再加上美国与英国分享几乎所有的顶级军事机密，因为他们之间有深厚的信任。这就是为什么那么多美国基地被设在英国。如果英国出了什么事，美国人已经在那里了。
人们说我们被一种共同的语言所分隔，但这种说法有两面性。本质上，美国是诞生于英国人的血液，尽管语言有很大的不同，但它也是帮助我们更加紧密联系在一起的因素。
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In the end you have two countries with deep history, close economic and cultural ties, a deep seeded bond, and similar goals, politics, environmental stances, and religious ideology
All of this earned the unique title of “special relationship" which is unparalleled throughout the world and history. When one falls the other picks them up or falls trying. All this born out of such horrific history between the two countries is nothing short of miraculous.
I could go on but in the end, if citizens from either country bad mouth the other, they clearly need a reality check because as far as friends go we are the best for eachother that one can get

最终，你们是两个有着深厚历史、紧密的经济和文化联系、根深蒂固的纽带、以及相似的目标、政治、环境立场和宗教理念的国家。
所有这些都赢得了“特殊关系”这一独特的称号，这在全世界和历史上都是无与伦比的。当一方跌倒时，另一个会扶起它，或者尝试着跌倒。这一切都源于两国之间如此可怕的历史，这简直是奇迹。
我可以继续说下去，但归根结底，如果来自任何一个国家的公民诋毁对方，他们显然需要现实检查，因为就朋友而言，我们是彼此能得到的最好的朋友。

Muhammad Zaman
Let’s put it this way:
The tone of the relationship is set by the incoming US President, never our PM. The former’s actions are proactive, the latter’s reactionary. For example Obama was more amenable than Trump, and Trump less dismissive than Biden, while our PM’s are uniformly obsequious to all of them
While the UK has a professional and effective military, we are still hugely dependent on the US, as the setting of the evacuation deadline in Kabul by the US, not by allies make clear. Nor would have the UK or other allies would have gone into Bosnia, Syria or Iraq without US involvement.

让我们这样看问题：
美国与英国关系的基调通常由新上任的美国总统来设定，而不是我们的首相来设定。美国总统的行动往往具有主动性，而我们的首相则更多是被动反应。例如，奥巴马比特朗普更易于沟通，拜登又比特朗普更轻视人一点，而我们的首相对所有美国总统都表现得过分顺从。
虽然英国拥有专业且高效的军事力量，但我们在很大程度上仍然依赖于美国，正如在喀布尔设定的撤离最后期限是由美国单方面决定的，而不是与盟友协商的结果一样。如果没有美国的参与，英国或其他盟友也不会介入波斯尼亚、叙利亚或伊拉克的事务。

The US has a economy about eight times bigger than ours. If anything we had more economic clout with the Americans when we were also part of the EU, but not post-Brexit. The US can seek demands and assurances from our PM regarding our Irish border, but no one can dictate the Americans about their own borders. The current COVID ban of UK travellers to the US, but not vice versa is another clear reinforcement of that fact.
The common cultural and language and historical arguments are suspect too, given that there are closer ties to Canada, Oz and NZ but no “special relationship.”
The special relationship exists primarily in the minds of those UK politicians and individuals wishing greater prestige by association with a superpower than we actually have in reality without that association. From the American side, the premise is based on cultural and historical affinity, not political or economic reality.

美国的经济规模大约是我们的八倍。如果说我们曾经拥有更多的经济影响力，那也是在我们还是欧盟的一部分时，但脱欧后情况已不再如此。美国可以就爱尔兰边境问题向我们的总理寻求要求和保证，但没有人能够对美国自己的边境政策指手画脚。当前，美国对英国旅行者实施COVID禁令，但英国却不能对美国旅行者采取对等措施，这清楚地强化了美国在这一关系中的主导地位。
关于共同的文化、语言和历史联系的论点也存在疑问，毕竟我们与加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰有着更紧密的联系，但却并未形成所谓的“特殊关系”。
所谓的“特殊关系”主要存在于那些希望借助与超级大国的联系来提升自身声望的英国政治家和个人的想象中，这并非基于我们实际拥有的影响力。从美国的角度来看，这种关系更多是基于文化和历史的亲近，而非政治或经济的现实考量。