1983年至2024年美国海军和中国海军水面作战舰艇建造比较
正文翻译
Comparison of USN and PLAN surface combatant shipbuilding by raw numbers, tonnage, type and VLS between 1983 and 2024 / Credits: Claude Berube : cgberube on X
1983年至2024年美国海军和中国人民解放军海军水面作战舰艇建造比较：按数量、吨位、类型和垂直发射系统单元数量比较 / 鸣谢：Claude Berube : cgberube
1983年至2024年美国海军和中国人民解放军海军水面作战舰艇建造比较：按数量、吨位、类型和垂直发射系统单元数量比较 / 鸣谢：Claude Berube : cgberube
评论翻译
tomrichards8464
likes: 21
What's with the 2023 and 2024 PLAN commissioning numbers? Is this underreporting due to lagging data, or a real massive drop in the rate of construction? If the latter, is that because the yards are producing something other than MSCs instead?
中国海军2023和2024年服役的舰艇数量怎么这么少？是数据还没更新，还是他们真的造得少了？要是造得少了，是不是船厂都在忙别的，没怎么造大型水面舰艇了？
likes: 21
What's with the 2023 and 2024 PLAN commissioning numbers? Is this underreporting due to lagging data, or a real massive drop in the rate of construction? If the latter, is that because the yards are producing something other than MSCs instead?
中国海军2023和2024年服役的舰艇数量怎么这么少？是数据还没更新，还是他们真的造得少了？要是造得少了，是不是船厂都在忙别的，没怎么造大型水面舰艇了？
VictoryForCake
likes: 21
Its generally 3-5 years from keel laying to launch and fitting out, 2020 and 2021 were hard years in China for Covid, commissioning and fitting out a ship is different compared to the more people concentrated work doing building, easier to isolate a smaller group of people.
Even a few months of a delay can throw off timetables by quite a bit.
We know right now from satellite and aerial photography that China has laid down type 55, 52D, and 54A's, alongside a myriad of other ships.
从铺设龙骨到下水舾装通常需要3-5年。2020和2021年中国受疫情影响严重，舾装和服役所需人员较少，受影响相对较小，但建造阶段需要大量人员聚集，更容易受影响。
即使几个月的延误也会严重影响进度。
我们通过卫星和航拍照片得知，中国仍在建造055、052D、054A等大量舰艇。
likes: 21
Its generally 3-5 years from keel laying to launch and fitting out, 2020 and 2021 were hard years in China for Covid, commissioning and fitting out a ship is different compared to the more people concentrated work doing building, easier to isolate a smaller group of people.
Even a few months of a delay can throw off timetables by quite a bit.
We know right now from satellite and aerial photography that China has laid down type 55, 52D, and 54A's, alongside a myriad of other ships.
从铺设龙骨到下水舾装通常需要3-5年。2020和2021年中国受疫情影响严重，舾装和服役所需人员较少，受影响相对较小，但建造阶段需要大量人员聚集，更容易受影响。
即使几个月的延误也会严重影响进度。
我们通过卫星和航拍照片得知，中国仍在建造055、052D、054A等大量舰艇。
PLArealtalk
likes: 18
It's more that there was a pause in new construction after the big run of 055, 052D and 054A production of the mid to late 2010s finished. From memory that lack of new orders became apparent before COVID.
My personal view is they were uating what kind of fleet composition they wanted going into the 2020s and beyond, based on new technologies and the likely future strategic environment, and it was only after that did we see a few new orders be placed for restart of some surface combatants classes, but even then it seems deliberately not at the pace they were going at in the mid to late 2010s.
更确切地说，是在2010年代中后期大规模生产055、052D和054A结束后，新舰建造出现了一个停顿期。我记得，新订单的缺乏在疫情前就已显现。
我个人认为，他们当时正在基于新技术和可能的未来战略环境，评估他们希望在2020年代及以后拥有的舰队构成，此后我们才看到一些新订单下达，以重启某些水面作战舰艇的生产。但即便如此，（新订单的生产）速度似乎也明显不如2010年代中后期。
likes: 18
It's more that there was a pause in new construction after the big run of 055, 052D and 054A production of the mid to late 2010s finished. From memory that lack of new orders became apparent before COVID.
My personal view is they were uating what kind of fleet composition they wanted going into the 2020s and beyond, based on new technologies and the likely future strategic environment, and it was only after that did we see a few new orders be placed for restart of some surface combatants classes, but even then it seems deliberately not at the pace they were going at in the mid to late 2010s.
更确切地说，是在2010年代中后期大规模生产055、052D和054A结束后，新舰建造出现了一个停顿期。我记得，新订单的缺乏在疫情前就已显现。
我个人认为，他们当时正在基于新技术和可能的未来战略环境，评估他们希望在2020年代及以后拥有的舰队构成，此后我们才看到一些新订单下达，以重启某些水面作战舰艇的生产。但即便如此，（新订单的生产）速度似乎也明显不如2010年代中后期。
chanman819
likes: 4
Also gives the recruiting and training pipeline time to catch up or get ready. I would be surprised if that huge surge in construction didn't run up against some crewing constraints
这样做也能让征兵和训练体系有时间赶上进度或做好准备。我认为如此大规模的建造如果没有遇到一些人员方面的制约，那才奇怪。
likes: 4
Also gives the recruiting and training pipeline time to catch up or get ready. I would be surprised if that huge surge in construction didn't run up against some crewing constraints
这样做也能让征兵和训练体系有时间赶上进度或做好准备。我认为如此大规模的建造如果没有遇到一些人员方面的制约，那才奇怪。
PLArealtalk
likes: 7
That is also a possible, albeit probably not primary, factor. I think the surge in construction was somewhat offset by retiring older ships with larger crews.
"What does modern warfare look like and what do we need" is probably the biggest factor, given the 2010s procurement basically helped to catapult the PLAN to generally fleet wide modernity competitive with most upper tier surface navies.
A shift to undersea procurement as more of a priority may also be a factor, that may only be confirmed with time.
人员问题也可能有点关系，但应该不是主要的。我觉得造新船的同时也退役了一些老船，那些老船要的人多，所以人员压力也还好。
“现代战争要怎么打，我们需要什么”才是最重要的，毕竟2010年代那波造船潮已经让中国海军变得很现代化，能跟强国海军比了。
还有一种可能是他们现在更重视造潜艇之类的水下装备了，这只能通过时间来证实。
likes: 7
That is also a possible, albeit probably not primary, factor. I think the surge in construction was somewhat offset by retiring older ships with larger crews.
"What does modern warfare look like and what do we need" is probably the biggest factor, given the 2010s procurement basically helped to catapult the PLAN to generally fleet wide modernity competitive with most upper tier surface navies.
A shift to undersea procurement as more of a priority may also be a factor, that may only be confirmed with time.
人员问题也可能有点关系，但应该不是主要的。我觉得造新船的同时也退役了一些老船，那些老船要的人多，所以人员压力也还好。
“现代战争要怎么打，我们需要什么”才是最重要的，毕竟2010年代那波造船潮已经让中国海军变得很现代化，能跟强国海军比了。
还有一种可能是他们现在更重视造潜艇之类的水下装备了，这只能通过时间来证实。
chanman819
likes: 2
Well, you know how it is with different factors. Sometimes they all come together neatly and consultants get to use the word *synergy* a lot.
Are the crews of older PLAN ships that much larger? It looks like the crews of the retired Type 051 or 053 are large relative to their size and capabilities, but in terms of sailors, a Type 051 has pretty much the same number of crew as a Type 052C (Wikipedia figures).
The aircraft carriers are also going to hog up a bunch of crew. Using the QEs, Kuznetsov, Charles de Gaulle, and the Indian carriers as a reference, each one probably has 1500-2000 crew, or easily as much as a half-dozen large surface combatants.
It does make me wonder if *Fujian* might be closer to a US carrier in crew size.
嗯，各种因素嘛，有时候凑一块儿挺巧的，搞得顾问们老喜欢说“协同效应”。老军舰的兵真的多那么多吗？是，051和053看起来是挺挤的，但看人数，051跟052C差不多（维基百科说的）。
航母也吃人数啊，看看英国的、俄国的、法国的还有印度的航母，一艘就得一两千人，顶得上五六艘大驱了。
我就在想，“福建”号会不会跟美国航母一样，要那么多人？
likes: 2
Well, you know how it is with different factors. Sometimes they all come together neatly and consultants get to use the word *synergy* a lot.
Are the crews of older PLAN ships that much larger? It looks like the crews of the retired Type 051 or 053 are large relative to their size and capabilities, but in terms of sailors, a Type 051 has pretty much the same number of crew as a Type 052C (Wikipedia figures).
The aircraft carriers are also going to hog up a bunch of crew. Using the QEs, Kuznetsov, Charles de Gaulle, and the Indian carriers as a reference, each one probably has 1500-2000 crew, or easily as much as a half-dozen large surface combatants.
It does make me wonder if *Fujian* might be closer to a US carrier in crew size.
嗯，各种因素嘛，有时候凑一块儿挺巧的，搞得顾问们老喜欢说“协同效应”。老军舰的兵真的多那么多吗？是，051和053看起来是挺挤的，但看人数，051跟052C差不多（维基百科说的）。
航母也吃人数啊，看看英国的、俄国的、法国的还有印度的航母，一艘就得一两千人，顶得上五六艘大驱了。
我就在想，“福建”号会不会跟美国航母一样，要那么多人？
PLArealtalk
likes: 10
I certainly agree that with the sheer amount of ships they had retired, they certainly would have recruited more (and the increased part of the defense budget the PLAN have received would be contributing to that), however the amount of additional recruitment was probably a bit ameliorated due to the larger crews of older ships in the per tonnage sense; from the old subchasers to old destroyers.
In terms of the rate limiting step for current procurement, I think caution around new technologies and the strategic environment are the most significant reasons for the current more "moderate" surface ship build rate.
Or putting it another way, if the leadership assessed that they *needed* another 8x 055s and 25x 052Ds by the end of the decade, the funding for recruitment, procurement and sustainment would probably not be the limiting factor. But knowing what they need, and knowing whether buying X number of a given platform if something better/more long lasting is around the corner, is a more difficult question.
我同意他们退了不少船，肯定要多招人（海军经费也多了），但老船吨位大，人也多，所以其实也没补多少人。要我说现在造船没那么快，主要还是因为他们对新技术比较谨慎，也在考虑未来的战略环境。换句话说，要是上面觉得到2030年非得再要8艘055和25艘052D，那肯定不差钱，招人也不是问题。但关键是他们得先搞清楚自己到底要什么，要是更好的东西马上就出来了，现在买一堆现成的划不划算，这才是最难的。
likes: 10
I certainly agree that with the sheer amount of ships they had retired, they certainly would have recruited more (and the increased part of the defense budget the PLAN have received would be contributing to that), however the amount of additional recruitment was probably a bit ameliorated due to the larger crews of older ships in the per tonnage sense; from the old subchasers to old destroyers.
In terms of the rate limiting step for current procurement, I think caution around new technologies and the strategic environment are the most significant reasons for the current more "moderate" surface ship build rate.
Or putting it another way, if the leadership assessed that they *needed* another 8x 055s and 25x 052Ds by the end of the decade, the funding for recruitment, procurement and sustainment would probably not be the limiting factor. But knowing what they need, and knowing whether buying X number of a given platform if something better/more long lasting is around the corner, is a more difficult question.
我同意他们退了不少船，肯定要多招人（海军经费也多了），但老船吨位大，人也多，所以其实也没补多少人。要我说现在造船没那么快，主要还是因为他们对新技术比较谨慎，也在考虑未来的战略环境。换句话说，要是上面觉得到2030年非得再要8艘055和25艘052D，那肯定不差钱，招人也不是问题。但关键是他们得先搞清楚自己到底要什么，要是更好的东西马上就出来了，现在买一堆现成的划不划算，这才是最难的。
beachedwhale1945
likes: 6
You also have to think about when these ships retire. Given a nominal 30 year service life, the PLAN will see the fleet size plummet from 2042-2050. That will require surging construction to counteract, then slowing it back down again.
To maintain a fleet size, you want a slow and steady construction pace, not a boom-and-bust cycle.
你还得想想这些船什么时候退役。按30年服役期算，中国海军到2042-2050年那会儿，船要一下子少一大堆。到时候就得猛造船来补，补完了又得慢下来。要保持舰队规模稳定，最好是慢慢地、稳稳地造，别一会儿猛增一会儿又停下来。
likes: 6
You also have to think about when these ships retire. Given a nominal 30 year service life, the PLAN will see the fleet size plummet from 2042-2050. That will require surging construction to counteract, then slowing it back down again.
To maintain a fleet size, you want a slow and steady construction pace, not a boom-and-bust cycle.
你还得想想这些船什么时候退役。按30年服役期算，中国海军到2042-2050年那会儿，船要一下子少一大堆。到时候就得猛造船来补，补完了又得慢下来。要保持舰队规模稳定，最好是慢慢地、稳稳地造，别一会儿猛增一会儿又停下来。
chanman819
likes: 5
There are upsides and downsides. It's not like the PLAN has the same need to drip-feed orders to keep the yards alive like the US during the post-Cold War era.
Just because several ships all enter service at the same time doesn't mean they all have to retire at the same time. The ones in worst shape can be retired early and the rest of the batch tapered off as their replacements enter service.
And ships built in batches, like those 5 Type 052DLs in the same dry dock are going to have far more parts commonality than if they were built in a more serial fashion.
I just view it as less boom-and-bust and more batch production where batches can vary in size and interval depending on force and budgetary needs.
这样做有好有坏。中国海军跟冷战后的美国不一样，不用为了养活船厂零零星星地下单。
就算几艘船一块儿服役，也不代表它们就得一块儿退役。状态不好的可以先退，剩下的等新船来了再慢慢退。
而且像那五艘在同一个船坞造的052DL，批量生产的零件通用性肯定比一艘一艘地造要好。我觉得这与其说是大起大落，不如说是按需按预算分批生产，每批造多少、隔多久造一批，都是可以调整的。
likes: 5
There are upsides and downsides. It's not like the PLAN has the same need to drip-feed orders to keep the yards alive like the US during the post-Cold War era.
Just because several ships all enter service at the same time doesn't mean they all have to retire at the same time. The ones in worst shape can be retired early and the rest of the batch tapered off as their replacements enter service.
And ships built in batches, like those 5 Type 052DLs in the same dry dock are going to have far more parts commonality than if they were built in a more serial fashion.
I just view it as less boom-and-bust and more batch production where batches can vary in size and interval depending on force and budgetary needs.
这样做有好有坏。中国海军跟冷战后的美国不一样，不用为了养活船厂零零星星地下单。
就算几艘船一块儿服役，也不代表它们就得一块儿退役。状态不好的可以先退，剩下的等新船来了再慢慢退。
而且像那五艘在同一个船坞造的052DL，批量生产的零件通用性肯定比一艘一艘地造要好。我觉得这与其说是大起大落，不如说是按需按预算分批生产，每批造多少、隔多久造一批，都是可以调整的。
beachedwhale1945
likes: 3
>It's not like the PLAN has the same need to drip-feed orders to keep the yards alive like the US during the post-Cold War era.
They don’t have that problem NOW, but predicting the shipyard capacity in 25 years depends on a lot of factors, some completely out of China’s control. If, for example, other nations start producing more commercial ships than China (which over 25 years is not unreasonable), then some of those yards may start closing down without direct government contracts.
The world leader in any particular field rarely lasts more than a few decades, so be very careful about making any predictions on what industrial capacity anyone will have more than 15-20 years into the future.
>Just because several ships all enter service at the same time doesn't mean they all have to retire at the same time. The ones in worst shape can be retired early and the rest of the batch tapered off as their replacements enter service.
This is generally less flexible than you think, and entirely depends on the service life of the individual ships. You have to start planning for the retirements well ahead, running some ships harder than others. Given the decade of high production, China the little flexibility in each ship will start to compound, so by 2050 they will have mass retirements (i.e. much more than the replacement rate). They completed 27 destroyers in the five years from 2018-2022 (5.4 per year), far above the replacement rate of 2.1-3.0 rate I’d expect for their fleet size goal (72-90 DDGs, my estimate).
It’s going to be a challenge, not an insurmountable one, but a challenge.
>And ships built in batches, like those 5 Type 052DLs in the same dry dock are going to have far more parts commonality than if they were built in a more serial fashion.
Which has the downside of potentially perpetuating design flaws, especially when you are starting a massive expansion. Every navy I have ever studied had some significant issues with their first mass-production batches, some major and others minor. I have no doubt China has already compiled a list of such features on the 052Ds and 054As, which they will attempt to rectify on the next batches, but these may-or-may-not be correctable for existing ships.
Conservation of Misery is the most important law for any design engineer to learn.
>I just view it as less boom-and-bust and more batch production where batches can vary in size and interval depending on force and budgetary needs.
Batch production with a highly variable cadence is by definition is a boom-and-bust cycle. China knows this and will start to produce batches at a more even and sustainable pace going forward, with some incremental improvements within a batch and major ones between batches.
“中国海军不像冷战后的美国那样，需要零星地下订单来维持造船厂的运转。”
他们现在确实没这个问题，但预测25年后的造船厂产能就得考虑很多因素了，有些还完全是中国控制不了的。比方说，要是有别的国家商船造得比中国多（25年时间不短，这事儿也不是不可能），那有些船厂没政府订单就得关门。任何领域的世界领先地位都很难保持几十年，所以预测任何国家未来15-20年以上的工业产能都得非常谨慎。
“仅仅因为几艘舰艇同时服役，并不意味着它们必须同时退役。状况最差的可以提前退役，其余的则在其替代舰艇服役后逐步退役。”
这可没你想的那么灵活，完全取决于每艘船的寿命。你得提前很久就开始规划退役，让有些船多跑几年。考虑到中国过去十年造了那么多船，每艘船的灵活性都会累积起来，到2050年他们肯定会面临大规模退役（远超正常换代的速度）。他们2018-2022五年就造了27艘驱逐舰（一年5.4艘），远超我估计的他们舰队规模目标（72-90艘驱逐舰）所需的2.1-3.0艘的换代速度。这会是个挑战，虽然不是克服不了，但肯定是挑战。
“成批建造的舰艇，比如在同一个船坞建造的5艘052DL，将比以更连续的方式建造的舰艇拥有更多的零部件通用性。”
但这也有个缺点，就是可能会让设计缺陷一直存在，尤其是在大规模扩张的初期。我研究过的所有海军，第一批大规模生产的船都有些大大小小的问题。我毫不怀疑中国也已经总结了052D和054A的不足之处，并且会在下一批次上改进，但这些改进可能没法应用到已经造好的船上。“守恒的痛苦”是所有设计工程师都必须牢记的。
“我觉得这与其说是大起大落，不如说是按需按预算分批生产”
批量生产要是忽多忽少，那其实就是一会儿猛增一会儿又停下来的“繁荣-萧条”模式。中国也明白这个道理，所以以后造船会更稳一些，速度不会像以前那样大起大落，同一批船里小改小动，换一批就大改。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
likes: 3
>It's not like the PLAN has the same need to drip-feed orders to keep the yards alive like the US during the post-Cold War era.
They don’t have that problem NOW, but predicting the shipyard capacity in 25 years depends on a lot of factors, some completely out of China’s control. If, for example, other nations start producing more commercial ships than China (which over 25 years is not unreasonable), then some of those yards may start closing down without direct government contracts.
The world leader in any particular field rarely lasts more than a few decades, so be very careful about making any predictions on what industrial capacity anyone will have more than 15-20 years into the future.
>Just because several ships all enter service at the same time doesn't mean they all have to retire at the same time. The ones in worst shape can be retired early and the rest of the batch tapered off as their replacements enter service.
This is generally less flexible than you think, and entirely depends on the service life of the individual ships. You have to start planning for the retirements well ahead, running some ships harder than others. Given the decade of high production, China the little flexibility in each ship will start to compound, so by 2050 they will have mass retirements (i.e. much more than the replacement rate). They completed 27 destroyers in the five years from 2018-2022 (5.4 per year), far above the replacement rate of 2.1-3.0 rate I’d expect for their fleet size goal (72-90 DDGs, my estimate).
It’s going to be a challenge, not an insurmountable one, but a challenge.
>And ships built in batches, like those 5 Type 052DLs in the same dry dock are going to have far more parts commonality than if they were built in a more serial fashion.
Which has the downside of potentially perpetuating design flaws, especially when you are starting a massive expansion. Every navy I have ever studied had some significant issues with their first mass-production batches, some major and others minor. I have no doubt China has already compiled a list of such features on the 052Ds and 054As, which they will attempt to rectify on the next batches, but these may-or-may-not be correctable for existing ships.
Conservation of Misery is the most important law for any design engineer to learn.
>I just view it as less boom-and-bust and more batch production where batches can vary in size and interval depending on force and budgetary needs.
Batch production with a highly variable cadence is by definition is a boom-and-bust cycle. China knows this and will start to produce batches at a more even and sustainable pace going forward, with some incremental improvements within a batch and major ones between batches.
“中国海军不像冷战后的美国那样，需要零星地下订单来维持造船厂的运转。”
他们现在确实没这个问题，但预测25年后的造船厂产能就得考虑很多因素了，有些还完全是中国控制不了的。比方说，要是有别的国家商船造得比中国多（25年时间不短，这事儿也不是不可能），那有些船厂没政府订单就得关门。任何领域的世界领先地位都很难保持几十年，所以预测任何国家未来15-20年以上的工业产能都得非常谨慎。
“仅仅因为几艘舰艇同时服役，并不意味着它们必须同时退役。状况最差的可以提前退役，其余的则在其替代舰艇服役后逐步退役。”
这可没你想的那么灵活，完全取决于每艘船的寿命。你得提前很久就开始规划退役，让有些船多跑几年。考虑到中国过去十年造了那么多船，每艘船的灵活性都会累积起来，到2050年他们肯定会面临大规模退役（远超正常换代的速度）。他们2018-2022五年就造了27艘驱逐舰（一年5.4艘），远超我估计的他们舰队规模目标（72-90艘驱逐舰）所需的2.1-3.0艘的换代速度。这会是个挑战，虽然不是克服不了，但肯定是挑战。
“成批建造的舰艇，比如在同一个船坞建造的5艘052DL，将比以更连续的方式建造的舰艇拥有更多的零部件通用性。”
但这也有个缺点，就是可能会让设计缺陷一直存在，尤其是在大规模扩张的初期。我研究过的所有海军，第一批大规模生产的船都有些大大小小的问题。我毫不怀疑中国也已经总结了052D和054A的不足之处，并且会在下一批次上改进，但这些改进可能没法应用到已经造好的船上。“守恒的痛苦”是所有设计工程师都必须牢记的。
“我觉得这与其说是大起大落，不如说是按需按预算分批生产”
批量生产要是忽多忽少，那其实就是一会儿猛增一会儿又停下来的“繁荣-萧条”模式。中国也明白这个道理，所以以后造船会更稳一些，速度不会像以前那样大起大落，同一批船里小改小动，换一批就大改。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
chanman819
likes: 1
All fair enough.
>I have no doubt China has already compiled a list of such features on the 052Ds and 054As, which they will attempt to rectify on the next batches, but these may-or-may-not be correctable for existing ships.
I think we may have seen a hint of that in the gap in the middle of Type 052C production and what looked like one last batch of Type 054As tacked on at the end. At least, it would be consistent with delays or issues cropping up with the development of their replacement designs.
And who knows, if the Type 054Bs turn out to be unusually troubled, maybe we'll see more 054As as a stopgap.
>Conservation of Misery is the most important law for any design engineer to learn.
Gotta pick your poison. I've wondered if part of the issues with the Zumwalt and LCS (and now Constellations) have some of their roots in how long it had been since the US Navy had procured or designed new surface warship classes.
The Burkes aside, it only recently struck me that the US built as many Ticonderoga-class as all other post-WW2 CG/CGNs combined. (27 vs. 9x Leahy, 9x Belknap, 2x California, 4x Virginia, Truxtun, Bainbridge, Long Beach).
I'm sure it helped a lot with manufacturing efficiency and logistics, but I wonder if that also left procurement and design staff out of practice or out of a job. Which, I guess isn't unlike the situation of the Type 052D vs. the mix of preceding post-Cold War designs
说得有道理
“我毫不怀疑中国已经编制了052D和054A的此类功能列表，他们将尝试在下一批中纠正这些功能，但这些功能可能无法为现有舰艇纠正。”
我认为我们可能已经在052C型驱逐舰生产的中断以及最后追加的一批054A型护卫舰中看到了一些端倪。至少，这与他们的替代设计开发中出现的延误或问题是一致的。谁知道呢，如果054B型护卫舰的研发非常不顺利，也许我们会看到更多的054A型作为权宜之计。
“守恒的痛苦”是任何设计工程师都必须学习的最重要的定律。
总得有所取舍。我一直在想，“朱姆沃尔特”级和濒海战斗舰（以及现在的“星座”级）的部分问题，是不是因为美国海军太久没采购或设计新的水面舰艇了。“伯克”级不算，我最近才发现美国造的“提康德罗加”级巡洋舰，居然比二战后其他所有巡洋舰加起来都多（27艘对9艘“利希”级、9艘“贝尔克纳普”级、2艘“加利福尼亚”级、4艘“弗吉尼亚”级、“特拉克斯顿”号、“班布里奇”号、“长滩”号）。这肯定提高了生产和后勤效率，但会不会也让采购和设计人员生疏了，甚至丢了饭碗？我觉得这跟052D型驱逐舰和之前冷战后各种设计的混杂情况有点像。
likes: 1
All fair enough.
>I have no doubt China has already compiled a list of such features on the 052Ds and 054As, which they will attempt to rectify on the next batches, but these may-or-may-not be correctable for existing ships.
I think we may have seen a hint of that in the gap in the middle of Type 052C production and what looked like one last batch of Type 054As tacked on at the end. At least, it would be consistent with delays or issues cropping up with the development of their replacement designs.
And who knows, if the Type 054Bs turn out to be unusually troubled, maybe we'll see more 054As as a stopgap.
>Conservation of Misery is the most important law for any design engineer to learn.
Gotta pick your poison. I've wondered if part of the issues with the Zumwalt and LCS (and now Constellations) have some of their roots in how long it had been since the US Navy had procured or designed new surface warship classes.
The Burkes aside, it only recently struck me that the US built as many Ticonderoga-class as all other post-WW2 CG/CGNs combined. (27 vs. 9x Leahy, 9x Belknap, 2x California, 4x Virginia, Truxtun, Bainbridge, Long Beach).
I'm sure it helped a lot with manufacturing efficiency and logistics, but I wonder if that also left procurement and design staff out of practice or out of a job. Which, I guess isn't unlike the situation of the Type 052D vs. the mix of preceding post-Cold War designs
说得有道理
“我毫不怀疑中国已经编制了052D和054A的此类功能列表，他们将尝试在下一批中纠正这些功能，但这些功能可能无法为现有舰艇纠正。”
我认为我们可能已经在052C型驱逐舰生产的中断以及最后追加的一批054A型护卫舰中看到了一些端倪。至少，这与他们的替代设计开发中出现的延误或问题是一致的。谁知道呢，如果054B型护卫舰的研发非常不顺利，也许我们会看到更多的054A型作为权宜之计。
“守恒的痛苦”是任何设计工程师都必须学习的最重要的定律。
总得有所取舍。我一直在想，“朱姆沃尔特”级和濒海战斗舰（以及现在的“星座”级）的部分问题，是不是因为美国海军太久没采购或设计新的水面舰艇了。“伯克”级不算，我最近才发现美国造的“提康德罗加”级巡洋舰，居然比二战后其他所有巡洋舰加起来都多（27艘对9艘“利希”级、9艘“贝尔克纳普”级、2艘“加利福尼亚”级、4艘“弗吉尼亚”级、“特拉克斯顿”号、“班布里奇”号、“长滩”号）。这肯定提高了生产和后勤效率，但会不会也让采购和设计人员生疏了，甚至丢了饭碗？我觉得这跟052D型驱逐舰和之前冷战后各种设计的混杂情况有点像。
neocloud27
likes: 9
If you look at the building and commissioning of the 054A, 052D and 055s (the bulk of the ships built in the last few years), there does seem to be a pause/drop of about 18 months after the last batches started building and got commissioned in 2020/2022, they started mass building again at the end of 2022, maybe Covid?
如果你观察 054A、052D 和 055 型舰艇（过去几年建造的主力）的建造和服役情况，似乎在 2020/2022 年最后一批开始建造和服役后，有一个大约 18 个月的停顿/下降。他们于 2022 年底再次开始大规模建造，也许是新冠疫情的影响？
likes: 9
If you look at the building and commissioning of the 054A, 052D and 055s (the bulk of the ships built in the last few years), there does seem to be a pause/drop of about 18 months after the last batches started building and got commissioned in 2020/2022, they started mass building again at the end of 2022, maybe Covid?
如果你观察 054A、052D 和 055 型舰艇（过去几年建造的主力）的建造和服役情况，似乎在 2020/2022 年最后一批开始建造和服役后，有一个大约 18 个月的停顿/下降。他们于 2022 年底再次开始大规模建造，也许是新冠疫情的影响？
QINTG
likes: 1
When building new models of warships at the beginning, the efficiency will be relatively low, but production efficiency will increase after becoming proficient.
054A==>054B 052d==>052DL 055==>055B
在开始建造新型军舰时，效率相对较低，但在熟练之后，生产效率会提高。054A==>054B 052d==>052DL 055==>055B
likes: 1
When building new models of warships at the beginning, the efficiency will be relatively low, but production efficiency will increase after becoming proficient.
054A==>054B 052d==>052DL 055==>055B
在开始建造新型军舰时，效率相对较低，但在熟练之后，生产效率会提高。054A==>054B 052d==>052DL 055==>055B
Suspicious_Loads
likes: 6
China also produces ships in batches. 055 were produced 2014-2018 and then stopped. They are probably uating and making changes before next batch comes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_055_destroyer#Ships_of_class
中国也采用批量生产的方式建造军舰。055 型驱逐舰在 2014 年至 2018 年间建造，然后停产。他们可能正在评估并进行改进，为下一批的建造做准备。
[维基百科]
likes: 6
China also produces ships in batches. 055 were produced 2014-2018 and then stopped. They are probably uating and making changes before next batch comes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_055_destroyer#Ships_of_class
中国也采用批量生产的方式建造军舰。055 型驱逐舰在 2014 年至 2018 年间建造，然后停产。他们可能正在评估并进行改进，为下一批的建造做准备。
[维基百科]
Few-Variety2842
likes: 3
My guess is they are waiting for the newer gen ship designs to be finalized, such as IEP and energy weapons. The test result from the first Type 054B may open the floodgate again
我估计他们是在等新一代的船设计搞定，像什么全电推进、能量武器之类的。等第一艘 054B 试完了，可能又要开始猛造了。
likes: 3
My guess is they are waiting for the newer gen ship designs to be finalized, such as IEP and energy weapons. The test result from the first Type 054B may open the floodgate again
我估计他们是在等新一代的船设计搞定，像什么全电推进、能量武器之类的。等第一艘 054B 试完了，可能又要开始猛造了。
Necessary_Pass1670
likes: 3
I have an even simpler theory: five year plan budgets. The temporary pause in 2020 was simply because budgeted planned construction for the 2015-20 five year plan have been realised and funding for further construction only released from the next five year plan in 2021.
我有个更简单的想法：就是五年计划的预算。2020年停了是因为2015-20这五年计划的钱花完了，新的五年计划要到2021年才开始拨钱。
likes: 3
I have an even simpler theory: five year plan budgets. The temporary pause in 2020 was simply because budgeted planned construction for the 2015-20 five year plan have been realised and funding for further construction only released from the next five year plan in 2021.
我有个更简单的想法：就是五年计划的预算。2020年停了是因为2015-20这五年计划的钱花完了，新的五年计划要到2021年才开始拨钱。
CertifiedMeanie
likes: 11
I think one only has to look at specific projects to see major issues in the US Navy procurement.
The Zumwalts turned out to be complete and very expensive failures, that now need an extensive refit to be somewhat useful after they were designed around a ridiculous mission profile that belongs in the 1940s.
The LCS, both of them, turned out to be complete lemons, plagued by all sort of issues and are being abandoned as a whole.
The Constellation-Class looked to fix this issue, by taking a proven design from Italy. However it got so clusterfucked and fumbled that now it's running several years late.
On top of these huge fuck ups come additional smaller fuck ups, like delays with the Columbia SSBNs, DDG(X) not being in sight whatsoever, F/A-XX perhaps being in jeopardy depending on how closely it's tied to the USAFs NGAD effort, early teething issues with the Ford EMALS, shipyards not having the capacity or ability to deliver what's needed and in time.
People often will be optimistic and say that things will change and that now everything will start to get better. But the fact of the matter is that the USN is relying on a fleet of increasingly older ships, with replacements far into the future and at exorbitant prices. All of that compounded by recruitment issues and steel workers in the shipyards being treated like trash, on top of a limited amount of shipyards. Well, the picture that's being painted shows something very clearly: that the USN is in for a hard time.
The PLAN doesn't have infinite growth potential, but there is still a lot of growth left for them with their current set of available infrastructure.
Overall, the world will continue to spin, but it will be a major blow to the US and their interests when they have become the second best Navy in the Pacific. And countries like Korea and Japan are much more interested in defending their own waters rather than enforcing the sovereignty of other countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, you name it. That's something the US is mostly concerned about, so it's not something that can truly be picked up by regional allies.
我认为人们只需要看看具体的项目，就能发现美国海军采购方面的主要问题。 “朱姆沃尔特”级最终成为了彻底且极其昂贵的失败品，它们的设计基于一个荒谬的、属于20世纪40年代的任务设定，现在需要进行大规模的改装才能变得稍微有用一些。
濒海战斗舰，无论是哪一种型号，都成为了彻头彻尾的次品，受到各种问题的困扰，并且正在被整体放弃。
“星座”级原本希望通过采用意大利的成熟设计来解决这些问题。然而，由于各种混乱和失误，现在已经延误了好几年。
除了这些巨大的失误之外，还有其他较小的失误，例如“哥伦比亚”级弹道导弹核潜艇的延误、DDG(X)驱逐舰项目仍然遥遥无期、F/A-XX战斗机项目可能因为与美国空军的“下一代空中优势”（NGAD）项目的关联而面临风险、“福特”级航母的电磁弹射系统（EMALS）早期存在各种问题、造船厂没有足够的产能或能力按时交付所需的舰艇。
人们常常会乐观地认为情况会改变，一切都会好起来。但事实是，美国海军依赖的是一支日益老化的舰队，其替代舰艇的交付遥遥无期，而且价格极其昂贵。所有这些都因征兵问题、造船厂的钢铁工人待遇恶劣以及造船厂数量有限而变得更加复杂。
总之，呈现出的画面非常清晰地表明：美国海军将面临一段艰难时期。
中国海军并非拥有无限的增长潜力，但就其目前可用的基础设施而言，仍然有很大的增长空间。
总而言之，世界将继续运转，但当美国成为太平洋地区第二强大的海军时，这对美国及其利益将是一个重大打击。而且，像韩国和日本这样的国家更关心保卫自己的领海，而不是去维护其他国家比如像菲律宾、台湾（地区）等地的“主权”。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
likes: 11
I think one only has to look at specific projects to see major issues in the US Navy procurement.
The Zumwalts turned out to be complete and very expensive failures, that now need an extensive refit to be somewhat useful after they were designed around a ridiculous mission profile that belongs in the 1940s.
The LCS, both of them, turned out to be complete lemons, plagued by all sort of issues and are being abandoned as a whole.
The Constellation-Class looked to fix this issue, by taking a proven design from Italy. However it got so clusterfucked and fumbled that now it's running several years late.
On top of these huge fuck ups come additional smaller fuck ups, like delays with the Columbia SSBNs, DDG(X) not being in sight whatsoever, F/A-XX perhaps being in jeopardy depending on how closely it's tied to the USAFs NGAD effort, early teething issues with the Ford EMALS, shipyards not having the capacity or ability to deliver what's needed and in time.
People often will be optimistic and say that things will change and that now everything will start to get better. But the fact of the matter is that the USN is relying on a fleet of increasingly older ships, with replacements far into the future and at exorbitant prices. All of that compounded by recruitment issues and steel workers in the shipyards being treated like trash, on top of a limited amount of shipyards. Well, the picture that's being painted shows something very clearly: that the USN is in for a hard time.
The PLAN doesn't have infinite growth potential, but there is still a lot of growth left for them with their current set of available infrastructure.
Overall, the world will continue to spin, but it will be a major blow to the US and their interests when they have become the second best Navy in the Pacific. And countries like Korea and Japan are much more interested in defending their own waters rather than enforcing the sovereignty of other countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, you name it. That's something the US is mostly concerned about, so it's not something that can truly be picked up by regional allies.
我认为人们只需要看看具体的项目，就能发现美国海军采购方面的主要问题。 “朱姆沃尔特”级最终成为了彻底且极其昂贵的失败品，它们的设计基于一个荒谬的、属于20世纪40年代的任务设定，现在需要进行大规模的改装才能变得稍微有用一些。
濒海战斗舰，无论是哪一种型号，都成为了彻头彻尾的次品，受到各种问题的困扰，并且正在被整体放弃。
“星座”级原本希望通过采用意大利的成熟设计来解决这些问题。然而，由于各种混乱和失误，现在已经延误了好几年。
除了这些巨大的失误之外，还有其他较小的失误，例如“哥伦比亚”级弹道导弹核潜艇的延误、DDG(X)驱逐舰项目仍然遥遥无期、F/A-XX战斗机项目可能因为与美国空军的“下一代空中优势”（NGAD）项目的关联而面临风险、“福特”级航母的电磁弹射系统（EMALS）早期存在各种问题、造船厂没有足够的产能或能力按时交付所需的舰艇。
人们常常会乐观地认为情况会改变，一切都会好起来。但事实是，美国海军依赖的是一支日益老化的舰队，其替代舰艇的交付遥遥无期，而且价格极其昂贵。所有这些都因征兵问题、造船厂的钢铁工人待遇恶劣以及造船厂数量有限而变得更加复杂。
总之，呈现出的画面非常清晰地表明：美国海军将面临一段艰难时期。
中国海军并非拥有无限的增长潜力，但就其目前可用的基础设施而言，仍然有很大的增长空间。
总而言之，世界将继续运转，但当美国成为太平洋地区第二强大的海军时，这对美国及其利益将是一个重大打击。而且，像韩国和日本这样的国家更关心保卫自己的领海，而不是去维护其他国家比如像菲律宾、台湾（地区）等地的“主权”。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
swagfarts12
likes: 6
The USN needs to start holding people criminally responsible for some of these procurement screw ups, it almost seems like they're doing it on purpose
美国海军得开始抓一些人进监狱才行了，就这些采购上出的幺蛾子，简直就像他们故意搞的一样。
likes: 6
The USN needs to start holding people criminally responsible for some of these procurement screw ups, it almost seems like they're doing it on purpose
美国海军得开始抓一些人进监狱才行了，就这些采购上出的幺蛾子，简直就像他们故意搞的一样。
Hot-Train7201
likes: 1
>And countries like Korea and Japan are much more interested in defending their own waters rather than enforcing the sovereignty of other countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, you name it.
They're interested in defending their sea trade routes, which flow through those very waters owned by Philippines, Taiwan, etc. Defending their waters means nothing if all their trade is being interdicted by China's navy in the waters of the Philippines, Taiwan, etc.
“韩国和日本更关心的是守好自己家门口，而不是管菲律宾、台湾（地区）那些地方的主权。”
他们得保护海上贸易线啊，那些航线正好就经过菲律宾、台湾（地区）那片海。要是他们的贸易都被中国海军在那些地方给掐断了，那光守着自己家门口有啥用？
likes: 1
>And countries like Korea and Japan are much more interested in defending their own waters rather than enforcing the sovereignty of other countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, you name it.
They're interested in defending their sea trade routes, which flow through those very waters owned by Philippines, Taiwan, etc. Defending their waters means nothing if all their trade is being interdicted by China's navy in the waters of the Philippines, Taiwan, etc.
“韩国和日本更关心的是守好自己家门口，而不是管菲律宾、台湾（地区）那些地方的主权。”
他们得保护海上贸易线啊，那些航线正好就经过菲律宾、台湾（地区）那片海。要是他们的贸易都被中国海军在那些地方给掐断了，那光守着自己家门口有啥用？
yippee-kay-yay
likes: 6
I find this logic funny considering China is in the top two trading partners for all those countries. So why are they going to interdict their own cargo?.
Is like the Australian justification for SSN's. "We need them to protect our trade routes with our main partners(which include China) from China".
考虑到中国是这些国家最重要的贸易伙伴之一，这种认为中国会拦截其贸易的逻辑就显得十分荒谬。他们为什么要损害自身的经济利益，去拦截自己的货物呢？这类似于澳大利亚为获得核动力潜艇所提出的理由：“我们需要核潜艇来保护我们与主要贸易伙伴（其中就包括中国）的贸易航线，以应对来自中国的潜在威胁。”
likes: 6
I find this logic funny considering China is in the top two trading partners for all those countries. So why are they going to interdict their own cargo?.
Is like the Australian justification for SSN's. "We need them to protect our trade routes with our main partners(which include China) from China".
考虑到中国是这些国家最重要的贸易伙伴之一，这种认为中国会拦截其贸易的逻辑就显得十分荒谬。他们为什么要损害自身的经济利益，去拦截自己的货物呢？这类似于澳大利亚为获得核动力潜艇所提出的理由：“我们需要核潜艇来保护我们与主要贸易伙伴（其中就包括中国）的贸易航线，以应对来自中国的潜在威胁。”
ConstantStatistician
likes: 3
Ships are one thing, but arguably even more important is how many aircraft each side can bring to bear in the region. Aircraft are the primary weapon of modern naval combat via aircraft carriers, not warships themselves. The PLAN may lack carriers next to the USN, but mainland China itself is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, meaning the PLAN can rely on ground-based aircraft, while the USN can only bring a limited number of aircraft carriers to any given location at a time.
船是一回事，但更重要的是看谁能在那个地方摆出更多的飞机。现在打海战主要靠航母上的飞机，不是光靠军舰。中国海军航母可能没美国多，但中国大陆就是个“不沉的航母”，能用陆地上的飞机，美国海军一次能派过去的航母数量有限。
likes: 3
Ships are one thing, but arguably even more important is how many aircraft each side can bring to bear in the region. Aircraft are the primary weapon of modern naval combat via aircraft carriers, not warships themselves. The PLAN may lack carriers next to the USN, but mainland China itself is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, meaning the PLAN can rely on ground-based aircraft, while the USN can only bring a limited number of aircraft carriers to any given location at a time.
船是一回事，但更重要的是看谁能在那个地方摆出更多的飞机。现在打海战主要靠航母上的飞机，不是光靠军舰。中国海军航母可能没美国多，但中国大陆就是个“不沉的航母”，能用陆地上的飞机，美国海军一次能派过去的航母数量有限。
YareSekiro
likes: 4
I think that's the same idea that US is using South Korea/Japan and to a lesser extent Taiwan as the "unsinkable carrier", but then it comes the question of US dragging SK/Japan into a conflict that they could stayed out of against a foe that is much closer to them than US.
我觉得美国也是这个意思，把韩国、日本，还有台湾（地区）（稍微差一点）当成“不沉的航母”来用。但问题是，美国会不会把韩国日本拉进一场他们本来可以不掺和的仗，而且他们的对手离他们可比离美国近多了。
likes: 4
I think that's the same idea that US is using South Korea/Japan and to a lesser extent Taiwan as the "unsinkable carrier", but then it comes the question of US dragging SK/Japan into a conflict that they could stayed out of against a foe that is much closer to them than US.
我觉得美国也是这个意思，把韩国、日本，还有台湾（地区）（稍微差一点）当成“不沉的航母”来用。但问题是，美国会不会把韩国日本拉进一场他们本来可以不掺和的仗，而且他们的对手离他们可比离美国近多了。
Few-Variety2842
likes: 5
> US is using South Korea/Japan and to a lesser extent Taiwan as the "unsinkable carrier"
There is also the issue of feasibility. SKorea and Japan (except for one air base) are still quite far from Taiwan that mid air tankers are still necessary. And, stationing US air force on Taiwan could trigger the war.
“美国是把韩国、日本，还有台湾（地区）（稍微算上）当‘不沉航母’用。”
但问题是，这事儿行不行得通。韩国和日本（除了一个空军基地）离台湾（地区）还挺远的，飞机过去还得空中加油。而且，美国要是在台湾（地区）驻军，搞不好直接就打起来了。
likes: 5
> US is using South Korea/Japan and to a lesser extent Taiwan as the "unsinkable carrier"
There is also the issue of feasibility. SKorea and Japan (except for one air base) are still quite far from Taiwan that mid air tankers are still necessary. And, stationing US air force on Taiwan could trigger the war.
“美国是把韩国、日本，还有台湾（地区）（稍微算上）当‘不沉航母’用。”
但问题是，这事儿行不行得通。韩国和日本（除了一个空军基地）离台湾（地区）还挺远的，飞机过去还得空中加油。而且，美国要是在台湾（地区）驻军，搞不好直接就打起来了。
dasCKD
likes: 2
South Korea, Taiwan, and honestly also Japan to a much smaller extent, are becoming increasingly untenable positions for the USM to really try to hold and fight out of in a big way. In the foreseeable future the US will have to lean much more heavily on CBGs and also US-based air sorties. Which is why I think that bungling the 6th gen over \\\\\\\\*costs\\\\\\\\* of all things was such a foolish idea
韩国、台湾（地区），以及在较小程度上也包括日本，正变得越来越难以成为美国在发生大规模冲突时真正能够坚守和作战的阵地。在可预见的未来，美国将不得不更多地依赖航母打击群以及从美国本土起飞的空袭。这就是为什么我认为因为成本问题而搞砸第六代战机项目实在是太蠢了。
likes: 2
South Korea, Taiwan, and honestly also Japan to a much smaller extent, are becoming increasingly untenable positions for the USM to really try to hold and fight out of in a big way. In the foreseeable future the US will have to lean much more heavily on CBGs and also US-based air sorties. Which is why I think that bungling the 6th gen over \\\\\\\\*costs\\\\\\\\* of all things was such a foolish idea
韩国、台湾（地区），以及在较小程度上也包括日本，正变得越来越难以成为美国在发生大规模冲突时真正能够坚守和作战的阵地。在可预见的未来，美国将不得不更多地依赖航母打击群以及从美国本土起飞的空袭。这就是为什么我认为因为成本问题而搞砸第六代战机项目实在是太蠢了。
broncobuckaneer
likes: 1
>against a foe that is much closer to them than US.
Yeah, tough sell to fight a country that can launch ballistic missiles against your entire populace. The entirety of south Korea is within about 300 miles of China and Japan within about about 450 miles (if they launch over N Korea and Russia).
“对手离他们可比离美国近多了。”
是啊，要让他们跟一个能用导弹打他们全国的国家打仗，这可不好说服。整个韩国离中国就三百来英里，日本也就四百五（要是从朝鲜和俄罗斯那边飞过来的话）。
likes: 1
>against a foe that is much closer to them than US.
Yeah, tough sell to fight a country that can launch ballistic missiles against your entire populace. The entirety of south Korea is within about 300 miles of China and Japan within about about 450 miles (if they launch over N Korea and Russia).
“对手离他们可比离美国近多了。”
是啊，要让他们跟一个能用导弹打他们全国的国家打仗，这可不好说服。整个韩国离中国就三百来英里，日本也就四百五（要是从朝鲜和俄罗斯那边飞过来的话）。
edgygothteen69
likes: 3
We are so fucked
我们完蛋了
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
likes: 3
We are so fucked
我们完蛋了
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
sgt102
likes: 4
USN launched nothing in 2013 & 2014 and one hull in 2015?
I'm surprised that they have a naval shipyard left...
美国海军 2013 和 2014 年居然一艘船都没下水，2015 年才一艘？
我真奇怪他们居然还有船厂活着……
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
likes: 4
USN launched nothing in 2013 & 2014 and one hull in 2015?
I'm surprised that they have a naval shipyard left...
美国海军 2013 和 2014 年居然一艘船都没下水，2015 年才一艘？
我真奇怪他们居然还有船厂活着……
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
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