炮舰外交 - 对委内瑞拉开战，美帝国可要考虑清楚了
正文翻译
Gunboat Diplomacy
炮舰外交——对委内瑞拉开战，美帝国可要考虑清楚了
Some things never seem to change. Now that the US monopoly on the adjective “American” has seemingly become universally acknowledged (even in many parts of Latin America), it hardly comes as a surprise that US policy in Latin America has not changed for almost two centuries.
As we speak, a small US Navy flotilla is patrolling off the Venezuelan coast. So far it seems a classic case of gunboat diplomacy, a peculiar practice pioneered by the English (when Brittannia still ruled the waves), which was adopted by the US, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands and applied with varying success.
有些事情似乎永远不会改变。如今，美国（the US）对“美国的（American）”这一形容词的垄断似乎已得到普遍认可（即使在拉丁美洲的许多地方也是如此），因此，美国在拉丁美洲的政策近两个世纪以来未变也就不足为奇了。
就在此刻，一支美国海军小型舰队正在委内瑞拉海岸附近巡逻。迄今为止，这似乎是炮舰外交的经典案例，这种奇特的做法由英国人首创（当时不列颠尼亚仍统治着海洋），后来被美国、德国、法国、意大利和荷兰采用，并取得了不同程度的成功。
Today, we are fortunate enough to be witnessing in real time another case of gunboat diplomacy against Venezuela. Unlike Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), where gunboat diplomacy morphed into a full-scale invasion, Venezuela is a tough nut to crack. Although some Americans might be able to identify Venezuela on the map, there are even fewer who have any notion of Venezuelan history and politics. Sure enough, relying on the mainstream media will not enlighten them. There might only be a handful of Americans with any knowledge of Venezuelan culture and what Venezuelans can be like, both individually and as a collective. It is doubtful whether any of the latter are to be found among Donald Trump’s advisers.
It should be clear that Venezuelans may be “Latin Americans,” but totally different from Nicaraguans, Salvadoreans or Guatemalans. Nor are they like Mexicans or Cubans, although their Spanish may sound the same as Cuban Spanish.
今天，我们有幸亲眼目睹又一例针对委内瑞拉的炮舰外交。与1983年的格林纳达和1989年的巴拿马不同，委内瑞拉是一块难啃的骨头，因为在这两个国家，炮舰外交最终演变成了一场全面入侵。虽然有些美国人或许能在地图上认出委内瑞拉，但真正了解委内瑞拉历史和政治的人更是凤毛麟角。显然，依靠主流媒体并不能让他们有所了解。或许只有极少数美国人了解委内瑞拉的文化，以及委内瑞拉人——无论是个人还是集体——的面貌。唐纳德·特朗普的顾问中能否找到后者，令人怀疑。
委内瑞拉人或许是“拉丁美洲人”，但他们与尼加拉瓜人、萨尔瓦多人或危地马拉人截然不同。他们也不像墨西哥人或古巴人，尽管他们的西班牙语听起来可能和古巴西班牙语一样。
The last time that gunboat diplomacy yielded tangible results in Venezuela was back in 1908, when the Dutch navy intervened to bring to power Juan Vicente Gómez, then Vice-President, as President Cipriano Castro was leaving for Paris to get medical treatment for syphilis. Acting either as president himself or as a “Grey Eminence” ruling the country through puppets, Gómez remained in power until 1935. It was Gómez who returned the favor from the Dutch by granting extensive benefits to the Shell Oil Company, which at that time was still a Dutch-English firm. This gave Venezuela a place among the sext group of the world’s major oil producers. In the early 1930s, Venezuela was the third biggest producer, after the US and the USSR. Thirty years later, in the 1960s, Venezuela was number two, soon to be surpassed by the upcoming Middle Eastern oil producing nations. Today, Venezuela ranks 21st.
炮舰外交上一次在委内瑞拉取得实质性成果是在1908年。当时总统西普里亚诺·卡斯特罗正前往巴黎治疗梅毒（注：1899-1908年在任独裁者），荷兰海军出手相助，使时任副总统的胡安·维森特·戈麦斯上台。戈麦斯要么亲自担任总统，要么通过傀儡统治国家，一直掌权到1935年。戈麦斯回报荷兰，为壳牌石油公司提供了巨额利益，而壳牌石油公司当时仍是一家荷英合资公司。这让委内瑞拉跻身世界主要产油国之列。20世纪30年代初，委内瑞拉是继美国和苏联之后的第三大产油国。30年后，在20世纪60年代，委内瑞拉位居第二，但很快被新兴的中东产油国超越。如今，委内瑞拉排名第21位。
Thus, given the fact that world oil production is currently higher than demand, the insistence with which Donald Trump is now trying to impose his will on Venezuela does not primarily appear to be about oil. The only thing is perhaps that many US refineries were built to process the heavy, almost tar-like Venezuelan crude, and that it is expensive and cumbersome to adapt such refineries to oil from other sources. During the past decades, Venezuela has not exactly been the kind of trading partner that Americans like to do business with.
Of course, officially the current US maneuver has ostensibly to do with drug trafficking. Again, this is a silly pretext, because if Venezuela plays any role at all in this field, it can only be a very modest one. Moreover, with Colombia being the world’s leading cocaine producer, boasting two thirds of all the world’s coca acreage (followed by Peru with one quarter and Bolivia with almost ten percent), Venezuela just cannot be considered a real player in this field.
因此，鉴于目前世界石油产量高于需求，唐纳德·特朗普如今试图将其意志强加于委内瑞拉的立场，其主要目的似乎并非石油。唯一的问题或许在于，许多美国炼油厂的建造初衷就是为了加工重质、几乎像焦油一样的委内瑞拉原油，而将这些炼油厂改造成其他产地的石油成本高昂且繁琐。在过去的几十年里，委内瑞拉并非美国人乐于与之做生意的那种贸易伙伴。
当然，美国目前的行动表面上与贩毒有关。这又是一个愚蠢的借口，因为即使委内瑞拉在这个领域发挥了任何作用，也只能是微不足道的。此外，哥伦比亚是世界最大的可卡因生产国，拥有全球三分之二的古柯种植面积（其次是秘鲁，占四分之一，玻利维亚占近十分之一），委内瑞拉根本无法被视为这个领域的真正参与者。
Given the nature of the drug trafficking business, the risks connected with it, but above all the enormous financial and political interests involved, it is risky to make any far reaching statements. However, over the years there have been so many indications and pieces of secondary evidence that it is safe to say that American spy agencies, especially the CIA, play a key role in the entire industry. It is the CIA that oversees and coordinates the production of the raw materials, organizes the drug production process, and the transport of the merchandise to the main markets in North America, Europe and elsewhere. The DEA also plays a key role fighting against drug trafficking, which helps to eliminate unwanted competitors and in the end helps to keep prices sufficiently high for the interested parties to make great profits, all tax-free! Given this interaction, it is safe to say that it is eventually the US deep state that is in charge of the world’s drug trafficking.
鉴于贩毒行业的性质、相关风险，尤其是其中蕴含的巨大经济和政治利益，发表任何影响深远的言论都存在风险。然而，多年来，已有诸多迹象和间接证据表明，美国间谍机构，尤其是中央情报局，在整个毒品行业中扮演着关键角色。中央情报局负责监督和协调原材料的生产，组织毒品生产流程，以及将毒品运往北美、欧洲和其他主要市场。美国缉毒局也在“打击”毒品贩运中发挥着关键作用，这有助于消除不受欢迎的竞争对手，并最终帮助维持足够高的价格，使相关方能够获得巨额利润，而且所有这些都无需纳税！鉴于这种互动，可以肯定地说，最终掌控全球毒品贩运的是美国深层政府。
Against this background, the charges against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro are as outrageous as they are imaginary and unfounded. As a matter of fact, the US is trying to pull the same trick against Maduro as they did in 1989 against Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, taken to Miami to be tried for drug trafficking and now rotting in a US jail.
However, it will probably not be as easy to arrest Maduro, because an invasion of Venezuela by US troops seems out of the question for the simple reason that Venezuela is not Panama, which for the US had the advantage of housing some important US military bases (in the Panama Canal Zone). The nearest base to Venezuela that the US could use are the islands of Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire, all three part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is a US vassal state and loyal member of NATO, for all sorts of practical and political reasons, it does not seem so easy to establish a US operational base there at short notice.
在此背景下，针对委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的指控既荒谬可笑，又毫无根据。事实上，美国正试图对马杜罗使用1989年对巴拿马强人曼努埃尔·诺列加的伎俩。诺列加因贩毒被送往迈阿密受审，如今却在美国监狱里奄奄一息。
然而，逮捕马杜罗可能并非易事，因为美军入侵委内瑞拉似乎是不可能的，原因很简单，委内瑞拉不是巴拿马，而美国在巴拿马拥有一些重要的军事基地（位于巴拿马运河区）。距离委内瑞拉最近的美国可用基地是库拉索岛、阿鲁巴岛和博内尔岛，这三个岛屿都属于荷兰王国。尽管荷兰是美国的附庸国，也是北约的忠实成员国，但由于各种实际和政治原因，在短时间内在那里建立美国军事基地似乎并非易事。
Other obstacles for a smooth replay of the Panamanian operation are Venezuela’s geography and the size, morale and combat readiness of its armed forces. Whereas Panama (created in 1903 as a result of a US intervention against Colombia of which it was originally a province) is somewhat of a failed state, Venezuela is the heir of the venerable Bolivarian tradition and Venezuelans are a proud and fiercely independent people.
Although Trump’s advisers and perhaps he himself may believe that Maduro is a contemporary version of Noriega, or a Latin American version of Saddam Hussein and that the Venezuelan army will collapse as soon as the Americans show up, they are mistaken. Any US armed intervention in Venezuela is likely to encounter stiff resistance.
顺利复制巴拿马行动的其他障碍包括委内瑞拉的地理位置以及其武装部队的规模、士气和战备状态。巴拿马（1903年因美国干预哥伦比亚而成立，最初是哥伦比亚的一个省）在某种程度上是一个失败国家，而委内瑞拉继承了古老的玻利瓦尔传统，委内瑞拉人民是一支自豪而极度独立的民族。
尽管特朗普的顾问，或许甚至他本人，都可能认为马杜罗是当代版的诺列加，或是拉丁美洲版的萨达姆·侯赛因，认为一旦美国人出现，委内瑞拉军队就会崩溃，但他们错了。美国对委内瑞拉的任何武装干预都可能遭遇强烈抵抗。
Anyone who has ever been to Venezuela and spent some time among Venezuelans will understand they are no pushovers. Take Caracas night life, for instance. Once, when having a drink with a professor from Central University, I was surprised to find out he would always carry an automatic pistol in his belt, something no American or European colleague would ever think of. In Caracas, however, most men in bars would be similarly equipped. And don’t think such weapons are never used. They can be drawn whenever the owner feels he is threatened or insulted.
A high-ranking European diplomat once told me that Venezuelans were tough negotiators, remarking that knives were, so to speak, always on the table, instead of underneath it, as in many other Latin American nations.
任何去过委内瑞拉并与委内瑞拉人相处过一段时间的人都知道，他们绝非等闲之辈。就拿加拉加斯的夜生活来说吧。有一次，我和中央大学的一位教授喝酒，惊讶地发现他腰带上总是别着一把自动手枪，这是任何美国或欧洲同事都想不到的。然而，在加拉加斯，酒吧里的大多数男人也都配备类似的武器。而且，别以为这种武器从来不用。只要主人感到受到威胁或侮辱，随时可能拔出。
一位欧洲高级外交官曾告诉我，委内瑞拉人谈判时很强硬，他指出，刀子总是放在桌子上，而不是像其他许多拉美国家那样放在桌子底下。
In other words, the Venezuelan mentality is proud, tough and combative, and Venezuelans will stand their ground, as they have always done since becoming America’s third independent nation, after the US and Haiti. What’s more, unlike the US, the Venezuelans gained their independence without European support.
Of course, it remains entirely unpredictable how the present standoff will end, and it is always possible that Maduro backs out and tries to placate the tough guy in the White House.
Nevertheless, President Trump better watch out.
换句话说，委内瑞拉人的心态是自豪、坚韧和好斗的，委内瑞拉人会坚守阵地，就像他们自成为继美国和海地之后第三个独立国家以来一直做的那样。更重要的是，与美国不同，委内瑞拉是在没有欧洲支持的情况下获得独立的。
当然，目前的僵局最终将如何收场仍然完全难以预测，马杜罗随时有可能退缩，试图安抚白宫里的硬汉。
然而，特朗普总统最好还是小心点。
Gunboat Diplomacy
炮舰外交——对委内瑞拉开战，美帝国可要考虑清楚了
Some things never seem to change. Now that the US monopoly on the adjective “American” has seemingly become universally acknowledged (even in many parts of Latin America), it hardly comes as a surprise that US policy in Latin America has not changed for almost two centuries.
As we speak, a small US Navy flotilla is patrolling off the Venezuelan coast. So far it seems a classic case of gunboat diplomacy, a peculiar practice pioneered by the English (when Brittannia still ruled the waves), which was adopted by the US, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands and applied with varying success.
有些事情似乎永远不会改变。如今，美国（the US）对“美国的（American）”这一形容词的垄断似乎已得到普遍认可（即使在拉丁美洲的许多地方也是如此），因此，美国在拉丁美洲的政策近两个世纪以来未变也就不足为奇了。
就在此刻，一支美国海军小型舰队正在委内瑞拉海岸附近巡逻。迄今为止，这似乎是炮舰外交的经典案例，这种奇特的做法由英国人首创（当时不列颠尼亚仍统治着海洋），后来被美国、德国、法国、意大利和荷兰采用，并取得了不同程度的成功。
Today, we are fortunate enough to be witnessing in real time another case of gunboat diplomacy against Venezuela. Unlike Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), where gunboat diplomacy morphed into a full-scale invasion, Venezuela is a tough nut to crack. Although some Americans might be able to identify Venezuela on the map, there are even fewer who have any notion of Venezuelan history and politics. Sure enough, relying on the mainstream media will not enlighten them. There might only be a handful of Americans with any knowledge of Venezuelan culture and what Venezuelans can be like, both individually and as a collective. It is doubtful whether any of the latter are to be found among Donald Trump’s advisers.
It should be clear that Venezuelans may be “Latin Americans,” but totally different from Nicaraguans, Salvadoreans or Guatemalans. Nor are they like Mexicans or Cubans, although their Spanish may sound the same as Cuban Spanish.
今天，我们有幸亲眼目睹又一例针对委内瑞拉的炮舰外交。与1983年的格林纳达和1989年的巴拿马不同，委内瑞拉是一块难啃的骨头，因为在这两个国家，炮舰外交最终演变成了一场全面入侵。虽然有些美国人或许能在地图上认出委内瑞拉，但真正了解委内瑞拉历史和政治的人更是凤毛麟角。显然，依靠主流媒体并不能让他们有所了解。或许只有极少数美国人了解委内瑞拉的文化，以及委内瑞拉人——无论是个人还是集体——的面貌。唐纳德·特朗普的顾问中能否找到后者，令人怀疑。
委内瑞拉人或许是“拉丁美洲人”，但他们与尼加拉瓜人、萨尔瓦多人或危地马拉人截然不同。他们也不像墨西哥人或古巴人，尽管他们的西班牙语听起来可能和古巴西班牙语一样。
The last time that gunboat diplomacy yielded tangible results in Venezuela was back in 1908, when the Dutch navy intervened to bring to power Juan Vicente Gómez, then Vice-President, as President Cipriano Castro was leaving for Paris to get medical treatment for syphilis. Acting either as president himself or as a “Grey Eminence” ruling the country through puppets, Gómez remained in power until 1935. It was Gómez who returned the favor from the Dutch by granting extensive benefits to the Shell Oil Company, which at that time was still a Dutch-English firm. This gave Venezuela a place among the sext group of the world’s major oil producers. In the early 1930s, Venezuela was the third biggest producer, after the US and the USSR. Thirty years later, in the 1960s, Venezuela was number two, soon to be surpassed by the upcoming Middle Eastern oil producing nations. Today, Venezuela ranks 21st.
炮舰外交上一次在委内瑞拉取得实质性成果是在1908年。当时总统西普里亚诺·卡斯特罗正前往巴黎治疗梅毒（注：1899-1908年在任独裁者），荷兰海军出手相助，使时任副总统的胡安·维森特·戈麦斯上台。戈麦斯要么亲自担任总统，要么通过傀儡统治国家，一直掌权到1935年。戈麦斯回报荷兰，为壳牌石油公司提供了巨额利益，而壳牌石油公司当时仍是一家荷英合资公司。这让委内瑞拉跻身世界主要产油国之列。20世纪30年代初，委内瑞拉是继美国和苏联之后的第三大产油国。30年后，在20世纪60年代，委内瑞拉位居第二，但很快被新兴的中东产油国超越。如今，委内瑞拉排名第21位。
Thus, given the fact that world oil production is currently higher than demand, the insistence with which Donald Trump is now trying to impose his will on Venezuela does not primarily appear to be about oil. The only thing is perhaps that many US refineries were built to process the heavy, almost tar-like Venezuelan crude, and that it is expensive and cumbersome to adapt such refineries to oil from other sources. During the past decades, Venezuela has not exactly been the kind of trading partner that Americans like to do business with.
Of course, officially the current US maneuver has ostensibly to do with drug trafficking. Again, this is a silly pretext, because if Venezuela plays any role at all in this field, it can only be a very modest one. Moreover, with Colombia being the world’s leading cocaine producer, boasting two thirds of all the world’s coca acreage (followed by Peru with one quarter and Bolivia with almost ten percent), Venezuela just cannot be considered a real player in this field.
因此，鉴于目前世界石油产量高于需求，唐纳德·特朗普如今试图将其意志强加于委内瑞拉的立场，其主要目的似乎并非石油。唯一的问题或许在于，许多美国炼油厂的建造初衷就是为了加工重质、几乎像焦油一样的委内瑞拉原油，而将这些炼油厂改造成其他产地的石油成本高昂且繁琐。在过去的几十年里，委内瑞拉并非美国人乐于与之做生意的那种贸易伙伴。
当然，美国目前的行动表面上与贩毒有关。这又是一个愚蠢的借口，因为即使委内瑞拉在这个领域发挥了任何作用，也只能是微不足道的。此外，哥伦比亚是世界最大的可卡因生产国，拥有全球三分之二的古柯种植面积（其次是秘鲁，占四分之一，玻利维亚占近十分之一），委内瑞拉根本无法被视为这个领域的真正参与者。
Given the nature of the drug trafficking business, the risks connected with it, but above all the enormous financial and political interests involved, it is risky to make any far reaching statements. However, over the years there have been so many indications and pieces of secondary evidence that it is safe to say that American spy agencies, especially the CIA, play a key role in the entire industry. It is the CIA that oversees and coordinates the production of the raw materials, organizes the drug production process, and the transport of the merchandise to the main markets in North America, Europe and elsewhere. The DEA also plays a key role fighting against drug trafficking, which helps to eliminate unwanted competitors and in the end helps to keep prices sufficiently high for the interested parties to make great profits, all tax-free! Given this interaction, it is safe to say that it is eventually the US deep state that is in charge of the world’s drug trafficking.
鉴于贩毒行业的性质、相关风险，尤其是其中蕴含的巨大经济和政治利益，发表任何影响深远的言论都存在风险。然而，多年来，已有诸多迹象和间接证据表明，美国间谍机构，尤其是中央情报局，在整个毒品行业中扮演着关键角色。中央情报局负责监督和协调原材料的生产，组织毒品生产流程，以及将毒品运往北美、欧洲和其他主要市场。美国缉毒局也在“打击”毒品贩运中发挥着关键作用，这有助于消除不受欢迎的竞争对手，并最终帮助维持足够高的价格，使相关方能够获得巨额利润，而且所有这些都无需纳税！鉴于这种互动，可以肯定地说，最终掌控全球毒品贩运的是美国深层政府。
Against this background, the charges against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro are as outrageous as they are imaginary and unfounded. As a matter of fact, the US is trying to pull the same trick against Maduro as they did in 1989 against Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, taken to Miami to be tried for drug trafficking and now rotting in a US jail.
However, it will probably not be as easy to arrest Maduro, because an invasion of Venezuela by US troops seems out of the question for the simple reason that Venezuela is not Panama, which for the US had the advantage of housing some important US military bases (in the Panama Canal Zone). The nearest base to Venezuela that the US could use are the islands of Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire, all three part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is a US vassal state and loyal member of NATO, for all sorts of practical and political reasons, it does not seem so easy to establish a US operational base there at short notice.
在此背景下，针对委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的指控既荒谬可笑，又毫无根据。事实上，美国正试图对马杜罗使用1989年对巴拿马强人曼努埃尔·诺列加的伎俩。诺列加因贩毒被送往迈阿密受审，如今却在美国监狱里奄奄一息。
然而，逮捕马杜罗可能并非易事，因为美军入侵委内瑞拉似乎是不可能的，原因很简单，委内瑞拉不是巴拿马，而美国在巴拿马拥有一些重要的军事基地（位于巴拿马运河区）。距离委内瑞拉最近的美国可用基地是库拉索岛、阿鲁巴岛和博内尔岛，这三个岛屿都属于荷兰王国。尽管荷兰是美国的附庸国，也是北约的忠实成员国，但由于各种实际和政治原因，在短时间内在那里建立美国军事基地似乎并非易事。
Other obstacles for a smooth replay of the Panamanian operation are Venezuela’s geography and the size, morale and combat readiness of its armed forces. Whereas Panama (created in 1903 as a result of a US intervention against Colombia of which it was originally a province) is somewhat of a failed state, Venezuela is the heir of the venerable Bolivarian tradition and Venezuelans are a proud and fiercely independent people.
Although Trump’s advisers and perhaps he himself may believe that Maduro is a contemporary version of Noriega, or a Latin American version of Saddam Hussein and that the Venezuelan army will collapse as soon as the Americans show up, they are mistaken. Any US armed intervention in Venezuela is likely to encounter stiff resistance.
顺利复制巴拿马行动的其他障碍包括委内瑞拉的地理位置以及其武装部队的规模、士气和战备状态。巴拿马（1903年因美国干预哥伦比亚而成立，最初是哥伦比亚的一个省）在某种程度上是一个失败国家，而委内瑞拉继承了古老的玻利瓦尔传统，委内瑞拉人民是一支自豪而极度独立的民族。
尽管特朗普的顾问，或许甚至他本人，都可能认为马杜罗是当代版的诺列加，或是拉丁美洲版的萨达姆·侯赛因，认为一旦美国人出现，委内瑞拉军队就会崩溃，但他们错了。美国对委内瑞拉的任何武装干预都可能遭遇强烈抵抗。
Anyone who has ever been to Venezuela and spent some time among Venezuelans will understand they are no pushovers. Take Caracas night life, for instance. Once, when having a drink with a professor from Central University, I was surprised to find out he would always carry an automatic pistol in his belt, something no American or European colleague would ever think of. In Caracas, however, most men in bars would be similarly equipped. And don’t think such weapons are never used. They can be drawn whenever the owner feels he is threatened or insulted.
A high-ranking European diplomat once told me that Venezuelans were tough negotiators, remarking that knives were, so to speak, always on the table, instead of underneath it, as in many other Latin American nations.
任何去过委内瑞拉并与委内瑞拉人相处过一段时间的人都知道，他们绝非等闲之辈。就拿加拉加斯的夜生活来说吧。有一次，我和中央大学的一位教授喝酒，惊讶地发现他腰带上总是别着一把自动手枪，这是任何美国或欧洲同事都想不到的。然而，在加拉加斯，酒吧里的大多数男人也都配备类似的武器。而且，别以为这种武器从来不用。只要主人感到受到威胁或侮辱，随时可能拔出。
一位欧洲高级外交官曾告诉我，委内瑞拉人谈判时很强硬，他指出，刀子总是放在桌子上，而不是像其他许多拉美国家那样放在桌子底下。
In other words, the Venezuelan mentality is proud, tough and combative, and Venezuelans will stand their ground, as they have always done since becoming America’s third independent nation, after the US and Haiti. What’s more, unlike the US, the Venezuelans gained their independence without European support.
Of course, it remains entirely unpredictable how the present standoff will end, and it is always possible that Maduro backs out and tries to placate the tough guy in the White House.
Nevertheless, President Trump better watch out.
换句话说，委内瑞拉人的心态是自豪、坚韧和好斗的，委内瑞拉人会坚守阵地，就像他们自成为继美国和海地之后第三个独立国家以来一直做的那样。更重要的是，与美国不同，委内瑞拉是在没有欧洲支持的情况下获得独立的。
当然，目前的僵局最终将如何收场仍然完全难以预测，马杜罗随时有可能退缩，试图安抚白宫里的硬汉。
然而，特朗普总统最好还是小心点。
评论翻译
Gunboat Diplomacy
炮舰外交——对委内瑞拉开战，美帝国可要考虑清楚了
Some things never seem to change. Now that the US monopoly on the adjective “American” has seemingly become universally acknowledged (even in many parts of Latin America), it hardly comes as a surprise that US policy in Latin America has not changed for almost two centuries.
As we speak, a small US Navy flotilla is patrolling off the Venezuelan coast. So far it seems a classic case of gunboat diplomacy, a peculiar practice pioneered by the English (when Brittannia still ruled the waves), which was adopted by the US, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands and applied with varying success.
有些事情似乎永远不会改变。如今，美国（the US）对“美国的（American）”这一形容词的垄断似乎已得到普遍认可（即使在拉丁美洲的许多地方也是如此），因此，美国在拉丁美洲的政策近两个世纪以来未变也就不足为奇了。
就在此刻，一支美国海军小型舰队正在委内瑞拉海岸附近巡逻。迄今为止，这似乎是炮舰外交的经典案例，这种奇特的做法由英国人首创（当时不列颠尼亚仍统治着海洋），后来被美国、德国、法国、意大利和荷兰采用，并取得了不同程度的成功。
Today, we are fortunate enough to be witnessing in real time another case of gunboat diplomacy against Venezuela. Unlike Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), where gunboat diplomacy morphed into a full-scale invasion, Venezuela is a tough nut to crack. Although some Americans might be able to identify Venezuela on the map, there are even fewer who have any notion of Venezuelan history and politics. Sure enough, relying on the mainstream media will not enlighten them. There might only be a handful of Americans with any knowledge of Venezuelan culture and what Venezuelans can be like, both individually and as a collective. It is doubtful whether any of the latter are to be found among Donald Trump’s advisers.
It should be clear that Venezuelans may be “Latin Americans,” but totally different from Nicaraguans, Salvadoreans or Guatemalans. Nor are they like Mexicans or Cubans, although their Spanish may sound the same as Cuban Spanish.
今天，我们有幸亲眼目睹又一例针对委内瑞拉的炮舰外交。与1983年的格林纳达和1989年的巴拿马不同，委内瑞拉是一块难啃的骨头，因为在这两个国家，炮舰外交最终演变成了一场全面入侵。虽然有些美国人或许能在地图上认出委内瑞拉，但真正了解委内瑞拉历史和政治的人更是凤毛麟角。显然，依靠主流媒体并不能让他们有所了解。或许只有极少数美国人了解委内瑞拉的文化，以及委内瑞拉人——无论是个人还是集体——的面貌。唐纳德·特朗普的顾问中能否找到后者，令人怀疑。
委内瑞拉人或许是“拉丁美洲人”，但他们与尼加拉瓜人、萨尔瓦多人或危地马拉人截然不同。他们也不像墨西哥人或古巴人，尽管他们的西班牙语听起来可能和古巴西班牙语一样。
The last time that gunboat diplomacy yielded tangible results in Venezuela was back in 1908, when the Dutch navy intervened to bring to power Juan Vicente Gómez, then Vice-President, as President Cipriano Castro was leaving for Paris to get medical treatment for syphilis. Acting either as president himself or as a “Grey Eminence” ruling the country through puppets, Gómez remained in power until 1935. It was Gómez who returned the favor from the Dutch by granting extensive benefits to the Shell Oil Company, which at that time was still a Dutch-English firm. This gave Venezuela a place among the sext group of the world’s major oil producers. In the early 1930s, Venezuela was the third biggest producer, after the US and the USSR. Thirty years later, in the 1960s, Venezuela was number two, soon to be surpassed by the upcoming Middle Eastern oil producing nations. Today, Venezuela ranks 21st.
炮舰外交上一次在委内瑞拉取得实质性成果是在1908年。当时总统西普里亚诺·卡斯特罗正前往巴黎治疗梅毒（注：1899-1908年在任独裁者），荷兰海军出手相助，使时任副总统的胡安·维森特·戈麦斯上台。戈麦斯要么亲自担任总统，要么通过傀儡统治国家，一直掌权到1935年。戈麦斯回报荷兰，为壳牌石油公司提供了巨额利益，而壳牌石油公司当时仍是一家荷英合资公司。这让委内瑞拉跻身世界主要产油国之列。20世纪30年代初，委内瑞拉是继美国和苏联之后的第三大产油国。30年后，在20世纪60年代，委内瑞拉位居第二，但很快被新兴的中东产油国超越。如今，委内瑞拉排名第21位。
Thus, given the fact that world oil production is currently higher than demand, the insistence with which Donald Trump is now trying to impose his will on Venezuela does not primarily appear to be about oil. The only thing is perhaps that many US refineries were built to process the heavy, almost tar-like Venezuelan crude, and that it is expensive and cumbersome to adapt such refineries to oil from other sources. During the past decades, Venezuela has not exactly been the kind of trading partner that Americans like to do business with.
Of course, officially the current US maneuver has ostensibly to do with drug trafficking. Again, this is a silly pretext, because if Venezuela plays any role at all in this field, it can only be a very modest one. Moreover, with Colombia being the world’s leading cocaine producer, boasting two thirds of all the world’s coca acreage (followed by Peru with one quarter and Bolivia with almost ten percent), Venezuela just cannot be considered a real player in this field.
因此，鉴于目前世界石油产量高于需求，唐纳德·特朗普如今试图将其意志强加于委内瑞拉的立场，其主要目的似乎并非石油。唯一的问题或许在于，许多美国炼油厂的建造初衷就是为了加工重质、几乎像焦油一样的委内瑞拉原油，而将这些炼油厂改造成其他产地的石油成本高昂且繁琐。在过去的几十年里，委内瑞拉并非美国人乐于与之做生意的那种贸易伙伴。
当然，美国目前的行动表面上与贩毒有关。这又是一个愚蠢的借口，因为即使委内瑞拉在这个领域发挥了任何作用，也只能是微不足道的。此外，哥伦比亚是世界最大的可卡因生产国，拥有全球三分之二的古柯种植面积（其次是秘鲁，占四分之一，玻利维亚占近十分之一），委内瑞拉根本无法被视为这个领域的真正参与者。
Given the nature of the drug trafficking business, the risks connected with it, but above all the enormous financial and political interests involved, it is risky to make any far reaching statements. However, over the years there have been so many indications and pieces of secondary evidence that it is safe to say that American spy agencies, especially the CIA, play a key role in the entire industry. It is the CIA that oversees and coordinates the production of the raw materials, organizes the drug production process, and the transport of the merchandise to the main markets in North America, Europe and elsewhere. The DEA also plays a key role fighting against drug trafficking, which helps to eliminate unwanted competitors and in the end helps to keep prices sufficiently high for the interested parties to make great profits, all tax-free! Given this interaction, it is safe to say that it is eventually the US deep state that is in charge of the world’s drug trafficking.
鉴于贩毒行业的性质、相关风险，尤其是其中蕴含的巨大经济和政治利益，发表任何影响深远的言论都存在风险。然而，多年来，已有诸多迹象和间接证据表明，美国间谍机构，尤其是中央情报局，在整个毒品行业中扮演着关键角色。中央情报局负责监督和协调原材料的生产，组织毒品生产流程，以及将毒品运往北美、欧洲和其他主要市场。美国缉毒局也在“打击”毒品贩运中发挥着关键作用，这有助于消除不受欢迎的竞争对手，并最终帮助维持足够高的价格，使相关方能够获得巨额利润，而且所有这些都无需纳税！鉴于这种互动，可以肯定地说，最终掌控全球毒品贩运的是美国深层政府。
Against this background, the charges against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro are as outrageous as they are imaginary and unfounded. As a matter of fact, the US is trying to pull the same trick against Maduro as they did in 1989 against Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, taken to Miami to be tried for drug trafficking and now rotting in a US jail.
However, it will probably not be as easy to arrest Maduro, because an invasion of Venezuela by US troops seems out of the question for the simple reason that Venezuela is not Panama, which for the US had the advantage of housing some important US military bases (in the Panama Canal Zone). The nearest base to Venezuela that the US could use are the islands of Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire, all three part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is a US vassal state and loyal member of NATO, for all sorts of practical and political reasons, it does not seem so easy to establish a US operational base there at short notice.
在此背景下，针对委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的指控既荒谬可笑，又毫无根据。事实上，美国正试图对马杜罗使用1989年对巴拿马强人曼努埃尔·诺列加的伎俩。诺列加因贩毒被送往迈阿密受审，如今却在美国监狱里奄奄一息。
然而，逮捕马杜罗可能并非易事，因为美军入侵委内瑞拉似乎是不可能的，原因很简单，委内瑞拉不是巴拿马，而美国在巴拿马拥有一些重要的军事基地（位于巴拿马运河区）。距离委内瑞拉最近的美国可用基地是库拉索岛、阿鲁巴岛和博内尔岛，这三个岛屿都属于荷兰王国。尽管荷兰是美国的附庸国，也是北约的忠实成员国，但由于各种实际和政治原因，在短时间内在那里建立美国军事基地似乎并非易事。
Other obstacles for a smooth replay of the Panamanian operation are Venezuela’s geography and the size, morale and combat readiness of its armed forces. Whereas Panama (created in 1903 as a result of a US intervention against Colombia of which it was originally a province) is somewhat of a failed state, Venezuela is the heir of the venerable Bolivarian tradition and Venezuelans are a proud and fiercely independent people.
Although Trump’s advisers and perhaps he himself may believe that Maduro is a contemporary version of Noriega, or a Latin American version of Saddam Hussein and that the Venezuelan army will collapse as soon as the Americans show up, they are mistaken. Any US armed intervention in Venezuela is likely to encounter stiff resistance.
顺利复制巴拿马行动的其他障碍包括委内瑞拉的地理位置以及其武装部队的规模、士气和战备状态。巴拿马（1903年因美国干预哥伦比亚而成立，最初是哥伦比亚的一个省）在某种程度上是一个失败国家，而委内瑞拉继承了古老的玻利瓦尔传统，委内瑞拉人民是一支自豪而极度独立的民族。
尽管特朗普的顾问，或许甚至他本人，都可能认为马杜罗是当代版的诺列加，或是拉丁美洲版的萨达姆·侯赛因，认为一旦美国人出现，委内瑞拉军队就会崩溃，但他们错了。美国对委内瑞拉的任何武装干预都可能遭遇强烈抵抗。
Anyone who has ever been to Venezuela and spent some time among Venezuelans will understand they are no pushovers. Take Caracas night life, for instance. Once, when having a drink with a professor from Central University, I was surprised to find out he would always carry an automatic pistol in his belt, something no American or European colleague would ever think of. In Caracas, however, most men in bars would be similarly equipped. And don’t think such weapons are never used. They can be drawn whenever the owner feels he is threatened or insulted.
A high-ranking European diplomat once told me that Venezuelans were tough negotiators, remarking that knives were, so to speak, always on the table, instead of underneath it, as in many other Latin American nations.
任何去过委内瑞拉并与委内瑞拉人相处过一段时间的人都知道，他们绝非等闲之辈。就拿加拉加斯的夜生活来说吧。有一次，我和中央大学的一位教授喝酒，惊讶地发现他腰带上总是别着一把自动手枪，这是任何美国或欧洲同事都想不到的。然而，在加拉加斯，酒吧里的大多数男人也都配备类似的武器。而且，别以为这种武器从来不用。只要主人感到受到威胁或侮辱，随时可能拔出。
一位欧洲高级外交官曾告诉我，委内瑞拉人谈判时很强硬，他指出，刀子总是放在桌子上，而不是像其他许多拉美国家那样放在桌子底下。
In other words, the Venezuelan mentality is proud, tough and combative, and Venezuelans will stand their ground, as they have always done since becoming America’s third independent nation, after the US and Haiti. What’s more, unlike the US, the Venezuelans gained their independence without European support.
Of course, it remains entirely unpredictable how the present standoff will end, and it is always possible that Maduro backs out and tries to placate the tough guy in the White House.
Nevertheless, President Trump better watch out.
换句话说，委内瑞拉人的心态是自豪、坚韧和好斗的，委内瑞拉人会坚守阵地，就像他们自成为继美国和海地之后第三个独立国家以来一直做的那样。更重要的是，与美国不同，委内瑞拉是在没有欧洲支持的情况下获得独立的。
当然，目前的僵局最终将如何收场仍然完全难以预测，马杜罗随时有可能退缩，试图安抚白宫里的硬汉。
然而，特朗普总统最好还是小心点。
Gunboat Diplomacy
炮舰外交——对委内瑞拉开战，美帝国可要考虑清楚了
Some things never seem to change. Now that the US monopoly on the adjective “American” has seemingly become universally acknowledged (even in many parts of Latin America), it hardly comes as a surprise that US policy in Latin America has not changed for almost two centuries.
As we speak, a small US Navy flotilla is patrolling off the Venezuelan coast. So far it seems a classic case of gunboat diplomacy, a peculiar practice pioneered by the English (when Brittannia still ruled the waves), which was adopted by the US, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands and applied with varying success.
有些事情似乎永远不会改变。如今，美国（the US）对“美国的（American）”这一形容词的垄断似乎已得到普遍认可（即使在拉丁美洲的许多地方也是如此），因此，美国在拉丁美洲的政策近两个世纪以来未变也就不足为奇了。
就在此刻，一支美国海军小型舰队正在委内瑞拉海岸附近巡逻。迄今为止，这似乎是炮舰外交的经典案例，这种奇特的做法由英国人首创（当时不列颠尼亚仍统治着海洋），后来被美国、德国、法国、意大利和荷兰采用，并取得了不同程度的成功。
Today, we are fortunate enough to be witnessing in real time another case of gunboat diplomacy against Venezuela. Unlike Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), where gunboat diplomacy morphed into a full-scale invasion, Venezuela is a tough nut to crack. Although some Americans might be able to identify Venezuela on the map, there are even fewer who have any notion of Venezuelan history and politics. Sure enough, relying on the mainstream media will not enlighten them. There might only be a handful of Americans with any knowledge of Venezuelan culture and what Venezuelans can be like, both individually and as a collective. It is doubtful whether any of the latter are to be found among Donald Trump’s advisers.
It should be clear that Venezuelans may be “Latin Americans,” but totally different from Nicaraguans, Salvadoreans or Guatemalans. Nor are they like Mexicans or Cubans, although their Spanish may sound the same as Cuban Spanish.
今天，我们有幸亲眼目睹又一例针对委内瑞拉的炮舰外交。与1983年的格林纳达和1989年的巴拿马不同，委内瑞拉是一块难啃的骨头，因为在这两个国家，炮舰外交最终演变成了一场全面入侵。虽然有些美国人或许能在地图上认出委内瑞拉，但真正了解委内瑞拉历史和政治的人更是凤毛麟角。显然，依靠主流媒体并不能让他们有所了解。或许只有极少数美国人了解委内瑞拉的文化，以及委内瑞拉人——无论是个人还是集体——的面貌。唐纳德·特朗普的顾问中能否找到后者，令人怀疑。
委内瑞拉人或许是“拉丁美洲人”，但他们与尼加拉瓜人、萨尔瓦多人或危地马拉人截然不同。他们也不像墨西哥人或古巴人，尽管他们的西班牙语听起来可能和古巴西班牙语一样。
The last time that gunboat diplomacy yielded tangible results in Venezuela was back in 1908, when the Dutch navy intervened to bring to power Juan Vicente Gómez, then Vice-President, as President Cipriano Castro was leaving for Paris to get medical treatment for syphilis. Acting either as president himself or as a “Grey Eminence” ruling the country through puppets, Gómez remained in power until 1935. It was Gómez who returned the favor from the Dutch by granting extensive benefits to the Shell Oil Company, which at that time was still a Dutch-English firm. This gave Venezuela a place among the sext group of the world’s major oil producers. In the early 1930s, Venezuela was the third biggest producer, after the US and the USSR. Thirty years later, in the 1960s, Venezuela was number two, soon to be surpassed by the upcoming Middle Eastern oil producing nations. Today, Venezuela ranks 21st.
炮舰外交上一次在委内瑞拉取得实质性成果是在1908年。当时总统西普里亚诺·卡斯特罗正前往巴黎治疗梅毒（注：1899-1908年在任独裁者），荷兰海军出手相助，使时任副总统的胡安·维森特·戈麦斯上台。戈麦斯要么亲自担任总统，要么通过傀儡统治国家，一直掌权到1935年。戈麦斯回报荷兰，为壳牌石油公司提供了巨额利益，而壳牌石油公司当时仍是一家荷英合资公司。这让委内瑞拉跻身世界主要产油国之列。20世纪30年代初，委内瑞拉是继美国和苏联之后的第三大产油国。30年后，在20世纪60年代，委内瑞拉位居第二，但很快被新兴的中东产油国超越。如今，委内瑞拉排名第21位。
Thus, given the fact that world oil production is currently higher than demand, the insistence with which Donald Trump is now trying to impose his will on Venezuela does not primarily appear to be about oil. The only thing is perhaps that many US refineries were built to process the heavy, almost tar-like Venezuelan crude, and that it is expensive and cumbersome to adapt such refineries to oil from other sources. During the past decades, Venezuela has not exactly been the kind of trading partner that Americans like to do business with.
Of course, officially the current US maneuver has ostensibly to do with drug trafficking. Again, this is a silly pretext, because if Venezuela plays any role at all in this field, it can only be a very modest one. Moreover, with Colombia being the world’s leading cocaine producer, boasting two thirds of all the world’s coca acreage (followed by Peru with one quarter and Bolivia with almost ten percent), Venezuela just cannot be considered a real player in this field.
因此，鉴于目前世界石油产量高于需求，唐纳德·特朗普如今试图将其意志强加于委内瑞拉的立场，其主要目的似乎并非石油。唯一的问题或许在于，许多美国炼油厂的建造初衷就是为了加工重质、几乎像焦油一样的委内瑞拉原油，而将这些炼油厂改造成其他产地的石油成本高昂且繁琐。在过去的几十年里，委内瑞拉并非美国人乐于与之做生意的那种贸易伙伴。
当然，美国目前的行动表面上与贩毒有关。这又是一个愚蠢的借口，因为即使委内瑞拉在这个领域发挥了任何作用，也只能是微不足道的。此外，哥伦比亚是世界最大的可卡因生产国，拥有全球三分之二的古柯种植面积（其次是秘鲁，占四分之一，玻利维亚占近十分之一），委内瑞拉根本无法被视为这个领域的真正参与者。
Given the nature of the drug trafficking business, the risks connected with it, but above all the enormous financial and political interests involved, it is risky to make any far reaching statements. However, over the years there have been so many indications and pieces of secondary evidence that it is safe to say that American spy agencies, especially the CIA, play a key role in the entire industry. It is the CIA that oversees and coordinates the production of the raw materials, organizes the drug production process, and the transport of the merchandise to the main markets in North America, Europe and elsewhere. The DEA also plays a key role fighting against drug trafficking, which helps to eliminate unwanted competitors and in the end helps to keep prices sufficiently high for the interested parties to make great profits, all tax-free! Given this interaction, it is safe to say that it is eventually the US deep state that is in charge of the world’s drug trafficking.
鉴于贩毒行业的性质、相关风险，尤其是其中蕴含的巨大经济和政治利益，发表任何影响深远的言论都存在风险。然而，多年来，已有诸多迹象和间接证据表明，美国间谍机构，尤其是中央情报局，在整个毒品行业中扮演着关键角色。中央情报局负责监督和协调原材料的生产，组织毒品生产流程，以及将毒品运往北美、欧洲和其他主要市场。美国缉毒局也在“打击”毒品贩运中发挥着关键作用，这有助于消除不受欢迎的竞争对手，并最终帮助维持足够高的价格，使相关方能够获得巨额利润，而且所有这些都无需纳税！鉴于这种互动，可以肯定地说，最终掌控全球毒品贩运的是美国深层政府。
Against this background, the charges against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro are as outrageous as they are imaginary and unfounded. As a matter of fact, the US is trying to pull the same trick against Maduro as they did in 1989 against Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, taken to Miami to be tried for drug trafficking and now rotting in a US jail.
However, it will probably not be as easy to arrest Maduro, because an invasion of Venezuela by US troops seems out of the question for the simple reason that Venezuela is not Panama, which for the US had the advantage of housing some important US military bases (in the Panama Canal Zone). The nearest base to Venezuela that the US could use are the islands of Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire, all three part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is a US vassal state and loyal member of NATO, for all sorts of practical and political reasons, it does not seem so easy to establish a US operational base there at short notice.
在此背景下，针对委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的指控既荒谬可笑，又毫无根据。事实上，美国正试图对马杜罗使用1989年对巴拿马强人曼努埃尔·诺列加的伎俩。诺列加因贩毒被送往迈阿密受审，如今却在美国监狱里奄奄一息。
然而，逮捕马杜罗可能并非易事，因为美军入侵委内瑞拉似乎是不可能的，原因很简单，委内瑞拉不是巴拿马，而美国在巴拿马拥有一些重要的军事基地（位于巴拿马运河区）。距离委内瑞拉最近的美国可用基地是库拉索岛、阿鲁巴岛和博内尔岛，这三个岛屿都属于荷兰王国。尽管荷兰是美国的附庸国，也是北约的忠实成员国，但由于各种实际和政治原因，在短时间内在那里建立美国军事基地似乎并非易事。
Other obstacles for a smooth replay of the Panamanian operation are Venezuela’s geography and the size, morale and combat readiness of its armed forces. Whereas Panama (created in 1903 as a result of a US intervention against Colombia of which it was originally a province) is somewhat of a failed state, Venezuela is the heir of the venerable Bolivarian tradition and Venezuelans are a proud and fiercely independent people.
Although Trump’s advisers and perhaps he himself may believe that Maduro is a contemporary version of Noriega, or a Latin American version of Saddam Hussein and that the Venezuelan army will collapse as soon as the Americans show up, they are mistaken. Any US armed intervention in Venezuela is likely to encounter stiff resistance.
顺利复制巴拿马行动的其他障碍包括委内瑞拉的地理位置以及其武装部队的规模、士气和战备状态。巴拿马（1903年因美国干预哥伦比亚而成立，最初是哥伦比亚的一个省）在某种程度上是一个失败国家，而委内瑞拉继承了古老的玻利瓦尔传统，委内瑞拉人民是一支自豪而极度独立的民族。
尽管特朗普的顾问，或许甚至他本人，都可能认为马杜罗是当代版的诺列加，或是拉丁美洲版的萨达姆·侯赛因，认为一旦美国人出现，委内瑞拉军队就会崩溃，但他们错了。美国对委内瑞拉的任何武装干预都可能遭遇强烈抵抗。
Anyone who has ever been to Venezuela and spent some time among Venezuelans will understand they are no pushovers. Take Caracas night life, for instance. Once, when having a drink with a professor from Central University, I was surprised to find out he would always carry an automatic pistol in his belt, something no American or European colleague would ever think of. In Caracas, however, most men in bars would be similarly equipped. And don’t think such weapons are never used. They can be drawn whenever the owner feels he is threatened or insulted.
A high-ranking European diplomat once told me that Venezuelans were tough negotiators, remarking that knives were, so to speak, always on the table, instead of underneath it, as in many other Latin American nations.
任何去过委内瑞拉并与委内瑞拉人相处过一段时间的人都知道，他们绝非等闲之辈。就拿加拉加斯的夜生活来说吧。有一次，我和中央大学的一位教授喝酒，惊讶地发现他腰带上总是别着一把自动手枪，这是任何美国或欧洲同事都想不到的。然而，在加拉加斯，酒吧里的大多数男人也都配备类似的武器。而且，别以为这种武器从来不用。只要主人感到受到威胁或侮辱，随时可能拔出。
一位欧洲高级外交官曾告诉我，委内瑞拉人谈判时很强硬，他指出，刀子总是放在桌子上，而不是像其他许多拉美国家那样放在桌子底下。
In other words, the Venezuelan mentality is proud, tough and combative, and Venezuelans will stand their ground, as they have always done since becoming America’s third independent nation, after the US and Haiti. What’s more, unlike the US, the Venezuelans gained their independence without European support.
Of course, it remains entirely unpredictable how the present standoff will end, and it is always possible that Maduro backs out and tries to placate the tough guy in the White House.
Nevertheless, President Trump better watch out.
换句话说，委内瑞拉人的心态是自豪、坚韧和好斗的，委内瑞拉人会坚守阵地，就像他们自成为继美国和海地之后第三个独立国家以来一直做的那样。更重要的是，与美国不同，委内瑞拉是在没有欧洲支持的情况下获得独立的。
当然，目前的僵局最终将如何收场仍然完全难以预测，马杜罗随时有可能退缩，试图安抚白宫里的硬汉。
然而，特朗普总统最好还是小心点。
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