中国能打多久“稀土牌”？
正文翻译
Arnaud Bertrand
@RnaudBertrand
This is probably the most important geopolitical question in the world right now: for how long can China play the “rare earths card”?
It’s now well established this gives China considerable leverage. For one thing the frantic state of panic of US Treasury Secretary Bessent over the past couple of days is a pretty big tell: he publicly insulted senior Chinese officials over the move , lobbied for “emergency powers”, said this was a Chinese attack on the “world” , and that it would meet a “fulsome group response” from the U.S. and its allies .
If that’s not Washington being rattled, I don’t know what is.
What seems to be the consensus view, because I’ve seen it mentioned over and over again, is that one of the main bottlenecks to break this rare earths stranglehold is environmental regulations.
As the narrative goes, the West essentially regulated itself out of the rare earths business by imposing environmental standards that China simply ignored.
And so, by implication, all it would take is the right regulatory changes and government subsidies and the problem is solvable within a few years or so, it’s mainly a question of political will to accept environmental trade-offs.
There is some degree of truth in that - rare earths processing can be very polluting - but this is otherwise very much "magic bullet thinking".
The difficulty of breaking the rare earths stranglehold is far - FAR - more immense than mere regulatory adjustments.
China’s dominance has much more to do with the scale of their manufacturing and the vertical integration of their supply chains, and as such breaking the stranglehold at this stage requires upgrading the West’s industrialization level comprehensively.
We’re talking something requiring a complete makeover of the West’s socioeconomic structure, involving trillions in capital in investment - with profitability perhaps 2 to 3 decades away - as well as a profound upending of its education system. In short, a generational-level undertaking on an almost unprecedented scale.
You might be tempted to compare the efforts needed to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Program - that’s mighty enough, right? - but that would actually be vastly understating it. The amount of efforts needed is more comparable to something like the Industrial Revolution itself than to any individual megaproject.
You don’t believe me, right? Surely I must be exaggerating! No way it can be that dramatic!
That’s why I wrote my latest article. To show you in details the absolutely titanic efforts that would be needed to break the stranglehold for just ONE of the elements on China’s list of export controls: gallium.
Bear in mind when you read the article that it’s just ONE chemical element out of 21 under export controls, and that China’s export controls don’t only include chemical elements but also downstream products (lithium-ion batteries, superhard materials, etc.)
After finishing this article, Bessent's panic will feel almost understated.
这可能是当前世界上最重要的地缘政治问题：中国能打多久“稀土牌”？
现在已经很清楚，这给中国带来了相当大的筹码。首先，美国财政部长贝森特过去几天的疯狂恐慌状态就是一个明显的信号：他公开侮辱中国高级官员，针对这一举措游说美国动用“紧急权力”，称这是中国对“世界”的攻击，并表示美国及其盟友将做出“全面的集体回应”。
如果这不是华盛顿的惊慌失措，我不知道什么才是。
似乎有一种共识观点，因为我反复看到它被提及，即打破稀土垄断的主要瓶颈之一是环境法规。
按照这种说法，西方通过实施中国直接忽略的环境标准，基本上将自己排除在稀土业务之外。
因此，言下之意，只要进行正确的法规调整和政府补贴，问题就能在几年内解决，这主要是一个是否愿意接受环境权衡的政治意愿问题。
这其中有一定道理——稀土加工确实可能污染非常严重——但这种想法在很大程度上是“魔法子弹思维”。
打破稀土垄断的难度远远——远远——超出了单纯的法规调整。
中国的主导地位更多与其制造业规模和供应链的垂直整合有关，因此在现阶段打破这种垄断需要全面提升西方的工业化水平。
我们谈论的是一种需要完全改造西方社会经济结构的事情，涉及数万亿的资本投资——盈利可能需要20到30年——以及教育系统的深刻变革。简而言之，这是一个几乎史无前例的代际级任务。
你可能会想将所需努力与曼哈顿计划或阿波罗计划相比——这已经够宏大了，对吧？——但这实际上远远低估了它。所需努力的规模更像是工业革命本身，而不是任何单一的超级项目。
你不相信我，对吧？我肯定在夸张！不可能那么夸张！
这就是为什么我写了最新的文章。详细展示打破仅中国出口管制名单上21种元素之一——镓——的垄断所需的绝对巨大的努力。
请记住，当你阅读这篇文章时，这只是中国出口管制的21种化学元素中的一种，而且中国的出口管制不仅包括化学元素，还包括下游产品（锂离子电池、超硬材料等）。
读完这篇文章后，你会觉得贝森特的恐慌几乎可以说是轻描淡写了。
（文章链接：阅读需要会员）
Arnaud Bertrand
@RnaudBertrand
This is probably the most important geopolitical question in the world right now: for how long can China play the “rare earths card”?
It’s now well established this gives China considerable leverage. For one thing the frantic state of panic of US Treasury Secretary Bessent over the past couple of days is a pretty big tell: he publicly insulted senior Chinese officials over the move , lobbied for “emergency powers”, said this was a Chinese attack on the “world” , and that it would meet a “fulsome group response” from the U.S. and its allies .
If that’s not Washington being rattled, I don’t know what is.
What seems to be the consensus view, because I’ve seen it mentioned over and over again, is that one of the main bottlenecks to break this rare earths stranglehold is environmental regulations.
As the narrative goes, the West essentially regulated itself out of the rare earths business by imposing environmental standards that China simply ignored.
And so, by implication, all it would take is the right regulatory changes and government subsidies and the problem is solvable within a few years or so, it’s mainly a question of political will to accept environmental trade-offs.
There is some degree of truth in that - rare earths processing can be very polluting - but this is otherwise very much "magic bullet thinking".
The difficulty of breaking the rare earths stranglehold is far - FAR - more immense than mere regulatory adjustments.
China’s dominance has much more to do with the scale of their manufacturing and the vertical integration of their supply chains, and as such breaking the stranglehold at this stage requires upgrading the West’s industrialization level comprehensively.
We’re talking something requiring a complete makeover of the West’s socioeconomic structure, involving trillions in capital in investment - with profitability perhaps 2 to 3 decades away - as well as a profound upending of its education system. In short, a generational-level undertaking on an almost unprecedented scale.
You might be tempted to compare the efforts needed to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Program - that’s mighty enough, right? - but that would actually be vastly understating it. The amount of efforts needed is more comparable to something like the Industrial Revolution itself than to any individual megaproject.
You don’t believe me, right? Surely I must be exaggerating! No way it can be that dramatic!
That’s why I wrote my latest article. To show you in details the absolutely titanic efforts that would be needed to break the stranglehold for just ONE of the elements on China’s list of export controls: gallium.
Bear in mind when you read the article that it’s just ONE chemical element out of 21 under export controls, and that China’s export controls don’t only include chemical elements but also downstream products (lithium-ion batteries, superhard materials, etc.)
After finishing this article, Bessent's panic will feel almost understated.
这可能是当前世界上最重要的地缘政治问题：中国能打多久“稀土牌”？
现在已经很清楚，这给中国带来了相当大的筹码。首先，美国财政部长贝森特过去几天的疯狂恐慌状态就是一个明显的信号：他公开侮辱中国高级官员，针对这一举措游说美国动用“紧急权力”，称这是中国对“世界”的攻击，并表示美国及其盟友将做出“全面的集体回应”。
如果这不是华盛顿的惊慌失措，我不知道什么才是。
似乎有一种共识观点，因为我反复看到它被提及，即打破稀土垄断的主要瓶颈之一是环境法规。
按照这种说法，西方通过实施中国直接忽略的环境标准，基本上将自己排除在稀土业务之外。
因此，言下之意，只要进行正确的法规调整和政府补贴，问题就能在几年内解决，这主要是一个是否愿意接受环境权衡的政治意愿问题。
这其中有一定道理——稀土加工确实可能污染非常严重——但这种想法在很大程度上是“魔法子弹思维”。
打破稀土垄断的难度远远——远远——超出了单纯的法规调整。
中国的主导地位更多与其制造业规模和供应链的垂直整合有关，因此在现阶段打破这种垄断需要全面提升西方的工业化水平。
我们谈论的是一种需要完全改造西方社会经济结构的事情，涉及数万亿的资本投资——盈利可能需要20到30年——以及教育系统的深刻变革。简而言之，这是一个几乎史无前例的代际级任务。
你可能会想将所需努力与曼哈顿计划或阿波罗计划相比——这已经够宏大了，对吧？——但这实际上远远低估了它。所需努力的规模更像是工业革命本身，而不是任何单一的超级项目。
你不相信我，对吧？我肯定在夸张！不可能那么夸张！
这就是为什么我写了最新的文章。详细展示打破仅中国出口管制名单上21种元素之一——镓——的垄断所需的绝对巨大的努力。
请记住，当你阅读这篇文章时，这只是中国出口管制的21种化学元素中的一种，而且中国的出口管制不仅包括化学元素，还包括下游产品（锂离子电池、超硬材料等）。
读完这篇文章后，你会觉得贝森特的恐慌几乎可以说是轻描淡写了。
（文章链接：阅读需要会员）
评论翻译
Arnaud Bertrand
@RnaudBertrand
This is probably the most important geopolitical question in the world right now: for how long can China play the “rare earths card”?
It’s now well established this gives China considerable leverage. For one thing the frantic state of panic of US Treasury Secretary Bessent over the past couple of days is a pretty big tell: he publicly insulted senior Chinese officials over the move , lobbied for “emergency powers”, said this was a Chinese attack on the “world” , and that it would meet a “fulsome group response” from the U.S. and its allies .
If that’s not Washington being rattled, I don’t know what is.
What seems to be the consensus view, because I’ve seen it mentioned over and over again, is that one of the main bottlenecks to break this rare earths stranglehold is environmental regulations.
As the narrative goes, the West essentially regulated itself out of the rare earths business by imposing environmental standards that China simply ignored.
And so, by implication, all it would take is the right regulatory changes and government subsidies and the problem is solvable within a few years or so, it’s mainly a question of political will to accept environmental trade-offs.
There is some degree of truth in that - rare earths processing can be very polluting - but this is otherwise very much "magic bullet thinking".
The difficulty of breaking the rare earths stranglehold is far - FAR - more immense than mere regulatory adjustments.
China’s dominance has much more to do with the scale of their manufacturing and the vertical integration of their supply chains, and as such breaking the stranglehold at this stage requires upgrading the West’s industrialization level comprehensively.
We’re talking something requiring a complete makeover of the West’s socioeconomic structure, involving trillions in capital in investment - with profitability perhaps 2 to 3 decades away - as well as a profound upending of its education system. In short, a generational-level undertaking on an almost unprecedented scale.
You might be tempted to compare the efforts needed to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Program - that’s mighty enough, right? - but that would actually be vastly understating it. The amount of efforts needed is more comparable to something like the Industrial Revolution itself than to any individual megaproject.
You don’t believe me, right? Surely I must be exaggerating! No way it can be that dramatic!
That’s why I wrote my latest article. To show you in details the absolutely titanic efforts that would be needed to break the stranglehold for just ONE of the elements on China’s list of export controls: gallium.
Bear in mind when you read the article that it’s just ONE chemical element out of 21 under export controls, and that China’s export controls don’t only include chemical elements but also downstream products (lithium-ion batteries, superhard materials, etc.)
After finishing this article, Bessent's panic will feel almost understated.
这可能是当前世界上最重要的地缘政治问题：中国能打多久“稀土牌”？
现在已经很清楚，这给中国带来了相当大的筹码。首先，美国财政部长贝森特过去几天的疯狂恐慌状态就是一个明显的信号：他公开侮辱中国高级官员，针对这一举措游说美国动用“紧急权力”，称这是中国对“世界”的攻击，并表示美国及其盟友将做出“全面的集体回应”。
如果这不是华盛顿的惊慌失措，我不知道什么才是。
似乎有一种共识观点，因为我反复看到它被提及，即打破稀土垄断的主要瓶颈之一是环境法规。
按照这种说法，西方通过实施中国直接忽略的环境标准，基本上将自己排除在稀土业务之外。
因此，言下之意，只要进行正确的法规调整和政府补贴，问题就能在几年内解决，这主要是一个是否愿意接受环境权衡的政治意愿问题。
这其中有一定道理——稀土加工确实可能污染非常严重——但这种想法在很大程度上是“魔法子弹思维”。
打破稀土垄断的难度远远——远远——超出了单纯的法规调整。
中国的主导地位更多与其制造业规模和供应链的垂直整合有关，因此在现阶段打破这种垄断需要全面提升西方的工业化水平。
我们谈论的是一种需要完全改造西方社会经济结构的事情，涉及数万亿的资本投资——盈利可能需要20到30年——以及教育系统的深刻变革。简而言之，这是一个几乎史无前例的代际级任务。
你可能会想将所需努力与曼哈顿计划或阿波罗计划相比——这已经够宏大了，对吧？——但这实际上远远低估了它。所需努力的规模更像是工业革命本身，而不是任何单一的超级项目。
你不相信我，对吧？我肯定在夸张！不可能那么夸张！
这就是为什么我写了最新的文章。详细展示打破仅中国出口管制名单上21种元素之一——镓——的垄断所需的绝对巨大的努力。
请记住，当你阅读这篇文章时，这只是中国出口管制的21种化学元素中的一种，而且中国的出口管制不仅包括化学元素，还包括下游产品（锂离子电池、超硬材料等）。
读完这篇文章后，你会觉得贝森特的恐慌几乎可以说是轻描淡写了。
（文章链接：阅读需要会员）
Arnaud Bertrand
@RnaudBertrand
This is probably the most important geopolitical question in the world right now: for how long can China play the “rare earths card”?
It’s now well established this gives China considerable leverage. For one thing the frantic state of panic of US Treasury Secretary Bessent over the past couple of days is a pretty big tell: he publicly insulted senior Chinese officials over the move , lobbied for “emergency powers”, said this was a Chinese attack on the “world” , and that it would meet a “fulsome group response” from the U.S. and its allies .
If that’s not Washington being rattled, I don’t know what is.
What seems to be the consensus view, because I’ve seen it mentioned over and over again, is that one of the main bottlenecks to break this rare earths stranglehold is environmental regulations.
As the narrative goes, the West essentially regulated itself out of the rare earths business by imposing environmental standards that China simply ignored.
And so, by implication, all it would take is the right regulatory changes and government subsidies and the problem is solvable within a few years or so, it’s mainly a question of political will to accept environmental trade-offs.
There is some degree of truth in that - rare earths processing can be very polluting - but this is otherwise very much "magic bullet thinking".
The difficulty of breaking the rare earths stranglehold is far - FAR - more immense than mere regulatory adjustments.
China’s dominance has much more to do with the scale of their manufacturing and the vertical integration of their supply chains, and as such breaking the stranglehold at this stage requires upgrading the West’s industrialization level comprehensively.
We’re talking something requiring a complete makeover of the West’s socioeconomic structure, involving trillions in capital in investment - with profitability perhaps 2 to 3 decades away - as well as a profound upending of its education system. In short, a generational-level undertaking on an almost unprecedented scale.
You might be tempted to compare the efforts needed to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Program - that’s mighty enough, right? - but that would actually be vastly understating it. The amount of efforts needed is more comparable to something like the Industrial Revolution itself than to any individual megaproject.
You don’t believe me, right? Surely I must be exaggerating! No way it can be that dramatic!
That’s why I wrote my latest article. To show you in details the absolutely titanic efforts that would be needed to break the stranglehold for just ONE of the elements on China’s list of export controls: gallium.
Bear in mind when you read the article that it’s just ONE chemical element out of 21 under export controls, and that China’s export controls don’t only include chemical elements but also downstream products (lithium-ion batteries, superhard materials, etc.)
After finishing this article, Bessent's panic will feel almost understated.
这可能是当前世界上最重要的地缘政治问题：中国能打多久“稀土牌”？
现在已经很清楚，这给中国带来了相当大的筹码。首先，美国财政部长贝森特过去几天的疯狂恐慌状态就是一个明显的信号：他公开侮辱中国高级官员，针对这一举措游说美国动用“紧急权力”，称这是中国对“世界”的攻击，并表示美国及其盟友将做出“全面的集体回应”。
如果这不是华盛顿的惊慌失措，我不知道什么才是。
似乎有一种共识观点，因为我反复看到它被提及，即打破稀土垄断的主要瓶颈之一是环境法规。
按照这种说法，西方通过实施中国直接忽略的环境标准，基本上将自己排除在稀土业务之外。
因此，言下之意，只要进行正确的法规调整和政府补贴，问题就能在几年内解决，这主要是一个是否愿意接受环境权衡的政治意愿问题。
这其中有一定道理——稀土加工确实可能污染非常严重——但这种想法在很大程度上是“魔法子弹思维”。
打破稀土垄断的难度远远——远远——超出了单纯的法规调整。
中国的主导地位更多与其制造业规模和供应链的垂直整合有关，因此在现阶段打破这种垄断需要全面提升西方的工业化水平。
我们谈论的是一种需要完全改造西方社会经济结构的事情，涉及数万亿的资本投资——盈利可能需要20到30年——以及教育系统的深刻变革。简而言之，这是一个几乎史无前例的代际级任务。
你可能会想将所需努力与曼哈顿计划或阿波罗计划相比——这已经够宏大了，对吧？——但这实际上远远低估了它。所需努力的规模更像是工业革命本身，而不是任何单一的超级项目。
你不相信我，对吧？我肯定在夸张！不可能那么夸张！
这就是为什么我写了最新的文章。详细展示打破仅中国出口管制名单上21种元素之一——镓——的垄断所需的绝对巨大的努力。
请记住，当你阅读这篇文章时，这只是中国出口管制的21种化学元素中的一种，而且中国的出口管制不仅包括化学元素，还包括下游产品（锂离子电池、超硬材料等）。
读完这篇文章后，你会觉得贝森特的恐慌几乎可以说是轻描淡写了。
（文章链接：阅读需要会员）
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