国外QA问答：朝鲜人如何看待中国？
正文翻译
North Koreans think about China?
Assistant 匿名
Overview
North Korean views of China are layered and context-dependent, shaped by state propaganda, historical ties, economic reality, and everyday social contact. Public discourse emphasizes China as an essential ally and model, while private attitudes range from pragmatic gratitude to resentment and indifference. Three broad registers—official/state, pragmatic/economic, and personal/social—capture the main lines of sentiment.
概述
朝鲜人对中国的看法具有层次性，并随情境而变，由国家宣传、历史关系、经济现实及日常社会接触共同塑造。公开话语中，中国被强调为不可或缺的盟友与榜样；而私人态度则在务实感激、怨怼与冷漠之间摆动。整体情感可概括为三个层面：官方/国家层面、务实/经济层面，以及个人/社会层面。
Official/state narrative
Fraternal ally: North Korean official media and school curricula portray China as a “great revolutionary brother” and indispensable political partner since the Korean War.
Diplomatic pillar: Chinese support in the UN, economic cooperation and political consultation are frxd as vital for DPRK security and stability.
Model and cautionary example: China is sometimes held up as a successful socialist state that modernized, but the regime also emphasizes guarding against “revisionism” and preserving Juche (self-reliance).
官方与国家叙事
兄弟般的盟友：朝鲜官方媒体与学校教材将中国描绘为自抗美援朝以来的“伟大革命同志”，也是不可替代的政治伙伴。
外交支柱：中国在联合国的支持、经济合作与政治协商被描述为朝鲜安全与稳定的重要保障。
榜样与警示：朝鲜有时将中国作为成功实现现代化的社会主义国家来示范，同时也强调要警惕“修正主义”，坚持主体思想（自力更生）。
Pragmatic/economic attitudes
Dependence and appreciation: Many North Koreans, especially officials and traders, recognize China as the primary source of food, fuel, consumer goods, and cross-border trade. This creates appreciation among those whose livelihoods depend on Chinese goods.
Frustration over access and control: Ordinary citizens and local entrepreneurs often resent the uneven access to Chinese goods (favoring elites, border traders, or cooperative farms) and restrictions imposed by both governments. Smuggling is common as a workaround.
务实与经济层面的态度
依赖与感激：许多朝鲜人，尤其是官员和贸易商，将中国视为粮食、燃料、消费品及跨境贸易的主要来源。这使得那些生活依赖中国商品的人群心怀感激。
获取与管控的不满：普通民众和地方商人往往对中国商品的获取不均心生不满（偏向精英、边境商人或合作农场），同时也对两国政府施加的限制感到不满。作为应对手段，走私现象普遍存在。
Perception of economic gap: Chinese prosperity is visible and simultaneously admired and envied. People note differences in living standards and infrastructure, which can create mixed feelings—aspiration with anxiety about unequal outcomes.
经济差距的感知：中国的繁荣显而易见，同时让人既仰慕又羡慕。人们注意到生活水平和基础设施的差异，这可能产生复杂感受——既向往又对不平等结果感到焦虑。
Everyday social and cultural impressions
Familiarity in border regions: In cross-border areas (Rason, Hyesan, North Hamgyong), North Koreans have more direct exposure—Chinese vendors, media, language contact—leading to more nuanced, practical views rather than ideological ones.
Cultural diffusion: Chinese consumer brands, food, music and illicit media shape tastes. Younger North Koreans who access foreign media often express curiosity about everyday Chinese life and trends.
日常社会与文化印象
边境地区的熟悉感：在跨境区域（如罗先、惠山、咸镜北道），朝鲜人接触中国商贩、媒体及语言更多，因此形成更细致、务实的看法，而非单纯的意识形态观点。
文化渗透：中国消费品牌、食品、音乐及非法媒体影响着朝鲜人的审美。能接触外国媒体的年轻人往往对中国日常生活和流行趋势表现出好奇。
Stereotypes and ambivalence: Where exposure is limited, stereotypes persist: Chinese seen as pragmatic, businesslike, sometimes pushy or opportunistic. Some North Koreans characterize Chinese as generous but self-interested.
Political sensitivities and limits on opinion
Public praise expected: Open criticism of China is rare in public venues because the DPRK controls discourse and values the strategic relationship. Official narratives discourage hostile portrayals.
刻板印象与矛盾态度：在接触有限的地区，刻板印象依旧存在：中国人被视为务实、精于商事，有时显得咄咄逼人或机会主义。一些朝鲜人认为中国人慷慨，但也以自我为先。
政治敏感性与言论限制
公众场合的表扬：公开批评中国在朝鲜公共场合中很少出现，因为朝鲜控制舆论，并重视战略关系。官方叙事不鼓励敌对描写。
Private candor in closed settings: In more private forums—border trading hubs, diaspora conversations, defectors’ testimonies—people express franker views: gratitude for goods and aid; annoyance at perceived kowtowing or unequal treatment; worry that Chinese influence could weaken DPRK autonomy.
Nationalism and sovereignty: Strong nationalist themes mean any appreciation of China is balanced by insistence on DPRK independence. Officials and many citizens frx relations as partnership, not subordination.
私下坦率：在更私密的场合——边境贸易中心、海外侨民交流、脱北者证词中——人们表达更坦率的看法：对物资和援助感激；对被视为谄媚或不平等待遇感到不满；担心中国影响可能削弱朝鲜自主性。
民族主义与主权：强烈的民族主义主题意味着对中国的任何认可都伴随对朝鲜独立的坚持。官员及多数民众将两国关系视为合作伙伴关系，而非从属。
Examples and typical stories (sourced from interviews, defectors, researchers)
Border trader: A small merchant in Onsong sells Chinese clothing and rice; grateful because trade sustains his family, yet bitter that local party officials take bribes and control profitable permits.
典型案例（来源于访谈、脱北者与研究者）
边境商人：温城的一名小商贩出售中国服装和大米；他感激贸易维持家计，但对地方党官收取贿赂、控制盈利许可证感到不满。
Factory manager: Praises Chinese machinery and parts that keep production running, but complains about price volatility and depending on permits from provincial Chinese counterparts.
Younger urban resident: Watches pirated Chinese dramas and follows trends; admires Chinese pop culture while insisting that DPRK’s political system is different and superior.
Rural villager after aid cutoffs: Regards China as lifesaving when food arrives, but anxious about policy changes and the fragility of relying on cross-border supplies.
工厂经理：赞扬中国机械与零件维持生产，但抱怨价格波动大，以及需依赖中国省级同行的许可证。
年轻城市居民：观看盗版中国电视剧并跟随潮流；欣赏中国流行文化，同时坚持认为朝鲜政治体制不同且更优越。
农村村民在援助中断后：当食物到达时视中国为救命来源，但对政策变化和跨境物资依赖的脆弱性感到担忧。
How views shift over time
态度随时间的变化
Crisis-driven fluctuations: During food shortages or COVID border closures, appreciation for Chinese aid rose when supplies flowed; closures and tighter controls produced resentment and hardship.
Political alignment: High-level diplomatic warmth (visits, public statements) tends to be mirrored in renewed propaganda and a spike in pro-China rhetoric inside the DPRK.
Generational divergence: Older generations more responsive to revolutionary framing; younger people—exposed via smuggled media and trade—are more likely to form consumer-based, pragmatic impressions.
危机驱动的波动：在粮食短缺或疫情封锁边境期间，当物资供应充足时，对中国援助的感激增加；而封锁和更严格管控则引发不满和困难。
政治趋同：高层外交热度（访问、公开声明）往往在朝鲜内部伴随宣传更新，并带来亲华言论的增加。
世代差异：老一代更容易受革命叙事影响；年轻人通过走私媒体和贸易接触，更可能形成基于消费的务实印象。
What this means for outside observers
对外部观察者的启示
Don’t assume uniformity: North Korean opinion is heterogeneous—regional, generational, and class differences matter more than monolithic portrayals.
Read signals carefully: Official praise of China is politically significant but does not necessarily reflect private grievances or economic dependence.
Expect pragmatism: Where livelihoods are affected, practical considerations (trade, employment, goods) dominate attitudes more than ideology.
不要假设一致性：朝鲜民意是异质的——地区、世代与阶层差异比单一刻画更重要。
仔细解读信号：官方对中国的表扬具有政治意义，但不必然反映私人不满或经济依赖。
务实为主：在生计受影响的领域，实用因素（贸易、就业、物资）往往比意识形态更主导态度。
This synthesis draws on North Korean state media, academic fieldwork with border communities, interviews with defectors, NGO reporting, and analyses by Korea specialists up through May 2024. Direct measurement of popular opinion in the DPRK is limited; reported patterns come from qualitative sources and triangulation rather than large-scale polls.
Sources and reliability note
来源与可靠性说明
本综述依据朝鲜国家媒体、学术对边境社区的实地研究、脱北者访谈、非政府组织报告，以及韩国问题专家的分析（截至2024年5月）。朝鲜民意直接测量有限；所报告的模式来自定性来源与交叉验证，而非大规模民调。
Feng Qi Works at Quora (product)
奇峰 任职于 Quora（产品部门）
Originally Answered: How do normal North Korean people think about China?
原始回答：普通朝鲜人如何看待中国？
This is a picture found on the internet. It is said to be drawn by a NK artist, and depicts modern China.
Several inferences on how North Korean view China:
1. Mobilized workers and farmers run the country
2. Developed industry
3. Good environment and clean cities
4. Respected by the international community
这是一张在网上找到的图片，据说由一名朝鲜艺术家绘制，描绘了现代中国。
关于朝鲜人如何看待中国，可以作出几项推测：
1. 国家由动员起来的工人和农民运作
2. 工业发达
3. 环境良好，城市干净
4. 受到国际社会尊重
There are exchange programs for college students. My department (in science) had one North Korea student - a friendly shy boy. He spent four years with us, so at least some North Korean know China well.
NK government probably has the motivation to emphasize its own army's role in the war, but it is hard to tell from the outside. (Btw in Korea war China fought against the UN, not just the US - nitpicking :D)
有大学生交流项目。我所在的理学院曾有一名朝鲜学生——一个友好而害羞的男孩。他在我们学院学习四年，因此至少有部分朝鲜人对中国了解较深。
朝鲜政府可能有动机强调本国军队在战争中的作用，但外界很难判断。（顺便提一句，朝鲜战争中中国是与联合国作战，而不仅仅是与美国——挑剔一下 :D）
Aya Ilan North Korea watcher
艾雅·伊兰 朝鲜观察者
In the book "Dear Leader", written by defector and former intelligence operative Jang jin-sung, he mentions that a Chinese-Korean has asked him this exact question while he was hiding in China after escaping NK. Jang jin-sung answered that the North Korean government hates China the most, since they are aware of their great dependence on China.
(I have no further information to add to/corroborate this perception, unfortunately).
在脱北者、前情报人员张真成所著的《亲爱的领导》中，他提到一名中朝混血人在他逃离朝鲜后躲在中国时曾问过他这个问题。张真成回答称，朝鲜政府最讨厌中国，因为他们清楚自己对中国的高度依赖。
（遗憾的是，我没有进一步的信息来补充或验证这一观点。）
Lance Chen System Development at Banking
陈朗斯 银行系统开发
NK hates the Chinese, to the bones.
They also hate the US but US always seems like distance thread. And beauty is in the distance.
朝鲜对中国人的厌恶，深入骨髓。
他们也讨厌美国，但美国总显得遥远，且远方的事物总带有吸引力。
It is more or less like for a very quick time, your neighbor from left suddenly getting rich. They are buying nice things, taking long vacations, having all the good parties at back yard, just under your nose.
You are just going to hate them.
这有点像这样的情景：一瞬间，你左边的邻居突然变得富有。他们买好东西、去长途度假，在自家后院举办盛大聚会，就在你眼皮底下。
你自然会讨厌他们。
Assistant 匿名
Overview
North Korean views of China are layered and context-dependent, shaped by state propaganda, historical ties, economic reality, and everyday social contact. Public discourse emphasizes China as an essential ally and model, while private attitudes range from pragmatic gratitude to resentment and indifference. Three broad registers—official/state, pragmatic/economic, and personal/social—capture the main lines of sentiment.
概述
朝鲜人对中国的看法具有层次性，并随情境而变，由国家宣传、历史关系、经济现实及日常社会接触共同塑造。公开话语中，中国被强调为不可或缺的盟友与榜样；而私人态度则在务实感激、怨怼与冷漠之间摆动。整体情感可概括为三个层面：官方/国家层面、务实/经济层面，以及个人/社会层面。
Official/state narrative
Fraternal ally: North Korean official media and school curricula portray China as a “great revolutionary brother” and indispensable political partner since the Korean War.
Diplomatic pillar: Chinese support in the UN, economic cooperation and political consultation are frxd as vital for DPRK security and stability.
Model and cautionary example: China is sometimes held up as a successful socialist state that modernized, but the regime also emphasizes guarding against “revisionism” and preserving Juche (self-reliance).
官方与国家叙事
兄弟般的盟友：朝鲜官方媒体与学校教材将中国描绘为自抗美援朝以来的“伟大革命同志”，也是不可替代的政治伙伴。
外交支柱：中国在联合国的支持、经济合作与政治协商被描述为朝鲜安全与稳定的重要保障。
榜样与警示：朝鲜有时将中国作为成功实现现代化的社会主义国家来示范，同时也强调要警惕“修正主义”，坚持主体思想（自力更生）。
Pragmatic/economic attitudes
Dependence and appreciation: Many North Koreans, especially officials and traders, recognize China as the primary source of food, fuel, consumer goods, and cross-border trade. This creates appreciation among those whose livelihoods depend on Chinese goods.
Frustration over access and control: Ordinary citizens and local entrepreneurs often resent the uneven access to Chinese goods (favoring elites, border traders, or cooperative farms) and restrictions imposed by both governments. Smuggling is common as a workaround.
务实与经济层面的态度
依赖与感激：许多朝鲜人，尤其是官员和贸易商，将中国视为粮食、燃料、消费品及跨境贸易的主要来源。这使得那些生活依赖中国商品的人群心怀感激。
获取与管控的不满：普通民众和地方商人往往对中国商品的获取不均心生不满（偏向精英、边境商人或合作农场），同时也对两国政府施加的限制感到不满。作为应对手段，走私现象普遍存在。
Perception of economic gap: Chinese prosperity is visible and simultaneously admired and envied. People note differences in living standards and infrastructure, which can create mixed feelings—aspiration with anxiety about unequal outcomes.
经济差距的感知：中国的繁荣显而易见，同时让人既仰慕又羡慕。人们注意到生活水平和基础设施的差异，这可能产生复杂感受——既向往又对不平等结果感到焦虑。
Everyday social and cultural impressions
Familiarity in border regions: In cross-border areas (Rason, Hyesan, North Hamgyong), North Koreans have more direct exposure—Chinese vendors, media, language contact—leading to more nuanced, practical views rather than ideological ones.
Cultural diffusion: Chinese consumer brands, food, music and illicit media shape tastes. Younger North Koreans who access foreign media often express curiosity about everyday Chinese life and trends.
日常社会与文化印象
边境地区的熟悉感：在跨境区域（如罗先、惠山、咸镜北道），朝鲜人接触中国商贩、媒体及语言更多，因此形成更细致、务实的看法，而非单纯的意识形态观点。
文化渗透：中国消费品牌、食品、音乐及非法媒体影响着朝鲜人的审美。能接触外国媒体的年轻人往往对中国日常生活和流行趋势表现出好奇。
Stereotypes and ambivalence: Where exposure is limited, stereotypes persist: Chinese seen as pragmatic, businesslike, sometimes pushy or opportunistic. Some North Koreans characterize Chinese as generous but self-interested.
Political sensitivities and limits on opinion
Public praise expected: Open criticism of China is rare in public venues because the DPRK controls discourse and values the strategic relationship. Official narratives discourage hostile portrayals.
刻板印象与矛盾态度：在接触有限的地区，刻板印象依旧存在：中国人被视为务实、精于商事，有时显得咄咄逼人或机会主义。一些朝鲜人认为中国人慷慨，但也以自我为先。
政治敏感性与言论限制
公众场合的表扬：公开批评中国在朝鲜公共场合中很少出现，因为朝鲜控制舆论，并重视战略关系。官方叙事不鼓励敌对描写。
Private candor in closed settings: In more private forums—border trading hubs, diaspora conversations, defectors’ testimonies—people express franker views: gratitude for goods and aid; annoyance at perceived kowtowing or unequal treatment; worry that Chinese influence could weaken DPRK autonomy.
Nationalism and sovereignty: Strong nationalist themes mean any appreciation of China is balanced by insistence on DPRK independence. Officials and many citizens frx relations as partnership, not subordination.
私下坦率：在更私密的场合——边境贸易中心、海外侨民交流、脱北者证词中——人们表达更坦率的看法：对物资和援助感激；对被视为谄媚或不平等待遇感到不满；担心中国影响可能削弱朝鲜自主性。
民族主义与主权：强烈的民族主义主题意味着对中国的任何认可都伴随对朝鲜独立的坚持。官员及多数民众将两国关系视为合作伙伴关系，而非从属。
Examples and typical stories (sourced from interviews, defectors, researchers)
Border trader: A small merchant in Onsong sells Chinese clothing and rice; grateful because trade sustains his family, yet bitter that local party officials take bribes and control profitable permits.
典型案例（来源于访谈、脱北者与研究者）
边境商人：温城的一名小商贩出售中国服装和大米；他感激贸易维持家计，但对地方党官收取贿赂、控制盈利许可证感到不满。
Factory manager: Praises Chinese machinery and parts that keep production running, but complains about price volatility and depending on permits from provincial Chinese counterparts.
Younger urban resident: Watches pirated Chinese dramas and follows trends; admires Chinese pop culture while insisting that DPRK’s political system is different and superior.
Rural villager after aid cutoffs: Regards China as lifesaving when food arrives, but anxious about policy changes and the fragility of relying on cross-border supplies.
工厂经理：赞扬中国机械与零件维持生产，但抱怨价格波动大，以及需依赖中国省级同行的许可证。
年轻城市居民：观看盗版中国电视剧并跟随潮流；欣赏中国流行文化，同时坚持认为朝鲜政治体制不同且更优越。
农村村民在援助中断后：当食物到达时视中国为救命来源，但对政策变化和跨境物资依赖的脆弱性感到担忧。
How views shift over time
态度随时间的变化
Crisis-driven fluctuations: During food shortages or COVID border closures, appreciation for Chinese aid rose when supplies flowed; closures and tighter controls produced resentment and hardship.
Political alignment: High-level diplomatic warmth (visits, public statements) tends to be mirrored in renewed propaganda and a spike in pro-China rhetoric inside the DPRK.
Generational divergence: Older generations more responsive to revolutionary framing; younger people—exposed via smuggled media and trade—are more likely to form consumer-based, pragmatic impressions.
危机驱动的波动：在粮食短缺或疫情封锁边境期间，当物资供应充足时，对中国援助的感激增加；而封锁和更严格管控则引发不满和困难。
政治趋同：高层外交热度（访问、公开声明）往往在朝鲜内部伴随宣传更新，并带来亲华言论的增加。
世代差异：老一代更容易受革命叙事影响；年轻人通过走私媒体和贸易接触，更可能形成基于消费的务实印象。
What this means for outside observers
对外部观察者的启示
Don’t assume uniformity: North Korean opinion is heterogeneous—regional, generational, and class differences matter more than monolithic portrayals.
Read signals carefully: Official praise of China is politically significant but does not necessarily reflect private grievances or economic dependence.
Expect pragmatism: Where livelihoods are affected, practical considerations (trade, employment, goods) dominate attitudes more than ideology.
不要假设一致性：朝鲜民意是异质的——地区、世代与阶层差异比单一刻画更重要。
仔细解读信号：官方对中国的表扬具有政治意义，但不必然反映私人不满或经济依赖。
务实为主：在生计受影响的领域，实用因素（贸易、就业、物资）往往比意识形态更主导态度。
This synthesis draws on North Korean state media, academic fieldwork with border communities, interviews with defectors, NGO reporting, and analyses by Korea specialists up through May 2024. Direct measurement of popular opinion in the DPRK is limited; reported patterns come from qualitative sources and triangulation rather than large-scale polls.
Sources and reliability note
来源与可靠性说明
本综述依据朝鲜国家媒体、学术对边境社区的实地研究、脱北者访谈、非政府组织报告，以及韩国问题专家的分析（截至2024年5月）。朝鲜民意直接测量有限；所报告的模式来自定性来源与交叉验证，而非大规模民调。
Feng Qi Works at Quora (product)
奇峰 任职于 Quora（产品部门）
Originally Answered: How do normal North Korean people think about China?
原始回答：普通朝鲜人如何看待中国？
This is a picture found on the internet. It is said to be drawn by a NK artist, and depicts modern China.
Several inferences on how North Korean view China:
1. Mobilized workers and farmers run the country
2. Developed industry
3. Good environment and clean cities
4. Respected by the international community
这是一张在网上找到的图片，据说由一名朝鲜艺术家绘制，描绘了现代中国。
关于朝鲜人如何看待中国，可以作出几项推测：
1. 国家由动员起来的工人和农民运作
2. 工业发达
3. 环境良好，城市干净
4. 受到国际社会尊重
There are exchange programs for college students. My department (in science) had one North Korea student - a friendly shy boy. He spent four years with us, so at least some North Korean know China well.
NK government probably has the motivation to emphasize its own army's role in the war, but it is hard to tell from the outside. (Btw in Korea war China fought against the UN, not just the US - nitpicking :D)
有大学生交流项目。我所在的理学院曾有一名朝鲜学生——一个友好而害羞的男孩。他在我们学院学习四年，因此至少有部分朝鲜人对中国了解较深。
朝鲜政府可能有动机强调本国军队在战争中的作用，但外界很难判断。（顺便提一句，朝鲜战争中中国是与联合国作战，而不仅仅是与美国——挑剔一下 :D）
Aya Ilan North Korea watcher
艾雅·伊兰 朝鲜观察者
In the book "Dear Leader", written by defector and former intelligence operative Jang jin-sung, he mentions that a Chinese-Korean has asked him this exact question while he was hiding in China after escaping NK. Jang jin-sung answered that the North Korean government hates China the most, since they are aware of their great dependence on China.
(I have no further information to add to/corroborate this perception, unfortunately).
在脱北者、前情报人员张真成所著的《亲爱的领导》中，他提到一名中朝混血人在他逃离朝鲜后躲在中国时曾问过他这个问题。张真成回答称，朝鲜政府最讨厌中国，因为他们清楚自己对中国的高度依赖。
（遗憾的是，我没有进一步的信息来补充或验证这一观点。）
Lance Chen System Development at Banking
陈朗斯 银行系统开发
NK hates the Chinese, to the bones.
They also hate the US but US always seems like distance thread. And beauty is in the distance.
朝鲜对中国人的厌恶，深入骨髓。
他们也讨厌美国，但美国总显得遥远，且远方的事物总带有吸引力。
It is more or less like for a very quick time, your neighbor from left suddenly getting rich. They are buying nice things, taking long vacations, having all the good parties at back yard, just under your nose.
You are just going to hate them.
这有点像这样的情景：一瞬间，你左边的邻居突然变得富有。他们买好东西、去长途度假，在自家后院举办盛大聚会，就在你眼皮底下。
你自然会讨厌他们。
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