俄罗斯现在的装甲车辆数量竟比入侵乌克兰时还要多
正文翻译
Yes, Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles. But the sheer size of its Cold War vehicle stockpile means it can replace every loss—and then some.
没错，俄罗斯确实损失了大量装甲车辆。但其冷战时期库存的庞大规模意味着它能够弥补所有损失——甚至还绰绰有余。
Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles
俄罗斯已损失了大量装甲车辆
But it has pulled even more out of long-term storage
但它从长期储存中启用了更多装备
Despite heavy losses, the Russian vehicle inventory is actually bigger today than it was in 2022
尽管损失惨重，俄罗斯目前的装甲车辆总数实际上比 2022 年更多
There's low risk of Russia actually running low on vehicles before 2030
俄罗斯在 2030 年前几乎不可能面临装备短缺风险
That's a clear indicator that Russian mechanized assaults will continue
这清楚表明俄军的机械化突击仍将持续
The Russian military has more armored vehicles than it did on the eve of Russia's wider war on Ukraine in February 2022. And for one main reason.
俄军现役装甲车辆数量已超过 2022 年 2 月全面侵乌战争前夕的水平，这主要归因于一个关键因素。
Despite losing as many as 16,100 vehicles in action in Ukraine, the Russians have more than compensated for these losses by pulling nearly 13,000 old vehicles out of long-term storage—and complementing these older vehicles with around 4,000 brand-new vehicles.
尽管在乌克兰战场上损失了多达 16100 辆装甲车，但俄军通过启封近 13000 辆库存旧装备，并补充约 4000 辆全新载具，不仅完全弥补了损失还实现了净增长。
The upshot is that the Russians had 20,000 vehicles in February 2022. 45 months later, they have 21,000. Yes, many of those vehicles are less sophisticated than the newer—and lost—vehicles they replaced. All the same, they represent a potent and enduring armored force. If the Kremlin chooses to use them sparingly.
数据显示：2022 年 2 月俄军拥有 20000 辆装甲车，45 个月后这个数字增长至 21000 辆。虽然这些补充车辆在技术性能上不如已损毁的新型装备，但依然构成持续强大的装甲力量——前提是克里姆林宫选择节制使用。
The implication is a foreboding one for Ukraine and any other country Russia may target.
这对乌克兰及所有可能成为俄罗斯目标的国家的预警信号令人忧心。
"Russia is not exhausting its armored reserves," explained analyst Delwin, who crunched the numbers. "Modeling forward with constant 2025 loss levels and stable new production, the total fleet remains above 2022 levels through at least 2030."
"俄罗斯并未耗尽装甲储备，"分析人士德尔温在深入研究数据后解释称。"按照 2025 年持续损失水平和稳定新产能进行模型推算，至少在 2030 年前，其装甲车辆总数仍将维持在 2022 年水平之上。"
How Russia replaced 16,000 lost vehicles
俄罗斯损失的 16,000 辆战车是如何补充的
Yes, Russia could struggle to make good major vehicular losses after 2030. That won't help Ukraine, however—at least not now.
诚然，2030 年后俄罗斯或难弥补重大装备损失。但这对乌克兰而言无济于事——至少目前如此。
There are divergent trends inside Delwin's overall figures, of course. According to Delwin's count, which draws on the work of open-source analyst Jompy, there's been a slight decline in the Russian tank inventory since 2022 even as the Russian armed forces have massively expanded with new regiments and brigades.
当然，德尔温的总体数据中存在着分化趋势。根据其援引开源分析师乔皮的研究统计，自 2022 年以来俄军坦克库存略有下降，尽管其武装力量通过新建团旅编制实现了大规模扩军。
This makes sense, as the tanks' main role has changed. As recently as 2022, large formations of tanks—sometimes dozens at a time—would operate independently or in combined-arms formations with other vehicle types. Tank attacks were still feasible ... and common.
这合乎逻辑，因为坦克的主要角色已经转变。就在 2022 年，大规模坦克编队——有时一次出动数十辆——还能独立作战或与其他装甲车辆组成合成战术群。坦克攻势当时仍然可行...且频繁发生。
But that was before tiny first-person-view drones were everywhere all the time along the 1,100-km front line of the wider war.
但这种态势在小型第一视角无人机开始全天候遍布这场纵深战争 1100 公里战线后彻底改变。
Why tanks matter less in 2025
为何 2025 年坦克重要性降低
A handful of $500 FPVs can knock out a million-dollar tank. FPV drones have been responsible for destroying more than two-thirds of Russian tanks in recent months. Now tanks on both sides of Russia's wider war on Ukraine usually stay far behind the front line, hiding in underground dugouts and only occasionally rolling out to fire a few cannon rounds from kilometers away. Tanks are far less central to Russian battlefield doctrine than they were just four years ago.
价值 500 美元的几架穿越机就能摧毁百万美元级坦克。最近数月三分之二以上的俄军坦克损失都源自这种自杀式无人机。如今在俄乌这场大规模冲突中，双方坦克通常远离前线，藏身于地下掩体，偶尔才会出动在数公里外发射几发炮弹。相比四年前，坦克在俄军战术体系中的核心地位已大幅削弱。
When Russian tanks do roll into direct combat, it's usually as the lead vehicles in small mechanized assault groups including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) hauling squads of infantry. Wrapped in layers of improvised anti-drone armor and fitted with mine-clearing plows, the tanks clear a path for the trailing vehicles, detonating mines and absorbing as many drone strikes as possible.
当俄罗斯坦克确实投入直接作战时，它们通常作为小型机械化突击群的先导车辆，伴随步兵战车（IFV）和装甲运兵车（APC）运送步兵班组。这些坦克外层覆盖着临时组装的反无人机装甲，前端加装扫雷犁，负责为后续车辆开辟通道——既引爆地雷，也尽可能吸引无人机攻击。
Vital battle taxis
至关重要的战场出租车
Tanks support the IFVs and APCs, which are now the most important vehicles on the battlefield. They carry and protect the infantry whose job it is to occupy and hold new positions as Russia aims for incremental territorial gains rather than dramatic breakthroughs.
坦克为当今战场上最重要的步兵战车和装甲运兵车提供支援。这些载具肩负运输和保护步兵的任务，在俄军追求渐进式领土收益（而非戏剧性突破）的战略下，步兵需要占领并固守新阵地。
And that's why the number of APCs in Russian service has grown—a lot. Delwin noted "a sharp increase of 38%" in the quantity of infantry-carriers as the Kremlin replaces losses and equips new units with their share of the vehicles. The total number of heavier IFVs, such as the BMP-3, has slightly declined, however, as there were never as many of these vehicles in storage compared to lighter, simpler APCs such as the MT-LB.
这正是俄军装甲运兵车数量大幅增长的原因。德尔温指出，随着克里姆林宫补充战损并为新部队配发装备，步兵载具数量出现"38%的骤增"。不过较重的步兵战车（如 BMP-3）总数略有下降，因为相比 MT-LB 这类轻便简易的装甲运兵车，库存中重型步兵战车原本就不占优势。
While many Russian assaults now involve troops infiltrating on foot or on motorcycles—methods of attack that favor a military that's flush with manpower and ambivalent toward casualties—mechanized assaults "remain a consistent tactic," Delwin wrote, "with monthly losses in the low hundreds during such operations."
尽管当前俄军许多攻势采用步兵徒步渗透或摩托车突击的方式——这些战术适合兵力充足且对伤亡容忍度高的军队——但德温指出"机械化突击仍是其常规战术"，"此类行动中每月损失的装甲车辆仅维持在数百辆低位"。
"These vehicles remain essential for assaulting fortified positions, though increasingly paired with light motorbike units and infiltration-oriented assault teams," he added. As long as the Russians mix infantry assaults with mechanized assaults, they're at low risk of actually running out of vehicles.
他补充说明："虽然这些装甲车辆越来越多地与轻型摩托车单位及渗透型突击小组协同作战，但它们仍是攻克防御工事的关键装备。"只要俄军保持步兵突击与机械化突击的混合战术，其装甲装备就基本不会面临耗尽风险。
For the next five years, at least.
至少在接下来五年内如此。
Yes, Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles. But the sheer size of its Cold War vehicle stockpile means it can replace every loss—and then some.
没错，俄罗斯确实损失了大量装甲车辆。但其冷战时期库存的庞大规模意味着它能够弥补所有损失——甚至还绰绰有余。
Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles
俄罗斯已损失了大量装甲车辆
But it has pulled even more out of long-term storage
但它从长期储存中启用了更多装备
Despite heavy losses, the Russian vehicle inventory is actually bigger today than it was in 2022
尽管损失惨重，俄罗斯目前的装甲车辆总数实际上比 2022 年更多
There's low risk of Russia actually running low on vehicles before 2030
俄罗斯在 2030 年前几乎不可能面临装备短缺风险
That's a clear indicator that Russian mechanized assaults will continue
这清楚表明俄军的机械化突击仍将持续
The Russian military has more armored vehicles than it did on the eve of Russia's wider war on Ukraine in February 2022. And for one main reason.
俄军现役装甲车辆数量已超过 2022 年 2 月全面侵乌战争前夕的水平，这主要归因于一个关键因素。
Despite losing as many as 16,100 vehicles in action in Ukraine, the Russians have more than compensated for these losses by pulling nearly 13,000 old vehicles out of long-term storage—and complementing these older vehicles with around 4,000 brand-new vehicles.
尽管在乌克兰战场上损失了多达 16100 辆装甲车，但俄军通过启封近 13000 辆库存旧装备，并补充约 4000 辆全新载具，不仅完全弥补了损失还实现了净增长。
The upshot is that the Russians had 20,000 vehicles in February 2022. 45 months later, they have 21,000. Yes, many of those vehicles are less sophisticated than the newer—and lost—vehicles they replaced. All the same, they represent a potent and enduring armored force. If the Kremlin chooses to use them sparingly.
数据显示：2022 年 2 月俄军拥有 20000 辆装甲车，45 个月后这个数字增长至 21000 辆。虽然这些补充车辆在技术性能上不如已损毁的新型装备，但依然构成持续强大的装甲力量——前提是克里姆林宫选择节制使用。
The implication is a foreboding one for Ukraine and any other country Russia may target.
这对乌克兰及所有可能成为俄罗斯目标的国家的预警信号令人忧心。
"Russia is not exhausting its armored reserves," explained analyst Delwin, who crunched the numbers. "Modeling forward with constant 2025 loss levels and stable new production, the total fleet remains above 2022 levels through at least 2030."
"俄罗斯并未耗尽装甲储备，"分析人士德尔温在深入研究数据后解释称。"按照 2025 年持续损失水平和稳定新产能进行模型推算，至少在 2030 年前，其装甲车辆总数仍将维持在 2022 年水平之上。"
How Russia replaced 16,000 lost vehicles
俄罗斯损失的 16,000 辆战车是如何补充的
Yes, Russia could struggle to make good major vehicular losses after 2030. That won't help Ukraine, however—at least not now.
诚然，2030 年后俄罗斯或难弥补重大装备损失。但这对乌克兰而言无济于事——至少目前如此。
There are divergent trends inside Delwin's overall figures, of course. According to Delwin's count, which draws on the work of open-source analyst Jompy, there's been a slight decline in the Russian tank inventory since 2022 even as the Russian armed forces have massively expanded with new regiments and brigades.
当然，德尔温的总体数据中存在着分化趋势。根据其援引开源分析师乔皮的研究统计，自 2022 年以来俄军坦克库存略有下降，尽管其武装力量通过新建团旅编制实现了大规模扩军。
This makes sense, as the tanks' main role has changed. As recently as 2022, large formations of tanks—sometimes dozens at a time—would operate independently or in combined-arms formations with other vehicle types. Tank attacks were still feasible ... and common.
这合乎逻辑，因为坦克的主要角色已经转变。就在 2022 年，大规模坦克编队——有时一次出动数十辆——还能独立作战或与其他装甲车辆组成合成战术群。坦克攻势当时仍然可行...且频繁发生。
But that was before tiny first-person-view drones were everywhere all the time along the 1,100-km front line of the wider war.
但这种态势在小型第一视角无人机开始全天候遍布这场纵深战争 1100 公里战线后彻底改变。
Why tanks matter less in 2025
为何 2025 年坦克重要性降低
A handful of $500 FPVs can knock out a million-dollar tank. FPV drones have been responsible for destroying more than two-thirds of Russian tanks in recent months. Now tanks on both sides of Russia's wider war on Ukraine usually stay far behind the front line, hiding in underground dugouts and only occasionally rolling out to fire a few cannon rounds from kilometers away. Tanks are far less central to Russian battlefield doctrine than they were just four years ago.
价值 500 美元的几架穿越机就能摧毁百万美元级坦克。最近数月三分之二以上的俄军坦克损失都源自这种自杀式无人机。如今在俄乌这场大规模冲突中，双方坦克通常远离前线，藏身于地下掩体，偶尔才会出动在数公里外发射几发炮弹。相比四年前，坦克在俄军战术体系中的核心地位已大幅削弱。
When Russian tanks do roll into direct combat, it's usually as the lead vehicles in small mechanized assault groups including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) hauling squads of infantry. Wrapped in layers of improvised anti-drone armor and fitted with mine-clearing plows, the tanks clear a path for the trailing vehicles, detonating mines and absorbing as many drone strikes as possible.
当俄罗斯坦克确实投入直接作战时，它们通常作为小型机械化突击群的先导车辆，伴随步兵战车（IFV）和装甲运兵车（APC）运送步兵班组。这些坦克外层覆盖着临时组装的反无人机装甲，前端加装扫雷犁，负责为后续车辆开辟通道——既引爆地雷，也尽可能吸引无人机攻击。
Vital battle taxis
至关重要的战场出租车
Tanks support the IFVs and APCs, which are now the most important vehicles on the battlefield. They carry and protect the infantry whose job it is to occupy and hold new positions as Russia aims for incremental territorial gains rather than dramatic breakthroughs.
坦克为当今战场上最重要的步兵战车和装甲运兵车提供支援。这些载具肩负运输和保护步兵的任务，在俄军追求渐进式领土收益（而非戏剧性突破）的战略下，步兵需要占领并固守新阵地。
And that's why the number of APCs in Russian service has grown—a lot. Delwin noted "a sharp increase of 38%" in the quantity of infantry-carriers as the Kremlin replaces losses and equips new units with their share of the vehicles. The total number of heavier IFVs, such as the BMP-3, has slightly declined, however, as there were never as many of these vehicles in storage compared to lighter, simpler APCs such as the MT-LB.
这正是俄军装甲运兵车数量大幅增长的原因。德尔温指出，随着克里姆林宫补充战损并为新部队配发装备，步兵载具数量出现"38%的骤增"。不过较重的步兵战车（如 BMP-3）总数略有下降，因为相比 MT-LB 这类轻便简易的装甲运兵车，库存中重型步兵战车原本就不占优势。
While many Russian assaults now involve troops infiltrating on foot or on motorcycles—methods of attack that favor a military that's flush with manpower and ambivalent toward casualties—mechanized assaults "remain a consistent tactic," Delwin wrote, "with monthly losses in the low hundreds during such operations."
尽管当前俄军许多攻势采用步兵徒步渗透或摩托车突击的方式——这些战术适合兵力充足且对伤亡容忍度高的军队——但德温指出"机械化突击仍是其常规战术"，"此类行动中每月损失的装甲车辆仅维持在数百辆低位"。
"These vehicles remain essential for assaulting fortified positions, though increasingly paired with light motorbike units and infiltration-oriented assault teams," he added. As long as the Russians mix infantry assaults with mechanized assaults, they're at low risk of actually running out of vehicles.
他补充说明："虽然这些装甲车辆越来越多地与轻型摩托车单位及渗透型突击小组协同作战，但它们仍是攻克防御工事的关键装备。"只要俄军保持步兵突击与机械化突击的混合战术，其装甲装备就基本不会面临耗尽风险。
For the next five years, at least.
至少在接下来五年内如此。
评论翻译
Yes, Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles. But the sheer size of its Cold War vehicle stockpile means it can replace every loss—and then some.
没错，俄罗斯确实损失了大量装甲车辆。但其冷战时期库存的庞大规模意味着它能够弥补所有损失——甚至还绰绰有余。
Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles
俄罗斯已损失了大量装甲车辆
But it has pulled even more out of long-term storage
但它从长期储存中启用了更多装备
Despite heavy losses, the Russian vehicle inventory is actually bigger today than it was in 2022
尽管损失惨重，俄罗斯目前的装甲车辆总数实际上比 2022 年更多
There's low risk of Russia actually running low on vehicles before 2030
俄罗斯在 2030 年前几乎不可能面临装备短缺风险
That's a clear indicator that Russian mechanized assaults will continue
这清楚表明俄军的机械化突击仍将持续
The Russian military has more armored vehicles than it did on the eve of Russia's wider war on Ukraine in February 2022. And for one main reason.
俄军现役装甲车辆数量已超过 2022 年 2 月全面侵乌战争前夕的水平，这主要归因于一个关键因素。
Despite losing as many as 16,100 vehicles in action in Ukraine, the Russians have more than compensated for these losses by pulling nearly 13,000 old vehicles out of long-term storage—and complementing these older vehicles with around 4,000 brand-new vehicles.
尽管在乌克兰战场上损失了多达 16100 辆装甲车，但俄军通过启封近 13000 辆库存旧装备，并补充约 4000 辆全新载具，不仅完全弥补了损失还实现了净增长。
The upshot is that the Russians had 20,000 vehicles in February 2022. 45 months later, they have 21,000. Yes, many of those vehicles are less sophisticated than the newer—and lost—vehicles they replaced. All the same, they represent a potent and enduring armored force. If the Kremlin chooses to use them sparingly.
数据显示：2022 年 2 月俄军拥有 20000 辆装甲车，45 个月后这个数字增长至 21000 辆。虽然这些补充车辆在技术性能上不如已损毁的新型装备，但依然构成持续强大的装甲力量——前提是克里姆林宫选择节制使用。
The implication is a foreboding one for Ukraine and any other country Russia may target.
这对乌克兰及所有可能成为俄罗斯目标的国家的预警信号令人忧心。
"Russia is not exhausting its armored reserves," explained analyst Delwin, who crunched the numbers. "Modeling forward with constant 2025 loss levels and stable new production, the total fleet remains above 2022 levels through at least 2030."
"俄罗斯并未耗尽装甲储备，"分析人士德尔温在深入研究数据后解释称。"按照 2025 年持续损失水平和稳定新产能进行模型推算，至少在 2030 年前，其装甲车辆总数仍将维持在 2022 年水平之上。"
How Russia replaced 16,000 lost vehicles
俄罗斯损失的 16,000 辆战车是如何补充的
Yes, Russia could struggle to make good major vehicular losses after 2030. That won't help Ukraine, however—at least not now.
诚然，2030 年后俄罗斯或难弥补重大装备损失。但这对乌克兰而言无济于事——至少目前如此。
There are divergent trends inside Delwin's overall figures, of course. According to Delwin's count, which draws on the work of open-source analyst Jompy, there's been a slight decline in the Russian tank inventory since 2022 even as the Russian armed forces have massively expanded with new regiments and brigades.
当然，德尔温的总体数据中存在着分化趋势。根据其援引开源分析师乔皮的研究统计，自 2022 年以来俄军坦克库存略有下降，尽管其武装力量通过新建团旅编制实现了大规模扩军。
This makes sense, as the tanks' main role has changed. As recently as 2022, large formations of tanks—sometimes dozens at a time—would operate independently or in combined-arms formations with other vehicle types. Tank attacks were still feasible ... and common.
这合乎逻辑，因为坦克的主要角色已经转变。就在 2022 年，大规模坦克编队——有时一次出动数十辆——还能独立作战或与其他装甲车辆组成合成战术群。坦克攻势当时仍然可行...且频繁发生。
But that was before tiny first-person-view drones were everywhere all the time along the 1,100-km front line of the wider war.
但这种态势在小型第一视角无人机开始全天候遍布这场纵深战争 1100 公里战线后彻底改变。
Why tanks matter less in 2025
为何 2025 年坦克重要性降低
A handful of $500 FPVs can knock out a million-dollar tank. FPV drones have been responsible for destroying more than two-thirds of Russian tanks in recent months. Now tanks on both sides of Russia's wider war on Ukraine usually stay far behind the front line, hiding in underground dugouts and only occasionally rolling out to fire a few cannon rounds from kilometers away. Tanks are far less central to Russian battlefield doctrine than they were just four years ago.
价值 500 美元的几架穿越机就能摧毁百万美元级坦克。最近数月三分之二以上的俄军坦克损失都源自这种自杀式无人机。如今在俄乌这场大规模冲突中，双方坦克通常远离前线，藏身于地下掩体，偶尔才会出动在数公里外发射几发炮弹。相比四年前，坦克在俄军战术体系中的核心地位已大幅削弱。
When Russian tanks do roll into direct combat, it's usually as the lead vehicles in small mechanized assault groups including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) hauling squads of infantry. Wrapped in layers of improvised anti-drone armor and fitted with mine-clearing plows, the tanks clear a path for the trailing vehicles, detonating mines and absorbing as many drone strikes as possible.
当俄罗斯坦克确实投入直接作战时，它们通常作为小型机械化突击群的先导车辆，伴随步兵战车（IFV）和装甲运兵车（APC）运送步兵班组。这些坦克外层覆盖着临时组装的反无人机装甲，前端加装扫雷犁，负责为后续车辆开辟通道——既引爆地雷，也尽可能吸引无人机攻击。
Vital battle taxis
至关重要的战场出租车
Tanks support the IFVs and APCs, which are now the most important vehicles on the battlefield. They carry and protect the infantry whose job it is to occupy and hold new positions as Russia aims for incremental territorial gains rather than dramatic breakthroughs.
坦克为当今战场上最重要的步兵战车和装甲运兵车提供支援。这些载具肩负运输和保护步兵的任务，在俄军追求渐进式领土收益（而非戏剧性突破）的战略下，步兵需要占领并固守新阵地。
And that's why the number of APCs in Russian service has grown—a lot. Delwin noted "a sharp increase of 38%" in the quantity of infantry-carriers as the Kremlin replaces losses and equips new units with their share of the vehicles. The total number of heavier IFVs, such as the BMP-3, has slightly declined, however, as there were never as many of these vehicles in storage compared to lighter, simpler APCs such as the MT-LB.
这正是俄军装甲运兵车数量大幅增长的原因。德尔温指出，随着克里姆林宫补充战损并为新部队配发装备，步兵载具数量出现"38%的骤增"。不过较重的步兵战车（如 BMP-3）总数略有下降，因为相比 MT-LB 这类轻便简易的装甲运兵车，库存中重型步兵战车原本就不占优势。
While many Russian assaults now involve troops infiltrating on foot or on motorcycles—methods of attack that favor a military that's flush with manpower and ambivalent toward casualties—mechanized assaults "remain a consistent tactic," Delwin wrote, "with monthly losses in the low hundreds during such operations."
尽管当前俄军许多攻势采用步兵徒步渗透或摩托车突击的方式——这些战术适合兵力充足且对伤亡容忍度高的军队——但德温指出"机械化突击仍是其常规战术"，"此类行动中每月损失的装甲车辆仅维持在数百辆低位"。
"These vehicles remain essential for assaulting fortified positions, though increasingly paired with light motorbike units and infiltration-oriented assault teams," he added. As long as the Russians mix infantry assaults with mechanized assaults, they're at low risk of actually running out of vehicles.
他补充说明："虽然这些装甲车辆越来越多地与轻型摩托车单位及渗透型突击小组协同作战，但它们仍是攻克防御工事的关键装备。"只要俄军保持步兵突击与机械化突击的混合战术，其装甲装备就基本不会面临耗尽风险。
For the next five years, at least.
至少在接下来五年内如此。
Yes, Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles. But the sheer size of its Cold War vehicle stockpile means it can replace every loss—and then some.
没错，俄罗斯确实损失了大量装甲车辆。但其冷战时期库存的庞大规模意味着它能够弥补所有损失——甚至还绰绰有余。
Russia has lost a lot of armored vehicles
俄罗斯已损失了大量装甲车辆
But it has pulled even more out of long-term storage
但它从长期储存中启用了更多装备
Despite heavy losses, the Russian vehicle inventory is actually bigger today than it was in 2022
尽管损失惨重，俄罗斯目前的装甲车辆总数实际上比 2022 年更多
There's low risk of Russia actually running low on vehicles before 2030
俄罗斯在 2030 年前几乎不可能面临装备短缺风险
That's a clear indicator that Russian mechanized assaults will continue
这清楚表明俄军的机械化突击仍将持续
The Russian military has more armored vehicles than it did on the eve of Russia's wider war on Ukraine in February 2022. And for one main reason.
俄军现役装甲车辆数量已超过 2022 年 2 月全面侵乌战争前夕的水平，这主要归因于一个关键因素。
Despite losing as many as 16,100 vehicles in action in Ukraine, the Russians have more than compensated for these losses by pulling nearly 13,000 old vehicles out of long-term storage—and complementing these older vehicles with around 4,000 brand-new vehicles.
尽管在乌克兰战场上损失了多达 16100 辆装甲车，但俄军通过启封近 13000 辆库存旧装备，并补充约 4000 辆全新载具，不仅完全弥补了损失还实现了净增长。
The upshot is that the Russians had 20,000 vehicles in February 2022. 45 months later, they have 21,000. Yes, many of those vehicles are less sophisticated than the newer—and lost—vehicles they replaced. All the same, they represent a potent and enduring armored force. If the Kremlin chooses to use them sparingly.
数据显示：2022 年 2 月俄军拥有 20000 辆装甲车，45 个月后这个数字增长至 21000 辆。虽然这些补充车辆在技术性能上不如已损毁的新型装备，但依然构成持续强大的装甲力量——前提是克里姆林宫选择节制使用。
The implication is a foreboding one for Ukraine and any other country Russia may target.
这对乌克兰及所有可能成为俄罗斯目标的国家的预警信号令人忧心。
"Russia is not exhausting its armored reserves," explained analyst Delwin, who crunched the numbers. "Modeling forward with constant 2025 loss levels and stable new production, the total fleet remains above 2022 levels through at least 2030."
"俄罗斯并未耗尽装甲储备，"分析人士德尔温在深入研究数据后解释称。"按照 2025 年持续损失水平和稳定新产能进行模型推算，至少在 2030 年前，其装甲车辆总数仍将维持在 2022 年水平之上。"
How Russia replaced 16,000 lost vehicles
俄罗斯损失的 16,000 辆战车是如何补充的
Yes, Russia could struggle to make good major vehicular losses after 2030. That won't help Ukraine, however—at least not now.
诚然，2030 年后俄罗斯或难弥补重大装备损失。但这对乌克兰而言无济于事——至少目前如此。
There are divergent trends inside Delwin's overall figures, of course. According to Delwin's count, which draws on the work of open-source analyst Jompy, there's been a slight decline in the Russian tank inventory since 2022 even as the Russian armed forces have massively expanded with new regiments and brigades.
当然，德尔温的总体数据中存在着分化趋势。根据其援引开源分析师乔皮的研究统计，自 2022 年以来俄军坦克库存略有下降，尽管其武装力量通过新建团旅编制实现了大规模扩军。
This makes sense, as the tanks' main role has changed. As recently as 2022, large formations of tanks—sometimes dozens at a time—would operate independently or in combined-arms formations with other vehicle types. Tank attacks were still feasible ... and common.
这合乎逻辑，因为坦克的主要角色已经转变。就在 2022 年，大规模坦克编队——有时一次出动数十辆——还能独立作战或与其他装甲车辆组成合成战术群。坦克攻势当时仍然可行...且频繁发生。
But that was before tiny first-person-view drones were everywhere all the time along the 1,100-km front line of the wider war.
但这种态势在小型第一视角无人机开始全天候遍布这场纵深战争 1100 公里战线后彻底改变。
Why tanks matter less in 2025
为何 2025 年坦克重要性降低
A handful of $500 FPVs can knock out a million-dollar tank. FPV drones have been responsible for destroying more than two-thirds of Russian tanks in recent months. Now tanks on both sides of Russia's wider war on Ukraine usually stay far behind the front line, hiding in underground dugouts and only occasionally rolling out to fire a few cannon rounds from kilometers away. Tanks are far less central to Russian battlefield doctrine than they were just four years ago.
价值 500 美元的几架穿越机就能摧毁百万美元级坦克。最近数月三分之二以上的俄军坦克损失都源自这种自杀式无人机。如今在俄乌这场大规模冲突中，双方坦克通常远离前线，藏身于地下掩体，偶尔才会出动在数公里外发射几发炮弹。相比四年前，坦克在俄军战术体系中的核心地位已大幅削弱。
When Russian tanks do roll into direct combat, it's usually as the lead vehicles in small mechanized assault groups including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) hauling squads of infantry. Wrapped in layers of improvised anti-drone armor and fitted with mine-clearing plows, the tanks clear a path for the trailing vehicles, detonating mines and absorbing as many drone strikes as possible.
当俄罗斯坦克确实投入直接作战时，它们通常作为小型机械化突击群的先导车辆，伴随步兵战车（IFV）和装甲运兵车（APC）运送步兵班组。这些坦克外层覆盖着临时组装的反无人机装甲，前端加装扫雷犁，负责为后续车辆开辟通道——既引爆地雷，也尽可能吸引无人机攻击。
Vital battle taxis
至关重要的战场出租车
Tanks support the IFVs and APCs, which are now the most important vehicles on the battlefield. They carry and protect the infantry whose job it is to occupy and hold new positions as Russia aims for incremental territorial gains rather than dramatic breakthroughs.
坦克为当今战场上最重要的步兵战车和装甲运兵车提供支援。这些载具肩负运输和保护步兵的任务，在俄军追求渐进式领土收益（而非戏剧性突破）的战略下，步兵需要占领并固守新阵地。
And that's why the number of APCs in Russian service has grown—a lot. Delwin noted "a sharp increase of 38%" in the quantity of infantry-carriers as the Kremlin replaces losses and equips new units with their share of the vehicles. The total number of heavier IFVs, such as the BMP-3, has slightly declined, however, as there were never as many of these vehicles in storage compared to lighter, simpler APCs such as the MT-LB.
这正是俄军装甲运兵车数量大幅增长的原因。德尔温指出，随着克里姆林宫补充战损并为新部队配发装备，步兵载具数量出现"38%的骤增"。不过较重的步兵战车（如 BMP-3）总数略有下降，因为相比 MT-LB 这类轻便简易的装甲运兵车，库存中重型步兵战车原本就不占优势。
While many Russian assaults now involve troops infiltrating on foot or on motorcycles—methods of attack that favor a military that's flush with manpower and ambivalent toward casualties—mechanized assaults "remain a consistent tactic," Delwin wrote, "with monthly losses in the low hundreds during such operations."
尽管当前俄军许多攻势采用步兵徒步渗透或摩托车突击的方式——这些战术适合兵力充足且对伤亡容忍度高的军队——但德温指出"机械化突击仍是其常规战术"，"此类行动中每月损失的装甲车辆仅维持在数百辆低位"。
"These vehicles remain essential for assaulting fortified positions, though increasingly paired with light motorbike units and infiltration-oriented assault teams," he added. As long as the Russians mix infantry assaults with mechanized assaults, they're at low risk of actually running out of vehicles.
他补充说明："虽然这些装甲车辆越来越多地与轻型摩托车单位及渗透型突击小组协同作战，但它们仍是攻克防御工事的关键装备。"只要俄军保持步兵突击与机械化突击的混合战术，其装甲装备就基本不会面临耗尽风险。
For the next five years, at least.
至少在接下来五年内如此。
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