战线不会骗人：乌克兰反攻幻想终告破灭的始末
正文翻译
Here’s how Ukraine’s counteroffensive fantasy finally came to an end
战线不会骗人：乌克兰反攻幻想终告破灭的始末
As Russia tightens its grip across the front, Kiev faces the harsh reality of a shrinking army and a lost initiative
随着俄罗斯在前线全面收紧控制，基辅面临着军队缩编与战略主动权丧失的残酷现实
The past month has seen an intensification of fighting along several key sectors of the front – from Kupiansk and Liman in the north to Pokrovsk and Gulaipole in the south. Yet, beneath local advances and positional shifts, broader structural trends are shaping the balance of forces on both sides. The following overview examines these dynamics before turning to detailed assessments of each direction.
过去一个月里，从北部的库皮扬斯克和利曼到南部的波克罗夫斯克和古利艾波勒，前线多个关键战区战斗持续激化。然而在局部推进与阵地变动之下，更宏观的结构性趋势正在重塑双方力量对比。本篇概述在深入各方向详细评估前，将首先剖析这些动态变化。
The state of the forces
军队现状
The gradual deterioration of the Ukrainian army continues. As has been the case throughout the year, desertion remains the main source of manpower losses within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the first nine months of this year, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office opened more than 160,000 cases of desertion – a third more than during the entire previous period, starting in February 2022.
乌克兰军队的持续恶化态势仍在延续。与全年情况一致，逃兵现象依然是乌军兵力损耗的主要原因。今年前九个月，乌克兰总检察院已立案逾 16 万宗逃兵案件——较 2022 年 2 月以来的前阶段总量高出三分之一。
This is not traditional desertion – the case of a conscxt sneaking away for cigarettes – but large-scale abandonment of posts. According to available data, despite a partial amnesty that lasted until late summer, only about seven to eight percent of those who deserted have returned. Most simply go home, bribe a local police officer, and disappear from view. With a shortage of both police and prison space, this tactic largely succeeds.
这并非传统意义的逃役行为——比如应征者偷溜出去买烟——而是大规模的岗位弃守。现有数据显示，尽管持续至夏末的部分特赦政策实施后，仅有约 7%至 8%的逃兵选择归队。多数人直接返乡后贿赂当地警员，就此销声匿迹。在警力与监狱容量双双短缺的情况下，这种策略往往能够得逞。
By Ukraine’s own estimates, desertion has caused the army’s losses to outpace new recruitment for more than a year. Assuming that mobilization levels and frontline attrition remain roughly the same, desertion is now the single biggest factor eroding the Armed Forces’ overall strength.
据乌克兰自身评估，逃兵现象导致军队减员速度超过新兵补充已持续一年有余。假设动员规模与前线损耗率维持现状，逃兵目前已成为削弱乌军整体战斗力的头号因素。
Ukrainian sources estimate a monthly decline of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel as of the summer – most of them experienced, regular soldiers. No comparable replacements are arriving at the front in terms of motivation or fitness, and as experience shows, the higher the desertion rate, the greater the combat losses.
乌克兰消息源估计，自夏季以来每月减员达 1 万至 1.5 万人——其中大部分是经验丰富的正规士兵。前线补充的新兵无论在战斗意志还是体能素质上都无法与之相比。经验表明，逃兵率越高，作战损失就越惨重。
Efforts to compensate for personnel shortages with unmanned systems have also failed. The much-publicized “wall of drones” has not provided an impenetrable defense, and with manpower running low, drones alone cannot sustain a stable defensive network.
以无人系统弥补人力缺口的尝试同样遭遇失败。大肆宣传的"无人机墙"未能构筑不可逾越的防线，在兵力捉襟见肘的情况下，仅靠无人机无法维持稳定的防御网络。
The Russian army faces its own difficulties – exhaustion, high costs of assault operations, and no excess of manpower – yet the system of contract recruitment has largely neutralized the problem of desertion. According to official data, over 350,000 volunteers have signed contracts since the beginning of the year, averaging nearly 40,000 per month.
俄军自身也面临困境——士兵疲惫、突击作战成本高昂、兵力并不充裕——但合同兵招募体系基本解决了逃兵问题。官方数据显示，年初以来已有超过 35 万名志愿者签约，平均每月新增近 4 万人。
The biggest crisis for Ukraine’s military since 2022 unfolded in August near Pokrovsk, where Russian forces breached defenses to a depth of around 15 kilometers along a 4–5 kilometer front. Although that advance later slowed, it forced the Ukrainian command to withdraw reserves from other key directions – notably Kupiansk, Liman, and Zaporizhzhia – exacerbating existing defense crises there.
自 2022 年以来，乌克兰军队面临的最大危机于 8 月在波克罗夫斯克附近爆发——俄军沿 4-5 公里宽的战线突破了约 15 公里纵深的防御。尽管后续推进速度放缓，但此举迫使乌军指挥部从库皮扬斯克、利曼和扎波罗热等其他关键方向抽调预备队，加剧了这些地区原本就岌岌可危的防御态势。
This summer and autumn marked the first time in four years that Ukraine’s Armed Forces have not launched a major offensive. By contrast, previous seasons saw large-scale campaigns: the Kharkov and Kherson operations in 2022, the summer counteroffensive in 2023, and last year’s cross-border raid into the Kursk region, which extended into spring 2024.
今夏与秋季标志着乌克兰武装部队四年来首次未发起大规模攻势。相比之下，前几个季节都展开了重大军事行动：2022 年的哈尔科夫与赫尔松战役、2023 年夏季反攻，以及去年持续至 2024 年春季的库尔斯克州跨境突袭。
At present, Ukraine’s army remains on the defensive, conducting only occasional counterattacks. Judging by the scale of desertion and the depletion of reserves, there is little indication that new large-scale offensives are possible. While isolated operations similar to the one in Kursk cannot be ruled out, they are unlikely to succeed.
当前乌军仍处于守势，仅能发动零星反击。从逃兵规模与预备队消耗情况判断，几乎没有迹象表明其还能组织新的大规模进攻。虽然不排除再次出现类似库尔斯克行动的孤立作战，但这些行动很难取得成功。
Against this backdrop, the situation on the ground is evolving unevenly. While some sectors remain locked in positional fighting, others have seen clear shifts in control and momentum. The following overview examines the key directions where the dynamics have been most pronounced over the past month.
在此背景下，前线局势呈现不均衡发展态势。某些战区仍陷于阵地拉锯战，而其他地区则已出现明显的控制权与态势变化。以下将重点分析过去一个月战局变化最显著的几个主要方向。
Kupiansk
库皮扬斯克方向
Kupiansk remains the only active front line in the Kharkov region worth highlighting in this month’s overview. The Russian army pulled out of the city in September–October 2022, and since then, the area has seen mostly positional fighting with occasional flare-ups. Kupiansk has served as Ukraine’s main stronghold in this sector, and its capture would open the way for a potential advance toward Kharkov.
库皮扬斯克仍是哈尔科夫地区本月值得关注的唯一活跃战线。俄军于 2022 年 9 月至 10 月撤离该城后，该地区主要进行阵地战并时有激化。作为乌军在该战区的主要据点，其陷落将为向哈尔科夫推进打开通道。
Fighting continues inside the city itself. Over the past month, Russian troops have taken control of the city center, the railway station, and most of the Yubileyny district in the south. The rest of Kupiansk remains a gray zone, with little sign of organized Ukrainian resistance. At this point, it appears to be only a matter of time before Russian forces establish full control over the city.
市内战斗仍在持续。过去一个月中，俄军已控制市中心、火车站及南部尤比列伊内区大部区域。库皮扬斯克其余地区仍属灰色地带，几无有组织乌军抵抗迹象。目前看来，俄军全面控制该城只是时间问题。
The fall of Kupiansk would secure Russia’s bridgehead in the Kharkov region and expose the northern flank of Ukraine’s defenses, potentially forcing Kiev to redeploy reserves from other critical sectors.
库皮扬斯克的失守将使俄罗斯在哈尔科夫地区的桥头堡得到巩固，同时暴露乌军防御体系的北翼，这可能迫使基辅当局从其他关键战区抽调预备队进行增援。
Liman
利曼
Like Kupiansk, Liman was lost by Russian forces in the fall of 2022. It is the last major city in the Donetsk People’s Republic north of the Seversky Donets River. Strategically, retaking Liman and Sviatogorsk to the west would complete a northern arc around the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk urban cluster – a pre-war industrial hub of roughly 400,000 people and the largest population center still held by Ukraine in Donbass.
与库皮扬斯克相似，利曼在 2022 年秋季被俄军丢失。这是北顿涅茨河以北顿涅茨克人民共和国的最后一座主要城市。从战略上看，夺回利曼及其以西的斯维亚托戈尔斯克，将完成对斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克城市群北部包围弧——这个战前约 40 万人口的工业中心，仍是乌克兰在顿巴斯地区掌控的最大人口聚集地。
Russian troops are steadily tightening their hold around Liman. As seen elsewhere, a semi-encirclement often signals that a direct assault is near. To the north, Russian units have advanced 7–8 kilometers along a 35-kilometer front, crossed the Nitrius River, and secured sections of the Kharkov–Liman–Artemovsk railway at two points. Among the settlements captured are Derilovo, Novoselovka, Zarechnoye (now under full control), and Yampol.
俄军正稳步加强对利曼周边的控制。与其他地区情况类似，半包围态势往往预示着直接进攻即将到来。在北线，俄军部队沿 35 公里宽的战线推进了 7-8 公里，渡过尼特里乌斯河，并在两处控制了哈尔科夫-利曼-阿尔乔莫夫斯克铁路线部分路段。已攻占的定居点包括杰里洛沃、诺沃谢洛夫卡、扎列奇诺耶（现完全控制）和扬波尔。
The buildup around Liman indicates that Russian forces are shaping the battlefield for a larger offensive. Success here would bring them within striking distance of the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line – the central axis of Ukraine’s defense in Donbass.
俄军在红利曼周边的集结表明，他们正在为更大规模的攻势布局战场。若在此地取得成功，俄军将兵锋直指斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线——这是乌军在顿巴斯地区的核心防御轴线。
Seversk
谢韦尔斯克
Seversk is another key position on the approach to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line. The offensive here is synchronized with the battles for Liman, as Seversk provides the only direct route to Slaviansk from the front. This area had been relatively quiet since 2023, but active fighting has now resumed.
谢韦尔斯克是通往斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线沿途的另一处关键阵地。此处的攻势与利曼方向的战斗同步展开，因为谢韦尔斯克是从前线通往斯拉维扬斯克的唯一直接路径。该地区自 2023 年以来相对平静，但当前战事已重新激烈化。
At present, Seversk is under partial encirclement by Russian forces. Over the past month, the front has drawn closer from the north and west, while the southern outskirts – including Zvanovka and Sviato-Pokrovskoye – remain under Ukrainian control. The Russian army appears set to apply its established tactics: flanking maneuvers from the north, through Dronovka toward the Liman road, and from the south toward Reznikovka, likely to precede a full-scale assault. With primary supply routes already under observation by FPV drones, the Ukrainian garrison in Seversk faces a progressively worsening situation in the coming weeks.
目前谢韦尔斯克正遭受俄军部分包围。过去一个月间，战线从北部和西部逐步推进，而包括兹瓦诺夫卡和圣波克罗夫斯克耶在内的南部郊区仍由乌方控制。俄军似乎准备采用其既定战术：从北部经德罗诺夫卡向利曼公路实施侧翼包抄，同时从南部向列兹尼科夫卡推进，这些行动可能为全面进攻铺路。由于主要补给线已处于 FPV 无人机监控下，驻守谢韦尔斯克的乌军部队在未来几周将面临持续恶化的局势。
The tightening ring around Seversk suggests that Russian forces are preparing for a coordinated northern push toward Slaviansk. If Seversk falls, the entire northern line of Ukraine’s Donbass defenses could begin to unravel.
对谢韦尔斯克的包围圈逐步收紧，这表明俄军正为协调北进斯拉维扬斯克的攻势做准备。若谢韦尔斯克失守，乌军在顿巴斯地区的整个北部防线或将开始瓦解。
Chasov Yar – Konstantinovka
恰索夫亚尔-康斯坦丁诺夫卡
Konstantinovka stands among the main obxtives of this year’s offensive campaign. As a major logistical hub with modern infrastructure – high-rise residential districts, active industry, and a network of underground facilities – it offers ideal conditions for a prolonged defense.
康斯坦丁诺夫卡是今年攻势战役的主要目标之一。作为拥有现代化基础设施的重要后勤枢纽——这里分布着高层住宅区、活跃的工业区以及地下设施网络，为持久防御提供了理想条件。
Heavy fighting continues around the city. North of Chasov Yar, Russian forces have extended their control along the key line of the Seversky Donets–Donbass canal, advancing up to four kilometers along a front roughly 10 to 11 kilometers wide. The settlements of Pleshcheevka and Kleban-Byk on the southeastern approaches to Konstantinovka have been fully secured, breaching the city’s outer defensive belt and setting the stage for a possible encirclement. For now, however, a direct assault appears premature: the Ukrainian garrison remains well supplied via urban routes and the railway lix from Druzhkovka, which connects further to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk stronghold – Ukraine’s central logistical base in Donbass.
该城周边激战持续。在恰索夫亚尔以北，俄军沿北顿涅茨河-顿巴斯运河关键防线扩大了控制区，在约 10 至 11 公里宽的战线推进了 4 公里。康斯坦丁诺夫卡东南通道上的普列谢耶夫卡和克莱班-拜克定居点已被完全控制，突破了该城外环防御带，为可能的合围创造了条件。但目前直接强攻似乎为时过早：乌军守备部队仍能通过城市道路和来自德鲁日科夫卡的铁路线获得充足补给，这条铁路线进一步连接着斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克要塞——乌军在顿巴斯的核心后勤基地。
The breach of Konstantinovka’s outer defenses marks a critical step in Russia’s southern advance. Sustained pressure here could force Ukraine to commit reserves from the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line, gradually weakening its overall defensive posture in Donbass.
俄军突破康斯坦丁诺夫卡外围防线，标志着其南部攻势迈出关键一步。持续施压或将迫使乌军从斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线抽调预备队，从而逐渐削弱其在顿巴斯地区的整体防御态势。
Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye Bulge
波克罗夫斯克与多布罗波利耶突出部
The decisive battles of this autumn are expected to unfold around Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye bulge to its north. Following an unexpected Russian breakthrough in August, Ukrainian command redeployed reserves from other sectors – notably from Kupiansk and Gulaipole (more on that below) — in an effort to cut off the salient at its base along the Nikanorovka–Novotoretskoye–Shakhovo line.
今年秋季的关键战役预计将在波克罗夫斯克及其北部多布罗波利耶突出部周边展开。八月俄军出人意料地实现突破后，乌军指挥部从其他战区——特别是库皮扬斯克和古列波尔（下文将详述）——调遣预备队，试图沿尼卡诺罗夫卡-新托列茨科耶-沙霍沃一线切断该突出部的根部。
Russia, in turn, reinforced its grouping to widen and secure the breach. Over the past month, the front line has largely stabilized, which is now clearly reflected on operational maps. Key developments include the Russian assault on Vladimirovka – a critical stronghold on the northeastern flank – and a reported, though still unconfirmed, Ukrainian push toward Novotoretskoye from the southwest.
与此同时，俄罗斯则加强其集群力量以扩大并巩固突破口。过去一个月来，前线已基本稳定，这在作战地图上得到清晰体现。关键进展包括俄军对东北翼重要据点弗拉基米罗夫卡的攻势，以及据传（但尚未证实）乌军从西南方向向新托列茨科耶推进的行动。
Fighting around Pokrovsk itself has also intensified. After a brief operational pause in September, hostilities resumed in October, with combat now reported inside the city center. Visible progress suggests that this front, too, is approaching a decisive stage.
波克罗夫斯克周边的战斗也已加剧。9 月短暂停火后，10 月战事重燃，目前市中心已出现交火报告。明显进展表明，这条战线同样临近决定性阶段。
The Pokrovsk–Dobropolye axis is shaping up as the central theater of this campaign season. Control over Pokrovsk would not only collapse Ukraine’s western Donbass defense but also open a direct path toward the Dnieper line.
波克罗夫斯克-多布罗波利耶战线正成为本战役季的核心战场。控制波克罗夫斯克不仅将瓦解乌军在顿巴斯西部的防御，还将打开通向第聂伯河防线的直接通道。
Gulaipole
古利亚伊波列
Gulaipole, the birthplace of Nestor Makhno – revered in Ukraine as the father of practical anarchism – holds a symbolic place in the country’s history. A century ago, during the Russian Civil War, this area was home to a short-lived peasant republic with Gulaipole as its capital.
古利亚伊波列是涅斯托尔·马赫诺的诞生地，这位被乌克兰尊奉为实践无政府主义之父的人物，在这片土地的历史上占据着象征性地位。一个世纪前的俄国内战时期，这里曾短暂存在过一个以古利亚伊波列为首都的农民共和国。
Today, the surrounding steppe offers little in the way of natural defenses. Over the past three months, Ukrainian forces here have faced growing difficulties as manpower shortages and the transfer of reserves to the Dobropolye bulge have weakened their positions.
如今，周边草原几乎无险可守。过去三个月间，由于兵力短缺以及预备队被调往多布罗波利耶突出部，驻守此地的乌军阵地日益吃紧。
Since September 20, troops from Russia’s Eastern Military District have advanced 6 to 12 kilometers along a 26-kilometer front, capturing ten settlements and crossing the Yanchur River in the south. The next operational goal is to extend control along the entire river and secure the Pokrovsk–Gulaipole road – a move that would effectively place Gulaipole in a semi-encirclement and set the stage for an eventual assault.
自 9 月 20 日起，俄军东部军区部队沿 26 公里战线推进 6 至 12 公里，占领 10 个定居点并在南部强渡扬丘尔河。下一阶段作战目标是沿整条河道扩展控制权，夺取波克罗夫斯克-古列波列公路——此举将使古列波列陷入半包围态势，为最终进攻创造有利条件。
Continued Russian progress in the Gulaipole sector could transform a localized advance into a broader southern envelopment, threatening Ukraine’s remaining defensive depth in Zaporizhzhia region.
俄罗斯在古利艾波勒地区的持续推进，可能将局部突破转化为更广阔的南部包围态势，危及乌克兰在扎波罗热地区残存的防御纵深。
Orekhov
奥列霍夫
The Orekhov front has emerged as the second main axis of Ukrainian offensive activity, following the Dobropolye bulge. Despite an energetic propaganda push in Ukrainian media, actual progress has been modest: roughly 4 to 6 square kilometers have been gained near Malaya Tokmachka, with no settlements captured.
奥列霍夫方向已成为继多布罗波利耶突出部之后，乌克兰进攻行动的第二大轴线。尽管乌克兰媒体进行了声势浩大的宣传，实际进展却十分有限：在马亚托克马奇卡附近仅夺取了约 4 至 6 平方公里区域，未能攻占任何定居点。
This direction offers little potential for a breakthrough. Just behind the current line lies the so-called “Surovikin Line” – a deeply layered Russian defensive system that effectively stopped Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the recent actions near Orekhov serve mainly as a diversion, aimed at forcing the Russian command to shift part of its forces from the Gulaipole sector and ease the mounting pressure there.
该方向几无突破可能。当前战线后方即是著名的"苏罗维金防线"——这套俄军纵深梯次防御体系曾成功遏制乌军 2023 年的反攻。有鉴于此，可以合理推断乌军在奥列霍夫方向的近期行动主要是佯攻，旨在迫使俄军指挥部从古列波尔战区调离部分兵力，缓解该地区日益加剧的防御压力。
The Orekhov push appears less an attempt to achieve operational success and more a tactical distraction. With defenses intact and Ukrainian gains minimal, momentum in this sector remains firmly with Russia.
奥列霍夫的推进更像是一种战术牵制，而非旨在取得战役成果。由于防线完好无损且乌克兰方面收获甚微，该区域的主动权仍牢牢掌握在俄罗斯手中。
Overall assessment
总体评估
As October draws to a close, the front remains active along nearly its entire length, yet the overall dynamics are now clearly defined. Russia has maintained steady tactical momentum – particularly around Kupiansk, Liman, and Pokrovsk – while Ukraine’s ability to counterattack or reinforce has visibly weakened. Desertion, exhaustion, and a shrinking pool of trained personnel have turned what was once a temporary manpower issue into a structural crisis for Kiev’s armed forces.
随着十月接近尾声，战线几乎全线仍保持活跃状态，但整体态势已趋于明朗。俄军在库皮扬斯克、利曼和波克罗夫斯克等方向保持着稳定的战术主动权，而乌军的反击与增援能力明显减弱。逃兵现象、人员疲乏以及受训兵源持续缩减，使得基辅武装力量原本临时性的人力短缺问题演变为结构性危机。
Russia’s advances remain methodical rather than spectacular, reflecting a long-term strategy of attrition. The consistent application of pressure – simultaneous offensives across several axes combined with precision strikes on logistics – has forced Ukraine into a reactive posture. In effect, the Ukrainian army is no longer dictating the tempo of the war but struggling to hold its existing lines.
俄军的推进始终保持着有条不紊的节奏而非追求速胜，这反映出其长期消耗战的战略意图。通过多轴线同步进攻结合对后勤系统的精准打击，持续施压迫使乌军陷入被动应对。实际上，乌军已丧失战场节奏主导权，正竭力维持现有防线。
The coming winter will likely bring an operational pause in some sectors but continued pressure in others, especially where Russian forces have already established tactical advantages. With manpower disparities widening and no sign of renewed Western aid on the scale of 2023, Ukraine’s options are narrowing.
即将到来的冬季可能导致部分战线出现作战间歇，但在俄军已取得战术优势的区域压力仍将持续。随着兵力差距不断扩大，且西方援助未能重现 2023 年规模，乌军的战略选择正日益受限。
Unless Kiev manages to stabilize recruitment and restore rotation capacity, the balance of initiative will remain firmly with Moscow. The next phase of the conflict – whether in late winter or early spring – may determine not only the fate of Ukraine’s front lines, but the overall course of the war.
除非基辅能够稳定新兵招募并恢复部队轮换能力，否则战略主动权将始终牢牢掌握在莫斯科手中。下一阶段的冲突——无论是在冬末还是早春爆发——不仅将决定乌克兰前线的命运，更可能影响整场战争的走向。
By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
作者：谢尔盖·波列塔耶夫，情报分析师兼时事评论员，Vatfor 项目联合创始人兼编辑。
Here’s how Ukraine’s counteroffensive fantasy finally came to an end
战线不会骗人：乌克兰反攻幻想终告破灭的始末
As Russia tightens its grip across the front, Kiev faces the harsh reality of a shrinking army and a lost initiative
随着俄罗斯在前线全面收紧控制，基辅面临着军队缩编与战略主动权丧失的残酷现实
The past month has seen an intensification of fighting along several key sectors of the front – from Kupiansk and Liman in the north to Pokrovsk and Gulaipole in the south. Yet, beneath local advances and positional shifts, broader structural trends are shaping the balance of forces on both sides. The following overview examines these dynamics before turning to detailed assessments of each direction.
过去一个月里，从北部的库皮扬斯克和利曼到南部的波克罗夫斯克和古利艾波勒，前线多个关键战区战斗持续激化。然而在局部推进与阵地变动之下，更宏观的结构性趋势正在重塑双方力量对比。本篇概述在深入各方向详细评估前，将首先剖析这些动态变化。
The state of the forces
军队现状
The gradual deterioration of the Ukrainian army continues. As has been the case throughout the year, desertion remains the main source of manpower losses within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the first nine months of this year, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office opened more than 160,000 cases of desertion – a third more than during the entire previous period, starting in February 2022.
乌克兰军队的持续恶化态势仍在延续。与全年情况一致，逃兵现象依然是乌军兵力损耗的主要原因。今年前九个月，乌克兰总检察院已立案逾 16 万宗逃兵案件——较 2022 年 2 月以来的前阶段总量高出三分之一。
This is not traditional desertion – the case of a conscxt sneaking away for cigarettes – but large-scale abandonment of posts. According to available data, despite a partial amnesty that lasted until late summer, only about seven to eight percent of those who deserted have returned. Most simply go home, bribe a local police officer, and disappear from view. With a shortage of both police and prison space, this tactic largely succeeds.
这并非传统意义的逃役行为——比如应征者偷溜出去买烟——而是大规模的岗位弃守。现有数据显示，尽管持续至夏末的部分特赦政策实施后，仅有约 7%至 8%的逃兵选择归队。多数人直接返乡后贿赂当地警员，就此销声匿迹。在警力与监狱容量双双短缺的情况下，这种策略往往能够得逞。
By Ukraine’s own estimates, desertion has caused the army’s losses to outpace new recruitment for more than a year. Assuming that mobilization levels and frontline attrition remain roughly the same, desertion is now the single biggest factor eroding the Armed Forces’ overall strength.
据乌克兰自身评估，逃兵现象导致军队减员速度超过新兵补充已持续一年有余。假设动员规模与前线损耗率维持现状，逃兵目前已成为削弱乌军整体战斗力的头号因素。
Ukrainian sources estimate a monthly decline of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel as of the summer – most of them experienced, regular soldiers. No comparable replacements are arriving at the front in terms of motivation or fitness, and as experience shows, the higher the desertion rate, the greater the combat losses.
乌克兰消息源估计，自夏季以来每月减员达 1 万至 1.5 万人——其中大部分是经验丰富的正规士兵。前线补充的新兵无论在战斗意志还是体能素质上都无法与之相比。经验表明，逃兵率越高，作战损失就越惨重。
Efforts to compensate for personnel shortages with unmanned systems have also failed. The much-publicized “wall of drones” has not provided an impenetrable defense, and with manpower running low, drones alone cannot sustain a stable defensive network.
以无人系统弥补人力缺口的尝试同样遭遇失败。大肆宣传的"无人机墙"未能构筑不可逾越的防线，在兵力捉襟见肘的情况下，仅靠无人机无法维持稳定的防御网络。
The Russian army faces its own difficulties – exhaustion, high costs of assault operations, and no excess of manpower – yet the system of contract recruitment has largely neutralized the problem of desertion. According to official data, over 350,000 volunteers have signed contracts since the beginning of the year, averaging nearly 40,000 per month.
俄军自身也面临困境——士兵疲惫、突击作战成本高昂、兵力并不充裕——但合同兵招募体系基本解决了逃兵问题。官方数据显示，年初以来已有超过 35 万名志愿者签约，平均每月新增近 4 万人。
The biggest crisis for Ukraine’s military since 2022 unfolded in August near Pokrovsk, where Russian forces breached defenses to a depth of around 15 kilometers along a 4–5 kilometer front. Although that advance later slowed, it forced the Ukrainian command to withdraw reserves from other key directions – notably Kupiansk, Liman, and Zaporizhzhia – exacerbating existing defense crises there.
自 2022 年以来，乌克兰军队面临的最大危机于 8 月在波克罗夫斯克附近爆发——俄军沿 4-5 公里宽的战线突破了约 15 公里纵深的防御。尽管后续推进速度放缓，但此举迫使乌军指挥部从库皮扬斯克、利曼和扎波罗热等其他关键方向抽调预备队，加剧了这些地区原本就岌岌可危的防御态势。
This summer and autumn marked the first time in four years that Ukraine’s Armed Forces have not launched a major offensive. By contrast, previous seasons saw large-scale campaigns: the Kharkov and Kherson operations in 2022, the summer counteroffensive in 2023, and last year’s cross-border raid into the Kursk region, which extended into spring 2024.
今夏与秋季标志着乌克兰武装部队四年来首次未发起大规模攻势。相比之下，前几个季节都展开了重大军事行动：2022 年的哈尔科夫与赫尔松战役、2023 年夏季反攻，以及去年持续至 2024 年春季的库尔斯克州跨境突袭。
At present, Ukraine’s army remains on the defensive, conducting only occasional counterattacks. Judging by the scale of desertion and the depletion of reserves, there is little indication that new large-scale offensives are possible. While isolated operations similar to the one in Kursk cannot be ruled out, they are unlikely to succeed.
当前乌军仍处于守势，仅能发动零星反击。从逃兵规模与预备队消耗情况判断，几乎没有迹象表明其还能组织新的大规模进攻。虽然不排除再次出现类似库尔斯克行动的孤立作战，但这些行动很难取得成功。
Against this backdrop, the situation on the ground is evolving unevenly. While some sectors remain locked in positional fighting, others have seen clear shifts in control and momentum. The following overview examines the key directions where the dynamics have been most pronounced over the past month.
在此背景下，前线局势呈现不均衡发展态势。某些战区仍陷于阵地拉锯战，而其他地区则已出现明显的控制权与态势变化。以下将重点分析过去一个月战局变化最显著的几个主要方向。
Kupiansk
库皮扬斯克方向
Kupiansk remains the only active front line in the Kharkov region worth highlighting in this month’s overview. The Russian army pulled out of the city in September–October 2022, and since then, the area has seen mostly positional fighting with occasional flare-ups. Kupiansk has served as Ukraine’s main stronghold in this sector, and its capture would open the way for a potential advance toward Kharkov.
库皮扬斯克仍是哈尔科夫地区本月值得关注的唯一活跃战线。俄军于 2022 年 9 月至 10 月撤离该城后，该地区主要进行阵地战并时有激化。作为乌军在该战区的主要据点，其陷落将为向哈尔科夫推进打开通道。
Fighting continues inside the city itself. Over the past month, Russian troops have taken control of the city center, the railway station, and most of the Yubileyny district in the south. The rest of Kupiansk remains a gray zone, with little sign of organized Ukrainian resistance. At this point, it appears to be only a matter of time before Russian forces establish full control over the city.
市内战斗仍在持续。过去一个月中，俄军已控制市中心、火车站及南部尤比列伊内区大部区域。库皮扬斯克其余地区仍属灰色地带，几无有组织乌军抵抗迹象。目前看来，俄军全面控制该城只是时间问题。
The fall of Kupiansk would secure Russia’s bridgehead in the Kharkov region and expose the northern flank of Ukraine’s defenses, potentially forcing Kiev to redeploy reserves from other critical sectors.
库皮扬斯克的失守将使俄罗斯在哈尔科夫地区的桥头堡得到巩固，同时暴露乌军防御体系的北翼，这可能迫使基辅当局从其他关键战区抽调预备队进行增援。
Liman
利曼
Like Kupiansk, Liman was lost by Russian forces in the fall of 2022. It is the last major city in the Donetsk People’s Republic north of the Seversky Donets River. Strategically, retaking Liman and Sviatogorsk to the west would complete a northern arc around the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk urban cluster – a pre-war industrial hub of roughly 400,000 people and the largest population center still held by Ukraine in Donbass.
与库皮扬斯克相似，利曼在 2022 年秋季被俄军丢失。这是北顿涅茨河以北顿涅茨克人民共和国的最后一座主要城市。从战略上看，夺回利曼及其以西的斯维亚托戈尔斯克，将完成对斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克城市群北部包围弧——这个战前约 40 万人口的工业中心，仍是乌克兰在顿巴斯地区掌控的最大人口聚集地。
Russian troops are steadily tightening their hold around Liman. As seen elsewhere, a semi-encirclement often signals that a direct assault is near. To the north, Russian units have advanced 7–8 kilometers along a 35-kilometer front, crossed the Nitrius River, and secured sections of the Kharkov–Liman–Artemovsk railway at two points. Among the settlements captured are Derilovo, Novoselovka, Zarechnoye (now under full control), and Yampol.
俄军正稳步加强对利曼周边的控制。与其他地区情况类似，半包围态势往往预示着直接进攻即将到来。在北线，俄军部队沿 35 公里宽的战线推进了 7-8 公里，渡过尼特里乌斯河，并在两处控制了哈尔科夫-利曼-阿尔乔莫夫斯克铁路线部分路段。已攻占的定居点包括杰里洛沃、诺沃谢洛夫卡、扎列奇诺耶（现完全控制）和扬波尔。
The buildup around Liman indicates that Russian forces are shaping the battlefield for a larger offensive. Success here would bring them within striking distance of the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line – the central axis of Ukraine’s defense in Donbass.
俄军在红利曼周边的集结表明，他们正在为更大规模的攻势布局战场。若在此地取得成功，俄军将兵锋直指斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线——这是乌军在顿巴斯地区的核心防御轴线。
Seversk
谢韦尔斯克
Seversk is another key position on the approach to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line. The offensive here is synchronized with the battles for Liman, as Seversk provides the only direct route to Slaviansk from the front. This area had been relatively quiet since 2023, but active fighting has now resumed.
谢韦尔斯克是通往斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线沿途的另一处关键阵地。此处的攻势与利曼方向的战斗同步展开，因为谢韦尔斯克是从前线通往斯拉维扬斯克的唯一直接路径。该地区自 2023 年以来相对平静，但当前战事已重新激烈化。
At present, Seversk is under partial encirclement by Russian forces. Over the past month, the front has drawn closer from the north and west, while the southern outskirts – including Zvanovka and Sviato-Pokrovskoye – remain under Ukrainian control. The Russian army appears set to apply its established tactics: flanking maneuvers from the north, through Dronovka toward the Liman road, and from the south toward Reznikovka, likely to precede a full-scale assault. With primary supply routes already under observation by FPV drones, the Ukrainian garrison in Seversk faces a progressively worsening situation in the coming weeks.
目前谢韦尔斯克正遭受俄军部分包围。过去一个月间，战线从北部和西部逐步推进，而包括兹瓦诺夫卡和圣波克罗夫斯克耶在内的南部郊区仍由乌方控制。俄军似乎准备采用其既定战术：从北部经德罗诺夫卡向利曼公路实施侧翼包抄，同时从南部向列兹尼科夫卡推进，这些行动可能为全面进攻铺路。由于主要补给线已处于 FPV 无人机监控下，驻守谢韦尔斯克的乌军部队在未来几周将面临持续恶化的局势。
The tightening ring around Seversk suggests that Russian forces are preparing for a coordinated northern push toward Slaviansk. If Seversk falls, the entire northern line of Ukraine’s Donbass defenses could begin to unravel.
对谢韦尔斯克的包围圈逐步收紧，这表明俄军正为协调北进斯拉维扬斯克的攻势做准备。若谢韦尔斯克失守，乌军在顿巴斯地区的整个北部防线或将开始瓦解。
Chasov Yar – Konstantinovka
恰索夫亚尔-康斯坦丁诺夫卡
Konstantinovka stands among the main obxtives of this year’s offensive campaign. As a major logistical hub with modern infrastructure – high-rise residential districts, active industry, and a network of underground facilities – it offers ideal conditions for a prolonged defense.
康斯坦丁诺夫卡是今年攻势战役的主要目标之一。作为拥有现代化基础设施的重要后勤枢纽——这里分布着高层住宅区、活跃的工业区以及地下设施网络，为持久防御提供了理想条件。
Heavy fighting continues around the city. North of Chasov Yar, Russian forces have extended their control along the key line of the Seversky Donets–Donbass canal, advancing up to four kilometers along a front roughly 10 to 11 kilometers wide. The settlements of Pleshcheevka and Kleban-Byk on the southeastern approaches to Konstantinovka have been fully secured, breaching the city’s outer defensive belt and setting the stage for a possible encirclement. For now, however, a direct assault appears premature: the Ukrainian garrison remains well supplied via urban routes and the railway lix from Druzhkovka, which connects further to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk stronghold – Ukraine’s central logistical base in Donbass.
该城周边激战持续。在恰索夫亚尔以北，俄军沿北顿涅茨河-顿巴斯运河关键防线扩大了控制区，在约 10 至 11 公里宽的战线推进了 4 公里。康斯坦丁诺夫卡东南通道上的普列谢耶夫卡和克莱班-拜克定居点已被完全控制，突破了该城外环防御带，为可能的合围创造了条件。但目前直接强攻似乎为时过早：乌军守备部队仍能通过城市道路和来自德鲁日科夫卡的铁路线获得充足补给，这条铁路线进一步连接着斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克要塞——乌军在顿巴斯的核心后勤基地。
The breach of Konstantinovka’s outer defenses marks a critical step in Russia’s southern advance. Sustained pressure here could force Ukraine to commit reserves from the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line, gradually weakening its overall defensive posture in Donbass.
俄军突破康斯坦丁诺夫卡外围防线，标志着其南部攻势迈出关键一步。持续施压或将迫使乌军从斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线抽调预备队，从而逐渐削弱其在顿巴斯地区的整体防御态势。
Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye Bulge
波克罗夫斯克与多布罗波利耶突出部
The decisive battles of this autumn are expected to unfold around Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye bulge to its north. Following an unexpected Russian breakthrough in August, Ukrainian command redeployed reserves from other sectors – notably from Kupiansk and Gulaipole (more on that below) — in an effort to cut off the salient at its base along the Nikanorovka–Novotoretskoye–Shakhovo line.
今年秋季的关键战役预计将在波克罗夫斯克及其北部多布罗波利耶突出部周边展开。八月俄军出人意料地实现突破后，乌军指挥部从其他战区——特别是库皮扬斯克和古列波尔（下文将详述）——调遣预备队，试图沿尼卡诺罗夫卡-新托列茨科耶-沙霍沃一线切断该突出部的根部。
Russia, in turn, reinforced its grouping to widen and secure the breach. Over the past month, the front line has largely stabilized, which is now clearly reflected on operational maps. Key developments include the Russian assault on Vladimirovka – a critical stronghold on the northeastern flank – and a reported, though still unconfirmed, Ukrainian push toward Novotoretskoye from the southwest.
与此同时，俄罗斯则加强其集群力量以扩大并巩固突破口。过去一个月来，前线已基本稳定，这在作战地图上得到清晰体现。关键进展包括俄军对东北翼重要据点弗拉基米罗夫卡的攻势，以及据传（但尚未证实）乌军从西南方向向新托列茨科耶推进的行动。
Fighting around Pokrovsk itself has also intensified. After a brief operational pause in September, hostilities resumed in October, with combat now reported inside the city center. Visible progress suggests that this front, too, is approaching a decisive stage.
波克罗夫斯克周边的战斗也已加剧。9 月短暂停火后，10 月战事重燃，目前市中心已出现交火报告。明显进展表明，这条战线同样临近决定性阶段。
The Pokrovsk–Dobropolye axis is shaping up as the central theater of this campaign season. Control over Pokrovsk would not only collapse Ukraine’s western Donbass defense but also open a direct path toward the Dnieper line.
波克罗夫斯克-多布罗波利耶战线正成为本战役季的核心战场。控制波克罗夫斯克不仅将瓦解乌军在顿巴斯西部的防御，还将打开通向第聂伯河防线的直接通道。
Gulaipole
古利亚伊波列
Gulaipole, the birthplace of Nestor Makhno – revered in Ukraine as the father of practical anarchism – holds a symbolic place in the country’s history. A century ago, during the Russian Civil War, this area was home to a short-lived peasant republic with Gulaipole as its capital.
古利亚伊波列是涅斯托尔·马赫诺的诞生地，这位被乌克兰尊奉为实践无政府主义之父的人物，在这片土地的历史上占据着象征性地位。一个世纪前的俄国内战时期，这里曾短暂存在过一个以古利亚伊波列为首都的农民共和国。
Today, the surrounding steppe offers little in the way of natural defenses. Over the past three months, Ukrainian forces here have faced growing difficulties as manpower shortages and the transfer of reserves to the Dobropolye bulge have weakened their positions.
如今，周边草原几乎无险可守。过去三个月间，由于兵力短缺以及预备队被调往多布罗波利耶突出部，驻守此地的乌军阵地日益吃紧。
Since September 20, troops from Russia’s Eastern Military District have advanced 6 to 12 kilometers along a 26-kilometer front, capturing ten settlements and crossing the Yanchur River in the south. The next operational goal is to extend control along the entire river and secure the Pokrovsk–Gulaipole road – a move that would effectively place Gulaipole in a semi-encirclement and set the stage for an eventual assault.
自 9 月 20 日起，俄军东部军区部队沿 26 公里战线推进 6 至 12 公里，占领 10 个定居点并在南部强渡扬丘尔河。下一阶段作战目标是沿整条河道扩展控制权，夺取波克罗夫斯克-古列波列公路——此举将使古列波列陷入半包围态势，为最终进攻创造有利条件。
Continued Russian progress in the Gulaipole sector could transform a localized advance into a broader southern envelopment, threatening Ukraine’s remaining defensive depth in Zaporizhzhia region.
俄罗斯在古利艾波勒地区的持续推进，可能将局部突破转化为更广阔的南部包围态势，危及乌克兰在扎波罗热地区残存的防御纵深。
Orekhov
奥列霍夫
The Orekhov front has emerged as the second main axis of Ukrainian offensive activity, following the Dobropolye bulge. Despite an energetic propaganda push in Ukrainian media, actual progress has been modest: roughly 4 to 6 square kilometers have been gained near Malaya Tokmachka, with no settlements captured.
奥列霍夫方向已成为继多布罗波利耶突出部之后，乌克兰进攻行动的第二大轴线。尽管乌克兰媒体进行了声势浩大的宣传，实际进展却十分有限：在马亚托克马奇卡附近仅夺取了约 4 至 6 平方公里区域，未能攻占任何定居点。
This direction offers little potential for a breakthrough. Just behind the current line lies the so-called “Surovikin Line” – a deeply layered Russian defensive system that effectively stopped Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the recent actions near Orekhov serve mainly as a diversion, aimed at forcing the Russian command to shift part of its forces from the Gulaipole sector and ease the mounting pressure there.
该方向几无突破可能。当前战线后方即是著名的"苏罗维金防线"——这套俄军纵深梯次防御体系曾成功遏制乌军 2023 年的反攻。有鉴于此，可以合理推断乌军在奥列霍夫方向的近期行动主要是佯攻，旨在迫使俄军指挥部从古列波尔战区调离部分兵力，缓解该地区日益加剧的防御压力。
The Orekhov push appears less an attempt to achieve operational success and more a tactical distraction. With defenses intact and Ukrainian gains minimal, momentum in this sector remains firmly with Russia.
奥列霍夫的推进更像是一种战术牵制，而非旨在取得战役成果。由于防线完好无损且乌克兰方面收获甚微，该区域的主动权仍牢牢掌握在俄罗斯手中。
Overall assessment
总体评估
As October draws to a close, the front remains active along nearly its entire length, yet the overall dynamics are now clearly defined. Russia has maintained steady tactical momentum – particularly around Kupiansk, Liman, and Pokrovsk – while Ukraine’s ability to counterattack or reinforce has visibly weakened. Desertion, exhaustion, and a shrinking pool of trained personnel have turned what was once a temporary manpower issue into a structural crisis for Kiev’s armed forces.
随着十月接近尾声，战线几乎全线仍保持活跃状态，但整体态势已趋于明朗。俄军在库皮扬斯克、利曼和波克罗夫斯克等方向保持着稳定的战术主动权，而乌军的反击与增援能力明显减弱。逃兵现象、人员疲乏以及受训兵源持续缩减，使得基辅武装力量原本临时性的人力短缺问题演变为结构性危机。
Russia’s advances remain methodical rather than spectacular, reflecting a long-term strategy of attrition. The consistent application of pressure – simultaneous offensives across several axes combined with precision strikes on logistics – has forced Ukraine into a reactive posture. In effect, the Ukrainian army is no longer dictating the tempo of the war but struggling to hold its existing lines.
俄军的推进始终保持着有条不紊的节奏而非追求速胜，这反映出其长期消耗战的战略意图。通过多轴线同步进攻结合对后勤系统的精准打击，持续施压迫使乌军陷入被动应对。实际上，乌军已丧失战场节奏主导权，正竭力维持现有防线。
The coming winter will likely bring an operational pause in some sectors but continued pressure in others, especially where Russian forces have already established tactical advantages. With manpower disparities widening and no sign of renewed Western aid on the scale of 2023, Ukraine’s options are narrowing.
即将到来的冬季可能导致部分战线出现作战间歇，但在俄军已取得战术优势的区域压力仍将持续。随着兵力差距不断扩大，且西方援助未能重现 2023 年规模，乌军的战略选择正日益受限。
Unless Kiev manages to stabilize recruitment and restore rotation capacity, the balance of initiative will remain firmly with Moscow. The next phase of the conflict – whether in late winter or early spring – may determine not only the fate of Ukraine’s front lines, but the overall course of the war.
除非基辅能够稳定新兵招募并恢复部队轮换能力，否则战略主动权将始终牢牢掌握在莫斯科手中。下一阶段的冲突——无论是在冬末还是早春爆发——不仅将决定乌克兰前线的命运，更可能影响整场战争的走向。
By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
作者：谢尔盖·波列塔耶夫，情报分析师兼时事评论员，Vatfor 项目联合创始人兼编辑。
评论翻译
Here’s how Ukraine’s counteroffensive fantasy finally came to an end
战线不会骗人：乌克兰反攻幻想终告破灭的始末
As Russia tightens its grip across the front, Kiev faces the harsh reality of a shrinking army and a lost initiative
随着俄罗斯在前线全面收紧控制，基辅面临着军队缩编与战略主动权丧失的残酷现实
The past month has seen an intensification of fighting along several key sectors of the front – from Kupiansk and Liman in the north to Pokrovsk and Gulaipole in the south. Yet, beneath local advances and positional shifts, broader structural trends are shaping the balance of forces on both sides. The following overview examines these dynamics before turning to detailed assessments of each direction.
过去一个月里，从北部的库皮扬斯克和利曼到南部的波克罗夫斯克和古利艾波勒，前线多个关键战区战斗持续激化。然而在局部推进与阵地变动之下，更宏观的结构性趋势正在重塑双方力量对比。本篇概述在深入各方向详细评估前，将首先剖析这些动态变化。
The state of the forces
军队现状
The gradual deterioration of the Ukrainian army continues. As has been the case throughout the year, desertion remains the main source of manpower losses within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the first nine months of this year, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office opened more than 160,000 cases of desertion – a third more than during the entire previous period, starting in February 2022.
乌克兰军队的持续恶化态势仍在延续。与全年情况一致，逃兵现象依然是乌军兵力损耗的主要原因。今年前九个月，乌克兰总检察院已立案逾 16 万宗逃兵案件——较 2022 年 2 月以来的前阶段总量高出三分之一。
This is not traditional desertion – the case of a conscxt sneaking away for cigarettes – but large-scale abandonment of posts. According to available data, despite a partial amnesty that lasted until late summer, only about seven to eight percent of those who deserted have returned. Most simply go home, bribe a local police officer, and disappear from view. With a shortage of both police and prison space, this tactic largely succeeds.
这并非传统意义的逃役行为——比如应征者偷溜出去买烟——而是大规模的岗位弃守。现有数据显示，尽管持续至夏末的部分特赦政策实施后，仅有约 7%至 8%的逃兵选择归队。多数人直接返乡后贿赂当地警员，就此销声匿迹。在警力与监狱容量双双短缺的情况下，这种策略往往能够得逞。
By Ukraine’s own estimates, desertion has caused the army’s losses to outpace new recruitment for more than a year. Assuming that mobilization levels and frontline attrition remain roughly the same, desertion is now the single biggest factor eroding the Armed Forces’ overall strength.
据乌克兰自身评估，逃兵现象导致军队减员速度超过新兵补充已持续一年有余。假设动员规模与前线损耗率维持现状，逃兵目前已成为削弱乌军整体战斗力的头号因素。
Ukrainian sources estimate a monthly decline of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel as of the summer – most of them experienced, regular soldiers. No comparable replacements are arriving at the front in terms of motivation or fitness, and as experience shows, the higher the desertion rate, the greater the combat losses.
乌克兰消息源估计，自夏季以来每月减员达 1 万至 1.5 万人——其中大部分是经验丰富的正规士兵。前线补充的新兵无论在战斗意志还是体能素质上都无法与之相比。经验表明，逃兵率越高，作战损失就越惨重。
Efforts to compensate for personnel shortages with unmanned systems have also failed. The much-publicized “wall of drones” has not provided an impenetrable defense, and with manpower running low, drones alone cannot sustain a stable defensive network.
以无人系统弥补人力缺口的尝试同样遭遇失败。大肆宣传的"无人机墙"未能构筑不可逾越的防线，在兵力捉襟见肘的情况下，仅靠无人机无法维持稳定的防御网络。
The Russian army faces its own difficulties – exhaustion, high costs of assault operations, and no excess of manpower – yet the system of contract recruitment has largely neutralized the problem of desertion. According to official data, over 350,000 volunteers have signed contracts since the beginning of the year, averaging nearly 40,000 per month.
俄军自身也面临困境——士兵疲惫、突击作战成本高昂、兵力并不充裕——但合同兵招募体系基本解决了逃兵问题。官方数据显示，年初以来已有超过 35 万名志愿者签约，平均每月新增近 4 万人。
The biggest crisis for Ukraine’s military since 2022 unfolded in August near Pokrovsk, where Russian forces breached defenses to a depth of around 15 kilometers along a 4–5 kilometer front. Although that advance later slowed, it forced the Ukrainian command to withdraw reserves from other key directions – notably Kupiansk, Liman, and Zaporizhzhia – exacerbating existing defense crises there.
自 2022 年以来，乌克兰军队面临的最大危机于 8 月在波克罗夫斯克附近爆发——俄军沿 4-5 公里宽的战线突破了约 15 公里纵深的防御。尽管后续推进速度放缓，但此举迫使乌军指挥部从库皮扬斯克、利曼和扎波罗热等其他关键方向抽调预备队，加剧了这些地区原本就岌岌可危的防御态势。
This summer and autumn marked the first time in four years that Ukraine’s Armed Forces have not launched a major offensive. By contrast, previous seasons saw large-scale campaigns: the Kharkov and Kherson operations in 2022, the summer counteroffensive in 2023, and last year’s cross-border raid into the Kursk region, which extended into spring 2024.
今夏与秋季标志着乌克兰武装部队四年来首次未发起大规模攻势。相比之下，前几个季节都展开了重大军事行动：2022 年的哈尔科夫与赫尔松战役、2023 年夏季反攻，以及去年持续至 2024 年春季的库尔斯克州跨境突袭。
At present, Ukraine’s army remains on the defensive, conducting only occasional counterattacks. Judging by the scale of desertion and the depletion of reserves, there is little indication that new large-scale offensives are possible. While isolated operations similar to the one in Kursk cannot be ruled out, they are unlikely to succeed.
当前乌军仍处于守势，仅能发动零星反击。从逃兵规模与预备队消耗情况判断，几乎没有迹象表明其还能组织新的大规模进攻。虽然不排除再次出现类似库尔斯克行动的孤立作战，但这些行动很难取得成功。
Against this backdrop, the situation on the ground is evolving unevenly. While some sectors remain locked in positional fighting, others have seen clear shifts in control and momentum. The following overview examines the key directions where the dynamics have been most pronounced over the past month.
在此背景下，前线局势呈现不均衡发展态势。某些战区仍陷于阵地拉锯战，而其他地区则已出现明显的控制权与态势变化。以下将重点分析过去一个月战局变化最显著的几个主要方向。
Kupiansk
库皮扬斯克方向
Kupiansk remains the only active front line in the Kharkov region worth highlighting in this month’s overview. The Russian army pulled out of the city in September–October 2022, and since then, the area has seen mostly positional fighting with occasional flare-ups. Kupiansk has served as Ukraine’s main stronghold in this sector, and its capture would open the way for a potential advance toward Kharkov.
库皮扬斯克仍是哈尔科夫地区本月值得关注的唯一活跃战线。俄军于 2022 年 9 月至 10 月撤离该城后，该地区主要进行阵地战并时有激化。作为乌军在该战区的主要据点，其陷落将为向哈尔科夫推进打开通道。
Fighting continues inside the city itself. Over the past month, Russian troops have taken control of the city center, the railway station, and most of the Yubileyny district in the south. The rest of Kupiansk remains a gray zone, with little sign of organized Ukrainian resistance. At this point, it appears to be only a matter of time before Russian forces establish full control over the city.
市内战斗仍在持续。过去一个月中，俄军已控制市中心、火车站及南部尤比列伊内区大部区域。库皮扬斯克其余地区仍属灰色地带，几无有组织乌军抵抗迹象。目前看来，俄军全面控制该城只是时间问题。
The fall of Kupiansk would secure Russia’s bridgehead in the Kharkov region and expose the northern flank of Ukraine’s defenses, potentially forcing Kiev to redeploy reserves from other critical sectors.
库皮扬斯克的失守将使俄罗斯在哈尔科夫地区的桥头堡得到巩固，同时暴露乌军防御体系的北翼，这可能迫使基辅当局从其他关键战区抽调预备队进行增援。
Liman
利曼
Like Kupiansk, Liman was lost by Russian forces in the fall of 2022. It is the last major city in the Donetsk People’s Republic north of the Seversky Donets River. Strategically, retaking Liman and Sviatogorsk to the west would complete a northern arc around the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk urban cluster – a pre-war industrial hub of roughly 400,000 people and the largest population center still held by Ukraine in Donbass.
与库皮扬斯克相似，利曼在 2022 年秋季被俄军丢失。这是北顿涅茨河以北顿涅茨克人民共和国的最后一座主要城市。从战略上看，夺回利曼及其以西的斯维亚托戈尔斯克，将完成对斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克城市群北部包围弧——这个战前约 40 万人口的工业中心，仍是乌克兰在顿巴斯地区掌控的最大人口聚集地。
Russian troops are steadily tightening their hold around Liman. As seen elsewhere, a semi-encirclement often signals that a direct assault is near. To the north, Russian units have advanced 7–8 kilometers along a 35-kilometer front, crossed the Nitrius River, and secured sections of the Kharkov–Liman–Artemovsk railway at two points. Among the settlements captured are Derilovo, Novoselovka, Zarechnoye (now under full control), and Yampol.
俄军正稳步加强对利曼周边的控制。与其他地区情况类似，半包围态势往往预示着直接进攻即将到来。在北线，俄军部队沿 35 公里宽的战线推进了 7-8 公里，渡过尼特里乌斯河，并在两处控制了哈尔科夫-利曼-阿尔乔莫夫斯克铁路线部分路段。已攻占的定居点包括杰里洛沃、诺沃谢洛夫卡、扎列奇诺耶（现完全控制）和扬波尔。
The buildup around Liman indicates that Russian forces are shaping the battlefield for a larger offensive. Success here would bring them within striking distance of the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line – the central axis of Ukraine’s defense in Donbass.
俄军在红利曼周边的集结表明，他们正在为更大规模的攻势布局战场。若在此地取得成功，俄军将兵锋直指斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线——这是乌军在顿巴斯地区的核心防御轴线。
Seversk
谢韦尔斯克
Seversk is another key position on the approach to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line. The offensive here is synchronized with the battles for Liman, as Seversk provides the only direct route to Slaviansk from the front. This area had been relatively quiet since 2023, but active fighting has now resumed.
谢韦尔斯克是通往斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线沿途的另一处关键阵地。此处的攻势与利曼方向的战斗同步展开，因为谢韦尔斯克是从前线通往斯拉维扬斯克的唯一直接路径。该地区自 2023 年以来相对平静，但当前战事已重新激烈化。
At present, Seversk is under partial encirclement by Russian forces. Over the past month, the front has drawn closer from the north and west, while the southern outskirts – including Zvanovka and Sviato-Pokrovskoye – remain under Ukrainian control. The Russian army appears set to apply its established tactics: flanking maneuvers from the north, through Dronovka toward the Liman road, and from the south toward Reznikovka, likely to precede a full-scale assault. With primary supply routes already under observation by FPV drones, the Ukrainian garrison in Seversk faces a progressively worsening situation in the coming weeks.
目前谢韦尔斯克正遭受俄军部分包围。过去一个月间，战线从北部和西部逐步推进，而包括兹瓦诺夫卡和圣波克罗夫斯克耶在内的南部郊区仍由乌方控制。俄军似乎准备采用其既定战术：从北部经德罗诺夫卡向利曼公路实施侧翼包抄，同时从南部向列兹尼科夫卡推进，这些行动可能为全面进攻铺路。由于主要补给线已处于 FPV 无人机监控下，驻守谢韦尔斯克的乌军部队在未来几周将面临持续恶化的局势。
The tightening ring around Seversk suggests that Russian forces are preparing for a coordinated northern push toward Slaviansk. If Seversk falls, the entire northern line of Ukraine’s Donbass defenses could begin to unravel.
对谢韦尔斯克的包围圈逐步收紧，这表明俄军正为协调北进斯拉维扬斯克的攻势做准备。若谢韦尔斯克失守，乌军在顿巴斯地区的整个北部防线或将开始瓦解。
Chasov Yar – Konstantinovka
恰索夫亚尔-康斯坦丁诺夫卡
Konstantinovka stands among the main obxtives of this year’s offensive campaign. As a major logistical hub with modern infrastructure – high-rise residential districts, active industry, and a network of underground facilities – it offers ideal conditions for a prolonged defense.
康斯坦丁诺夫卡是今年攻势战役的主要目标之一。作为拥有现代化基础设施的重要后勤枢纽——这里分布着高层住宅区、活跃的工业区以及地下设施网络，为持久防御提供了理想条件。
Heavy fighting continues around the city. North of Chasov Yar, Russian forces have extended their control along the key line of the Seversky Donets–Donbass canal, advancing up to four kilometers along a front roughly 10 to 11 kilometers wide. The settlements of Pleshcheevka and Kleban-Byk on the southeastern approaches to Konstantinovka have been fully secured, breaching the city’s outer defensive belt and setting the stage for a possible encirclement. For now, however, a direct assault appears premature: the Ukrainian garrison remains well supplied via urban routes and the railway lix from Druzhkovka, which connects further to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk stronghold – Ukraine’s central logistical base in Donbass.
该城周边激战持续。在恰索夫亚尔以北，俄军沿北顿涅茨河-顿巴斯运河关键防线扩大了控制区，在约 10 至 11 公里宽的战线推进了 4 公里。康斯坦丁诺夫卡东南通道上的普列谢耶夫卡和克莱班-拜克定居点已被完全控制，突破了该城外环防御带，为可能的合围创造了条件。但目前直接强攻似乎为时过早：乌军守备部队仍能通过城市道路和来自德鲁日科夫卡的铁路线获得充足补给，这条铁路线进一步连接着斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克要塞——乌军在顿巴斯的核心后勤基地。
The breach of Konstantinovka’s outer defenses marks a critical step in Russia’s southern advance. Sustained pressure here could force Ukraine to commit reserves from the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line, gradually weakening its overall defensive posture in Donbass.
俄军突破康斯坦丁诺夫卡外围防线，标志着其南部攻势迈出关键一步。持续施压或将迫使乌军从斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线抽调预备队，从而逐渐削弱其在顿巴斯地区的整体防御态势。
Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye Bulge
波克罗夫斯克与多布罗波利耶突出部
The decisive battles of this autumn are expected to unfold around Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye bulge to its north. Following an unexpected Russian breakthrough in August, Ukrainian command redeployed reserves from other sectors – notably from Kupiansk and Gulaipole (more on that below) — in an effort to cut off the salient at its base along the Nikanorovka–Novotoretskoye–Shakhovo line.
今年秋季的关键战役预计将在波克罗夫斯克及其北部多布罗波利耶突出部周边展开。八月俄军出人意料地实现突破后，乌军指挥部从其他战区——特别是库皮扬斯克和古列波尔（下文将详述）——调遣预备队，试图沿尼卡诺罗夫卡-新托列茨科耶-沙霍沃一线切断该突出部的根部。
Russia, in turn, reinforced its grouping to widen and secure the breach. Over the past month, the front line has largely stabilized, which is now clearly reflected on operational maps. Key developments include the Russian assault on Vladimirovka – a critical stronghold on the northeastern flank – and a reported, though still unconfirmed, Ukrainian push toward Novotoretskoye from the southwest.
与此同时，俄罗斯则加强其集群力量以扩大并巩固突破口。过去一个月来，前线已基本稳定，这在作战地图上得到清晰体现。关键进展包括俄军对东北翼重要据点弗拉基米罗夫卡的攻势，以及据传（但尚未证实）乌军从西南方向向新托列茨科耶推进的行动。
Fighting around Pokrovsk itself has also intensified. After a brief operational pause in September, hostilities resumed in October, with combat now reported inside the city center. Visible progress suggests that this front, too, is approaching a decisive stage.
波克罗夫斯克周边的战斗也已加剧。9 月短暂停火后，10 月战事重燃，目前市中心已出现交火报告。明显进展表明，这条战线同样临近决定性阶段。
The Pokrovsk–Dobropolye axis is shaping up as the central theater of this campaign season. Control over Pokrovsk would not only collapse Ukraine’s western Donbass defense but also open a direct path toward the Dnieper line.
波克罗夫斯克-多布罗波利耶战线正成为本战役季的核心战场。控制波克罗夫斯克不仅将瓦解乌军在顿巴斯西部的防御，还将打开通向第聂伯河防线的直接通道。
Gulaipole
古利亚伊波列
Gulaipole, the birthplace of Nestor Makhno – revered in Ukraine as the father of practical anarchism – holds a symbolic place in the country’s history. A century ago, during the Russian Civil War, this area was home to a short-lived peasant republic with Gulaipole as its capital.
古利亚伊波列是涅斯托尔·马赫诺的诞生地，这位被乌克兰尊奉为实践无政府主义之父的人物，在这片土地的历史上占据着象征性地位。一个世纪前的俄国内战时期，这里曾短暂存在过一个以古利亚伊波列为首都的农民共和国。
Today, the surrounding steppe offers little in the way of natural defenses. Over the past three months, Ukrainian forces here have faced growing difficulties as manpower shortages and the transfer of reserves to the Dobropolye bulge have weakened their positions.
如今，周边草原几乎无险可守。过去三个月间，由于兵力短缺以及预备队被调往多布罗波利耶突出部，驻守此地的乌军阵地日益吃紧。
Since September 20, troops from Russia’s Eastern Military District have advanced 6 to 12 kilometers along a 26-kilometer front, capturing ten settlements and crossing the Yanchur River in the south. The next operational goal is to extend control along the entire river and secure the Pokrovsk–Gulaipole road – a move that would effectively place Gulaipole in a semi-encirclement and set the stage for an eventual assault.
自 9 月 20 日起，俄军东部军区部队沿 26 公里战线推进 6 至 12 公里，占领 10 个定居点并在南部强渡扬丘尔河。下一阶段作战目标是沿整条河道扩展控制权，夺取波克罗夫斯克-古列波列公路——此举将使古列波列陷入半包围态势，为最终进攻创造有利条件。
Continued Russian progress in the Gulaipole sector could transform a localized advance into a broader southern envelopment, threatening Ukraine’s remaining defensive depth in Zaporizhzhia region.
俄罗斯在古利艾波勒地区的持续推进，可能将局部突破转化为更广阔的南部包围态势，危及乌克兰在扎波罗热地区残存的防御纵深。
Orekhov
奥列霍夫
The Orekhov front has emerged as the second main axis of Ukrainian offensive activity, following the Dobropolye bulge. Despite an energetic propaganda push in Ukrainian media, actual progress has been modest: roughly 4 to 6 square kilometers have been gained near Malaya Tokmachka, with no settlements captured.
奥列霍夫方向已成为继多布罗波利耶突出部之后，乌克兰进攻行动的第二大轴线。尽管乌克兰媒体进行了声势浩大的宣传，实际进展却十分有限：在马亚托克马奇卡附近仅夺取了约 4 至 6 平方公里区域，未能攻占任何定居点。
This direction offers little potential for a breakthrough. Just behind the current line lies the so-called “Surovikin Line” – a deeply layered Russian defensive system that effectively stopped Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the recent actions near Orekhov serve mainly as a diversion, aimed at forcing the Russian command to shift part of its forces from the Gulaipole sector and ease the mounting pressure there.
该方向几无突破可能。当前战线后方即是著名的"苏罗维金防线"——这套俄军纵深梯次防御体系曾成功遏制乌军 2023 年的反攻。有鉴于此，可以合理推断乌军在奥列霍夫方向的近期行动主要是佯攻，旨在迫使俄军指挥部从古列波尔战区调离部分兵力，缓解该地区日益加剧的防御压力。
The Orekhov push appears less an attempt to achieve operational success and more a tactical distraction. With defenses intact and Ukrainian gains minimal, momentum in this sector remains firmly with Russia.
奥列霍夫的推进更像是一种战术牵制，而非旨在取得战役成果。由于防线完好无损且乌克兰方面收获甚微，该区域的主动权仍牢牢掌握在俄罗斯手中。
Overall assessment
总体评估
As October draws to a close, the front remains active along nearly its entire length, yet the overall dynamics are now clearly defined. Russia has maintained steady tactical momentum – particularly around Kupiansk, Liman, and Pokrovsk – while Ukraine’s ability to counterattack or reinforce has visibly weakened. Desertion, exhaustion, and a shrinking pool of trained personnel have turned what was once a temporary manpower issue into a structural crisis for Kiev’s armed forces.
随着十月接近尾声，战线几乎全线仍保持活跃状态，但整体态势已趋于明朗。俄军在库皮扬斯克、利曼和波克罗夫斯克等方向保持着稳定的战术主动权，而乌军的反击与增援能力明显减弱。逃兵现象、人员疲乏以及受训兵源持续缩减，使得基辅武装力量原本临时性的人力短缺问题演变为结构性危机。
Russia’s advances remain methodical rather than spectacular, reflecting a long-term strategy of attrition. The consistent application of pressure – simultaneous offensives across several axes combined with precision strikes on logistics – has forced Ukraine into a reactive posture. In effect, the Ukrainian army is no longer dictating the tempo of the war but struggling to hold its existing lines.
俄军的推进始终保持着有条不紊的节奏而非追求速胜，这反映出其长期消耗战的战略意图。通过多轴线同步进攻结合对后勤系统的精准打击，持续施压迫使乌军陷入被动应对。实际上，乌军已丧失战场节奏主导权，正竭力维持现有防线。
The coming winter will likely bring an operational pause in some sectors but continued pressure in others, especially where Russian forces have already established tactical advantages. With manpower disparities widening and no sign of renewed Western aid on the scale of 2023, Ukraine’s options are narrowing.
即将到来的冬季可能导致部分战线出现作战间歇，但在俄军已取得战术优势的区域压力仍将持续。随着兵力差距不断扩大，且西方援助未能重现 2023 年规模，乌军的战略选择正日益受限。
Unless Kiev manages to stabilize recruitment and restore rotation capacity, the balance of initiative will remain firmly with Moscow. The next phase of the conflict – whether in late winter or early spring – may determine not only the fate of Ukraine’s front lines, but the overall course of the war.
除非基辅能够稳定新兵招募并恢复部队轮换能力，否则战略主动权将始终牢牢掌握在莫斯科手中。下一阶段的冲突——无论是在冬末还是早春爆发——不仅将决定乌克兰前线的命运，更可能影响整场战争的走向。
By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
作者：谢尔盖·波列塔耶夫，情报分析师兼时事评论员，Vatfor 项目联合创始人兼编辑。
Here’s how Ukraine’s counteroffensive fantasy finally came to an end
战线不会骗人：乌克兰反攻幻想终告破灭的始末
As Russia tightens its grip across the front, Kiev faces the harsh reality of a shrinking army and a lost initiative
随着俄罗斯在前线全面收紧控制，基辅面临着军队缩编与战略主动权丧失的残酷现实
The past month has seen an intensification of fighting along several key sectors of the front – from Kupiansk and Liman in the north to Pokrovsk and Gulaipole in the south. Yet, beneath local advances and positional shifts, broader structural trends are shaping the balance of forces on both sides. The following overview examines these dynamics before turning to detailed assessments of each direction.
过去一个月里，从北部的库皮扬斯克和利曼到南部的波克罗夫斯克和古利艾波勒，前线多个关键战区战斗持续激化。然而在局部推进与阵地变动之下，更宏观的结构性趋势正在重塑双方力量对比。本篇概述在深入各方向详细评估前，将首先剖析这些动态变化。
The state of the forces
军队现状
The gradual deterioration of the Ukrainian army continues. As has been the case throughout the year, desertion remains the main source of manpower losses within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the first nine months of this year, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office opened more than 160,000 cases of desertion – a third more than during the entire previous period, starting in February 2022.
乌克兰军队的持续恶化态势仍在延续。与全年情况一致，逃兵现象依然是乌军兵力损耗的主要原因。今年前九个月，乌克兰总检察院已立案逾 16 万宗逃兵案件——较 2022 年 2 月以来的前阶段总量高出三分之一。
This is not traditional desertion – the case of a conscxt sneaking away for cigarettes – but large-scale abandonment of posts. According to available data, despite a partial amnesty that lasted until late summer, only about seven to eight percent of those who deserted have returned. Most simply go home, bribe a local police officer, and disappear from view. With a shortage of both police and prison space, this tactic largely succeeds.
这并非传统意义的逃役行为——比如应征者偷溜出去买烟——而是大规模的岗位弃守。现有数据显示，尽管持续至夏末的部分特赦政策实施后，仅有约 7%至 8%的逃兵选择归队。多数人直接返乡后贿赂当地警员，就此销声匿迹。在警力与监狱容量双双短缺的情况下，这种策略往往能够得逞。
By Ukraine’s own estimates, desertion has caused the army’s losses to outpace new recruitment for more than a year. Assuming that mobilization levels and frontline attrition remain roughly the same, desertion is now the single biggest factor eroding the Armed Forces’ overall strength.
据乌克兰自身评估，逃兵现象导致军队减员速度超过新兵补充已持续一年有余。假设动员规模与前线损耗率维持现状，逃兵目前已成为削弱乌军整体战斗力的头号因素。
Ukrainian sources estimate a monthly decline of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel as of the summer – most of them experienced, regular soldiers. No comparable replacements are arriving at the front in terms of motivation or fitness, and as experience shows, the higher the desertion rate, the greater the combat losses.
乌克兰消息源估计，自夏季以来每月减员达 1 万至 1.5 万人——其中大部分是经验丰富的正规士兵。前线补充的新兵无论在战斗意志还是体能素质上都无法与之相比。经验表明，逃兵率越高，作战损失就越惨重。
Efforts to compensate for personnel shortages with unmanned systems have also failed. The much-publicized “wall of drones” has not provided an impenetrable defense, and with manpower running low, drones alone cannot sustain a stable defensive network.
以无人系统弥补人力缺口的尝试同样遭遇失败。大肆宣传的"无人机墙"未能构筑不可逾越的防线，在兵力捉襟见肘的情况下，仅靠无人机无法维持稳定的防御网络。
The Russian army faces its own difficulties – exhaustion, high costs of assault operations, and no excess of manpower – yet the system of contract recruitment has largely neutralized the problem of desertion. According to official data, over 350,000 volunteers have signed contracts since the beginning of the year, averaging nearly 40,000 per month.
俄军自身也面临困境——士兵疲惫、突击作战成本高昂、兵力并不充裕——但合同兵招募体系基本解决了逃兵问题。官方数据显示，年初以来已有超过 35 万名志愿者签约，平均每月新增近 4 万人。
The biggest crisis for Ukraine’s military since 2022 unfolded in August near Pokrovsk, where Russian forces breached defenses to a depth of around 15 kilometers along a 4–5 kilometer front. Although that advance later slowed, it forced the Ukrainian command to withdraw reserves from other key directions – notably Kupiansk, Liman, and Zaporizhzhia – exacerbating existing defense crises there.
自 2022 年以来，乌克兰军队面临的最大危机于 8 月在波克罗夫斯克附近爆发——俄军沿 4-5 公里宽的战线突破了约 15 公里纵深的防御。尽管后续推进速度放缓，但此举迫使乌军指挥部从库皮扬斯克、利曼和扎波罗热等其他关键方向抽调预备队，加剧了这些地区原本就岌岌可危的防御态势。
This summer and autumn marked the first time in four years that Ukraine’s Armed Forces have not launched a major offensive. By contrast, previous seasons saw large-scale campaigns: the Kharkov and Kherson operations in 2022, the summer counteroffensive in 2023, and last year’s cross-border raid into the Kursk region, which extended into spring 2024.
今夏与秋季标志着乌克兰武装部队四年来首次未发起大规模攻势。相比之下，前几个季节都展开了重大军事行动：2022 年的哈尔科夫与赫尔松战役、2023 年夏季反攻，以及去年持续至 2024 年春季的库尔斯克州跨境突袭。
At present, Ukraine’s army remains on the defensive, conducting only occasional counterattacks. Judging by the scale of desertion and the depletion of reserves, there is little indication that new large-scale offensives are possible. While isolated operations similar to the one in Kursk cannot be ruled out, they are unlikely to succeed.
当前乌军仍处于守势，仅能发动零星反击。从逃兵规模与预备队消耗情况判断，几乎没有迹象表明其还能组织新的大规模进攻。虽然不排除再次出现类似库尔斯克行动的孤立作战，但这些行动很难取得成功。
Against this backdrop, the situation on the ground is evolving unevenly. While some sectors remain locked in positional fighting, others have seen clear shifts in control and momentum. The following overview examines the key directions where the dynamics have been most pronounced over the past month.
在此背景下，前线局势呈现不均衡发展态势。某些战区仍陷于阵地拉锯战，而其他地区则已出现明显的控制权与态势变化。以下将重点分析过去一个月战局变化最显著的几个主要方向。
Kupiansk
库皮扬斯克方向
Kupiansk remains the only active front line in the Kharkov region worth highlighting in this month’s overview. The Russian army pulled out of the city in September–October 2022, and since then, the area has seen mostly positional fighting with occasional flare-ups. Kupiansk has served as Ukraine’s main stronghold in this sector, and its capture would open the way for a potential advance toward Kharkov.
库皮扬斯克仍是哈尔科夫地区本月值得关注的唯一活跃战线。俄军于 2022 年 9 月至 10 月撤离该城后，该地区主要进行阵地战并时有激化。作为乌军在该战区的主要据点，其陷落将为向哈尔科夫推进打开通道。
Fighting continues inside the city itself. Over the past month, Russian troops have taken control of the city center, the railway station, and most of the Yubileyny district in the south. The rest of Kupiansk remains a gray zone, with little sign of organized Ukrainian resistance. At this point, it appears to be only a matter of time before Russian forces establish full control over the city.
市内战斗仍在持续。过去一个月中，俄军已控制市中心、火车站及南部尤比列伊内区大部区域。库皮扬斯克其余地区仍属灰色地带，几无有组织乌军抵抗迹象。目前看来，俄军全面控制该城只是时间问题。
The fall of Kupiansk would secure Russia’s bridgehead in the Kharkov region and expose the northern flank of Ukraine’s defenses, potentially forcing Kiev to redeploy reserves from other critical sectors.
库皮扬斯克的失守将使俄罗斯在哈尔科夫地区的桥头堡得到巩固，同时暴露乌军防御体系的北翼，这可能迫使基辅当局从其他关键战区抽调预备队进行增援。
Liman
利曼
Like Kupiansk, Liman was lost by Russian forces in the fall of 2022. It is the last major city in the Donetsk People’s Republic north of the Seversky Donets River. Strategically, retaking Liman and Sviatogorsk to the west would complete a northern arc around the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk urban cluster – a pre-war industrial hub of roughly 400,000 people and the largest population center still held by Ukraine in Donbass.
与库皮扬斯克相似，利曼在 2022 年秋季被俄军丢失。这是北顿涅茨河以北顿涅茨克人民共和国的最后一座主要城市。从战略上看，夺回利曼及其以西的斯维亚托戈尔斯克，将完成对斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克城市群北部包围弧——这个战前约 40 万人口的工业中心，仍是乌克兰在顿巴斯地区掌控的最大人口聚集地。
Russian troops are steadily tightening their hold around Liman. As seen elsewhere, a semi-encirclement often signals that a direct assault is near. To the north, Russian units have advanced 7–8 kilometers along a 35-kilometer front, crossed the Nitrius River, and secured sections of the Kharkov–Liman–Artemovsk railway at two points. Among the settlements captured are Derilovo, Novoselovka, Zarechnoye (now under full control), and Yampol.
俄军正稳步加强对利曼周边的控制。与其他地区情况类似，半包围态势往往预示着直接进攻即将到来。在北线，俄军部队沿 35 公里宽的战线推进了 7-8 公里，渡过尼特里乌斯河，并在两处控制了哈尔科夫-利曼-阿尔乔莫夫斯克铁路线部分路段。已攻占的定居点包括杰里洛沃、诺沃谢洛夫卡、扎列奇诺耶（现完全控制）和扬波尔。
The buildup around Liman indicates that Russian forces are shaping the battlefield for a larger offensive. Success here would bring them within striking distance of the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line – the central axis of Ukraine’s defense in Donbass.
俄军在红利曼周边的集结表明，他们正在为更大规模的攻势布局战场。若在此地取得成功，俄军将兵锋直指斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线——这是乌军在顿巴斯地区的核心防御轴线。
Seversk
谢韦尔斯克
Seversk is another key position on the approach to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line. The offensive here is synchronized with the battles for Liman, as Seversk provides the only direct route to Slaviansk from the front. This area had been relatively quiet since 2023, but active fighting has now resumed.
谢韦尔斯克是通往斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线沿途的另一处关键阵地。此处的攻势与利曼方向的战斗同步展开，因为谢韦尔斯克是从前线通往斯拉维扬斯克的唯一直接路径。该地区自 2023 年以来相对平静，但当前战事已重新激烈化。
At present, Seversk is under partial encirclement by Russian forces. Over the past month, the front has drawn closer from the north and west, while the southern outskirts – including Zvanovka and Sviato-Pokrovskoye – remain under Ukrainian control. The Russian army appears set to apply its established tactics: flanking maneuvers from the north, through Dronovka toward the Liman road, and from the south toward Reznikovka, likely to precede a full-scale assault. With primary supply routes already under observation by FPV drones, the Ukrainian garrison in Seversk faces a progressively worsening situation in the coming weeks.
目前谢韦尔斯克正遭受俄军部分包围。过去一个月间，战线从北部和西部逐步推进，而包括兹瓦诺夫卡和圣波克罗夫斯克耶在内的南部郊区仍由乌方控制。俄军似乎准备采用其既定战术：从北部经德罗诺夫卡向利曼公路实施侧翼包抄，同时从南部向列兹尼科夫卡推进，这些行动可能为全面进攻铺路。由于主要补给线已处于 FPV 无人机监控下，驻守谢韦尔斯克的乌军部队在未来几周将面临持续恶化的局势。
The tightening ring around Seversk suggests that Russian forces are preparing for a coordinated northern push toward Slaviansk. If Seversk falls, the entire northern line of Ukraine’s Donbass defenses could begin to unravel.
对谢韦尔斯克的包围圈逐步收紧，这表明俄军正为协调北进斯拉维扬斯克的攻势做准备。若谢韦尔斯克失守，乌军在顿巴斯地区的整个北部防线或将开始瓦解。
Chasov Yar – Konstantinovka
恰索夫亚尔-康斯坦丁诺夫卡
Konstantinovka stands among the main obxtives of this year’s offensive campaign. As a major logistical hub with modern infrastructure – high-rise residential districts, active industry, and a network of underground facilities – it offers ideal conditions for a prolonged defense.
康斯坦丁诺夫卡是今年攻势战役的主要目标之一。作为拥有现代化基础设施的重要后勤枢纽——这里分布着高层住宅区、活跃的工业区以及地下设施网络，为持久防御提供了理想条件。
Heavy fighting continues around the city. North of Chasov Yar, Russian forces have extended their control along the key line of the Seversky Donets–Donbass canal, advancing up to four kilometers along a front roughly 10 to 11 kilometers wide. The settlements of Pleshcheevka and Kleban-Byk on the southeastern approaches to Konstantinovka have been fully secured, breaching the city’s outer defensive belt and setting the stage for a possible encirclement. For now, however, a direct assault appears premature: the Ukrainian garrison remains well supplied via urban routes and the railway lix from Druzhkovka, which connects further to the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk stronghold – Ukraine’s central logistical base in Donbass.
该城周边激战持续。在恰索夫亚尔以北，俄军沿北顿涅茨河-顿巴斯运河关键防线扩大了控制区，在约 10 至 11 公里宽的战线推进了 4 公里。康斯坦丁诺夫卡东南通道上的普列谢耶夫卡和克莱班-拜克定居点已被完全控制，突破了该城外环防御带，为可能的合围创造了条件。但目前直接强攻似乎为时过早：乌军守备部队仍能通过城市道路和来自德鲁日科夫卡的铁路线获得充足补给，这条铁路线进一步连接着斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克要塞——乌军在顿巴斯的核心后勤基地。
The breach of Konstantinovka’s outer defenses marks a critical step in Russia’s southern advance. Sustained pressure here could force Ukraine to commit reserves from the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk line, gradually weakening its overall defensive posture in Donbass.
俄军突破康斯坦丁诺夫卡外围防线，标志着其南部攻势迈出关键一步。持续施压或将迫使乌军从斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克防线抽调预备队，从而逐渐削弱其在顿巴斯地区的整体防御态势。
Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye Bulge
波克罗夫斯克与多布罗波利耶突出部
The decisive battles of this autumn are expected to unfold around Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye bulge to its north. Following an unexpected Russian breakthrough in August, Ukrainian command redeployed reserves from other sectors – notably from Kupiansk and Gulaipole (more on that below) — in an effort to cut off the salient at its base along the Nikanorovka–Novotoretskoye–Shakhovo line.
今年秋季的关键战役预计将在波克罗夫斯克及其北部多布罗波利耶突出部周边展开。八月俄军出人意料地实现突破后，乌军指挥部从其他战区——特别是库皮扬斯克和古列波尔（下文将详述）——调遣预备队，试图沿尼卡诺罗夫卡-新托列茨科耶-沙霍沃一线切断该突出部的根部。
Russia, in turn, reinforced its grouping to widen and secure the breach. Over the past month, the front line has largely stabilized, which is now clearly reflected on operational maps. Key developments include the Russian assault on Vladimirovka – a critical stronghold on the northeastern flank – and a reported, though still unconfirmed, Ukrainian push toward Novotoretskoye from the southwest.
与此同时，俄罗斯则加强其集群力量以扩大并巩固突破口。过去一个月来，前线已基本稳定，这在作战地图上得到清晰体现。关键进展包括俄军对东北翼重要据点弗拉基米罗夫卡的攻势，以及据传（但尚未证实）乌军从西南方向向新托列茨科耶推进的行动。
Fighting around Pokrovsk itself has also intensified. After a brief operational pause in September, hostilities resumed in October, with combat now reported inside the city center. Visible progress suggests that this front, too, is approaching a decisive stage.
波克罗夫斯克周边的战斗也已加剧。9 月短暂停火后，10 月战事重燃，目前市中心已出现交火报告。明显进展表明，这条战线同样临近决定性阶段。
The Pokrovsk–Dobropolye axis is shaping up as the central theater of this campaign season. Control over Pokrovsk would not only collapse Ukraine’s western Donbass defense but also open a direct path toward the Dnieper line.
波克罗夫斯克-多布罗波利耶战线正成为本战役季的核心战场。控制波克罗夫斯克不仅将瓦解乌军在顿巴斯西部的防御，还将打开通向第聂伯河防线的直接通道。
Gulaipole
古利亚伊波列
Gulaipole, the birthplace of Nestor Makhno – revered in Ukraine as the father of practical anarchism – holds a symbolic place in the country’s history. A century ago, during the Russian Civil War, this area was home to a short-lived peasant republic with Gulaipole as its capital.
古利亚伊波列是涅斯托尔·马赫诺的诞生地，这位被乌克兰尊奉为实践无政府主义之父的人物，在这片土地的历史上占据着象征性地位。一个世纪前的俄国内战时期，这里曾短暂存在过一个以古利亚伊波列为首都的农民共和国。
Today, the surrounding steppe offers little in the way of natural defenses. Over the past three months, Ukrainian forces here have faced growing difficulties as manpower shortages and the transfer of reserves to the Dobropolye bulge have weakened their positions.
如今，周边草原几乎无险可守。过去三个月间，由于兵力短缺以及预备队被调往多布罗波利耶突出部，驻守此地的乌军阵地日益吃紧。
Since September 20, troops from Russia’s Eastern Military District have advanced 6 to 12 kilometers along a 26-kilometer front, capturing ten settlements and crossing the Yanchur River in the south. The next operational goal is to extend control along the entire river and secure the Pokrovsk–Gulaipole road – a move that would effectively place Gulaipole in a semi-encirclement and set the stage for an eventual assault.
自 9 月 20 日起，俄军东部军区部队沿 26 公里战线推进 6 至 12 公里，占领 10 个定居点并在南部强渡扬丘尔河。下一阶段作战目标是沿整条河道扩展控制权，夺取波克罗夫斯克-古列波列公路——此举将使古列波列陷入半包围态势，为最终进攻创造有利条件。
Continued Russian progress in the Gulaipole sector could transform a localized advance into a broader southern envelopment, threatening Ukraine’s remaining defensive depth in Zaporizhzhia region.
俄罗斯在古利艾波勒地区的持续推进，可能将局部突破转化为更广阔的南部包围态势，危及乌克兰在扎波罗热地区残存的防御纵深。
Orekhov
奥列霍夫
The Orekhov front has emerged as the second main axis of Ukrainian offensive activity, following the Dobropolye bulge. Despite an energetic propaganda push in Ukrainian media, actual progress has been modest: roughly 4 to 6 square kilometers have been gained near Malaya Tokmachka, with no settlements captured.
奥列霍夫方向已成为继多布罗波利耶突出部之后，乌克兰进攻行动的第二大轴线。尽管乌克兰媒体进行了声势浩大的宣传，实际进展却十分有限：在马亚托克马奇卡附近仅夺取了约 4 至 6 平方公里区域，未能攻占任何定居点。
This direction offers little potential for a breakthrough. Just behind the current line lies the so-called “Surovikin Line” – a deeply layered Russian defensive system that effectively stopped Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the recent actions near Orekhov serve mainly as a diversion, aimed at forcing the Russian command to shift part of its forces from the Gulaipole sector and ease the mounting pressure there.
该方向几无突破可能。当前战线后方即是著名的"苏罗维金防线"——这套俄军纵深梯次防御体系曾成功遏制乌军 2023 年的反攻。有鉴于此，可以合理推断乌军在奥列霍夫方向的近期行动主要是佯攻，旨在迫使俄军指挥部从古列波尔战区调离部分兵力，缓解该地区日益加剧的防御压力。
The Orekhov push appears less an attempt to achieve operational success and more a tactical distraction. With defenses intact and Ukrainian gains minimal, momentum in this sector remains firmly with Russia.
奥列霍夫的推进更像是一种战术牵制，而非旨在取得战役成果。由于防线完好无损且乌克兰方面收获甚微，该区域的主动权仍牢牢掌握在俄罗斯手中。
Overall assessment
总体评估
As October draws to a close, the front remains active along nearly its entire length, yet the overall dynamics are now clearly defined. Russia has maintained steady tactical momentum – particularly around Kupiansk, Liman, and Pokrovsk – while Ukraine’s ability to counterattack or reinforce has visibly weakened. Desertion, exhaustion, and a shrinking pool of trained personnel have turned what was once a temporary manpower issue into a structural crisis for Kiev’s armed forces.
随着十月接近尾声，战线几乎全线仍保持活跃状态，但整体态势已趋于明朗。俄军在库皮扬斯克、利曼和波克罗夫斯克等方向保持着稳定的战术主动权，而乌军的反击与增援能力明显减弱。逃兵现象、人员疲乏以及受训兵源持续缩减，使得基辅武装力量原本临时性的人力短缺问题演变为结构性危机。
Russia’s advances remain methodical rather than spectacular, reflecting a long-term strategy of attrition. The consistent application of pressure – simultaneous offensives across several axes combined with precision strikes on logistics – has forced Ukraine into a reactive posture. In effect, the Ukrainian army is no longer dictating the tempo of the war but struggling to hold its existing lines.
俄军的推进始终保持着有条不紊的节奏而非追求速胜，这反映出其长期消耗战的战略意图。通过多轴线同步进攻结合对后勤系统的精准打击，持续施压迫使乌军陷入被动应对。实际上，乌军已丧失战场节奏主导权，正竭力维持现有防线。
The coming winter will likely bring an operational pause in some sectors but continued pressure in others, especially where Russian forces have already established tactical advantages. With manpower disparities widening and no sign of renewed Western aid on the scale of 2023, Ukraine’s options are narrowing.
即将到来的冬季可能导致部分战线出现作战间歇，但在俄军已取得战术优势的区域压力仍将持续。随着兵力差距不断扩大，且西方援助未能重现 2023 年规模，乌军的战略选择正日益受限。
Unless Kiev manages to stabilize recruitment and restore rotation capacity, the balance of initiative will remain firmly with Moscow. The next phase of the conflict – whether in late winter or early spring – may determine not only the fate of Ukraine’s front lines, but the overall course of the war.
除非基辅能够稳定新兵招募并恢复部队轮换能力，否则战略主动权将始终牢牢掌握在莫斯科手中。下一阶段的冲突——无论是在冬末还是早春爆发——不仅将决定乌克兰前线的命运，更可能影响整场战争的走向。
By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
作者：谢尔盖·波列塔耶夫，情报分析师兼时事评论员，Vatfor 项目联合创始人兼编辑。
很赞 9
收藏