为什么斩首行动难以根除美伊矛盾
正文翻译
Why Decapitation Will Not Solve the United States’ Iran Problem
为什么斩首行动难以根除美伊矛盾
When Iranians took to the streets to celebrate the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, it was tempting to think that the hardest part of the current confrontation with Iran was over. Iran has been a wicked policy problem for the United States, its Middle Eastern allies, and the international community for decades, and Khamenei was more than merely the face of the problem. He was a bitter voice of opposition, a hard-liner who persistently undermined moderates, and in control of all of the most threatening elements of Iranian power: its nuclear program, its paramilitary forces, its proxy network, and the intelligence services that both terrorized Iranians and carried out acts of terror around the world.
当伊朗民众于 2 月 28 日走上街头庆祝阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊之死时，人们很容易认为当前与伊朗对抗中最艰难的部分已经过去。几十年来，伊朗一直是美国、其亲近的中东盟友以及国际社会面临的一个棘手政策难题，而哈梅内伊不仅仅是这个问题的代表人物。他是激进的反对者，是坚持打压稳健派的硬硬派，并掌控着伊朗所有最具威胁的力量：核计划、准军事部队、代理人网络，以及既恐吓本国国民又在全球范围内实施恐怖活动的各种情报部门。
The United States and Israel were able to use exquisite intelligence and powerful munitions not only to kill Khamenei at the outset of the war, but also to kill many of his most senior advisers. Decapitating the regime seems to offer a tidy way to “solve” a problem that has resisted solution for almost half a century, and it could unfold along several paths. The new leaders who arise could adopt a wholly different posture toward the world. They could be incompetent in implementing Khamenei’s strategy. Or they could decide that self-preservation requires them to be more pliable in the face of U.S. demands. It is not unreasonable to think that any of Khamenei’s successors would be an improvement.
美国和以色列能够利用精良的情报和强大的弹药，不仅在战争伊始击毙了哈梅内伊，还击毙了他的许多高级顾问。对政权进行“斩首”似乎提供了一种简洁的方式，来“解决”这个近半个世纪以来一直无法解决的难题，而且其演变路径可能有好几种：新产生的领导人可能会对世界采取完全不同的姿态；他们可能在执行哈梅内伊的战略方面能力不足；或者他们可能认为，出于自保，面对美国的要求需要表现得更加温顺。认为哈梅内伊的任何继任者都会有所进步，这种想法并非没有道理。
Historical Record on Decapitation
关于斩首行动的历史记录
Unfortunately, though, meaningful improvement through decapitation is unlikely. Each situation is unique, and each involves an element of chance. Still, the track record for advancing ambitious political goals—which is what the United States has—through a limited military effort is poor. The most common outcome of external military intervention is instability or civil war; in some cases, new strongmen replace the old ones. While the fall of dictators certainly presents moments of euphoria, deeply networked people with money and guns (and few scruples) often triumph after periods of chaos. Even when the near term looks promising, the medium term often proves less so.
然而遗憾的是，通过斩首行动实现实质性改善的可能性很小。每种情况都是独特的，且都包含偶然因素。尽管如此，通过有限的军事努力来实现宏大的政治目标（这正是美国所追求的），其过往记录乏善可陈。外部军事干预最常见的结果是动荡或内战；在某些情况下，新的强人会取代旧的强人。虽然独裁者的倒台确实会带来短暂的狂喜，但那些拥有金钱、武器、深厚关系网且几乎没有道德顾虑的人往往会在混乱期后胜出。即使短期看起来很有希望，中期往往证明并非如此。
Consider, for example, Israel’s repeated decapitation of Hamas. Since Hamas was founded in 1987, Israel has assassinated—or attempted to assassinate—a long line of Hamas leaders, including Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin (2004) and former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (2024), while attempts against Khaled Mashal (1997) and Khalil al-Hayya (2025) failed. One could argue that these assassinations were punishment or deserved. However, what is much harder to argue is that these assassinations have either changed the direction of the Hamas leadership or done much to blunt the broader political ambitions of Hamas narrowly or the Palestinian national movement more broadly. Hamas, as a political movement, absorbed its martyrs and lives to fight another day.
以以色列对哈马斯反复进行的斩首行动为例。自哈马斯于 1987 年成立以来，以色列暗杀（或试图暗杀）了一长串哈马斯领导人，包括其创始人艾哈迈德·亚辛（2004年）和前总理伊斯梅尔·哈尼亚（2024年），而针对哈立德·马沙尔（1997年）和哈利勒·哈亚（2025年）的尝试则以失败告终。你可以争辩说这些暗杀是惩罚或者是罪有应得，但很难论证这些暗杀改变了哈马斯领导层的方向，或者削弱了哈马斯乃至更广泛的巴勒斯坦民族运动的政治抱负。作为一个政治运动，哈马斯吸收了其“殉道者”，并继续生存下去以待来日再战。
Of course, the story is not all so gloomy. Japan and Germany emerged from World War II with new leadership and close partnerships with the United States that have grown stronger in the subsequent eight decades. Panama has flourished after the 1989 removal of dictator Manuel Noriega for his drug-running efforts, and democracy has been strengthened.
当然，情况并非完全悲观。二战后的日本和德国产生了新的领导层，并与美国建立了紧密的伙伴关系，这种关系在随后的八十年里不断加强。巴拿马在 1989 年因独裁者曼努埃尔·诺列加的贩毒行为将其罢免后也走向了繁荣，民主制度得到了加强。
Iran’s Own History with Regime Change
伊朗自身的政权更迭史
A more mixed story can be found in Iran itself. As every Iranian knows, the United States and the United Kingdom worked together to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 after he nationalized the oil industry and partnered with the local communist party. The move allowed the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to rule unencumbered for a quarter-century. Fiercely anti-communist and close to the West, Iran stood as one of the “Twin Pillars” of Western strategy in the Persian Gulf, alongside Saudi Arabia. Between the two, they kept the region’s oil supplies firmly in the Western camp and far away from the Soviet unx. The Shah’s modernization efforts played well in Washington, and his close ties with Israel won Iran some friends; the Shah’s authoritarianism was easy for many to overlook.
在伊朗自身也能找到一个毁誉参半的故事。正如每个伊朗人都知道的，1953 年，美国和英国在摩萨台总理将石油工业国有化并与当地gcd合作后，联手推翻了他。此举让沙阿穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维无所顾忌地统治了四分之一个世纪。当时，伊朗作为坚定的反共派且亲近西方，与沙特阿拉伯并列为西方在波斯湾战略的“双支柱”。两者共同确保了该地区的石油供应牢牢掌握在西方阵营手中，并远离苏联。沙阿的现代化努力在华盛顿很受欢迎，他与以色列的紧密关系也为伊朗赢得了一些朋友；对许多人来说，沙阿的威权主义很容易被忽视。
For the most dangerous part of the Cold War, then, the U.S. effort to remove what it saw as a dangerous leader was a success. The problem from a U.S. perspective was the almost-half-century that followed his fall. Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has presented an enduring threat to U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East, and it has harbored a special animus against the United States.
因此，在冷战最危险的阶段，美国罢免其视为危险领导人的努力是成功的。但从美国的角度来看，问题出在他倒台后的近半个世纪里。自 1979 年成立以来，伊斯兰共和国对美国在中东的盟友和伙伴构成了持久威胁，并对美国怀有特殊的敌意。
Iraq as a Cautionary Tale
伊拉克作为前车之鉴
Neighboring Iraq is a harder case to judge. Saddam Hussein was certainly a malign force in both Iraq and the region, but it is Iran that benefited most when the United States removed him from power. The prevailing view in the Bush administration was that if the “dirty dozen” at the top of the Iraqi government were removed, the Iraqi people would be in control of their fate after decades of brutal dictatorship. Great effort and planning went into the military campaign, and politics were something of an afterthought.
邻国伊拉克则是一个更难评判的案例。萨达姆·侯赛因无疑是伊拉克乃至该地区的邪恶力量，但当美国将其赶下台时，获益最多的却是伊朗。布什政府当时的普遍观点是，如果伊拉克政府顶层的“十二恶人”被罢免，在经历了数十年的残酷独裁后，伊拉克人民将掌控自己的命运。当时大量的精力和规划都投入到了军事行动中，而政治在某种程度上只是事后才考虑的问题。
Yet every Iraqi government since the fall of Saddam has understood the depth of Iranian penetration of their country, its security apparatus, its economy, and its politics. The indelible images of Iraqis proudly holding their ink-stained fingers aloft after voting in 2005 were moving, but they were followed by a brutal insurgency that allowed Iran to penetrate further still. Iranian-backed militias hold wide swaths of the country in their grip, and every Iraqi prime minister has known he needs to strike a modus vivendi with Iran. In addition, the United States built on Saddam’s strategy to use heightened sectarianism as a tool of Iraqi political management. That strategy provided short-term stabilization, but it reinforced the country’s fault lines. For all of the blood and treasure that the United States poured into Iraq after decapitating the government, the scoreboard is decidedly mixed.
然而，自萨达姆倒台以来，每一届伊拉克政府都深知伊朗对其国家安全机构、经济和政治渗透之深。2005 年伊拉克人投票后自豪地举起沾满墨水的手指的画面令人动容，但紧随其后的是残酷的叛乱，这让伊朗得以进一步渗透。伊朗支持的民兵控制了该国的大片地区，每一位伊拉克总理都清楚自己需要与伊朗达成某种妥协。此外，美国在萨达姆战略的基础上，利用加剧的教派冲突作为伊拉克政治管理的工具。该战略虽然实现了短期稳定，但却强化了国家的断层线。尽管美国在“斩首”伊拉克政府后投入了大量鲜血和财富，但最终的成绩单却是忧喜参半。
Why Systems Survive Leaders
为什么体制能比领导人更长久
Elsewhere, the direct U.S. effort was less clear, and the outcomes remain murky. One set of arguable successes was in Eastern Europe. Although the United States’ role in precipitating the fall of the Iron Curtain was anything but acute, strong support to Eastern Europe—from the United States and European allies alike—helped many countries transition (back) to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. The United States moved Jean-Bertrand Aristide out (and then in, and then out) of power in the 1990s and 2000s, and Haiti has become steadily less secure and more dysfunctional. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi maintained an iron grip on his country. Since his fall in 2011, a power vacuum has persisted, and warring factions roam the country. Shortly thereafter, the United States helped ease Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power in Yemen, and chaos has followed in his wake.
在其他地方，美国的直接干预较不明显，结果依然模糊。一组存在争议的成功案例是在东欧。虽然美国在促使“铁幕”倒台中的作用并不直接，但来自美国及欧洲盟友的强力支持帮助许多国家在数十年威权统治后向民主转型。在 20 世纪 90 年代和 21 世纪初，美国将让·贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德赶下台（随后又让他上台，接着又下台），而海地变得越来越不安全且功能失调。利比亚独裁者穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲曾铁腕统治其国家，自 2011 年他倒台以来，权力真空一直存在，交战派系横行。此后不久，美国帮助阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫在也门下台，随之而来的是一片混乱。
Little of this was by design, but it reveals an important truth: Efforts to change systems of government are destabilizing. Too often, the “great man” theory of history persists, fostering the belief that removing a single person can cause complex problems to disappear. But leaders do not rule by themselves. They are the product of systems that are attuned to local circumstances, and they preside over elaborate patronage networks whose members have everything to lose. Removing a leader often exposes the pathologies of a country that was struggling. By virtue of being close to power, groups often acquire money, guns, and networks. When there is any vacuum, they deploy them to remain in power.
这些很少是刻意设计的，但它揭示了一个重要的事实：改变政府体制的努力具有破坏稳定性。往往“伟人论”的历史观依然根深蒂固，使人相信除掉一个人就能让复杂的问题消失。但领导人并非独自统治。他们是适应当地环境的体制产物，并主持着复杂的政治分赃网络，其成员一旦失去体制将一无所有。消灭一个领导人往往会暴露一个本就在挣扎中国家的各种病灶。凭借接近权力的地位，各种利益集团往往获得了金钱、武器和人脉。一旦出现权力真空，他们就会利用这些手段来维持统治。
What Successful Political Transitions Require
成功的政治转型需要什么
Compare this to Syria. Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria built his rump state in Idlib province for eight years before moving into Damascus. In Idlib, he and his team created an entire governmental network that built popular support, as well as a track record of success. That is to say, al-Sharaa had the time and space (and money) to build resilient institutions. Officials who were competent could be promoted, and the incompetent shunted aside. Large and loyal cadres were built, and discipline was instilled.
对比一下叙利亚。叙利亚的艾哈迈德·沙拉（Ahmed al-Sharaa）在进入大马士革之前，在伊德利卜省建立其残余政权长达八年之久。在伊德利卜，他和他的团队建立了一个完整的政府网络，赢得了民意支持并积累了成功的政绩。也就是说，沙拉拥有充足的时间、空间（和金钱）来建立有韧性的制度。有能力的官员得以晋升，无能者被排挤。他们建立了庞大且忠诚的骨干队伍，并树立了纪律。
That way, when he moved to take over the government in Damascus in December 2024, he was able to draw on his existing apparatus. This network is accustomed to working together, can create and implement policies, and knows how to build support. While the future of Syria remains murky, early signs suggest the new government is internally coherent and has won significant public backing.
这样一来，当他在 2024 年 12 月接管大马士革政府时，能够利用现有的机构。这个网络习惯于协同工作，能够制定并执行政策，并懂得如何赢得支持。虽然叙利亚的未来仍不明朗，但早期迹象表明新政府内部协调一致，并赢得了显著的公众支持。
Decapitation short-circuits that sort of process and does not allow resilient alternatives to emerge. Often, after decapitation, either some version of the current government remains in power, or countries dissolve into chaos. In an extensive survey of regime change efforts over the last two centuries, political scientist Alexander B. Downes found that “more than 40 percent of states that experience foreign-imposed regime change have a civil war within the next ten years.” He argued in his book that, paradoxically, “regime change is likely to result in unfavorable outcomes where it is easy and better outcomes where it is hard.”
斩首行动阻断了这种过程，导致无法产生有韧性的替代方案。通常在斩首行动后，要么是现政府的某种变体继续掌权，要么是国家陷入混乱。政治学家亚历山大·B·唐斯在对过去两个世纪政权更迭努力的广泛调查中发现，“经历过外国强加政权更迭的国家中，超过 40% 会在随后的十年内发生内战。”他在书中论证道，自相矛盾的是，“在政权更迭容易的地方往往会导致不利的结果，而在政权更迭艰难的地方反而结果更好。”
How Iran May Go
伊朗局势可能如何演变
Some argue that this argument is irrelevant for Iran. After what is expected to be an onslaught in the coming weeks, any Iranian government—even a continuation of the present one—would decide it is suicidal to pursue the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In that way, an acute danger to Israel and the United States will evaporate, and the war will be considered a success.
有人认为，这种论点对伊朗并不适用。他们认为，在接下来的几周内预期中的猛烈攻击之后，任何一届伊朗政府——即使是现政府的延续——都会认为继续追求核计划和弹道导弹计划是自杀行为。这样一来，以色列和美国面临的迫切危险将消失，战争将被视为成功。
But there are many ways that would not be the outcome. After all, for the current government, the attack validates their belief in the unrelenting hostility of the United States and Israel. An important part of deterrence is assurance: If a target refrains from proscribed behavior, threatened punishments will not follow. Iran’s leaders have often concluded that U.S. hostility to Iran has meant that the ratchet only goes one way, and the only consequence of Iranian concessions is demands that Iran make more concessions, albeit from a position of greater weakness.
但也有很多情况会导致截然不同的结果。毕竟，对于现政府而言，这次袭击证实了他们一直以来认为美以敌意不可调和的信念。威慑的一个重要部分是“保证”：如果目标停止了被禁止的行为，威胁中的惩罚就不会随之而来。伊朗领导人经常得出结论，美国对伊朗的敌意意味着这种压力只会单向增加，伊朗让步的唯一后果是对方要求做出更多让步，尽管是在更加弱势的地位上。
For many in the current regime, the war underlines Iran’s vital need to maintain its own deterrent. What shape that would take is unclear, but it is likely to emphasize asymmetrical tools that can cause serious damage. That could involve enduring threats to neighbors, to Israel, and to the United States. Iranian colleagues often remark that countries that have crossed the nuclear threshold—Pakistan, India, and North Korea—have never been attacked by Western powers, and the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons may well persist.
对于现政权中的许多人来说，这场战争凸显了伊朗维持自身威慑力的至关重要性。这种威慑的具体形式尚不明确，但很可能会强调能够造成严重损害的非对称工具。这可能包括对邻国、以色列和美国的持久威胁。伊朗同行经常评论说，那些跨过核门槛的国家——巴基斯坦、印度和朝鲜——从未受到过西方大国的攻击，因此伊朗追求核武器的动力可能会持续存在。
Should the government fall, a replacement government may have difficulty maintaining control. This would be especially true if devastating attacks on energy infrastructure created enduring economic distress. The new government would have little ability to relieve suffering and few tools to build patronage. As the central authority dissolved, ungoverned spaces could emerge that provided cover for armed groups to operate, including recidivist elements of the current government. That chaos could well spread outward for many years to come. It is unlikely that any country would seek to occupy Iran, a country more than twice the size of Texas, with a population three times the size of Iraq. Iran could simply smolder.
如果政府倒台，继任政府可能难以维持控制。如果对能源基础设施的破坏性袭击造成了持久的经济困境，情况尤其如此。新政府将几乎没有能力缓解民众痛苦，也缺乏手段来建立政治分赃体系。随着中央权威解体，可能会出现权力真空区，为武装组织的活动提供掩护，包括现政府的顽固势力。这种混乱很可能会在未来多年向外蔓延。不太可能有任何国家寻求占领伊朗，因为它的国土面积是德克萨斯州的两倍多，人口是伊拉克的三倍。伊朗可能会一直处于这种阴燃状态。
From Israel’s point of view, those sorts of scenarios may be an improvement on the status quo. Feeling an existential threat from Iran’s nuclear program and a persistent danger from Iran’s proxies, many Israelis would see even a chaotic situation in Iran as favorable. Israel believes it is already locked into an enduring battle with Iran, so its continuation, even on different terms, is an acceptable outcome.
从以色列的角度来看，这类场景可能比现状有所改善。由于感受到来自伊朗核计划的生存威胁和来自伊朗代理人的持续危险，许多以色列人会认为即便伊朗处于混乱状态也是有利的。以色列认为它已经卷入了与伊朗的持久战，因此战争以不同的形式继续是可以接受的结果。
Diverging U.S. and Israeli Stakes
美国与以色列利益的分歧
The United States has more complicated interests. It has much more extensive relationships in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, and a much more robust presence there. Persistent and evolving threats to the United States and its partners would heighten dangers to Americans present in the region, jeopardize growing economic investments, and have enduring negative effects on global trade. Simply put, the United States has not needed to feel it was on a constant war footing with Iran, but it may need to going forward.
美国的利益则更为复杂。它在伊朗周边地区有着更为广泛的关系，以及更为强大的存在。对美国及其伙伴持续且不断演变的威胁将增加该地区美国人的危险，危及不断增长的经济投资，并对全球贸易产生持久的负面影响。简单来说，美国此前并不需要觉得必须对伊朗保持长期的战争状态，但今后可能需要。
The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei was not the hard part of the current campaign. Deploying intelligence tools and military instruments against an adversary is something that U.S. and Israeli forces have done with great success for decades. What is harder is using those tools to shape political outcomes, and in particular, to shape the political choices that Iran’s leaders—and its future leaders—make. While President Donald Trump has sometimes spoken about his desire for regime change and the freedom of the Iranian people, those things are hard to accomplish, and even harder to do from arm’s length and with little preparation. The record of decapitation creating much more favorable governments is generally poor.
暗杀阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊并不是当前行动中最难的部分。几十年来，美以部队在针对对手部署情报工具和军事手段方面取得了巨大的成功。更难的是利用这些工具来影响政治结果，特别是影响伊朗现任及未来领导人所做出的政治选择。虽然特朗普总统有时会谈到他希望实现政权更迭和伊朗人民的自由，但这些事情很难达成，在缺乏准备且保持距离的情况下更是难上加难。斩首行动产生更理想政府的记录总体上非常糟糕。
More likely, the U.S. and Israeli governments hope that future leaders of Iran will see that resistance is futile, and they will simply submit to the aggressors’ strength and will. Here, too, the record is not encouraging. Khamenei was 86 and ailing, and succession talk was swirling. That may have been an opportunity to help Iran move in a different direction, but that moment has passed.
更有可能的是，美以政府希望伊朗未来的领导人能看到抵抗是徒劳的，并直接屈服于侵略者的力量和意志。在这里，历史记录同样不容乐观。哈梅内伊此前已 86 岁且身体欠佳，继任者的讨论本已甚嚣尘上。那本可能是一个帮助伊朗走向不同方向的机会，但那个时机已经错过了。
Conclusion
结论
The current war presents a much more acute challenge, and one where favorable outcomes will be much harder to secure. Much will depend on how the war unfolds and what is damaged in the process. The spectrum of possibilities is wide. But experience teaches that fighting the war successfully is a small part of achieving war aims. That is especially true here, where so many of the war aims seem to be political.
当前的战争呈现出更为严峻的挑战，且更难获得有利的结果。很大程度上取决于战争如何展开，以及在此过程中破坏了什么。可能性的范围很广。但经验告诉我们，成功地进行战争只是实现战争目标的一小部分。在这里尤其如此，因为如此多的战争目标似乎都是政治性的。
Almost 60 years ago, the development economist Albert O. Hirschman wrote about the “hiding hand.” That is, individuals systematically underestimate the difficulty of what they hope to do while also underestimating the creativity that unexpected difficulties will demand. The U.S. and Israeli governments have vast power to destroy, but far less capacity to build—especially in foreign lands that they have just vanquished. They should understand that the hard work is just beginning. Killing the Iranian leadership is not the goal of this operation. Changing the political decisions of future Iranian leaders is. That is the challenge, and it will be harder than they expect. It will require more creativity—and effort—than they seem ready to deploy.
大约 60 年前，发展经济学家阿尔伯特·O·赫希曼写到了“隐蔽的手”。也就是说，人们会系统性地低估他们希望做成的事情的难度，同时也低估了应对意外困难所需的创造力。美以政府拥有巨大的破坏力量，但建设能力却小得多——尤其是在他们刚刚战胜的异国土地上。他们应该明白，艰苦的工作才刚刚开始。杀掉伊朗领导层并不是这次行动的目标，改变未来伊朗领导人的政治决定才是。这就是挑战，它将比他们预期的更难，需要比他们目前展现出的更多的创造力和努力。
为什么斩首行动难以根除美伊矛盾
When Iranians took to the streets to celebrate the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, it was tempting to think that the hardest part of the current confrontation with Iran was over. Iran has been a wicked policy problem for the United States, its Middle Eastern allies, and the international community for decades, and Khamenei was more than merely the face of the problem. He was a bitter voice of opposition, a hard-liner who persistently undermined moderates, and in control of all of the most threatening elements of Iranian power: its nuclear program, its paramilitary forces, its proxy network, and the intelligence services that both terrorized Iranians and carried out acts of terror around the world.
当伊朗民众于 2 月 28 日走上街头庆祝阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊之死时，人们很容易认为当前与伊朗对抗中最艰难的部分已经过去。几十年来，伊朗一直是美国、其亲近的中东盟友以及国际社会面临的一个棘手政策难题，而哈梅内伊不仅仅是这个问题的代表人物。他是激进的反对者，是坚持打压稳健派的硬硬派，并掌控着伊朗所有最具威胁的力量：核计划、准军事部队、代理人网络，以及既恐吓本国国民又在全球范围内实施恐怖活动的各种情报部门。
The United States and Israel were able to use exquisite intelligence and powerful munitions not only to kill Khamenei at the outset of the war, but also to kill many of his most senior advisers. Decapitating the regime seems to offer a tidy way to “solve” a problem that has resisted solution for almost half a century, and it could unfold along several paths. The new leaders who arise could adopt a wholly different posture toward the world. They could be incompetent in implementing Khamenei’s strategy. Or they could decide that self-preservation requires them to be more pliable in the face of U.S. demands. It is not unreasonable to think that any of Khamenei’s successors would be an improvement.
美国和以色列能够利用精良的情报和强大的弹药，不仅在战争伊始击毙了哈梅内伊，还击毙了他的许多高级顾问。对政权进行“斩首”似乎提供了一种简洁的方式，来“解决”这个近半个世纪以来一直无法解决的难题，而且其演变路径可能有好几种：新产生的领导人可能会对世界采取完全不同的姿态；他们可能在执行哈梅内伊的战略方面能力不足；或者他们可能认为，出于自保，面对美国的要求需要表现得更加温顺。认为哈梅内伊的任何继任者都会有所进步，这种想法并非没有道理。
Historical Record on Decapitation
关于斩首行动的历史记录
Unfortunately, though, meaningful improvement through decapitation is unlikely. Each situation is unique, and each involves an element of chance. Still, the track record for advancing ambitious political goals—which is what the United States has—through a limited military effort is poor. The most common outcome of external military intervention is instability or civil war; in some cases, new strongmen replace the old ones. While the fall of dictators certainly presents moments of euphoria, deeply networked people with money and guns (and few scruples) often triumph after periods of chaos. Even when the near term looks promising, the medium term often proves less so.
然而遗憾的是，通过斩首行动实现实质性改善的可能性很小。每种情况都是独特的，且都包含偶然因素。尽管如此，通过有限的军事努力来实现宏大的政治目标（这正是美国所追求的），其过往记录乏善可陈。外部军事干预最常见的结果是动荡或内战；在某些情况下，新的强人会取代旧的强人。虽然独裁者的倒台确实会带来短暂的狂喜，但那些拥有金钱、武器、深厚关系网且几乎没有道德顾虑的人往往会在混乱期后胜出。即使短期看起来很有希望，中期往往证明并非如此。
Consider, for example, Israel’s repeated decapitation of Hamas. Since Hamas was founded in 1987, Israel has assassinated—or attempted to assassinate—a long line of Hamas leaders, including Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin (2004) and former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (2024), while attempts against Khaled Mashal (1997) and Khalil al-Hayya (2025) failed. One could argue that these assassinations were punishment or deserved. However, what is much harder to argue is that these assassinations have either changed the direction of the Hamas leadership or done much to blunt the broader political ambitions of Hamas narrowly or the Palestinian national movement more broadly. Hamas, as a political movement, absorbed its martyrs and lives to fight another day.
以以色列对哈马斯反复进行的斩首行动为例。自哈马斯于 1987 年成立以来，以色列暗杀（或试图暗杀）了一长串哈马斯领导人，包括其创始人艾哈迈德·亚辛（2004年）和前总理伊斯梅尔·哈尼亚（2024年），而针对哈立德·马沙尔（1997年）和哈利勒·哈亚（2025年）的尝试则以失败告终。你可以争辩说这些暗杀是惩罚或者是罪有应得，但很难论证这些暗杀改变了哈马斯领导层的方向，或者削弱了哈马斯乃至更广泛的巴勒斯坦民族运动的政治抱负。作为一个政治运动，哈马斯吸收了其“殉道者”，并继续生存下去以待来日再战。
Of course, the story is not all so gloomy. Japan and Germany emerged from World War II with new leadership and close partnerships with the United States that have grown stronger in the subsequent eight decades. Panama has flourished after the 1989 removal of dictator Manuel Noriega for his drug-running efforts, and democracy has been strengthened.
当然，情况并非完全悲观。二战后的日本和德国产生了新的领导层，并与美国建立了紧密的伙伴关系，这种关系在随后的八十年里不断加强。巴拿马在 1989 年因独裁者曼努埃尔·诺列加的贩毒行为将其罢免后也走向了繁荣，民主制度得到了加强。
Iran’s Own History with Regime Change
伊朗自身的政权更迭史
A more mixed story can be found in Iran itself. As every Iranian knows, the United States and the United Kingdom worked together to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 after he nationalized the oil industry and partnered with the local communist party. The move allowed the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to rule unencumbered for a quarter-century. Fiercely anti-communist and close to the West, Iran stood as one of the “Twin Pillars” of Western strategy in the Persian Gulf, alongside Saudi Arabia. Between the two, they kept the region’s oil supplies firmly in the Western camp and far away from the Soviet unx. The Shah’s modernization efforts played well in Washington, and his close ties with Israel won Iran some friends; the Shah’s authoritarianism was easy for many to overlook.
在伊朗自身也能找到一个毁誉参半的故事。正如每个伊朗人都知道的，1953 年，美国和英国在摩萨台总理将石油工业国有化并与当地gcd合作后，联手推翻了他。此举让沙阿穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维无所顾忌地统治了四分之一个世纪。当时，伊朗作为坚定的反共派且亲近西方，与沙特阿拉伯并列为西方在波斯湾战略的“双支柱”。两者共同确保了该地区的石油供应牢牢掌握在西方阵营手中，并远离苏联。沙阿的现代化努力在华盛顿很受欢迎，他与以色列的紧密关系也为伊朗赢得了一些朋友；对许多人来说，沙阿的威权主义很容易被忽视。
For the most dangerous part of the Cold War, then, the U.S. effort to remove what it saw as a dangerous leader was a success. The problem from a U.S. perspective was the almost-half-century that followed his fall. Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has presented an enduring threat to U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East, and it has harbored a special animus against the United States.
因此，在冷战最危险的阶段，美国罢免其视为危险领导人的努力是成功的。但从美国的角度来看，问题出在他倒台后的近半个世纪里。自 1979 年成立以来，伊斯兰共和国对美国在中东的盟友和伙伴构成了持久威胁，并对美国怀有特殊的敌意。
Iraq as a Cautionary Tale
伊拉克作为前车之鉴
Neighboring Iraq is a harder case to judge. Saddam Hussein was certainly a malign force in both Iraq and the region, but it is Iran that benefited most when the United States removed him from power. The prevailing view in the Bush administration was that if the “dirty dozen” at the top of the Iraqi government were removed, the Iraqi people would be in control of their fate after decades of brutal dictatorship. Great effort and planning went into the military campaign, and politics were something of an afterthought.
邻国伊拉克则是一个更难评判的案例。萨达姆·侯赛因无疑是伊拉克乃至该地区的邪恶力量，但当美国将其赶下台时，获益最多的却是伊朗。布什政府当时的普遍观点是，如果伊拉克政府顶层的“十二恶人”被罢免，在经历了数十年的残酷独裁后，伊拉克人民将掌控自己的命运。当时大量的精力和规划都投入到了军事行动中，而政治在某种程度上只是事后才考虑的问题。
Yet every Iraqi government since the fall of Saddam has understood the depth of Iranian penetration of their country, its security apparatus, its economy, and its politics. The indelible images of Iraqis proudly holding their ink-stained fingers aloft after voting in 2005 were moving, but they were followed by a brutal insurgency that allowed Iran to penetrate further still. Iranian-backed militias hold wide swaths of the country in their grip, and every Iraqi prime minister has known he needs to strike a modus vivendi with Iran. In addition, the United States built on Saddam’s strategy to use heightened sectarianism as a tool of Iraqi political management. That strategy provided short-term stabilization, but it reinforced the country’s fault lines. For all of the blood and treasure that the United States poured into Iraq after decapitating the government, the scoreboard is decidedly mixed.
然而，自萨达姆倒台以来，每一届伊拉克政府都深知伊朗对其国家安全机构、经济和政治渗透之深。2005 年伊拉克人投票后自豪地举起沾满墨水的手指的画面令人动容，但紧随其后的是残酷的叛乱，这让伊朗得以进一步渗透。伊朗支持的民兵控制了该国的大片地区，每一位伊拉克总理都清楚自己需要与伊朗达成某种妥协。此外，美国在萨达姆战略的基础上，利用加剧的教派冲突作为伊拉克政治管理的工具。该战略虽然实现了短期稳定，但却强化了国家的断层线。尽管美国在“斩首”伊拉克政府后投入了大量鲜血和财富，但最终的成绩单却是忧喜参半。
Why Systems Survive Leaders
为什么体制能比领导人更长久
Elsewhere, the direct U.S. effort was less clear, and the outcomes remain murky. One set of arguable successes was in Eastern Europe. Although the United States’ role in precipitating the fall of the Iron Curtain was anything but acute, strong support to Eastern Europe—from the United States and European allies alike—helped many countries transition (back) to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. The United States moved Jean-Bertrand Aristide out (and then in, and then out) of power in the 1990s and 2000s, and Haiti has become steadily less secure and more dysfunctional. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi maintained an iron grip on his country. Since his fall in 2011, a power vacuum has persisted, and warring factions roam the country. Shortly thereafter, the United States helped ease Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power in Yemen, and chaos has followed in his wake.
在其他地方，美国的直接干预较不明显，结果依然模糊。一组存在争议的成功案例是在东欧。虽然美国在促使“铁幕”倒台中的作用并不直接，但来自美国及欧洲盟友的强力支持帮助许多国家在数十年威权统治后向民主转型。在 20 世纪 90 年代和 21 世纪初，美国将让·贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德赶下台（随后又让他上台，接着又下台），而海地变得越来越不安全且功能失调。利比亚独裁者穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲曾铁腕统治其国家，自 2011 年他倒台以来，权力真空一直存在，交战派系横行。此后不久，美国帮助阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫在也门下台，随之而来的是一片混乱。
Little of this was by design, but it reveals an important truth: Efforts to change systems of government are destabilizing. Too often, the “great man” theory of history persists, fostering the belief that removing a single person can cause complex problems to disappear. But leaders do not rule by themselves. They are the product of systems that are attuned to local circumstances, and they preside over elaborate patronage networks whose members have everything to lose. Removing a leader often exposes the pathologies of a country that was struggling. By virtue of being close to power, groups often acquire money, guns, and networks. When there is any vacuum, they deploy them to remain in power.
这些很少是刻意设计的，但它揭示了一个重要的事实：改变政府体制的努力具有破坏稳定性。往往“伟人论”的历史观依然根深蒂固，使人相信除掉一个人就能让复杂的问题消失。但领导人并非独自统治。他们是适应当地环境的体制产物，并主持着复杂的政治分赃网络，其成员一旦失去体制将一无所有。消灭一个领导人往往会暴露一个本就在挣扎中国家的各种病灶。凭借接近权力的地位，各种利益集团往往获得了金钱、武器和人脉。一旦出现权力真空，他们就会利用这些手段来维持统治。
What Successful Political Transitions Require
成功的政治转型需要什么
Compare this to Syria. Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria built his rump state in Idlib province for eight years before moving into Damascus. In Idlib, he and his team created an entire governmental network that built popular support, as well as a track record of success. That is to say, al-Sharaa had the time and space (and money) to build resilient institutions. Officials who were competent could be promoted, and the incompetent shunted aside. Large and loyal cadres were built, and discipline was instilled.
对比一下叙利亚。叙利亚的艾哈迈德·沙拉（Ahmed al-Sharaa）在进入大马士革之前，在伊德利卜省建立其残余政权长达八年之久。在伊德利卜，他和他的团队建立了一个完整的政府网络，赢得了民意支持并积累了成功的政绩。也就是说，沙拉拥有充足的时间、空间（和金钱）来建立有韧性的制度。有能力的官员得以晋升，无能者被排挤。他们建立了庞大且忠诚的骨干队伍，并树立了纪律。
That way, when he moved to take over the government in Damascus in December 2024, he was able to draw on his existing apparatus. This network is accustomed to working together, can create and implement policies, and knows how to build support. While the future of Syria remains murky, early signs suggest the new government is internally coherent and has won significant public backing.
这样一来，当他在 2024 年 12 月接管大马士革政府时，能够利用现有的机构。这个网络习惯于协同工作，能够制定并执行政策，并懂得如何赢得支持。虽然叙利亚的未来仍不明朗，但早期迹象表明新政府内部协调一致，并赢得了显著的公众支持。
Decapitation short-circuits that sort of process and does not allow resilient alternatives to emerge. Often, after decapitation, either some version of the current government remains in power, or countries dissolve into chaos. In an extensive survey of regime change efforts over the last two centuries, political scientist Alexander B. Downes found that “more than 40 percent of states that experience foreign-imposed regime change have a civil war within the next ten years.” He argued in his book that, paradoxically, “regime change is likely to result in unfavorable outcomes where it is easy and better outcomes where it is hard.”
斩首行动阻断了这种过程，导致无法产生有韧性的替代方案。通常在斩首行动后，要么是现政府的某种变体继续掌权，要么是国家陷入混乱。政治学家亚历山大·B·唐斯在对过去两个世纪政权更迭努力的广泛调查中发现，“经历过外国强加政权更迭的国家中，超过 40% 会在随后的十年内发生内战。”他在书中论证道，自相矛盾的是，“在政权更迭容易的地方往往会导致不利的结果，而在政权更迭艰难的地方反而结果更好。”
How Iran May Go
伊朗局势可能如何演变
Some argue that this argument is irrelevant for Iran. After what is expected to be an onslaught in the coming weeks, any Iranian government—even a continuation of the present one—would decide it is suicidal to pursue the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In that way, an acute danger to Israel and the United States will evaporate, and the war will be considered a success.
有人认为，这种论点对伊朗并不适用。他们认为，在接下来的几周内预期中的猛烈攻击之后，任何一届伊朗政府——即使是现政府的延续——都会认为继续追求核计划和弹道导弹计划是自杀行为。这样一来，以色列和美国面临的迫切危险将消失，战争将被视为成功。
But there are many ways that would not be the outcome. After all, for the current government, the attack validates their belief in the unrelenting hostility of the United States and Israel. An important part of deterrence is assurance: If a target refrains from proscribed behavior, threatened punishments will not follow. Iran’s leaders have often concluded that U.S. hostility to Iran has meant that the ratchet only goes one way, and the only consequence of Iranian concessions is demands that Iran make more concessions, albeit from a position of greater weakness.
但也有很多情况会导致截然不同的结果。毕竟，对于现政府而言，这次袭击证实了他们一直以来认为美以敌意不可调和的信念。威慑的一个重要部分是“保证”：如果目标停止了被禁止的行为，威胁中的惩罚就不会随之而来。伊朗领导人经常得出结论，美国对伊朗的敌意意味着这种压力只会单向增加，伊朗让步的唯一后果是对方要求做出更多让步，尽管是在更加弱势的地位上。
For many in the current regime, the war underlines Iran’s vital need to maintain its own deterrent. What shape that would take is unclear, but it is likely to emphasize asymmetrical tools that can cause serious damage. That could involve enduring threats to neighbors, to Israel, and to the United States. Iranian colleagues often remark that countries that have crossed the nuclear threshold—Pakistan, India, and North Korea—have never been attacked by Western powers, and the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons may well persist.
对于现政权中的许多人来说，这场战争凸显了伊朗维持自身威慑力的至关重要性。这种威慑的具体形式尚不明确，但很可能会强调能够造成严重损害的非对称工具。这可能包括对邻国、以色列和美国的持久威胁。伊朗同行经常评论说，那些跨过核门槛的国家——巴基斯坦、印度和朝鲜——从未受到过西方大国的攻击，因此伊朗追求核武器的动力可能会持续存在。
Should the government fall, a replacement government may have difficulty maintaining control. This would be especially true if devastating attacks on energy infrastructure created enduring economic distress. The new government would have little ability to relieve suffering and few tools to build patronage. As the central authority dissolved, ungoverned spaces could emerge that provided cover for armed groups to operate, including recidivist elements of the current government. That chaos could well spread outward for many years to come. It is unlikely that any country would seek to occupy Iran, a country more than twice the size of Texas, with a population three times the size of Iraq. Iran could simply smolder.
如果政府倒台，继任政府可能难以维持控制。如果对能源基础设施的破坏性袭击造成了持久的经济困境，情况尤其如此。新政府将几乎没有能力缓解民众痛苦，也缺乏手段来建立政治分赃体系。随着中央权威解体，可能会出现权力真空区，为武装组织的活动提供掩护，包括现政府的顽固势力。这种混乱很可能会在未来多年向外蔓延。不太可能有任何国家寻求占领伊朗，因为它的国土面积是德克萨斯州的两倍多，人口是伊拉克的三倍。伊朗可能会一直处于这种阴燃状态。
From Israel’s point of view, those sorts of scenarios may be an improvement on the status quo. Feeling an existential threat from Iran’s nuclear program and a persistent danger from Iran’s proxies, many Israelis would see even a chaotic situation in Iran as favorable. Israel believes it is already locked into an enduring battle with Iran, so its continuation, even on different terms, is an acceptable outcome.
从以色列的角度来看，这类场景可能比现状有所改善。由于感受到来自伊朗核计划的生存威胁和来自伊朗代理人的持续危险，许多以色列人会认为即便伊朗处于混乱状态也是有利的。以色列认为它已经卷入了与伊朗的持久战，因此战争以不同的形式继续是可以接受的结果。
Diverging U.S. and Israeli Stakes
美国与以色列利益的分歧
The United States has more complicated interests. It has much more extensive relationships in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, and a much more robust presence there. Persistent and evolving threats to the United States and its partners would heighten dangers to Americans present in the region, jeopardize growing economic investments, and have enduring negative effects on global trade. Simply put, the United States has not needed to feel it was on a constant war footing with Iran, but it may need to going forward.
美国的利益则更为复杂。它在伊朗周边地区有着更为广泛的关系，以及更为强大的存在。对美国及其伙伴持续且不断演变的威胁将增加该地区美国人的危险，危及不断增长的经济投资，并对全球贸易产生持久的负面影响。简单来说，美国此前并不需要觉得必须对伊朗保持长期的战争状态，但今后可能需要。
The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei was not the hard part of the current campaign. Deploying intelligence tools and military instruments against an adversary is something that U.S. and Israeli forces have done with great success for decades. What is harder is using those tools to shape political outcomes, and in particular, to shape the political choices that Iran’s leaders—and its future leaders—make. While President Donald Trump has sometimes spoken about his desire for regime change and the freedom of the Iranian people, those things are hard to accomplish, and even harder to do from arm’s length and with little preparation. The record of decapitation creating much more favorable governments is generally poor.
暗杀阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊并不是当前行动中最难的部分。几十年来，美以部队在针对对手部署情报工具和军事手段方面取得了巨大的成功。更难的是利用这些工具来影响政治结果，特别是影响伊朗现任及未来领导人所做出的政治选择。虽然特朗普总统有时会谈到他希望实现政权更迭和伊朗人民的自由，但这些事情很难达成，在缺乏准备且保持距离的情况下更是难上加难。斩首行动产生更理想政府的记录总体上非常糟糕。
More likely, the U.S. and Israeli governments hope that future leaders of Iran will see that resistance is futile, and they will simply submit to the aggressors’ strength and will. Here, too, the record is not encouraging. Khamenei was 86 and ailing, and succession talk was swirling. That may have been an opportunity to help Iran move in a different direction, but that moment has passed.
更有可能的是，美以政府希望伊朗未来的领导人能看到抵抗是徒劳的，并直接屈服于侵略者的力量和意志。在这里，历史记录同样不容乐观。哈梅内伊此前已 86 岁且身体欠佳，继任者的讨论本已甚嚣尘上。那本可能是一个帮助伊朗走向不同方向的机会，但那个时机已经错过了。
Conclusion
结论
The current war presents a much more acute challenge, and one where favorable outcomes will be much harder to secure. Much will depend on how the war unfolds and what is damaged in the process. The spectrum of possibilities is wide. But experience teaches that fighting the war successfully is a small part of achieving war aims. That is especially true here, where so many of the war aims seem to be political.
当前的战争呈现出更为严峻的挑战，且更难获得有利的结果。很大程度上取决于战争如何展开，以及在此过程中破坏了什么。可能性的范围很广。但经验告诉我们，成功地进行战争只是实现战争目标的一小部分。在这里尤其如此，因为如此多的战争目标似乎都是政治性的。
Almost 60 years ago, the development economist Albert O. Hirschman wrote about the “hiding hand.” That is, individuals systematically underestimate the difficulty of what they hope to do while also underestimating the creativity that unexpected difficulties will demand. The U.S. and Israeli governments have vast power to destroy, but far less capacity to build—especially in foreign lands that they have just vanquished. They should understand that the hard work is just beginning. Killing the Iranian leadership is not the goal of this operation. Changing the political decisions of future Iranian leaders is. That is the challenge, and it will be harder than they expect. It will require more creativity—and effort—than they seem ready to deploy.
大约 60 年前，发展经济学家阿尔伯特·O·赫希曼写到了“隐蔽的手”。也就是说，人们会系统性地低估他们希望做成的事情的难度，同时也低估了应对意外困难所需的创造力。美以政府拥有巨大的破坏力量，但建设能力却小得多——尤其是在他们刚刚战胜的异国土地上。他们应该明白，艰苦的工作才刚刚开始。杀掉伊朗领导层并不是这次行动的目标，改变未来伊朗领导人的政治决定才是。这就是挑战，它将比他们预期的更难，需要比他们目前展现出的更多的创造力和努力。
评论翻译
