"很多人不曾谈到的是，遏制中国除了地缘需要，还有美国人内心非常强烈的情绪反应”马凯硕谈中美爆发冲突的深层原因
正文翻译
文字整理：
The U.S.-China geopolitical contest, which the United States has launched, is driven by deep structural forces. And I want to emphasize that, because, you know, if you notice, President Donald Trump started this contest, right? He was defeated in the election. President Joe Biden came in. He disagreed with Donald Trump on everything, except on China. And on China, President Joe Biden has not been able to lift a single tariff on China. Not once. That shows that personalities is not what's driving this contest. It's structural forces. And we must understand these structural forces. So what are the structural forces? There are at least three. The first is that, and this is an iron law of Geopolitics.. That has been around for 2,000, maybe 3,000 years. Whenever the world's number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world's number one power, which today is the United States, the world's number one power always pushes down the world's number one emerging power.
美中地缘政治竞争是由美国发起的，受到深层结构性力量的驱动。
我想强调这一点，因为如果你注意到，特朗普总统启动了这场竞争，对吧？他在选举中被击败。拜登总统上台后，他几乎在所有问题上都与特朗普意见相左，除了对华政策。在对华问题上，拜登总统未能取消任何一项对中国的关税，一次也没有。这表明，推动这场竞争的不是个人因素，而是结构性力量。我们必须理解这些结构性力量。那么，这些结构性力量是什么？
至少有三个。
首先，这是一个地缘政治的铁律，存在了两千年，或许三千年。每当世界第一新兴大国——今天是中国——即将超越世界第一大国——今天是美国——时，世界第一大国总是会打压新兴大国。
And this has been happening for 2,000 years. So in some ways, when the United States... The United States is trying, fighting so hard to retain its number one position, it's actually behaving very normally. This is what all great powers have done for thousands of years. But what is puzzling, you know, and I say this because I've been in the United States now for one week. And I am actually surprised that even though, and as I explain later, it may not necessarily be in the United States' interest to launch this contest against China, there is a rock-solid consensus in the American body politic. And when I speak to so many Americans here, and I've been here for one week now, they seem determined to stand up to China, even though it may not necessarily be in the American interest. So this is what, in many ways, is driving this contest, this enormous desire of the United States to remain number one in the world.
这种情况已经持续了两千年。所以在某种程度上，当美国如此努力地争取保持其世界第一的地位时，它实际上是在非常正常地行事。
这是几千年来所有大国都会做的事情。但令人困惑的是，我之所以这么说，是因为我在美国待了一周。我惊讶地发现，我稍后会解释的，发起这场对中国的竞争未必符合美国的利益，但美国政界却有着坚如磐石的共识。我在这儿待了一周，与许多美国人交谈，他们似乎都决心对抗中国，即使这未必符合美国的利益。所以，这在很大程度上推动了这场竞争，美国对保持世界第一的强烈愿望。
So that's the first factor that's making it inevitable. The second factor that's making this contest inevitable is the first one, by the way, I want to emphasize, everybody talks about it. I mean... Mr. Wang Huiya mentioned Graham Allison. He's also written a book, as you know, about the inevitability of war within the U.S. and China. And then he talks about this, what he calls the Thucydides Trap. So the first point I made, everybody knows about. But the second point I'm going to make, nobody talks about. Especially in the U.S. Because it's politically incorrect to mention it. Because the second structural force, that's driving this contest, is what I call the fear of the yellow peril. Now the fear of the yellow peril has laid buried in the Western imagination for 800 years. And by the way, I want to explain that this fear is not an imagination of mine, because it has surfaced in the U.S.
因此，这是使得这场竞争不可避免的第一个因素。
第二个因素，顺便说一下，我想强调的是，第一个因素人人都谈论。王辉亚（音译）先生提到过格雷厄姆·艾利森，他写了一本书，讨论了美中之间战争的不可避免性。他称之为“修昔底德陷阱”。所以我提到的第一个因素，大家都知道了。
但我要说的第二个因素，没人谈论，特别是在美国，因为提到它在政治上不正确。因为推动这场竞争的第二个结构性力量，是我所谓的“黄祸”恐惧。这种“黄祸”恐惧在西方想象中潜伏了800年。顺便说一句，我想解释一下，这种恐惧不是我凭空想象的，因为它在美国已经浮出水面。
It has surfaced in American history. And about 130 years ago, you should know this historical fact, the United States Congress passed an act called the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. Let me repeat that. The Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. So that is a very powerful demonstration of the fear of the yellow peril. So when we try to analyze and understand this U.S.-China contest, we try to look for the rational factors that are driving it. But there are also emotional factors. And these emotional factors are also very powerful. And when I said earlier that having been in the United States now for one week, I can feel the emotions towards China have become very, very negative. But I have to be here to feel it, to absorb it before I can confirm it. And that's what I've experienced. This very powerful, emotional reaction to China. And the third structural force that's also driving this contest, and they're all different.
这种恐惧在美国历史上已经显现。大约130年前，你应该知道这个历史事实，美国国会通过了一项名为《排华法案》的法律。我再重复一遍，《排华法案》。这非常有力地证明了“黄祸”恐惧的存在。因此，当我们试图分析和理解美中竞争时，我们会寻找推动它的理性因素。但也有情感因素，这些情感因素同样非常强大。
我之前提到，在美国待了一周后，我能感觉到对中国的负面情绪非常强烈。但我必须亲身在这里感受、体会，才能确认这一点。这就是我的体验，对中国非常强烈的情感反应。
第三个推动这场竞争的结构性力量也不同。
One is ancient, one is yellow peril, and the third one is a kind of a bipartisan disappointment in the United States that American engagement with China has not created a liberal democracy in China. Now, this is, again, not something I'm imagining, because as you will see in my book, when you read it, I quote a very important, actually he's now a very important American official in the Biden administration. His name is Kurt Campbell. And he published an essay. He published an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs, I think, with another official called Ellie Redner. And he said that the Americans believed that when America engaged China, when America opened up China economically, after America opened up China economically, China would also open up politically. China would become a liberal democracy. And America and China would live happily. Ever after. Now, as you can tell from the way I'm saying it, it sounds like a fairy tale.
一个是古老的规律，一个是“黄祸”恐惧，第三个是美国两党对美国与中国的接触未能使中国成为自由民主国家的失望。
这也不是我的想象，因为正如你在我的书中会看到的，我引用了一位非常重要的人物，他现在是拜登政府中的一位重要官员，名叫库尔特·坎贝尔。他发表了一篇《外交事务》杂志的文章，我想是与另一位官员艾莉·拉特纳共同撰写的。他说，美国人相信，当美国与中国接触、美国在经济上向中国开放后，中国也会在政治上开放。中国会成为自由民主国家，然后美国和中国会幸福地生活下去。从我说的语气中，你可以看出，这听起来像个童话。
And it is a fairy tale. Because in many ways, it's very puzzling. And this is what my book tries to do, to try and, in a sense, explain Chinese history to the Americans. That how is it a country like the United States, which is only less than 250 years old, right? Less than 250 years old. With one quarter of the population of China, America believed, hey, we, America, we can change China, which has got a population four times the size of China, and a history that is 4,000 years old at least, maybe 5,000 years. So what was behind this American belief that this young American republic could transform, one of the most ancient civilizations that we have today? But that in itself is an indication of the misunderstandings that Americans have, which is what my book tries to point out. So I hope you understand that there are deep structural forces that are driving this contest.
这确实是一个童话。因为在很多方面，这非常令人费解。这正是我的书试图做的，在某种意义上向美国人解释中国的历史。
一个像美国这样只有不到250年历史的国家，人口仅为中国的四分之一，美国却相信，嘿，我们美国可以改变中国，一个人口是美国四倍、历史至少有4000年、可能5000年的国家。这种美国信念的背后是什么？这个年轻的美国共和国认为自己可以改变当今最古老的文明之一？这本身就表明了美国人对中国的误解，这正是我的书试图指出的。所以我希望你们理解，推动这场竞争的深层结构性力量。
Is that paradoxically, again, this is another paradox. Even though the United States has launched this contest against China, it doesn't have a strategy. I mean, I'm not exaggerating this. In fact, as I explain in my book, and I'm sure Mr. Wang Huyao noticed it, I happened to have a one-on-one lunch with America's greatest living strategic thinker, Henry Kissinger. And at that lunch, he said to me, you know, and he allowed me to quote me, quote him as saying that, that the United States doesn't have a strategy. For managing China. But even if he hadn't said it to me, it's pretty obvious. Because when America launched this geopolitical contest against China, it hasn't specified what are its obxtives. What does America hope to accomplish in launching this contest against China? Right? It could be, number one, isolating China from the rest. The rest of the world, as it succeeded in doing with the Soviet unx, containing the Soviet unx.
矛盾的是，这又是一个悖论。尽管美国发起了这场对中国的竞争，但它没有一个明确的战略。我不是在夸大其词。
事实上，正如我在书中解释的，我相信王辉亚先生也注意到了，我曾与美国最伟大的在世战略思想家亨利·基辛格共进午餐。他在午餐时对我说，他允许我引用他的话，美国没有应对中国的战略。即使他不告诉我，这也很明显。因为当美国发起这场对中国的地缘政治竞争时，它没有明确目标。美国希望通过这场竞争实现什么？
可能是第一，孤立中国，与世界其他国家隔绝，就像它成功遏制苏联一样。
It could be overthrowing the communist Party of China. It could be preventing China from becoming the number one economy in the world. And I suggest these three obxtives, because if you analyze them, none of these three obxtives are achievable. Now, if you want to launch a contest, you must have very clear, very clear obxtives. What are you trying to accomplish? And the United States has never specified, and has never, unfortunately for itself, understood what it wants to do vis-a-vis China. And so that's the other paradox about the United States' decision to launch this contest against China. But having said that, let me now turn to the other half of the first paradox I spoke about, which is, is that while it is inevitable, it is also avoidable. So why is this contest avoidable? And there are several reasons. In fact, in my last chapter of my book, I talk about the five non-contradictions.
可能是推翻……。可能是阻止中国成为世界第一大经济体。我提出了这三个目标，因为如果你分析它们，这三个目标没有一个是可实现的。
现在，如果你想发起一场竞争，你必须有非常明确的目标。你想实现什么？不幸的是，美国从未明确说明，也从未理解它想对中国做什么。这就是美国决定发起这场对华竞争的另一个悖论。
但说了这些，让我转向我提到的第一个悖论的另一半，即这场竞争虽然看似不可避免，但也是可以避免的。为什么这场竞争可以避免？有几个原因。事实上，在我书的最后一章，我谈到了在美中之间五个“非矛盾”。
between U.S. and China, and I hope if you have a chance to read the book, please look at the five non-contradictions. By the way, the phrase non-contradiction itself is a very clumsy English phrase that is very rarely used, but I use it just to explain why this is so unusual, because there's actually no fundamental reason why the U.S. and China should clash with each other. And so let me give you two examples of why the United States and China should not clash with each other. The first reason is that if the fundamental national interest of the United States and if the fundamental national interest of China is to improve the well-being of their people, to make them improve their living standards and make them better and so on, and so forth, then frankly, the U.S. and China should be working together because they have a common interest in improving the well-being of their people.
我希望如果你有机会读这本书，请看看这五个“非矛盾”。顺便说一句，“非矛盾”这个词本身是一个很拙劣的英语表达，很少使用，但我用它来解释为什么这很不寻常，因为美中之间实际上没有根本理由必须发生冲突。所以让我举两个例子说明为什么美中不应该冲突。第一个原因是，如果美国和中国的根本国家利益是改善人民福祉，提高生活水平，让人民生活得更好等等，那么坦白说，美中应该合作，因为他们在改善人民福祉方面有共同利益。
And if they cooperate, if they trade with each other, they will get better, right? And the tragedy here is that the United States is the only major developed country where the average income... of the bottom 50, 5-0, 50, 5-0 percent has not improved for three decades. And the living conditions of the bottom 50 percent have deteriorated. In fact, there's another Nobel laureate, Angus Deaton, whom I quote in my book, who's published a book called Deaths of Despair. And he talks about how, you know, all the indicators, all the indicators of well-being are deteriorating in America. Life expectancy is coming down, shocking, in a major developed country, right? And poverty is growing. Suicides are growing. That's very sad. So all this, if the primary interest of the United States is to improve the well-being of its people, it should logically press the...
如果他们合作，相互贸易，情况会变得更好，对吧？这里的悲剧是，美国是唯一一个主要发达国家——其底层50%人口的平均收入在过去三十年没有改善。底层50%的生活条件恶化了。事实上，我在书中引用了另一位诺贝尔奖得主安格斯·迪顿，他出版了一本书《绝望之死》。他谈到美国的福祉指标都在恶化。预期寿命下降，这在一个主要发达国家是令人震惊的，对吧？贫困在增加，自杀率也在上升。这很悲哀。所以，如果美国的首要利益是改善人民福祉，它应该逻辑上按下……
cross-button on the geopolitical contest against China, and actually war with China, to improve the well-being of its people. And as you'll see in the book, I discuss that in some detail, of how they can cooperate on things like infrastructure and other areas to improve their well-being. So that's one area where there's a non-contradiction. The second area where there's a non-contradiction, and where actually U.S. and China are in conflict, is the U.S.-China relationship. The third area where actually U.S. and China should work together is in the area of global challenges. And clearly, United States and China face common global challenges. And we've seen this in COVID-19, right? COVID-19 has shown how much the world has shrunk, and how much we are all, as Kofi Annan, the late U.N. Secretary General, would say, we are now living in the same global village.
暂停地缘政治竞争的按钮，甚至避免与中国发生战争，以改善其人民的福祉。正如你在书中看到的，我详细讨论了他们如何在基础设施等领域合作，以改善福祉。这是第一个没有矛盾的领域。
第二个没有矛盾的领域，也是美中实际存在冲突的领域，是美中关系。
第三个美中应该合作的领域是全球挑战。显然，美国和中国面临共同的全球挑战。我们在新冠疫情中看到了这一点，对吧？新冠疫情显示了世界变得多么得小，正如已故联合国秘书长科菲·安南所说，我们现在生活在同一个全球村落。
It's no longer a huge planet. This is one small global village. So anything that happens to us affects all of us. So we should be cooperating. If you live in a village, you should be cooperating to fight against the common dangers, whether it's COVID-19, or if it's climate change. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. and China collaborate. So you can see there are very powerful reasons why US and China should collaborate.
这不再是一个巨大的星球，而是一个小小的全球村落。所以，发生在我们身上的任何事情都会影响到所有人。因此，我们应该合作。如果我们生活在一个村子里，我们应该合作对抗共同的威胁，无论是新冠疫情还是气候变化。除非美国和中国共同努力，否则无法解决气候变化问题。因此，你可以看到，美中合作的理由非常有力。
So that's what I'm trying to achieve in my book, to try and persuade both countries please press the pause button on what you are doing and focus on cooperating because that's what the world wants you to do. And that brings me to the next important point I want to make because you notice I just said that's what the world wants you to do because I have a whole chapter in my book which says that out of the 7.8 billion people in the world, there are 330 million who live in the United States, there are 1.4 billion who live in China, but there are still 6 billion people who live outside the United States and China. And these 6 billion people, you ask them privately, confidentially would you like the US-China geopolitical contest to accelerate? Or would you like US and China to stop this contest? And I can tell you that the overwhelming majority of the 6 billion people who live outside US and China want both countries to say stop this contest because it is not helping anybody.
这就是我在书中试图实现的目标，试图说服两国暂停目前的行动，专注于合作，因为这是世界的期望。这引出了我要说的下一个重点，因为我刚刚提到这是世界的期望。
我书中有一整章提到，全球78亿人口中，美国有3.3亿，中国有14亿，但还有60亿人生活在美中之外。如果你私下、秘密地问这60亿人，你希望美中地缘政治竞争加速吗？还是希望美中停止这场竞争？我可以告诉你，绝大多数生活在美中之外的60亿人希望两国说：停止这场竞争，因为它对任何人都没有帮助。
It is not helping the United States. It is not helping China and is not helping the rest of the world and I can tell you as someone who lives in Southeast Asia which is still South China, if you if you did a poll of the 650 million people who live in ASEAN they will say that they want this contest to pause because the Southeast Asian countries want to have good relations with United States and they want to have good good relations with China, and they don't want to be forced to choose. And that's the view of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. So in that sense, I hope that my book will be helpful to both US and China, because it will help to persuade them that given the larger global challenges that we face, let's come together, work together, and defeat these common challenges, and press the pause button on this geopolitical contest. Thank you very much.
这场竞争对美国没有帮助，对中国没有帮助，对世界其他地区也没有帮助。作为一个生活在东南亚——也就是中国南边的人，我可以告诉你，如果你在东盟6.5亿人口中做民调，他们会说希望这场竞争暂停，因为东南亚国家希望与美国保持良好关系，也希望与中国保持良好关系，他们不想被迫选择。这也是世界绝大多数人口的观点。
因此，我希望我的书能对美中两国有所帮助，因为它将说服两国，面对更大的全球挑战，让我们团结起来，共同努力，战胜这些共同挑战，暂停这场地缘政治竞争。非常感谢。
（完）
文字整理：
The U.S.-China geopolitical contest, which the United States has launched, is driven by deep structural forces. And I want to emphasize that, because, you know, if you notice, President Donald Trump started this contest, right? He was defeated in the election. President Joe Biden came in. He disagreed with Donald Trump on everything, except on China. And on China, President Joe Biden has not been able to lift a single tariff on China. Not once. That shows that personalities is not what's driving this contest. It's structural forces. And we must understand these structural forces. So what are the structural forces? There are at least three. The first is that, and this is an iron law of Geopolitics.. That has been around for 2,000, maybe 3,000 years. Whenever the world's number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world's number one power, which today is the United States, the world's number one power always pushes down the world's number one emerging power.
美中地缘政治竞争是由美国发起的，受到深层结构性力量的驱动。
我想强调这一点，因为如果你注意到，特朗普总统启动了这场竞争，对吧？他在选举中被击败。拜登总统上台后，他几乎在所有问题上都与特朗普意见相左，除了对华政策。在对华问题上，拜登总统未能取消任何一项对中国的关税，一次也没有。这表明，推动这场竞争的不是个人因素，而是结构性力量。我们必须理解这些结构性力量。那么，这些结构性力量是什么？
至少有三个。
首先，这是一个地缘政治的铁律，存在了两千年，或许三千年。每当世界第一新兴大国——今天是中国——即将超越世界第一大国——今天是美国——时，世界第一大国总是会打压新兴大国。
And this has been happening for 2,000 years. So in some ways, when the United States... The United States is trying, fighting so hard to retain its number one position, it's actually behaving very normally. This is what all great powers have done for thousands of years. But what is puzzling, you know, and I say this because I've been in the United States now for one week. And I am actually surprised that even though, and as I explain later, it may not necessarily be in the United States' interest to launch this contest against China, there is a rock-solid consensus in the American body politic. And when I speak to so many Americans here, and I've been here for one week now, they seem determined to stand up to China, even though it may not necessarily be in the American interest. So this is what, in many ways, is driving this contest, this enormous desire of the United States to remain number one in the world.
这种情况已经持续了两千年。所以在某种程度上，当美国如此努力地争取保持其世界第一的地位时，它实际上是在非常正常地行事。
这是几千年来所有大国都会做的事情。但令人困惑的是，我之所以这么说，是因为我在美国待了一周。我惊讶地发现，我稍后会解释的，发起这场对中国的竞争未必符合美国的利益，但美国政界却有着坚如磐石的共识。我在这儿待了一周，与许多美国人交谈，他们似乎都决心对抗中国，即使这未必符合美国的利益。所以，这在很大程度上推动了这场竞争，美国对保持世界第一的强烈愿望。
So that's the first factor that's making it inevitable. The second factor that's making this contest inevitable is the first one, by the way, I want to emphasize, everybody talks about it. I mean... Mr. Wang Huiya mentioned Graham Allison. He's also written a book, as you know, about the inevitability of war within the U.S. and China. And then he talks about this, what he calls the Thucydides Trap. So the first point I made, everybody knows about. But the second point I'm going to make, nobody talks about. Especially in the U.S. Because it's politically incorrect to mention it. Because the second structural force, that's driving this contest, is what I call the fear of the yellow peril. Now the fear of the yellow peril has laid buried in the Western imagination for 800 years. And by the way, I want to explain that this fear is not an imagination of mine, because it has surfaced in the U.S.
因此，这是使得这场竞争不可避免的第一个因素。
第二个因素，顺便说一下，我想强调的是，第一个因素人人都谈论。王辉亚（音译）先生提到过格雷厄姆·艾利森，他写了一本书，讨论了美中之间战争的不可避免性。他称之为“修昔底德陷阱”。所以我提到的第一个因素，大家都知道了。
但我要说的第二个因素，没人谈论，特别是在美国，因为提到它在政治上不正确。因为推动这场竞争的第二个结构性力量，是我所谓的“黄祸”恐惧。这种“黄祸”恐惧在西方想象中潜伏了800年。顺便说一句，我想解释一下，这种恐惧不是我凭空想象的，因为它在美国已经浮出水面。
It has surfaced in American history. And about 130 years ago, you should know this historical fact, the United States Congress passed an act called the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. Let me repeat that. The Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. So that is a very powerful demonstration of the fear of the yellow peril. So when we try to analyze and understand this U.S.-China contest, we try to look for the rational factors that are driving it. But there are also emotional factors. And these emotional factors are also very powerful. And when I said earlier that having been in the United States now for one week, I can feel the emotions towards China have become very, very negative. But I have to be here to feel it, to absorb it before I can confirm it. And that's what I've experienced. This very powerful, emotional reaction to China. And the third structural force that's also driving this contest, and they're all different.
这种恐惧在美国历史上已经显现。大约130年前，你应该知道这个历史事实，美国国会通过了一项名为《排华法案》的法律。我再重复一遍，《排华法案》。这非常有力地证明了“黄祸”恐惧的存在。因此，当我们试图分析和理解美中竞争时，我们会寻找推动它的理性因素。但也有情感因素，这些情感因素同样非常强大。
我之前提到，在美国待了一周后，我能感觉到对中国的负面情绪非常强烈。但我必须亲身在这里感受、体会，才能确认这一点。这就是我的体验，对中国非常强烈的情感反应。
第三个推动这场竞争的结构性力量也不同。
One is ancient, one is yellow peril, and the third one is a kind of a bipartisan disappointment in the United States that American engagement with China has not created a liberal democracy in China. Now, this is, again, not something I'm imagining, because as you will see in my book, when you read it, I quote a very important, actually he's now a very important American official in the Biden administration. His name is Kurt Campbell. And he published an essay. He published an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs, I think, with another official called Ellie Redner. And he said that the Americans believed that when America engaged China, when America opened up China economically, after America opened up China economically, China would also open up politically. China would become a liberal democracy. And America and China would live happily. Ever after. Now, as you can tell from the way I'm saying it, it sounds like a fairy tale.
一个是古老的规律，一个是“黄祸”恐惧，第三个是美国两党对美国与中国的接触未能使中国成为自由民主国家的失望。
这也不是我的想象，因为正如你在我的书中会看到的，我引用了一位非常重要的人物，他现在是拜登政府中的一位重要官员，名叫库尔特·坎贝尔。他发表了一篇《外交事务》杂志的文章，我想是与另一位官员艾莉·拉特纳共同撰写的。他说，美国人相信，当美国与中国接触、美国在经济上向中国开放后，中国也会在政治上开放。中国会成为自由民主国家，然后美国和中国会幸福地生活下去。从我说的语气中，你可以看出，这听起来像个童话。
And it is a fairy tale. Because in many ways, it's very puzzling. And this is what my book tries to do, to try and, in a sense, explain Chinese history to the Americans. That how is it a country like the United States, which is only less than 250 years old, right? Less than 250 years old. With one quarter of the population of China, America believed, hey, we, America, we can change China, which has got a population four times the size of China, and a history that is 4,000 years old at least, maybe 5,000 years. So what was behind this American belief that this young American republic could transform, one of the most ancient civilizations that we have today? But that in itself is an indication of the misunderstandings that Americans have, which is what my book tries to point out. So I hope you understand that there are deep structural forces that are driving this contest.
这确实是一个童话。因为在很多方面，这非常令人费解。这正是我的书试图做的，在某种意义上向美国人解释中国的历史。
一个像美国这样只有不到250年历史的国家，人口仅为中国的四分之一，美国却相信，嘿，我们美国可以改变中国，一个人口是美国四倍、历史至少有4000年、可能5000年的国家。这种美国信念的背后是什么？这个年轻的美国共和国认为自己可以改变当今最古老的文明之一？这本身就表明了美国人对中国的误解，这正是我的书试图指出的。所以我希望你们理解，推动这场竞争的深层结构性力量。
Is that paradoxically, again, this is another paradox. Even though the United States has launched this contest against China, it doesn't have a strategy. I mean, I'm not exaggerating this. In fact, as I explain in my book, and I'm sure Mr. Wang Huyao noticed it, I happened to have a one-on-one lunch with America's greatest living strategic thinker, Henry Kissinger. And at that lunch, he said to me, you know, and he allowed me to quote me, quote him as saying that, that the United States doesn't have a strategy. For managing China. But even if he hadn't said it to me, it's pretty obvious. Because when America launched this geopolitical contest against China, it hasn't specified what are its obxtives. What does America hope to accomplish in launching this contest against China? Right? It could be, number one, isolating China from the rest. The rest of the world, as it succeeded in doing with the Soviet unx, containing the Soviet unx.
矛盾的是，这又是一个悖论。尽管美国发起了这场对中国的竞争，但它没有一个明确的战略。我不是在夸大其词。
事实上，正如我在书中解释的，我相信王辉亚先生也注意到了，我曾与美国最伟大的在世战略思想家亨利·基辛格共进午餐。他在午餐时对我说，他允许我引用他的话，美国没有应对中国的战略。即使他不告诉我，这也很明显。因为当美国发起这场对中国的地缘政治竞争时，它没有明确目标。美国希望通过这场竞争实现什么？
可能是第一，孤立中国，与世界其他国家隔绝，就像它成功遏制苏联一样。
It could be overthrowing the communist Party of China. It could be preventing China from becoming the number one economy in the world. And I suggest these three obxtives, because if you analyze them, none of these three obxtives are achievable. Now, if you want to launch a contest, you must have very clear, very clear obxtives. What are you trying to accomplish? And the United States has never specified, and has never, unfortunately for itself, understood what it wants to do vis-a-vis China. And so that's the other paradox about the United States' decision to launch this contest against China. But having said that, let me now turn to the other half of the first paradox I spoke about, which is, is that while it is inevitable, it is also avoidable. So why is this contest avoidable? And there are several reasons. In fact, in my last chapter of my book, I talk about the five non-contradictions.
可能是推翻……。可能是阻止中国成为世界第一大经济体。我提出了这三个目标，因为如果你分析它们，这三个目标没有一个是可实现的。
现在，如果你想发起一场竞争，你必须有非常明确的目标。你想实现什么？不幸的是，美国从未明确说明，也从未理解它想对中国做什么。这就是美国决定发起这场对华竞争的另一个悖论。
但说了这些，让我转向我提到的第一个悖论的另一半，即这场竞争虽然看似不可避免，但也是可以避免的。为什么这场竞争可以避免？有几个原因。事实上，在我书的最后一章，我谈到了在美中之间五个“非矛盾”。
between U.S. and China, and I hope if you have a chance to read the book, please look at the five non-contradictions. By the way, the phrase non-contradiction itself is a very clumsy English phrase that is very rarely used, but I use it just to explain why this is so unusual, because there's actually no fundamental reason why the U.S. and China should clash with each other. And so let me give you two examples of why the United States and China should not clash with each other. The first reason is that if the fundamental national interest of the United States and if the fundamental national interest of China is to improve the well-being of their people, to make them improve their living standards and make them better and so on, and so forth, then frankly, the U.S. and China should be working together because they have a common interest in improving the well-being of their people.
我希望如果你有机会读这本书，请看看这五个“非矛盾”。顺便说一句，“非矛盾”这个词本身是一个很拙劣的英语表达，很少使用，但我用它来解释为什么这很不寻常，因为美中之间实际上没有根本理由必须发生冲突。所以让我举两个例子说明为什么美中不应该冲突。第一个原因是，如果美国和中国的根本国家利益是改善人民福祉，提高生活水平，让人民生活得更好等等，那么坦白说，美中应该合作，因为他们在改善人民福祉方面有共同利益。
And if they cooperate, if they trade with each other, they will get better, right? And the tragedy here is that the United States is the only major developed country where the average income... of the bottom 50, 5-0, 50, 5-0 percent has not improved for three decades. And the living conditions of the bottom 50 percent have deteriorated. In fact, there's another Nobel laureate, Angus Deaton, whom I quote in my book, who's published a book called Deaths of Despair. And he talks about how, you know, all the indicators, all the indicators of well-being are deteriorating in America. Life expectancy is coming down, shocking, in a major developed country, right? And poverty is growing. Suicides are growing. That's very sad. So all this, if the primary interest of the United States is to improve the well-being of its people, it should logically press the...
如果他们合作，相互贸易，情况会变得更好，对吧？这里的悲剧是，美国是唯一一个主要发达国家——其底层50%人口的平均收入在过去三十年没有改善。底层50%的生活条件恶化了。事实上，我在书中引用了另一位诺贝尔奖得主安格斯·迪顿，他出版了一本书《绝望之死》。他谈到美国的福祉指标都在恶化。预期寿命下降，这在一个主要发达国家是令人震惊的，对吧？贫困在增加，自杀率也在上升。这很悲哀。所以，如果美国的首要利益是改善人民福祉，它应该逻辑上按下……
cross-button on the geopolitical contest against China, and actually war with China, to improve the well-being of its people. And as you'll see in the book, I discuss that in some detail, of how they can cooperate on things like infrastructure and other areas to improve their well-being. So that's one area where there's a non-contradiction. The second area where there's a non-contradiction, and where actually U.S. and China are in conflict, is the U.S.-China relationship. The third area where actually U.S. and China should work together is in the area of global challenges. And clearly, United States and China face common global challenges. And we've seen this in COVID-19, right? COVID-19 has shown how much the world has shrunk, and how much we are all, as Kofi Annan, the late U.N. Secretary General, would say, we are now living in the same global village.
暂停地缘政治竞争的按钮，甚至避免与中国发生战争，以改善其人民的福祉。正如你在书中看到的，我详细讨论了他们如何在基础设施等领域合作，以改善福祉。这是第一个没有矛盾的领域。
第二个没有矛盾的领域，也是美中实际存在冲突的领域，是美中关系。
第三个美中应该合作的领域是全球挑战。显然，美国和中国面临共同的全球挑战。我们在新冠疫情中看到了这一点，对吧？新冠疫情显示了世界变得多么得小，正如已故联合国秘书长科菲·安南所说，我们现在生活在同一个全球村落。
It's no longer a huge planet. This is one small global village. So anything that happens to us affects all of us. So we should be cooperating. If you live in a village, you should be cooperating to fight against the common dangers, whether it's COVID-19, or if it's climate change. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. and China collaborate. So you can see there are very powerful reasons why US and China should collaborate.
这不再是一个巨大的星球，而是一个小小的全球村落。所以，发生在我们身上的任何事情都会影响到所有人。因此，我们应该合作。如果我们生活在一个村子里，我们应该合作对抗共同的威胁，无论是新冠疫情还是气候变化。除非美国和中国共同努力，否则无法解决气候变化问题。因此，你可以看到，美中合作的理由非常有力。
So that's what I'm trying to achieve in my book, to try and persuade both countries please press the pause button on what you are doing and focus on cooperating because that's what the world wants you to do. And that brings me to the next important point I want to make because you notice I just said that's what the world wants you to do because I have a whole chapter in my book which says that out of the 7.8 billion people in the world, there are 330 million who live in the United States, there are 1.4 billion who live in China, but there are still 6 billion people who live outside the United States and China. And these 6 billion people, you ask them privately, confidentially would you like the US-China geopolitical contest to accelerate? Or would you like US and China to stop this contest? And I can tell you that the overwhelming majority of the 6 billion people who live outside US and China want both countries to say stop this contest because it is not helping anybody.
这就是我在书中试图实现的目标，试图说服两国暂停目前的行动，专注于合作，因为这是世界的期望。这引出了我要说的下一个重点，因为我刚刚提到这是世界的期望。
我书中有一整章提到，全球78亿人口中，美国有3.3亿，中国有14亿，但还有60亿人生活在美中之外。如果你私下、秘密地问这60亿人，你希望美中地缘政治竞争加速吗？还是希望美中停止这场竞争？我可以告诉你，绝大多数生活在美中之外的60亿人希望两国说：停止这场竞争，因为它对任何人都没有帮助。
It is not helping the United States. It is not helping China and is not helping the rest of the world and I can tell you as someone who lives in Southeast Asia which is still South China, if you if you did a poll of the 650 million people who live in ASEAN they will say that they want this contest to pause because the Southeast Asian countries want to have good relations with United States and they want to have good good relations with China, and they don't want to be forced to choose. And that's the view of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. So in that sense, I hope that my book will be helpful to both US and China, because it will help to persuade them that given the larger global challenges that we face, let's come together, work together, and defeat these common challenges, and press the pause button on this geopolitical contest. Thank you very much.
这场竞争对美国没有帮助，对中国没有帮助，对世界其他地区也没有帮助。作为一个生活在东南亚——也就是中国南边的人，我可以告诉你，如果你在东盟6.5亿人口中做民调，他们会说希望这场竞争暂停，因为东南亚国家希望与美国保持良好关系，也希望与中国保持良好关系，他们不想被迫选择。这也是世界绝大多数人口的观点。
因此，我希望我的书能对美中两国有所帮助，因为它将说服两国，面对更大的全球挑战，让我们团结起来，共同努力，战胜这些共同挑战，暂停这场地缘政治竞争。非常感谢。
（完）
评论翻译
文字整理：
The U.S.-China geopolitical contest, which the United States has launched, is driven by deep structural forces. And I want to emphasize that, because, you know, if you notice, President Donald Trump started this contest, right? He was defeated in the election. President Joe Biden came in. He disagreed with Donald Trump on everything, except on China. And on China, President Joe Biden has not been able to lift a single tariff on China. Not once. That shows that personalities is not what's driving this contest. It's structural forces. And we must understand these structural forces. So what are the structural forces? There are at least three. The first is that, and this is an iron law of Geopolitics.. That has been around for 2,000, maybe 3,000 years. Whenever the world's number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world's number one power, which today is the United States, the world's number one power always pushes down the world's number one emerging power.
美中地缘政治竞争是由美国发起的，受到深层结构性力量的驱动。
我想强调这一点，因为如果你注意到，特朗普总统启动了这场竞争，对吧？他在选举中被击败。拜登总统上台后，他几乎在所有问题上都与特朗普意见相左，除了对华政策。在对华问题上，拜登总统未能取消任何一项对中国的关税，一次也没有。这表明，推动这场竞争的不是个人因素，而是结构性力量。我们必须理解这些结构性力量。那么，这些结构性力量是什么？
至少有三个。
首先，这是一个地缘政治的铁律，存在了两千年，或许三千年。每当世界第一新兴大国——今天是中国——即将超越世界第一大国——今天是美国——时，世界第一大国总是会打压新兴大国。
And this has been happening for 2,000 years. So in some ways, when the United States... The United States is trying, fighting so hard to retain its number one position, it's actually behaving very normally. This is what all great powers have done for thousands of years. But what is puzzling, you know, and I say this because I've been in the United States now for one week. And I am actually surprised that even though, and as I explain later, it may not necessarily be in the United States' interest to launch this contest against China, there is a rock-solid consensus in the American body politic. And when I speak to so many Americans here, and I've been here for one week now, they seem determined to stand up to China, even though it may not necessarily be in the American interest. So this is what, in many ways, is driving this contest, this enormous desire of the United States to remain number one in the world.
这种情况已经持续了两千年。所以在某种程度上，当美国如此努力地争取保持其世界第一的地位时，它实际上是在非常正常地行事。
这是几千年来所有大国都会做的事情。但令人困惑的是，我之所以这么说，是因为我在美国待了一周。我惊讶地发现，我稍后会解释的，发起这场对中国的竞争未必符合美国的利益，但美国政界却有着坚如磐石的共识。我在这儿待了一周，与许多美国人交谈，他们似乎都决心对抗中国，即使这未必符合美国的利益。所以，这在很大程度上推动了这场竞争，美国对保持世界第一的强烈愿望。
So that's the first factor that's making it inevitable. The second factor that's making this contest inevitable is the first one, by the way, I want to emphasize, everybody talks about it. I mean... Mr. Wang Huiya mentioned Graham Allison. He's also written a book, as you know, about the inevitability of war within the U.S. and China. And then he talks about this, what he calls the Thucydides Trap. So the first point I made, everybody knows about. But the second point I'm going to make, nobody talks about. Especially in the U.S. Because it's politically incorrect to mention it. Because the second structural force, that's driving this contest, is what I call the fear of the yellow peril. Now the fear of the yellow peril has laid buried in the Western imagination for 800 years. And by the way, I want to explain that this fear is not an imagination of mine, because it has surfaced in the U.S.
因此，这是使得这场竞争不可避免的第一个因素。
第二个因素，顺便说一下，我想强调的是，第一个因素人人都谈论。王辉亚（音译）先生提到过格雷厄姆·艾利森，他写了一本书，讨论了美中之间战争的不可避免性。他称之为“修昔底德陷阱”。所以我提到的第一个因素，大家都知道了。
但我要说的第二个因素，没人谈论，特别是在美国，因为提到它在政治上不正确。因为推动这场竞争的第二个结构性力量，是我所谓的“黄祸”恐惧。这种“黄祸”恐惧在西方想象中潜伏了800年。顺便说一句，我想解释一下，这种恐惧不是我凭空想象的，因为它在美国已经浮出水面。
It has surfaced in American history. And about 130 years ago, you should know this historical fact, the United States Congress passed an act called the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. Let me repeat that. The Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. So that is a very powerful demonstration of the fear of the yellow peril. So when we try to analyze and understand this U.S.-China contest, we try to look for the rational factors that are driving it. But there are also emotional factors. And these emotional factors are also very powerful. And when I said earlier that having been in the United States now for one week, I can feel the emotions towards China have become very, very negative. But I have to be here to feel it, to absorb it before I can confirm it. And that's what I've experienced. This very powerful, emotional reaction to China. And the third structural force that's also driving this contest, and they're all different.
这种恐惧在美国历史上已经显现。大约130年前，你应该知道这个历史事实，美国国会通过了一项名为《排华法案》的法律。我再重复一遍，《排华法案》。这非常有力地证明了“黄祸”恐惧的存在。因此，当我们试图分析和理解美中竞争时，我们会寻找推动它的理性因素。但也有情感因素，这些情感因素同样非常强大。
我之前提到，在美国待了一周后，我能感觉到对中国的负面情绪非常强烈。但我必须亲身在这里感受、体会，才能确认这一点。这就是我的体验，对中国非常强烈的情感反应。
第三个推动这场竞争的结构性力量也不同。
One is ancient, one is yellow peril, and the third one is a kind of a bipartisan disappointment in the United States that American engagement with China has not created a liberal democracy in China. Now, this is, again, not something I'm imagining, because as you will see in my book, when you read it, I quote a very important, actually he's now a very important American official in the Biden administration. His name is Kurt Campbell. And he published an essay. He published an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs, I think, with another official called Ellie Redner. And he said that the Americans believed that when America engaged China, when America opened up China economically, after America opened up China economically, China would also open up politically. China would become a liberal democracy. And America and China would live happily. Ever after. Now, as you can tell from the way I'm saying it, it sounds like a fairy tale.
一个是古老的规律，一个是“黄祸”恐惧，第三个是美国两党对美国与中国的接触未能使中国成为自由民主国家的失望。
这也不是我的想象，因为正如你在我的书中会看到的，我引用了一位非常重要的人物，他现在是拜登政府中的一位重要官员，名叫库尔特·坎贝尔。他发表了一篇《外交事务》杂志的文章，我想是与另一位官员艾莉·拉特纳共同撰写的。他说，美国人相信，当美国与中国接触、美国在经济上向中国开放后，中国也会在政治上开放。中国会成为自由民主国家，然后美国和中国会幸福地生活下去。从我说的语气中，你可以看出，这听起来像个童话。
And it is a fairy tale. Because in many ways, it's very puzzling. And this is what my book tries to do, to try and, in a sense, explain Chinese history to the Americans. That how is it a country like the United States, which is only less than 250 years old, right? Less than 250 years old. With one quarter of the population of China, America believed, hey, we, America, we can change China, which has got a population four times the size of China, and a history that is 4,000 years old at least, maybe 5,000 years. So what was behind this American belief that this young American republic could transform, one of the most ancient civilizations that we have today? But that in itself is an indication of the misunderstandings that Americans have, which is what my book tries to point out. So I hope you understand that there are deep structural forces that are driving this contest.
这确实是一个童话。因为在很多方面，这非常令人费解。这正是我的书试图做的，在某种意义上向美国人解释中国的历史。
一个像美国这样只有不到250年历史的国家，人口仅为中国的四分之一，美国却相信，嘿，我们美国可以改变中国，一个人口是美国四倍、历史至少有4000年、可能5000年的国家。这种美国信念的背后是什么？这个年轻的美国共和国认为自己可以改变当今最古老的文明之一？这本身就表明了美国人对中国的误解，这正是我的书试图指出的。所以我希望你们理解，推动这场竞争的深层结构性力量。
Is that paradoxically, again, this is another paradox. Even though the United States has launched this contest against China, it doesn't have a strategy. I mean, I'm not exaggerating this. In fact, as I explain in my book, and I'm sure Mr. Wang Huyao noticed it, I happened to have a one-on-one lunch with America's greatest living strategic thinker, Henry Kissinger. And at that lunch, he said to me, you know, and he allowed me to quote me, quote him as saying that, that the United States doesn't have a strategy. For managing China. But even if he hadn't said it to me, it's pretty obvious. Because when America launched this geopolitical contest against China, it hasn't specified what are its obxtives. What does America hope to accomplish in launching this contest against China? Right? It could be, number one, isolating China from the rest. The rest of the world, as it succeeded in doing with the Soviet unx, containing the Soviet unx.
矛盾的是，这又是一个悖论。尽管美国发起了这场对中国的竞争，但它没有一个明确的战略。我不是在夸大其词。
事实上，正如我在书中解释的，我相信王辉亚先生也注意到了，我曾与美国最伟大的在世战略思想家亨利·基辛格共进午餐。他在午餐时对我说，他允许我引用他的话，美国没有应对中国的战略。即使他不告诉我，这也很明显。因为当美国发起这场对中国的地缘政治竞争时，它没有明确目标。美国希望通过这场竞争实现什么？
可能是第一，孤立中国，与世界其他国家隔绝，就像它成功遏制苏联一样。
It could be overthrowing the communist Party of China. It could be preventing China from becoming the number one economy in the world. And I suggest these three obxtives, because if you analyze them, none of these three obxtives are achievable. Now, if you want to launch a contest, you must have very clear, very clear obxtives. What are you trying to accomplish? And the United States has never specified, and has never, unfortunately for itself, understood what it wants to do vis-a-vis China. And so that's the other paradox about the United States' decision to launch this contest against China. But having said that, let me now turn to the other half of the first paradox I spoke about, which is, is that while it is inevitable, it is also avoidable. So why is this contest avoidable? And there are several reasons. In fact, in my last chapter of my book, I talk about the five non-contradictions.
可能是推翻……。可能是阻止中国成为世界第一大经济体。我提出了这三个目标，因为如果你分析它们，这三个目标没有一个是可实现的。
现在，如果你想发起一场竞争，你必须有非常明确的目标。你想实现什么？不幸的是，美国从未明确说明，也从未理解它想对中国做什么。这就是美国决定发起这场对华竞争的另一个悖论。
但说了这些，让我转向我提到的第一个悖论的另一半，即这场竞争虽然看似不可避免，但也是可以避免的。为什么这场竞争可以避免？有几个原因。事实上，在我书的最后一章，我谈到了在美中之间五个“非矛盾”。
between U.S. and China, and I hope if you have a chance to read the book, please look at the five non-contradictions. By the way, the phrase non-contradiction itself is a very clumsy English phrase that is very rarely used, but I use it just to explain why this is so unusual, because there's actually no fundamental reason why the U.S. and China should clash with each other. And so let me give you two examples of why the United States and China should not clash with each other. The first reason is that if the fundamental national interest of the United States and if the fundamental national interest of China is to improve the well-being of their people, to make them improve their living standards and make them better and so on, and so forth, then frankly, the U.S. and China should be working together because they have a common interest in improving the well-being of their people.
我希望如果你有机会读这本书，请看看这五个“非矛盾”。顺便说一句，“非矛盾”这个词本身是一个很拙劣的英语表达，很少使用，但我用它来解释为什么这很不寻常，因为美中之间实际上没有根本理由必须发生冲突。所以让我举两个例子说明为什么美中不应该冲突。第一个原因是，如果美国和中国的根本国家利益是改善人民福祉，提高生活水平，让人民生活得更好等等，那么坦白说，美中应该合作，因为他们在改善人民福祉方面有共同利益。
And if they cooperate, if they trade with each other, they will get better, right? And the tragedy here is that the United States is the only major developed country where the average income... of the bottom 50, 5-0, 50, 5-0 percent has not improved for three decades. And the living conditions of the bottom 50 percent have deteriorated. In fact, there's another Nobel laureate, Angus Deaton, whom I quote in my book, who's published a book called Deaths of Despair. And he talks about how, you know, all the indicators, all the indicators of well-being are deteriorating in America. Life expectancy is coming down, shocking, in a major developed country, right? And poverty is growing. Suicides are growing. That's very sad. So all this, if the primary interest of the United States is to improve the well-being of its people, it should logically press the...
如果他们合作，相互贸易，情况会变得更好，对吧？这里的悲剧是，美国是唯一一个主要发达国家——其底层50%人口的平均收入在过去三十年没有改善。底层50%的生活条件恶化了。事实上，我在书中引用了另一位诺贝尔奖得主安格斯·迪顿，他出版了一本书《绝望之死》。他谈到美国的福祉指标都在恶化。预期寿命下降，这在一个主要发达国家是令人震惊的，对吧？贫困在增加，自杀率也在上升。这很悲哀。所以，如果美国的首要利益是改善人民福祉，它应该逻辑上按下……
cross-button on the geopolitical contest against China, and actually war with China, to improve the well-being of its people. And as you'll see in the book, I discuss that in some detail, of how they can cooperate on things like infrastructure and other areas to improve their well-being. So that's one area where there's a non-contradiction. The second area where there's a non-contradiction, and where actually U.S. and China are in conflict, is the U.S.-China relationship. The third area where actually U.S. and China should work together is in the area of global challenges. And clearly, United States and China face common global challenges. And we've seen this in COVID-19, right? COVID-19 has shown how much the world has shrunk, and how much we are all, as Kofi Annan, the late U.N. Secretary General, would say, we are now living in the same global village.
暂停地缘政治竞争的按钮，甚至避免与中国发生战争，以改善其人民的福祉。正如你在书中看到的，我详细讨论了他们如何在基础设施等领域合作，以改善福祉。这是第一个没有矛盾的领域。
第二个没有矛盾的领域，也是美中实际存在冲突的领域，是美中关系。
第三个美中应该合作的领域是全球挑战。显然，美国和中国面临共同的全球挑战。我们在新冠疫情中看到了这一点，对吧？新冠疫情显示了世界变得多么得小，正如已故联合国秘书长科菲·安南所说，我们现在生活在同一个全球村落。
It's no longer a huge planet. This is one small global village. So anything that happens to us affects all of us. So we should be cooperating. If you live in a village, you should be cooperating to fight against the common dangers, whether it's COVID-19, or if it's climate change. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. and China collaborate. So you can see there are very powerful reasons why US and China should collaborate.
这不再是一个巨大的星球，而是一个小小的全球村落。所以，发生在我们身上的任何事情都会影响到所有人。因此，我们应该合作。如果我们生活在一个村子里，我们应该合作对抗共同的威胁，无论是新冠疫情还是气候变化。除非美国和中国共同努力，否则无法解决气候变化问题。因此，你可以看到，美中合作的理由非常有力。
So that's what I'm trying to achieve in my book, to try and persuade both countries please press the pause button on what you are doing and focus on cooperating because that's what the world wants you to do. And that brings me to the next important point I want to make because you notice I just said that's what the world wants you to do because I have a whole chapter in my book which says that out of the 7.8 billion people in the world, there are 330 million who live in the United States, there are 1.4 billion who live in China, but there are still 6 billion people who live outside the United States and China. And these 6 billion people, you ask them privately, confidentially would you like the US-China geopolitical contest to accelerate? Or would you like US and China to stop this contest? And I can tell you that the overwhelming majority of the 6 billion people who live outside US and China want both countries to say stop this contest because it is not helping anybody.
这就是我在书中试图实现的目标，试图说服两国暂停目前的行动，专注于合作，因为这是世界的期望。这引出了我要说的下一个重点，因为我刚刚提到这是世界的期望。
我书中有一整章提到，全球78亿人口中，美国有3.3亿，中国有14亿，但还有60亿人生活在美中之外。如果你私下、秘密地问这60亿人，你希望美中地缘政治竞争加速吗？还是希望美中停止这场竞争？我可以告诉你，绝大多数生活在美中之外的60亿人希望两国说：停止这场竞争，因为它对任何人都没有帮助。
It is not helping the United States. It is not helping China and is not helping the rest of the world and I can tell you as someone who lives in Southeast Asia which is still South China, if you if you did a poll of the 650 million people who live in ASEAN they will say that they want this contest to pause because the Southeast Asian countries want to have good relations with United States and they want to have good good relations with China, and they don't want to be forced to choose. And that's the view of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. So in that sense, I hope that my book will be helpful to both US and China, because it will help to persuade them that given the larger global challenges that we face, let's come together, work together, and defeat these common challenges, and press the pause button on this geopolitical contest. Thank you very much.
这场竞争对美国没有帮助，对中国没有帮助，对世界其他地区也没有帮助。作为一个生活在东南亚——也就是中国南边的人，我可以告诉你，如果你在东盟6.5亿人口中做民调，他们会说希望这场竞争暂停，因为东南亚国家希望与美国保持良好关系，也希望与中国保持良好关系，他们不想被迫选择。这也是世界绝大多数人口的观点。
因此，我希望我的书能对美中两国有所帮助，因为它将说服两国，面对更大的全球挑战，让我们团结起来，共同努力，战胜这些共同挑战，暂停这场地缘政治竞争。非常感谢。
（完）
文字整理：
The U.S.-China geopolitical contest, which the United States has launched, is driven by deep structural forces. And I want to emphasize that, because, you know, if you notice, President Donald Trump started this contest, right? He was defeated in the election. President Joe Biden came in. He disagreed with Donald Trump on everything, except on China. And on China, President Joe Biden has not been able to lift a single tariff on China. Not once. That shows that personalities is not what's driving this contest. It's structural forces. And we must understand these structural forces. So what are the structural forces? There are at least three. The first is that, and this is an iron law of Geopolitics.. That has been around for 2,000, maybe 3,000 years. Whenever the world's number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world's number one power, which today is the United States, the world's number one power always pushes down the world's number one emerging power.
美中地缘政治竞争是由美国发起的，受到深层结构性力量的驱动。
我想强调这一点，因为如果你注意到，特朗普总统启动了这场竞争，对吧？他在选举中被击败。拜登总统上台后，他几乎在所有问题上都与特朗普意见相左，除了对华政策。在对华问题上，拜登总统未能取消任何一项对中国的关税，一次也没有。这表明，推动这场竞争的不是个人因素，而是结构性力量。我们必须理解这些结构性力量。那么，这些结构性力量是什么？
至少有三个。
首先，这是一个地缘政治的铁律，存在了两千年，或许三千年。每当世界第一新兴大国——今天是中国——即将超越世界第一大国——今天是美国——时，世界第一大国总是会打压新兴大国。
And this has been happening for 2,000 years. So in some ways, when the United States... The United States is trying, fighting so hard to retain its number one position, it's actually behaving very normally. This is what all great powers have done for thousands of years. But what is puzzling, you know, and I say this because I've been in the United States now for one week. And I am actually surprised that even though, and as I explain later, it may not necessarily be in the United States' interest to launch this contest against China, there is a rock-solid consensus in the American body politic. And when I speak to so many Americans here, and I've been here for one week now, they seem determined to stand up to China, even though it may not necessarily be in the American interest. So this is what, in many ways, is driving this contest, this enormous desire of the United States to remain number one in the world.
这种情况已经持续了两千年。所以在某种程度上，当美国如此努力地争取保持其世界第一的地位时，它实际上是在非常正常地行事。
这是几千年来所有大国都会做的事情。但令人困惑的是，我之所以这么说，是因为我在美国待了一周。我惊讶地发现，我稍后会解释的，发起这场对中国的竞争未必符合美国的利益，但美国政界却有着坚如磐石的共识。我在这儿待了一周，与许多美国人交谈，他们似乎都决心对抗中国，即使这未必符合美国的利益。所以，这在很大程度上推动了这场竞争，美国对保持世界第一的强烈愿望。
So that's the first factor that's making it inevitable. The second factor that's making this contest inevitable is the first one, by the way, I want to emphasize, everybody talks about it. I mean... Mr. Wang Huiya mentioned Graham Allison. He's also written a book, as you know, about the inevitability of war within the U.S. and China. And then he talks about this, what he calls the Thucydides Trap. So the first point I made, everybody knows about. But the second point I'm going to make, nobody talks about. Especially in the U.S. Because it's politically incorrect to mention it. Because the second structural force, that's driving this contest, is what I call the fear of the yellow peril. Now the fear of the yellow peril has laid buried in the Western imagination for 800 years. And by the way, I want to explain that this fear is not an imagination of mine, because it has surfaced in the U.S.
因此，这是使得这场竞争不可避免的第一个因素。
第二个因素，顺便说一下，我想强调的是，第一个因素人人都谈论。王辉亚（音译）先生提到过格雷厄姆·艾利森，他写了一本书，讨论了美中之间战争的不可避免性。他称之为“修昔底德陷阱”。所以我提到的第一个因素，大家都知道了。
但我要说的第二个因素，没人谈论，特别是在美国，因为提到它在政治上不正确。因为推动这场竞争的第二个结构性力量，是我所谓的“黄祸”恐惧。这种“黄祸”恐惧在西方想象中潜伏了800年。顺便说一句，我想解释一下，这种恐惧不是我凭空想象的，因为它在美国已经浮出水面。
It has surfaced in American history. And about 130 years ago, you should know this historical fact, the United States Congress passed an act called the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. Let me repeat that. The Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. So that is a very powerful demonstration of the fear of the yellow peril. So when we try to analyze and understand this U.S.-China contest, we try to look for the rational factors that are driving it. But there are also emotional factors. And these emotional factors are also very powerful. And when I said earlier that having been in the United States now for one week, I can feel the emotions towards China have become very, very negative. But I have to be here to feel it, to absorb it before I can confirm it. And that's what I've experienced. This very powerful, emotional reaction to China. And the third structural force that's also driving this contest, and they're all different.
这种恐惧在美国历史上已经显现。大约130年前，你应该知道这个历史事实，美国国会通过了一项名为《排华法案》的法律。我再重复一遍，《排华法案》。这非常有力地证明了“黄祸”恐惧的存在。因此，当我们试图分析和理解美中竞争时，我们会寻找推动它的理性因素。但也有情感因素，这些情感因素同样非常强大。
我之前提到，在美国待了一周后，我能感觉到对中国的负面情绪非常强烈。但我必须亲身在这里感受、体会，才能确认这一点。这就是我的体验，对中国非常强烈的情感反应。
第三个推动这场竞争的结构性力量也不同。
One is ancient, one is yellow peril, and the third one is a kind of a bipartisan disappointment in the United States that American engagement with China has not created a liberal democracy in China. Now, this is, again, not something I'm imagining, because as you will see in my book, when you read it, I quote a very important, actually he's now a very important American official in the Biden administration. His name is Kurt Campbell. And he published an essay. He published an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs, I think, with another official called Ellie Redner. And he said that the Americans believed that when America engaged China, when America opened up China economically, after America opened up China economically, China would also open up politically. China would become a liberal democracy. And America and China would live happily. Ever after. Now, as you can tell from the way I'm saying it, it sounds like a fairy tale.
一个是古老的规律，一个是“黄祸”恐惧，第三个是美国两党对美国与中国的接触未能使中国成为自由民主国家的失望。
这也不是我的想象，因为正如你在我的书中会看到的，我引用了一位非常重要的人物，他现在是拜登政府中的一位重要官员，名叫库尔特·坎贝尔。他发表了一篇《外交事务》杂志的文章，我想是与另一位官员艾莉·拉特纳共同撰写的。他说，美国人相信，当美国与中国接触、美国在经济上向中国开放后，中国也会在政治上开放。中国会成为自由民主国家，然后美国和中国会幸福地生活下去。从我说的语气中，你可以看出，这听起来像个童话。
And it is a fairy tale. Because in many ways, it's very puzzling. And this is what my book tries to do, to try and, in a sense, explain Chinese history to the Americans. That how is it a country like the United States, which is only less than 250 years old, right? Less than 250 years old. With one quarter of the population of China, America believed, hey, we, America, we can change China, which has got a population four times the size of China, and a history that is 4,000 years old at least, maybe 5,000 years. So what was behind this American belief that this young American republic could transform, one of the most ancient civilizations that we have today? But that in itself is an indication of the misunderstandings that Americans have, which is what my book tries to point out. So I hope you understand that there are deep structural forces that are driving this contest.
这确实是一个童话。因为在很多方面，这非常令人费解。这正是我的书试图做的，在某种意义上向美国人解释中国的历史。
一个像美国这样只有不到250年历史的国家，人口仅为中国的四分之一，美国却相信，嘿，我们美国可以改变中国，一个人口是美国四倍、历史至少有4000年、可能5000年的国家。这种美国信念的背后是什么？这个年轻的美国共和国认为自己可以改变当今最古老的文明之一？这本身就表明了美国人对中国的误解，这正是我的书试图指出的。所以我希望你们理解，推动这场竞争的深层结构性力量。
Is that paradoxically, again, this is another paradox. Even though the United States has launched this contest against China, it doesn't have a strategy. I mean, I'm not exaggerating this. In fact, as I explain in my book, and I'm sure Mr. Wang Huyao noticed it, I happened to have a one-on-one lunch with America's greatest living strategic thinker, Henry Kissinger. And at that lunch, he said to me, you know, and he allowed me to quote me, quote him as saying that, that the United States doesn't have a strategy. For managing China. But even if he hadn't said it to me, it's pretty obvious. Because when America launched this geopolitical contest against China, it hasn't specified what are its obxtives. What does America hope to accomplish in launching this contest against China? Right? It could be, number one, isolating China from the rest. The rest of the world, as it succeeded in doing with the Soviet unx, containing the Soviet unx.
矛盾的是，这又是一个悖论。尽管美国发起了这场对中国的竞争，但它没有一个明确的战略。我不是在夸大其词。
事实上，正如我在书中解释的，我相信王辉亚先生也注意到了，我曾与美国最伟大的在世战略思想家亨利·基辛格共进午餐。他在午餐时对我说，他允许我引用他的话，美国没有应对中国的战略。即使他不告诉我，这也很明显。因为当美国发起这场对中国的地缘政治竞争时，它没有明确目标。美国希望通过这场竞争实现什么？
可能是第一，孤立中国，与世界其他国家隔绝，就像它成功遏制苏联一样。
It could be overthrowing the communist Party of China. It could be preventing China from becoming the number one economy in the world. And I suggest these three obxtives, because if you analyze them, none of these three obxtives are achievable. Now, if you want to launch a contest, you must have very clear, very clear obxtives. What are you trying to accomplish? And the United States has never specified, and has never, unfortunately for itself, understood what it wants to do vis-a-vis China. And so that's the other paradox about the United States' decision to launch this contest against China. But having said that, let me now turn to the other half of the first paradox I spoke about, which is, is that while it is inevitable, it is also avoidable. So why is this contest avoidable? And there are several reasons. In fact, in my last chapter of my book, I talk about the five non-contradictions.
可能是推翻……。可能是阻止中国成为世界第一大经济体。我提出了这三个目标，因为如果你分析它们，这三个目标没有一个是可实现的。
现在，如果你想发起一场竞争，你必须有非常明确的目标。你想实现什么？不幸的是，美国从未明确说明，也从未理解它想对中国做什么。这就是美国决定发起这场对华竞争的另一个悖论。
但说了这些，让我转向我提到的第一个悖论的另一半，即这场竞争虽然看似不可避免，但也是可以避免的。为什么这场竞争可以避免？有几个原因。事实上，在我书的最后一章，我谈到了在美中之间五个“非矛盾”。
between U.S. and China, and I hope if you have a chance to read the book, please look at the five non-contradictions. By the way, the phrase non-contradiction itself is a very clumsy English phrase that is very rarely used, but I use it just to explain why this is so unusual, because there's actually no fundamental reason why the U.S. and China should clash with each other. And so let me give you two examples of why the United States and China should not clash with each other. The first reason is that if the fundamental national interest of the United States and if the fundamental national interest of China is to improve the well-being of their people, to make them improve their living standards and make them better and so on, and so forth, then frankly, the U.S. and China should be working together because they have a common interest in improving the well-being of their people.
我希望如果你有机会读这本书，请看看这五个“非矛盾”。顺便说一句，“非矛盾”这个词本身是一个很拙劣的英语表达，很少使用，但我用它来解释为什么这很不寻常，因为美中之间实际上没有根本理由必须发生冲突。所以让我举两个例子说明为什么美中不应该冲突。第一个原因是，如果美国和中国的根本国家利益是改善人民福祉，提高生活水平，让人民生活得更好等等，那么坦白说，美中应该合作，因为他们在改善人民福祉方面有共同利益。
And if they cooperate, if they trade with each other, they will get better, right? And the tragedy here is that the United States is the only major developed country where the average income... of the bottom 50, 5-0, 50, 5-0 percent has not improved for three decades. And the living conditions of the bottom 50 percent have deteriorated. In fact, there's another Nobel laureate, Angus Deaton, whom I quote in my book, who's published a book called Deaths of Despair. And he talks about how, you know, all the indicators, all the indicators of well-being are deteriorating in America. Life expectancy is coming down, shocking, in a major developed country, right? And poverty is growing. Suicides are growing. That's very sad. So all this, if the primary interest of the United States is to improve the well-being of its people, it should logically press the...
如果他们合作，相互贸易，情况会变得更好，对吧？这里的悲剧是，美国是唯一一个主要发达国家——其底层50%人口的平均收入在过去三十年没有改善。底层50%的生活条件恶化了。事实上，我在书中引用了另一位诺贝尔奖得主安格斯·迪顿，他出版了一本书《绝望之死》。他谈到美国的福祉指标都在恶化。预期寿命下降，这在一个主要发达国家是令人震惊的，对吧？贫困在增加，自杀率也在上升。这很悲哀。所以，如果美国的首要利益是改善人民福祉，它应该逻辑上按下……
cross-button on the geopolitical contest against China, and actually war with China, to improve the well-being of its people. And as you'll see in the book, I discuss that in some detail, of how they can cooperate on things like infrastructure and other areas to improve their well-being. So that's one area where there's a non-contradiction. The second area where there's a non-contradiction, and where actually U.S. and China are in conflict, is the U.S.-China relationship. The third area where actually U.S. and China should work together is in the area of global challenges. And clearly, United States and China face common global challenges. And we've seen this in COVID-19, right? COVID-19 has shown how much the world has shrunk, and how much we are all, as Kofi Annan, the late U.N. Secretary General, would say, we are now living in the same global village.
暂停地缘政治竞争的按钮，甚至避免与中国发生战争，以改善其人民的福祉。正如你在书中看到的，我详细讨论了他们如何在基础设施等领域合作，以改善福祉。这是第一个没有矛盾的领域。
第二个没有矛盾的领域，也是美中实际存在冲突的领域，是美中关系。
第三个美中应该合作的领域是全球挑战。显然，美国和中国面临共同的全球挑战。我们在新冠疫情中看到了这一点，对吧？新冠疫情显示了世界变得多么得小，正如已故联合国秘书长科菲·安南所说，我们现在生活在同一个全球村落。
It's no longer a huge planet. This is one small global village. So anything that happens to us affects all of us. So we should be cooperating. If you live in a village, you should be cooperating to fight against the common dangers, whether it's COVID-19, or if it's climate change. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. and China collaborate. So you can see there are very powerful reasons why US and China should collaborate.
这不再是一个巨大的星球，而是一个小小的全球村落。所以，发生在我们身上的任何事情都会影响到所有人。因此，我们应该合作。如果我们生活在一个村子里，我们应该合作对抗共同的威胁，无论是新冠疫情还是气候变化。除非美国和中国共同努力，否则无法解决气候变化问题。因此，你可以看到，美中合作的理由非常有力。
So that's what I'm trying to achieve in my book, to try and persuade both countries please press the pause button on what you are doing and focus on cooperating because that's what the world wants you to do. And that brings me to the next important point I want to make because you notice I just said that's what the world wants you to do because I have a whole chapter in my book which says that out of the 7.8 billion people in the world, there are 330 million who live in the United States, there are 1.4 billion who live in China, but there are still 6 billion people who live outside the United States and China. And these 6 billion people, you ask them privately, confidentially would you like the US-China geopolitical contest to accelerate? Or would you like US and China to stop this contest? And I can tell you that the overwhelming majority of the 6 billion people who live outside US and China want both countries to say stop this contest because it is not helping anybody.
这就是我在书中试图实现的目标，试图说服两国暂停目前的行动，专注于合作，因为这是世界的期望。这引出了我要说的下一个重点，因为我刚刚提到这是世界的期望。
我书中有一整章提到，全球78亿人口中，美国有3.3亿，中国有14亿，但还有60亿人生活在美中之外。如果你私下、秘密地问这60亿人，你希望美中地缘政治竞争加速吗？还是希望美中停止这场竞争？我可以告诉你，绝大多数生活在美中之外的60亿人希望两国说：停止这场竞争，因为它对任何人都没有帮助。
It is not helping the United States. It is not helping China and is not helping the rest of the world and I can tell you as someone who lives in Southeast Asia which is still South China, if you if you did a poll of the 650 million people who live in ASEAN they will say that they want this contest to pause because the Southeast Asian countries want to have good relations with United States and they want to have good good relations with China, and they don't want to be forced to choose. And that's the view of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. So in that sense, I hope that my book will be helpful to both US and China, because it will help to persuade them that given the larger global challenges that we face, let's come together, work together, and defeat these common challenges, and press the pause button on this geopolitical contest. Thank you very much.
这场竞争对美国没有帮助，对中国没有帮助，对世界其他地区也没有帮助。作为一个生活在东南亚——也就是中国南边的人，我可以告诉你，如果你在东盟6.5亿人口中做民调，他们会说希望这场竞争暂停，因为东南亚国家希望与美国保持良好关系，也希望与中国保持良好关系，他们不想被迫选择。这也是世界绝大多数人口的观点。
因此，我希望我的书能对美中两国有所帮助，因为它将说服两国，面对更大的全球挑战，让我们团结起来，共同努力，战胜这些共同挑战，暂停这场地缘政治竞争。非常感谢。
（完）
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