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Could Vietnam dethrone Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?

越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？

James Wu  Studied Southeast Asian history and politicsUpvoted by 
AliefTMD , lives in Indonesia (2002-present) and  Affan Afrizal Gani , lives in Indonesia (1998-present)

詹姆斯·吴 研究东南亚历史与政治，获阿利夫·TMD（2002年至今居住在印度尼西亚）和阿凡·阿夫里扎尔·加尼（1998年至今居住在印度尼西亚）点赞 

Originally Answered: Could Vietnam dethroned Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?
I will answer this from the perspective of a Singaporean, a fellow Southeast Asian.

原问题回答：越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？
我将以同为东南亚国家公民的新加坡人的视角来回答这个问题。

The phrase “regional power of Southeast Asia” is rendered somewhat meaningless by geographical realities. Southeast Asia is not an organic region. It is very clearly disaggregated into 2 components: mainland SEA and maritime SEA
The old name for mainland Southeast Asia is IndoChina (the French used this term to refer to their colonies but originally it referred to the entire mainland), which makes sense because the states here are located at the crossroads of Chinese and Indian political/economic/cultural influence. The operative geostrategic concept here is land power (military and economic): infantry, armour, high-speed railways, pipelines, etc.

“东南亚地区强国”这一说法，在地理现实面前显得有些无意义。东南亚并非一个有机整体，它明显可分为两个部分：东南亚大陆（中南半岛）和东南亚群岛（海上东南亚）。
东南亚大陆的旧称是“印度支那”（法国人曾用该术语指代其殖民地，但最初它指的是整个东南亚大陆），这一名称不无道理，因为该地区的国家地处中国与印度政治、经济、文化影响力的交汇点。此处关键的地缘战略概念是陆权（军事和经济层面）：步兵、装甲部队、高速铁路、输油管道等。

The old name for maritime Southeast Asia is the Malay Archipelago, or Nusantara. It contains a number of key maritime trade routes and chokepoints which became increasingly salient from the beginning of the Age of Sail. The operative geostrategic concept here is sea power (military and economic): warships, submarines, merchant fleets, sea ports.
Mainland and maritime Southeast Asia are divided by two seas: the Andaman Sea (which narrows into the strait of Malacca) and the South China Sea

东南亚群岛的旧称是“马来群岛”，或称“努山塔拉”（印尼语中对东南亚群岛的称呼）。该地区拥有多条关键海上贸易航线和咽喉要道，自大航海时代开启以来，这些航线和要道的重要性日益凸显。此处关键的地缘战略概念是海权（军事和经济层面）：军舰、潜艇、商船队、海港。
东南亚大陆与东南亚群岛被两片海域分隔：安达曼海（其狭窄处形成马六甲海峡）和南海。‘

What this means is that any Southeast Asian regional power, to attain hegemony over the ENTIRE region, must project their power over these substantial bodies of water. I cannot imagine either Indonesia or Vietnam doing this for the foreseeable future (China is a different matter but we will exclude it from this discussion since it is not, strictly speaking, part of Southeast Asia). Hence, hegemony can only be partial.

这意味着，任何一个东南亚地区强国，若想获得整个地区的霸权，就必须将其影响力投射到这些广阔的水域之上。在可预见的未来，我无法想象印度尼西亚或越南能做到这一点（中国则另当别论，但我们将其排除在本次讨论之外，因为严格来说，中国并非东南亚的一部分）。因此，霸权只能是局部的。

Moreover, Vietnam and Indonesia’s considerable geopolitical strengths are counterbalanced by significant geopolitical challenges which pose difficulties for each of them attaining regional preeminence.
In terms of demography, Indonesia has the largest population of the maritime SEA states; likewise Vietnam has the largest population on the mainland. Human resources are important: not just in terms of manpower for labor-intensive agricultural or manufacturing jobs but also in terms of generating intellectual capital and innovative ideas in a knowledge-based society and economy. You need people to build stuff, invent stuff, grow stuff, run stuff, etc. Indonesia’s population far outstrips that of all the other Southeast Asian states, dwarfing that of Vietnam by a factor of about 2.5. Hence it is fair to say that Indonesia has the greatest POTENTIAL of all the Southeast Asian states.

此外，越南和印度尼西亚可观的地缘政治优势，受到了重大地缘政治挑战的制衡，这些挑战使得两国难以各自取得地区主导地位。
人口方面，印度尼西亚是东南亚群岛国家中人口最多的；同样，越南是东南亚大陆国家中人口最多的。人力资源至关重要：不仅体现在劳动密集型农业或制造业所需的劳动力上，还体现在知识型社会和经济中智力资本的积累与创新理念的产生上。无论是建设、发明、生产还是管理等各类事务，都需要人力支撑。印度尼西亚的人口远超其他所有东南亚国家，约为越南人口的2.5倍，使其相形见绌。因此，公平地说，印度尼西亚是所有东南亚国家中潜力最大的。

Culturally, Vietnam has an advantage (somewhat akin to that of China) because of its ethnic and religious uniformity. The ethnic Kinh, or the Viet people, comprise an overwhelming 85.7% of the population, and most are secular/atheist. A predominant cultural mindset/values, shared historical background and standardized/mutually intelligible linguistic frxwork is highly conducive to national unity and social cohesion.

文化上，越南因种族和宗教的统一性而具有优势（这与中国的情况有些相似）。京族（即越南主体民族）占总人口的绝大多数，达85.7%，且大多数人是世俗主义者或无神论者。占主导地位的文化思维模式与价值观、共同的历史背景以及标准化且互通的语言体系，都非常有利于国家统一和社会凝聚力。

Indonesia is slightly disadvantaged here. The majority Javanese only make up about 40% of the population, with the rest being segmented into a multiplicity of ethnic minorities. This presents difficulties for national integration, as Indonesian leaders like Sukarno found out in the early years of independence, when ethnic secessionist movements and rebellions erupted all across the archipelago and had to be put down by the TNI. Then again, an overwhelming 87% of Indonesians are Muslim, so Islam might constitute a centripetal unifying force in the construction of national identity. (although if I am not wrong, the Islam practiced in Indonesia tends to be more syncretic and pluralistic than the stricter “orthodox” Arabized version of Islam practiced in the Middle East).

印度尼西亚在这方面则略处劣势。占人口多数的爪哇族仅约占总人口的40%，其余人口分为众多少数民族。这给国家整合带来了困难，正如苏加诺等印度尼西亚领导人在独立初期所经历的那样——当时群岛各地爆发了民族分裂运动和叛乱，不得不由印尼国民军予以镇压。不过，高达87%的印度尼西亚人信奉伊斯兰教，因此在国家认同构建中，伊斯兰教可能成为一种具有向心力的统一力量（尽管如果我没记错的话，印度尼西亚奉行的伊斯兰教往往比中东地区更严格的“正统”阿拉伯化伊斯兰教更具融合性和多元性）。

Economically, Indonesia is in the lead by far. The IMF graph below does not adequately reflect this, but in absolute terms, Indonesia’s GDP is about 4 times that of Vietnam.
Indonesia’s economy started off as largely reliant on the primary sector i.e. resource extraction like agriculture, mining, oil production etc. The vast resource endowments and natural wealth of the massive archipelago undoubtedly grants it an advantage in this aspect. But from the 1960s onward under Suharto, the Father of Development, it really industrialized and its growth took off spectacularly. Today it is still in the midst of transitioning away from the secondary sector (manufacturing) toward the tertiary one (services). It no longer relies as much on resource extraction for wealth, which is good.

经济上，印度尼西亚遥遥领先。下方的国际货币基金组织图表未能充分体现这一点，但按绝对值计算，印度尼西亚的国内生产总值约为越南的4倍。
印度尼西亚的经济起初主要依赖第一产业，即农业、采矿、石油生产等资源开采业。这座庞大群岛丰富的资源禀赋和自然财富，无疑使其在这方面具备优势。但从20世纪60年代起，在“发展之父”苏哈托的领导下，印度尼西亚真正实现了工业化，经济增长突飞猛进。如今，它仍处于从第二产业（制造业）向第三产业（服务业）转型的过程中，不再像过去那样高度依赖资源开采创造财富，这是一个积极的变化。

Vietnam’s lagging GDP is understandable because it was slightly late to the economic development game, having lost a few decades under the stifling command economy, and before that, being embroiled in 30 years of continuous war. It only embraced the free market around the 1990s, when the Doi Moi reforms were implemented. Vietnam is currently in a similar stage of development as Indonesia, transitioning from the secondary to tertiary sector, but still lagging behind somewhat. The primary sector (Agriculture + Others) remains a relatively larger part of GDP than Indonesia, meaning Vietnam is still industrializing.

越南的国内生产总值相对落后是可以理解的，因为它涉足经济发展的时间稍晚——在僵化的计划经济体制下浪费了数十年，而在此之前，又深陷长达30年的持续战争。直到20世纪90年代左右，越南实施“革新开放”政策后，才开始拥抱自由市场。目前，越南正处于与印度尼西亚相似的发展阶段，即从第二产业向第三产业转型，但仍略微落后。其第一产业（农业及其他）在国内生产总值中的占比仍高于印度尼西亚，这意味着越南仍在推进工业化进程。

Militarily, qualitative assessments of military strength are just as important as quantitative assessments. Both are pretty formidable, but in different ways. Having mentioned the relative importance of land power and sea power in mainland and maritime SEA earlier, it makes sense that Vietnam has a comparatively larger army and Indonesia has a comparatively larger navy. This is due to divergence of geostrategic focus.

军事上，对军事实力的定性评估与定量评估同等重要。两国的军事实力都相当强大，但各有侧重。正如前文提到的，陆权和海权在东南亚大陆与东南亚群岛分别具有相对重要性，因此越南拥有规模相对更大的陆军，而印度尼西亚拥有规模相对更大的海军，这与两国地缘战略重心的差异相符。

The Vietnamese army is battle-hardened: for 3 consecutive decades from about 1945 to 1975, Vietnam had known no other experience but war. Its army had fought four Great Powers (Imperial Japan, France, the US, and China) to win and preserve its independence. In the course of the three IndoChina Wars, it had access to and experience handling Soviet, American, and Chinese military hardware and equipment. I can say with moderate confidence that of all the Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam has THE most well-tested and robust military capabilities, ranging from small-scale guerrilla warfare to regular conventional operations, hence the well-deserved title “the Prussians of Asia”. In the mid-to-late 1970s the great fear was that the Vietnamese army, after taking Cambodia, would overrun Thailand and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia. Vietnam alone in Southeast Asia has tasted war, endured its lessons, and, to a significant degree, mastered its practice. As they say, experience is the best teacher. It is militarily well prepared to repulse and defend against threats from potential Great Power adversaries (China), or to project power offensively against its slightly weaker mainland Southeast Asian neighbors. In short, its well-honed military’s function is external.

越南军队久经沙场：从1945年到1975年的整整30年间，越南除了战争再无其他经历。为赢得并捍卫独立，越南军队曾与四个大国（日本帝国、法国、美国和中国）交战。在三次印度支那战争期间，越南获得并积累了操作苏联、美国和中国军事装备的经验。我可以相当有把握地说，在所有东南亚国家中，越南拥有最经受过考验、最强大的军事能力，其作战范围涵盖小规模游击战到常规正规作战，因此被誉为“亚洲普鲁士”，实至名归。20世纪70年代中后期，人们普遍担忧，越南军队在占领柬埔寨后，会进一步入侵泰国及东南亚大陆其他地区。在东南亚地区，唯有越南亲历过战争、承受过战争的教训，并在很大程度上掌握了战争的技巧。正如人们所说，经验是最好的老师。越南在军事上已做好充分准备，既能抵御潜在大国对手（中国）的威胁，也能对东南亚大陆实力稍弱的邻国发动攻势、投射力量。简而言之，其训练有素的军队主要承担对外职能。

In comparison, Indonesia’s military has fulfilled a function that is mostly internal. The TNI’s main expertise and mission has always been the quelling of regional unrest or rebellions mostly within the operational reach of its amphibious capability. The army has mostly been used to reimpose domestic order by force. As such I would imagine it specializes more in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.

相比之下，印度尼西亚军队的职能主要集中在国内。印尼国民军的核心专长和使命一直是平息地区动乱或叛乱，且这些行动大多在其两栖作战能力可覆盖的范围内。陆军主要被用于以武力恢复国内秩序。因此，我认为印尼军队更擅长反叛乱和稳定局势的行动。

This is not to say that Indonesia does not have some experience dealing with external threats, real or perceived. The fledgling TNI fought a fierce guerrilla war against the returning Dutch colonial masters in the war for independence, buying time for an eventual diplomatic solution. Under Sukarno, Konfrontasi was waged against the Federation of Malaya, mostly on the island of Borneo but also on the Malay Peninsula. During the Confrontation Indonesia deployed light infantry, commandos/special forces, and demonstrated its amphibious and airborne capabilities. The conflict was of a low-intensity nature, and operations were mostly confined to small-scale infiltration, raids, and ambushes. Success was limited in the face of British air and naval superiority.

这并非意味着印度尼西亚没有应对真实或感知到的外部威胁的经验。在独立战争中，初建的印尼国民军曾与卷土重来的荷兰殖民统治者展开激烈的游击战，为最终通过外交途径解决问题争取了时间。在苏加诺执政期间，印尼与马来亚联邦爆发了“对抗运动”，冲突主要发生在婆罗洲岛，部分也波及马来半岛。对抗期间，印尼部署了轻步兵、突击队/特种部队，并展示了其两栖作战和空降能力。这场冲突属于低强度冲突，作战行动主要局限于小规模渗透、突袭和伏击。面对英国的海空优势，印尼的战果有限。

Finally, a geographical analysis of both Vietnam and Indonesia reveals that both face significant constraints.
In Vietnam’s case, it possesses a tremendous geographic advantage in the form of not one (Thailand only has one) but two territorial-population “cores”: the Red River Delta in the north and the Mekong River Delta in the south, both of which are highly productive in terms of their agricultural output, and commercially vital in terms of their access to seaborne and coastal trade. Both river deltas are lowland plains, meaning that they are highly conducive to military consolidation and political centralization as well. The Red River Delta is well shielded by mountains and jungles, rendering it defensible against invasion from the north.

最后，对越南和印度尼西亚的地理分析表明，两国都面临着重大制约。
就越南而言，它拥有一项巨大的地理优势：并非一个（泰国仅有一个），而是两个领土-人口“核心区”——北部的红河三角洲和南部的湄公河三角洲。这两个三角洲的农业产量极高，且凭借便捷的海上和沿海贸易通道，具有重要的商业价值。两者均为低地平原，这也非常有利于军事整合和政治集权。红河三角洲被山脉和丛林严密环绕，使其能够有效抵御来自北方的入侵。

But the disadvantage is that those two cores are separated by an extremely thin coastal spine, a strip of territory which, to make it worse, is very mountainous. Mountains are just about the best natural barrier you can ask for, meaning that this mountainous spine impedes connectivity between the northern and southern cores, exacerbating political and economic divisions (see: North and South Vietnam). Imagine having two brains or hearts but connected only by a fragile, narrow conduit of nervous tissue or blood vessels.

但劣势在于，这两个核心区被一条极其狭窄的沿海地带分隔，更糟糕的是，该地带多山。山脉是最佳的天然屏障之一，这意味着这条多山的狭长地带阻碍了南北核心区之间的联系，加剧了政治和经济分裂（参考：越南南北分裂时期）。这就好比一个人有两个大脑或心脏，却仅通过脆弱狭窄的神经组织或血管相连。

Another geographic problem (but also an opportunity) for Vietnam is that it is territorially contiguous with China - the two share a border. Now this has historically been good because Vietnam has benefited from the influx and absorption of the Chinese language, culture, political institutions, technology etc. But it also presents an occasional security threat, as a thousand years of Chinese domination and more recently the 1979 war have illustrated. China has demonstrated the increasing reach of its naval power as well in the case of the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands. Vietnam is of course powerful when compared with its Southeast Asian neighbours. But this intimate geographic access/proximity to and from China (which Myanmar and Laos do not share) means, if I may quote George R.R. Martin, “however bright a torch might burn it can never match the rising sun”.

越南另一个地理问题（但同时也是机遇）是与中国领土接壤。从历史上看，这曾是一件好事，因为越南从中国语言、文化、政治制度、技术等的传入和吸收中获益良多。但正如千年的中国统治以及近期1979年的战争所表明的，这也偶尔带来安全威胁。在有争议的西沙群岛和南沙群岛问题上，中国也展示了其日益增强的海军投射能力。与东南亚邻国相比，越南当然实力不俗。但这种与中国紧密的地理邻近性（缅甸和老挝并不具备）意味着，引用乔治·R·R·马丁的话来说：“无论火炬燃烧得多么明亮，都永远无法与冉冉升起的太阳相媲美。”

 What about Indonesia’s geography? The first thing that stands out is its size. Indonesia is very clearly and indisputably the largest member of ASEAN, meaning that it can likely support a population to match that size. Moreover Indonesia’s islands are endowed with an abundance of natural resources which can be transmuted into wealth: tin, oil, natural gas, copper, and spices. In the early years of development this fuelled a burgeoning primary-sector economy.

印度尼西亚的地理状况如何？最显著的一点是其国土面积。印度尼西亚无疑是东盟中面积最大的成员国，这意味着它有能力承载与之匹配的人口规模。此外，印度尼西亚的岛屿蕴藏着丰富的自然资源，这些资源可转化为财富，包括锡、石油、天然气、铜和香料等。在发展初期，这些资源推动了第一产业经济的蓬勃发展。

Indonesia’s other major geostrategic advantage is that it sits astride multiple key maritime lines of communication i.e. shipping routes . It is also a major gatekeeper of several vital strategic straits/maritime chokepoints in the First Island Chain (the Sunda Strait, the Malacca Strait, Makassar Strait etc). This means that it benefits greatly from the lifeblood of seaborne commerce circulating through maritime Southeast Asia; it also means that if Indonesia develops a sufficiently robust naval capability it is well-placed to exercise sea control and denial against potential adversaries.

印度尼西亚另一项重要的地缘战略优势是，它横跨多条关键海上交通线（即航运路线）。它也是第一岛链上多个重要战略海峡/海上咽喉要道（巽他海峡、马六甲海峡、望加锡海峡等）的主要守护者。这意味着它能从东南亚群岛地区流通的海上贸易命脉中受益匪浅；同时也意味着，若印度尼西亚能发展出足够强大的海军力量，它将处于有利地位，能够对潜在对手实施制海权和反介入作战。

But Indonesia is also constrained by one major geographic weakness, namely its archipelagic fragmentation. Its heartland is the island of Java, but the Indonesian state as a whole has a liquid core (the Java Sea). For Jakarta to exert political control over the disconnected outlying islands it must be able to project sea power across a vast stretch of scattered, dispersed islands. The lack of territorial contiguity is not conducive to political centralization. Instead it facilitates the emergence of regional identities and secessionist or separatist movements (Aceh, East Timor, etc.) Indonesia is hard-pressed to manage and administer its multiple islands and control its maritime core. This is a challenge that is very taxing in terms of resources and attention. Moreover, only about 6000 of Indonesia’s 17000 islands are populated - that’s a lot of potential left undeveloped.

但印度尼西亚也受到一项主要地理劣势的制约，即其群岛分散的格局。它的核心区域是爪哇岛，但整个印度尼西亚的国家核心是一片“液态”区域（爪哇海）。雅加达要对彼此隔离的外围岛屿施加政治控制，就必须能够跨越广阔分散的岛屿投射海权。领土不连续不利于政治集权，反而容易催生地区认同和分裂主义运动（如亚齐、东帝汶等）。印度尼西亚难以管理和治理其众多岛屿，也难以掌控其海上核心区域，这一挑战对资源和精力的消耗极大。此外，印度尼西亚的17000个岛屿中，仅有约6000个有人居住——这意味着大量潜力尚未开发。

So, what this all means, in geopolitical terms, is that Vietnam and Indonesia, if they achieve pre-eminence, will do so in their SEPARATE spheres of influence. And these spheres of influence are unlikely to encompass the whole of the mainland or maritime realms respectively, but only a PART thereof.
Historically, Vietnam’s sphere, although never fully achieved in reality during the three IndoChina wars, has been expressed in the form of an IndoChinese communist bloc encompassing Laos and Cambodia:
Indonesia’s sphere, also never fully realized during Konfrontasi, was historically articulated in terms of Sukarno’s Indonesia Raya encompassing Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore:

因此，从地缘政治角度来看，这一切意味着，越南和印度尼西亚即便取得主导地位，也将是在各自独立的势力范围内实现。而且这些势力范围不太可能分别覆盖整个东南亚大陆或群岛地区，而只能是其中的一部分。
历史上，越南的势力范围虽在三次印度支那战争期间从未完全实现，但曾以印度支那共产主义集团的形式呈现，涵盖老挝和柬埔寨：
印度尼西亚的势力范围在“对抗运动”期间也未完全实现，历史上以苏加诺提出的“大印度尼西亚”构想为代表，涵盖马来西亚、文莱和新加坡：

In any case, I do not think either Indonesia or Vietnam are close to achieving such a sphere of influence in the foreseeable future. Neither are likely to become pseudo-hegemons in the respective mainland and maritime subregions, much less become the sole hegemon of Southeast Asia.
But the fact that they already are, or are likely to become SUB-REGIONAL MIDDLE POWERS cannot be denied. This does not mean they will dominate their respective spheres - indeed we can see Singapore and Cambodia practicing power-balancing to hedge against that (Cambodia by seeking Chinese patronage, Singapore by maintaining a considerable military deterrent) - but rather, it means that Indonesia and Vietnam are or probably will be primus inter pares (first among equals) in their respective sub-regions by virtue of their geopolitical weight. They will always be important in the grand strategic calculus of the region, and neighboring states will take into consideration this importance.

无论如何，我认为在可预见的未来，印度尼西亚和越南都无法实现这样的势力范围。两国都不太可能成为各自所在的大陆或群岛次区域的准霸权国家，更不用说成为东南亚唯一的霸权国家了。
但不可否认的是，它们已经是或很可能成为次区域中等强国。这并不意味着它们会主导各自的势力范围——事实上，我们可以看到新加坡和柬埔寨在采取均势策略以防范这种情况（柬埔寨寻求中国的支持，新加坡则维持相当规模的军事威慑）——而是意味着，凭借自身的地缘政治分量，印度尼西亚和越南在各自的次区域中已经或很可能成为“同侪之首”。它们在该地区的大战略考量中始终占据重要地位，周边国家都会重视这一点。

In conclusion, competition is not, as OP’s question seems to suggest, a zero-sum game. There will be no “dethroning” simply because there is no “throne” of hegemony for any Southeast Asian state to sit on in the first place. The regional dynamics of Southeast Asia have always been characterized by complexity, diversity, plurality, and some degree of “multipolarity”.
I see this as a good thing for Southeast Asia and foresee a hopeful future for ASEAN: Indonesia and Vietnam will be a ballast for our otherwise lightweight region which is likely to be tossed about in the waves of Great Power competition (namely China and the US, but to a lesser extent Japan, India, etc.) in the decades to come. This is not to say that ASEAN will agree on everything, but incoherence has a virtue of its own. The point I am making is that having these two important sub-regional middle powers, with substantial weight of their own, exuding their own geopolitical gravity, will ground us (the smaller ASEAN states) more firmly and prevent us from being drawn into the orbit of one hegemonic Great Power or another. It is there, suspended between multiple gravitational fields, that we will find our maximum autonomy.

总之，竞争并非如提问者所暗示的那样是一场零和游戏。不会有“取代”一说，因为首先，没有任何东南亚国家能够坐上霸权的“王座”。东南亚的地区动态向来以复杂、多样、多元以及一定程度的“多极化”为特征。
我认为这对东南亚是一件好事，并对东盟的未来充满希望：在未来几十年里，东盟这个本就影响力有限的地区可能会在大国竞争（主要是中美，其次是日本、印度等）的浪潮中摇摆不定，而印度尼西亚和越南将成为这一地区的压舱石。这并非说东盟会在所有事情上达成一致，但不一致本身也有其优势。我的核心观点是，有这两个重要的次区域中等强国存在，它们凭借自身的分量和地缘政治影响力，将使我们（东盟中小国家）根基更稳固，避免被卷入某个霸权大国的轨道。正是在多个引力场之间的平衡地带，我们才能获得最大的自主权。

Otherwise we face the danger of being polarized and becoming beholden to one Great Power or another. Southeast Asia has been described as a potential “shatterbelt”: a fragile region caught between externally colliding/competing Great Powers, internally fractured by ethnic and cultural divisions, and under persistent geopolitical stress. Other “shatterbelts” include the Eastern European Balkans and the Middle East. With any luck, Vietnam and Indonesia will act as regional stabilizers, lending some geopolitical solidity to ensure we do not crumple and crack in the decades to come.

否则，我们将面临两极分化、依附于某个大国的危险。东南亚被描述为一个潜在的“破碎地带”：一个夹在外部碰撞竞争的大国之间、内部因种族和文化分裂而脆弱不堪、长期承受地缘政治压力的地区。其他“破碎地带”还包括东欧巴尔干地区和中东。幸运的是，越南和印度尼西亚将充当地区稳定器，提供一定的地缘政治稳定性，确保我们在未来几十年不会崩溃瓦解。

There is a Chinese proverb that goes: “As there cannot be two suns in the heavens, there cannot be two emperors on earth” (天无二日，地无二王). I will end by happily rebutting that proverb with another saying: “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” (百花齐放，百家争鸣)
Diversity is ASEAN’s destiny.
Below: Indonesia’s national animal, the Garuda, happily embraces Vietnam’s national animal, the Water Buffalo

中国有句谚语：“天无二日，地无二王。” 最后，我想用另一句名言来反驳它，我对此乐见其成：“百花齐放，百家争鸣。”
多样性是东盟的宿命。
下图：印度尼西亚的国鸟鹰隼（伽鲁达）与越南的国兽水牛愉快相拥

Short answer: Unlikely in the near future. Indonesia’s size, strategic depth, and institutional advantages make it the default regional heavyweight for the foreseeable term; Vietnam can close gaps in sexted areas (economy, military modernization, diplomacy) but not displace Indonesia’s overall regional primacy quickly.
Why Indonesia is the incumbent regional power
Demographics and market size: Indonesia is the world's fourth-most-populous country (~275–300 million in 2025 projections) with a large domestic market that attracts investment and sustains regional economic influence.

简短结论：近期不太可能。印尼的国土规模、战略纵深和制度优势使其在可预见的未来仍是默认的地区强国；越南虽能在部分领域（经济、军事现代化、外交）缩小差距，但无法快速撼动印尼的整体地区主导地位。
印尼为何是当前地区强国
人口与市场规模：印尼是全球第四人口大国（2025年预计约2.75亿至3亿人），庞大的国内市场吸引投资，支撑其地区经济影响力。

Economic scale and diversification: Indonesia’s GDP (PPP and nominal) and resource base—energy, minerals, agriculture—give it structural economic weight beyond Vietnam’s smaller but fast-growing economy.
Geographic position and archipelagic advantages: Situated across the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean entry, Indonesia controls critical sea lines and sits astride ASEAN’s maritime heart.
Institutional role in ASEAN: Indonesia is a founding and central actor in ASEAN diplomacy, routinely brokering regional initiatives and mediating intramural disputes.

经济规模与多元化：印尼的国内生产总值（购买力平价及名义值）和资源基础（能源、矿产、农业）赋予其结构性经济分量，远超越南规模较小但增长迅速的经济。
地理位置与群岛优势：印尼横跨马六甲海峡和印度洋入口，掌控关键海上航线，位居东盟海上核心地带。
东盟中的制度性角色：印尼是东盟创始成员国及核心参与方，常牵头地区倡议并调解内部争端。

Military reach and defense spending: Indonesia is investing in higher-end platforms (patrol ships, submarines, air defense) and has greater personnel and strategic depth than Vietnam, enabling broader conventional regional presence.
Political legitimacy and soft power: As the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the region, Indonesia projects cultural and diplomatic influence across ASEAN and the wider Muslim world.
Where Vietnam is gaining ground

军事覆盖与国防开支：印尼正投资于高端装备（巡逻舰、潜艇、防空系统），且在兵力和战略纵深上优于越南，能够实现更广泛的地区常规军事存在。
政治合法性与软实力：作为该地区最大的穆斯林占多数的民主国家，印尼向整个东盟及更广泛的穆斯林世界投射文化和外交影响力。
越南的优势提升领域

Economic dynamism: Rapid manufacturing-led growth, strong FDI inflows (electronics, garments), and integration into global value chains raise Vietnam’s regional economic profile.
Military modernization and asymmetric capability: Significant investments in submarines, coastal defense, and missile systems increase Vietnam’s ability to defend its maritime claims and influence South China Sea dynamics.
Strategic partnerships: Deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, India, Australia, and EU members expand Vietnam’s diplomatic bandwidth and access to technology and security cooperation.

经济活力：以制造业为主导的快速增长、强劲的外国直接投资流入（电子、服装行业）以及融入全球价值链，提升了越南的地区经济地位。
军事现代化与非对称作战能力：在潜艇、海岸防御和导弹系统方面的大量投资，增强了越南捍卫其海洋主张及影响南海局势的能力。
战略伙伴关系：与美国、日本、印度、澳大利亚及欧盟成员国深化合作，拓展了越南的外交空间，使其得以获取技术并开展安全合作。

Governance and reform momentum: Continued economic reforms, improvements in infrastructure and business climate, and demographic advantages (younger workforce) support medium-term growth.
Key constraints on Vietnamese displacement of Indonesia
Scale and time horizon: Indonesia’s population and economy are multiple orders larger; shifting structural primacy requires decades, not years.

治理与改革势头：持续的经济改革、基础设施与营商环境的改善，以及人口优势（更年轻的劳动力），为越南的中期增长提供了支撑。
越南难以取代印尼的关键制约因素
规模与时间跨度：印尼的人口和经济规模远超越南一个数量级；结构性主导地位的转移需要数十年，而非数年就能实现。

Geographic limitations: Vietnam’s strategic leverage is concentrated on the South China Sea and land borders with China and ASEAN mainland; it lacks Indonesia’s maritime choke-point control and archipelagic spread.
Institutional reach: Vietnam is not an ASEAN central broker in the same way; its political model and historical posture limit its ability to lead ASEAN-wide agendas broadly.
Dependence and vulnerability: Vietnam’s export-led growth exposes it to external shocks and supply-chain changes; its defense posture is focused and not designed for broad regional power projection.

地理局限：越南的战略影响力集中在南海及与中国、东盟大陆国家的陆地边境；它缺乏印尼对海上咽喉要道的控制权和群岛分布带来的优势。
制度性影响力：越南并非东盟中同等核心的协调者；其政治模式和历史姿态限制了它广泛主导东盟整体议程的能力。
依赖性与脆弱性：越南以出口为导向的增长使其易受外部冲击和供应链变动的影响；其国防布局较为集中，并非为广泛的地区力量投射而设计。

plausible scenarios where Vietnam’s regional influence rises materially
Continued high-growth convergence: If Vietnam sustains 6–8% growth, upgrades institutions, and climbs value chains, its economic clout could challenge Indonesia in specific sectors (electronics, manufacturing hubs) within 10–20 years.
Strategic alignment against coercion: If ASEAN fragmentation widens and middle powers coalesce around Vietnam for South China Sea balancing, Vietnam’s strategic profile could eclipse Indonesia’s in maritime security debates.

越南地区影响力大幅提升的合理情景
持续高增长趋同：若越南能维持6%至8%的增长率、完善制度并向价值链上游攀升，其经济影响力可能在10至20年内，在特定行业（电子、制造业中心）对印尼构成挑战。
对抗胁迫的战略联合：若东盟分裂加剧，中等强国为平衡南海局势而围绕越南联合，越南在海上安全议题中的战略地位可能会盖过印尼。

Indonesia’s relative decline: Economic mismanagement, political instability, or strategic retrenchment in Jakarta could compress Indonesia’s regional role, creating an opening for Vietnam—this is contingent and not the baseline expectation.
What “dethrone” would mean practically
Complete replacement: Leading ASEAN agenda-setting across all domains, outranking Indonesia in economy, military, and diplomacy across the region—extremely unlikely in the near term.

印尼相对衰落：雅加达方面若出现经济管理不善、政治不稳定或战略收缩，可能会削弱印尼的地区作用，为越南创造机会——但这是偶发情况，并非基准预期。
“取代”的实际含义
完全取代：在所有领域主导东盟议程制定，在地区经济、军事、外交方面全面超越印尼——近期极不可能实现。

Issue-specific leadership: Vietnam leading on maritime security, certain supply-chain sectors, or alignment with external powers—plausible and already occurring in pockets.
Bottom line — practical assessment
Near term (next 3–7 years): Vietnam will grow more influential in focused domains (South China Sea diplomacy, manufacturing hubs, security partnerships) but will not displace Indonesia as the region’s dominant actor.

特定议题主导：越南在海上安全、特定供应链领域或与外部大国的协作中发挥主导作用——这一情景合理，且已在部分领域出现。
核心结论——实际评估
短期（未来3至7年）：越南将在特定领域（南海外交、制造业中心、安全伙伴关系）提升影响力，但不会取代印尼成为地区主导力量。

Medium term (10–20 years): Vietnam could narrow gaps and become a co-equal regional power in certain dimensions if it sustains high growth, deepens institutions, and benefits from favorable geopolitics; still requires Indonesia to underperform for full displacement.
Strategic implication: Expect a multipolar Southeast Asia where Indonesia remains a heavyweight and Vietnam an increasingly consequential challenger in specific arenas; regional stability will depend on institutional ASEAN resilience and external great-power interactions.

中期（10至20年）：若越南维持高增长、深化制度建设并受益于有利的地缘政治环境，可能会缩小差距，在特定维度成为与印尼平起平坐的地区强国；但要实现完全取代，仍需印尼表现不佳。
战略启示：预计东南亚将呈现多极化格局，印尼仍为地区强国，越南则在特定领域成为日益重要的挑战者；地区稳定将取决于东盟的制度韧性及外部大国的互动。

Anh Lam Knows Vietnamese
安·拉姆 懂越南语

Both Vietnam and Indonesia are not regional powers. It can be said that both countries have the potential to be, but not right now.
Indonesia, despite its large size and population, actually has little influence over its neighbours. Culturally, its influence is less than Thailand, economically it’s not as rich as Singapore and Malaysia, and it doesn’t have any political influence on any of its neighbours.

越南和印度尼西亚都不是地区强国。可以说两国都有成为地区强国的潜力，但目前还未达到。
印度尼西亚尽管国土面积广阔、人口众多，但实际上对邻国的影响力很小。文化上，其影响力不及泰国；经济上，不如新加坡和马来西亚富裕；政治上，对任何邻国都没有实质性影响力。

Indonesia is often not talked about globally at all, except for Bali.
Vietnam is growing fast but Vietnamese should not be complacent, Vietnam has a long way to go. Though politically, Vietnam does have influence in Laos and Cambodia, but these are small, weak countries.
Vietnam should aim to have greater influence globally and outside of Southeast Asia.

除了巴厘岛，印度尼西亚在全球范围内通常很少被提及。
越南发展迅速，但越南民众不应自满，该国仍有很长的路要走。尽管在政治上，越南对老挝和柬埔寨确实有一定影响力，但这两个都是弱小国家。
越南应致力于在全球及东南亚以外地区扩大影响力。

Vietnam’s GDP is still small for its size. With the population of Vietnam, it must aim for at least 3 trillion USD in GDP. I believe the Vietnamese government knows this, which is why they are constantly talking about pushing Vietnam to be a highly industrialised country by 2025.
But more importantly, there’s no need to be a regional power. Just make the country prosperous, clean and developed, the people rich and the culture thriving. This is a better way to push the country forward.

相对于自身的规模而言，越南的国内生产总值仍显偏低。以越南的人口规模，其国内生产总值至少应瞄准3万亿美元。我相信越南政府明白这一点，这也是他们不断强调要在2025年前将越南打造成高度工业化国家的原因。但更重要的是，不一定非要成为地区强国。只需让国家繁荣、整洁、发达，人民富裕、文化繁荣，这才是推动国家向前发展的更佳路径。

J T Owner and Manager (2018–present)
2018年至今担任所有者及管理者，5年前更新

Originally Answered: Could Vietnam dethroned Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?
Answer:

原问题回答：越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？

No. Indonesia will always have the edge over the other ASEAN countries. Indonesia have big support from countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Myammar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam lately.
Indonesia has a trillion US dollar economy against Vietnam of US$300Billion. Indonesia has huge human resources, military assets and budgets/spending.
Having said this, Vietnam will always be a military and economic power in ASEAN.
ASEAN region will even be stronger if there will be cooperation to protect its resources, sovereignties and/or territories.

不能。印度尼西亚将始终比其他东盟国家更具优势。印度尼西亚近期获得了马来西亚、菲律宾、文莱、泰国、缅甸、柬埔寨、老挝和越南等国的大力支持。
印度尼西亚的经济规模达1万亿美元，而越南为3000亿美元。印度尼西亚拥有庞大的人力资源、军事资产以及充足的国防预算与开支。
尽管如此，越南仍将是东盟地区的军事和经济强国之一。
如果东盟各国能够通过合作保护自身资源、主权和领土，该地区将变得更加强大。

 Hari Senin  Lives in Indonesia (1945–present)
哈里·塞宁 1945年至今居住在印度尼西亚，2年前

As an Indonesian I don't think that Indonesia is a regional power of Southeast Asia. Yes Indonesia has the largest population, the highest GDP, the largest region, and the strongest military in Southeast Asia (disputed), but Indonesia has no power over Southeast Asia.
Let's see, there are people who are pushing for Southeast Asia to support China, and there are people who are preaching American values, and etc., but there is no Indonesia.

作为印度尼西亚人，我认为印度尼西亚并非东南亚的地区强国。诚然，印度尼西亚拥有东南亚最多的人口、最高的国内生产总值、最广阔的国土面积以及最强的军事力量（存在争议），但它对东南亚并无支配力。
你看，有人推动东南亚支持中国，也有人宣扬美国价值观等等，但其中并没有印度尼西亚的身影。

There is no Indonesian power outside Indonesia itself. In fact, Indonesia itself is subject to ASEAN, not controlling ASEAN.
Indonesia is the dominated, not the domineering.
So Vietnam cannot depose a king who never existed.

印度尼西亚在本国之外并无任何影响力。事实上，印度尼西亚自身受东盟约束，而非掌控东盟。
印度尼西亚是被主导者，而非主导者。
因此，越南无法推翻一个从未存在过的“国王”。

Less So  Grew up before the country opened up to Coca Cola
莱丝·索 在中国对外开放引入可口可乐之前长大

Originally Answered: Could Vietnam dethroned Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?
It is possible but not likely, as anyone who looks at a map with population counts will realize. Indonesia is so large that when and if they manage to wake up to their potential, they may well become a pan-Asian power. And I sure hope they manage that, since the whole South East Asia including Vietnam will most likely benefit from a strong Indonesian market.

原问题回答：越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？
这有可能，但可能性不大——任何看过带有人口数据的地图的人都会意识到这一点。印度尼西亚规模如此庞大，一旦它成功唤醒自身潜力，很可能成为一个泛亚强国。我真心希望它能做到这一点，因为包括越南在内的整个东南亚，都极有可能从强大的印度尼西亚市场中受益。

Abmong Tiranand  Lives in Thailand
阿蒙·蒂拉南 居住在泰国 

While anything is possible, it’s rather unlikely.
Vietnam would have to quadruple its GDP to match those of Indonesia, and that’s provided Indonesia’s GDP remains stagnant in the interim.
The more money a country has the more it can spend on military toys. And these days, he who has more toys is the bigger power. Vietnam can of course start spending a higher percentage of its GDP to try and match Indonesia’s military budget, but that would come at a cost to Vietnam’s developments in other areas.

虽然一切皆有可能，但这种情况相当渺茫。
越南的国内生产总值需要增长三倍才能与印尼持平，而这还是建立在印尼国内生产总值在此期间停滞不前的前提下。
一个国家的财力越雄厚，能在军事装备上投入的资金就越多。如今，拥有更多先进装备的国家就是更强大的力量。越南当然可以开始提高国内生产总值中用于军事的比例，试图与印尼的国防预算持平，但这将以牺牲越南其他领域的发展为代价。

It’s even debatable whether Vietnam is the #2 Power in ASEAN. Thailand has about the same military budget as Vietnam, but nearly twice the GDP, so if Thailand wanted to spend the same percentage of its GDP as Vietnam does, Thailand’s military budget would double those spent by Vietnam.
Singapore also can’t be counted out. It has a smaller force, but is the most modernized armed force in ASEAN.
Vietnam has a mountain to climb to dethrone Indonesia.

越南是否是东盟第二强国甚至都存在争议。泰国的国防预算与越南大致相当，但国内生产总值几乎是越南的两倍，因此如果泰国愿意将国内生产总值中相同比例的资金用于国防，其国防预算将是越南的两倍。
新加坡也不容忽视。它的军队规模较小，但却是东盟中最现代化的武装力量。
越南要取代印尼，还有很长的路要走（面临巨大挑战）。

James Wu  Knows Indonesian
詹姆斯·吴 懂印尼语

No they will not, Vietnam is a small and weak country, while they think they are big and strong. Their potentials almost max out, while Indonesia is a big country with plenty natural resources, they full potentials still long way to go. If you come to Indonesia and Jakarta specifically youll see its not a poor country like many outsiders think ….its advance and the people are stylist..there are undeveloped areas for sure, homeless etc, but we have homeless people everywhere right?even in the US….I didnt see poverty anywhere like poverty in africa, vietnam, and elsewhere depicted in the internet….pictures of slums and dirty people doesnt always mean poverty as you know

不会，越南是一个弱小的国家，却自认为强大。它的潜力几乎已经耗尽，而印尼是一个拥有丰富自然资源的大国，其全部潜力的发挥还有很长的路要走。如果你来到印尼，尤其是雅加达，你会发现它并不像许多外人认为的那样贫穷……它很发达，人们也很时尚。当然，印尼也有不发达的地区，有无家可归者等等，但世界各地不都有无家可归的人吗？即使是在美国也是如此……我从未见过像互联网上描绘的非洲、越南等地那样的贫困状况……要知道，贫民窟和衣衫褴褛的人的照片并不总是意味着贫困。

Hujn Sorhar Lives in Indonesia (2023–present)
胡恩·索尔哈尔 2023年至今居住在印度尼西亚 

Indonesia is not actually a regional power in Southeast Asia. Just because it has a large population, GDP and territory, it is labelled a "regional power". Indonesia's power sits only within Indonesia itself, with the exception of Muslim power.
So, could Vietnam dethrone Indonesia from the throne of Southeast Asian regional power in that sense in the future? Perhaps.
But I don't think the Vietnamese have ever thought of pursuing that, since it has never been a thing in the Vietnamese mind. And 98% of Indonesians don't care if the Southeast Asian regional power label goes to Vietnam.

印尼实际上并非东南亚的地区强国。只是因为它拥有庞大的人口、国内生产总值和广阔的领土，才被贴上了“地区强国”的标签。除了在穆斯林世界的影响力外，印尼的实力仅局限于本国境内。
那么，从这个意义上说，越南未来能否从印尼手中夺走东南亚地区强国的“王座”？或许有可能。
但我认为越南人从未想过要追求这一地位，因为这在越南人的意识中从未存在过。而且98%的印尼人并不在乎“东南亚地区强国”这一标签是否会落到越南头上。

 Felippe Castro  Master in public Admin from Mindanao State University (Main)
费利佩·卡斯特罗 毕业于棉兰老岛州立大学（主校区），公共管理硕士，3年前

Did you know why the Vietnam war was stopped. And all troops had withdrawn. Because Philippine President Called the G7 and all european, soviet, USA, australia. For Caucaus dialog meeting held in Manila. Pres. Marcos was presiding head on the meeting. After several hours. Media was asked to leave the room for close door meeting. After 2hrs. Therefore it was concluded. That all troops from Vietnam will be withdrawn and no shall western power wage war against any asian without Asian permision and consent according to president marcos. THAT IS REGIONAL POWER AND ENFLUENCED MADE BY The PHILIPPINES. Please see the Video on youtube. It still very clear.

你知道越南战争为何会结束、所有军队为何会撤离吗？因为菲律宾总统召集了七国集团（G7）以及所有欧洲国家、苏联、美国、澳大利亚的代表，在马尼拉举行了高加索对话会议。马科斯总统担任会议主席。数小时后，媒体被请出会场，会议转入闭门讨论。两小时后，会议达成结论：所有驻越军队将全部撤离，并且根据马科斯总统的提议，西方强国未经亚洲国家允许和同意，不得对任何亚洲国家发动战争。这才是菲律宾所拥有的地区实力和影响力。你可以去YouTube上查看相关视频，内容仍然清晰可辨。

Could Vietnam dethrone Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?

越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？

James Wu  Studied Southeast Asian history and politicsUpvoted by 
AliefTMD , lives in Indonesia (2002-present) and  Affan Afrizal Gani , lives in Indonesia (1998-present)

詹姆斯·吴 研究东南亚历史与政治，获阿利夫·TMD（2002年至今居住在印度尼西亚）和阿凡·阿夫里扎尔·加尼（1998年至今居住在印度尼西亚）点赞 

Originally Answered: Could Vietnam dethroned Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?
I will answer this from the perspective of a Singaporean, a fellow Southeast Asian.

原问题回答：越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？
我将以同为东南亚国家公民的新加坡人的视角来回答这个问题。

The phrase “regional power of Southeast Asia” is rendered somewhat meaningless by geographical realities. Southeast Asia is not an organic region. It is very clearly disaggregated into 2 components: mainland SEA and maritime SEA
The old name for mainland Southeast Asia is IndoChina (the French used this term to refer to their colonies but originally it referred to the entire mainland), which makes sense because the states here are located at the crossroads of Chinese and Indian political/economic/cultural influence. The operative geostrategic concept here is land power (military and economic): infantry, armour, high-speed railways, pipelines, etc.

“东南亚地区强国”这一说法，在地理现实面前显得有些无意义。东南亚并非一个有机整体，它明显可分为两个部分：东南亚大陆（中南半岛）和东南亚群岛（海上东南亚）。
东南亚大陆的旧称是“印度支那”（法国人曾用该术语指代其殖民地，但最初它指的是整个东南亚大陆），这一名称不无道理，因为该地区的国家地处中国与印度政治、经济、文化影响力的交汇点。此处关键的地缘战略概念是陆权（军事和经济层面）：步兵、装甲部队、高速铁路、输油管道等。

The old name for maritime Southeast Asia is the Malay Archipelago, or Nusantara. It contains a number of key maritime trade routes and chokepoints which became increasingly salient from the beginning of the Age of Sail. The operative geostrategic concept here is sea power (military and economic): warships, submarines, merchant fleets, sea ports.
Mainland and maritime Southeast Asia are divided by two seas: the Andaman Sea (which narrows into the strait of Malacca) and the South China Sea

东南亚群岛的旧称是“马来群岛”，或称“努山塔拉”（印尼语中对东南亚群岛的称呼）。该地区拥有多条关键海上贸易航线和咽喉要道，自大航海时代开启以来，这些航线和要道的重要性日益凸显。此处关键的地缘战略概念是海权（军事和经济层面）：军舰、潜艇、商船队、海港。
东南亚大陆与东南亚群岛被两片海域分隔：安达曼海（其狭窄处形成马六甲海峡）和南海。‘

What this means is that any Southeast Asian regional power, to attain hegemony over the ENTIRE region, must project their power over these substantial bodies of water. I cannot imagine either Indonesia or Vietnam doing this for the foreseeable future (China is a different matter but we will exclude it from this discussion since it is not, strictly speaking, part of Southeast Asia). Hence, hegemony can only be partial.

这意味着，任何一个东南亚地区强国，若想获得整个地区的霸权，就必须将其影响力投射到这些广阔的水域之上。在可预见的未来，我无法想象印度尼西亚或越南能做到这一点（中国则另当别论，但我们将其排除在本次讨论之外，因为严格来说，中国并非东南亚的一部分）。因此，霸权只能是局部的。

Moreover, Vietnam and Indonesia’s considerable geopolitical strengths are counterbalanced by significant geopolitical challenges which pose difficulties for each of them attaining regional preeminence.
In terms of demography, Indonesia has the largest population of the maritime SEA states; likewise Vietnam has the largest population on the mainland. Human resources are important: not just in terms of manpower for labor-intensive agricultural or manufacturing jobs but also in terms of generating intellectual capital and innovative ideas in a knowledge-based society and economy. You need people to build stuff, invent stuff, grow stuff, run stuff, etc. Indonesia’s population far outstrips that of all the other Southeast Asian states, dwarfing that of Vietnam by a factor of about 2.5. Hence it is fair to say that Indonesia has the greatest POTENTIAL of all the Southeast Asian states.

此外，越南和印度尼西亚可观的地缘政治优势，受到了重大地缘政治挑战的制衡，这些挑战使得两国难以各自取得地区主导地位。
人口方面，印度尼西亚是东南亚群岛国家中人口最多的；同样，越南是东南亚大陆国家中人口最多的。人力资源至关重要：不仅体现在劳动密集型农业或制造业所需的劳动力上，还体现在知识型社会和经济中智力资本的积累与创新理念的产生上。无论是建设、发明、生产还是管理等各类事务，都需要人力支撑。印度尼西亚的人口远超其他所有东南亚国家，约为越南人口的2.5倍，使其相形见绌。因此，公平地说，印度尼西亚是所有东南亚国家中潜力最大的。

Culturally, Vietnam has an advantage (somewhat akin to that of China) because of its ethnic and religious uniformity. The ethnic Kinh, or the Viet people, comprise an overwhelming 85.7% of the population, and most are secular/atheist. A predominant cultural mindset/values, shared historical background and standardized/mutually intelligible linguistic frxwork is highly conducive to national unity and social cohesion.

文化上，越南因种族和宗教的统一性而具有优势（这与中国的情况有些相似）。京族（即越南主体民族）占总人口的绝大多数，达85.7%，且大多数人是世俗主义者或无神论者。占主导地位的文化思维模式与价值观、共同的历史背景以及标准化且互通的语言体系，都非常有利于国家统一和社会凝聚力。

Indonesia is slightly disadvantaged here. The majority Javanese only make up about 40% of the population, with the rest being segmented into a multiplicity of ethnic minorities. This presents difficulties for national integration, as Indonesian leaders like Sukarno found out in the early years of independence, when ethnic secessionist movements and rebellions erupted all across the archipelago and had to be put down by the TNI. Then again, an overwhelming 87% of Indonesians are Muslim, so Islam might constitute a centripetal unifying force in the construction of national identity. (although if I am not wrong, the Islam practiced in Indonesia tends to be more syncretic and pluralistic than the stricter “orthodox” Arabized version of Islam practiced in the Middle East).

印度尼西亚在这方面则略处劣势。占人口多数的爪哇族仅约占总人口的40%，其余人口分为众多少数民族。这给国家整合带来了困难，正如苏加诺等印度尼西亚领导人在独立初期所经历的那样——当时群岛各地爆发了民族分裂运动和叛乱，不得不由印尼国民军予以镇压。不过，高达87%的印度尼西亚人信奉伊斯兰教，因此在国家认同构建中，伊斯兰教可能成为一种具有向心力的统一力量（尽管如果我没记错的话，印度尼西亚奉行的伊斯兰教往往比中东地区更严格的“正统”阿拉伯化伊斯兰教更具融合性和多元性）。

Economically, Indonesia is in the lead by far. The IMF graph below does not adequately reflect this, but in absolute terms, Indonesia’s GDP is about 4 times that of Vietnam.
Indonesia’s economy started off as largely reliant on the primary sector i.e. resource extraction like agriculture, mining, oil production etc. The vast resource endowments and natural wealth of the massive archipelago undoubtedly grants it an advantage in this aspect. But from the 1960s onward under Suharto, the Father of Development, it really industrialized and its growth took off spectacularly. Today it is still in the midst of transitioning away from the secondary sector (manufacturing) toward the tertiary one (services). It no longer relies as much on resource extraction for wealth, which is good.

经济上，印度尼西亚遥遥领先。下方的国际货币基金组织图表未能充分体现这一点，但按绝对值计算，印度尼西亚的国内生产总值约为越南的4倍。
印度尼西亚的经济起初主要依赖第一产业，即农业、采矿、石油生产等资源开采业。这座庞大群岛丰富的资源禀赋和自然财富，无疑使其在这方面具备优势。但从20世纪60年代起，在“发展之父”苏哈托的领导下，印度尼西亚真正实现了工业化，经济增长突飞猛进。如今，它仍处于从第二产业（制造业）向第三产业（服务业）转型的过程中，不再像过去那样高度依赖资源开采创造财富，这是一个积极的变化。

Vietnam’s lagging GDP is understandable because it was slightly late to the economic development game, having lost a few decades under the stifling command economy, and before that, being embroiled in 30 years of continuous war. It only embraced the free market around the 1990s, when the Doi Moi reforms were implemented. Vietnam is currently in a similar stage of development as Indonesia, transitioning from the secondary to tertiary sector, but still lagging behind somewhat. The primary sector (Agriculture + Others) remains a relatively larger part of GDP than Indonesia, meaning Vietnam is still industrializing.

越南的国内生产总值相对落后是可以理解的，因为它涉足经济发展的时间稍晚——在僵化的计划经济体制下浪费了数十年，而在此之前，又深陷长达30年的持续战争。直到20世纪90年代左右，越南实施“革新开放”政策后，才开始拥抱自由市场。目前，越南正处于与印度尼西亚相似的发展阶段，即从第二产业向第三产业转型，但仍略微落后。其第一产业（农业及其他）在国内生产总值中的占比仍高于印度尼西亚，这意味着越南仍在推进工业化进程。

Militarily, qualitative assessments of military strength are just as important as quantitative assessments. Both are pretty formidable, but in different ways. Having mentioned the relative importance of land power and sea power in mainland and maritime SEA earlier, it makes sense that Vietnam has a comparatively larger army and Indonesia has a comparatively larger navy. This is due to divergence of geostrategic focus.

军事上，对军事实力的定性评估与定量评估同等重要。两国的军事实力都相当强大，但各有侧重。正如前文提到的，陆权和海权在东南亚大陆与东南亚群岛分别具有相对重要性，因此越南拥有规模相对更大的陆军，而印度尼西亚拥有规模相对更大的海军，这与两国地缘战略重心的差异相符。

The Vietnamese army is battle-hardened: for 3 consecutive decades from about 1945 to 1975, Vietnam had known no other experience but war. Its army had fought four Great Powers (Imperial Japan, France, the US, and China) to win and preserve its independence. In the course of the three IndoChina Wars, it had access to and experience handling Soviet, American, and Chinese military hardware and equipment. I can say with moderate confidence that of all the Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam has THE most well-tested and robust military capabilities, ranging from small-scale guerrilla warfare to regular conventional operations, hence the well-deserved title “the Prussians of Asia”. In the mid-to-late 1970s the great fear was that the Vietnamese army, after taking Cambodia, would overrun Thailand and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia. Vietnam alone in Southeast Asia has tasted war, endured its lessons, and, to a significant degree, mastered its practice. As they say, experience is the best teacher. It is militarily well prepared to repulse and defend against threats from potential Great Power adversaries (China), or to project power offensively against its slightly weaker mainland Southeast Asian neighbors. In short, its well-honed military’s function is external.

越南军队久经沙场：从1945年到1975年的整整30年间，越南除了战争再无其他经历。为赢得并捍卫独立，越南军队曾与四个大国（日本帝国、法国、美国和中国）交战。在三次印度支那战争期间，越南获得并积累了操作苏联、美国和中国军事装备的经验。我可以相当有把握地说，在所有东南亚国家中，越南拥有最经受过考验、最强大的军事能力，其作战范围涵盖小规模游击战到常规正规作战，因此被誉为“亚洲普鲁士”，实至名归。20世纪70年代中后期，人们普遍担忧，越南军队在占领柬埔寨后，会进一步入侵泰国及东南亚大陆其他地区。在东南亚地区，唯有越南亲历过战争、承受过战争的教训，并在很大程度上掌握了战争的技巧。正如人们所说，经验是最好的老师。越南在军事上已做好充分准备，既能抵御潜在大国对手（中国）的威胁，也能对东南亚大陆实力稍弱的邻国发动攻势、投射力量。简而言之，其训练有素的军队主要承担对外职能。

In comparison, Indonesia’s military has fulfilled a function that is mostly internal. The TNI’s main expertise and mission has always been the quelling of regional unrest or rebellions mostly within the operational reach of its amphibious capability. The army has mostly been used to reimpose domestic order by force. As such I would imagine it specializes more in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.

相比之下，印度尼西亚军队的职能主要集中在国内。印尼国民军的核心专长和使命一直是平息地区动乱或叛乱，且这些行动大多在其两栖作战能力可覆盖的范围内。陆军主要被用于以武力恢复国内秩序。因此，我认为印尼军队更擅长反叛乱和稳定局势的行动。

This is not to say that Indonesia does not have some experience dealing with external threats, real or perceived. The fledgling TNI fought a fierce guerrilla war against the returning Dutch colonial masters in the war for independence, buying time for an eventual diplomatic solution. Under Sukarno, Konfrontasi was waged against the Federation of Malaya, mostly on the island of Borneo but also on the Malay Peninsula. During the Confrontation Indonesia deployed light infantry, commandos/special forces, and demonstrated its amphibious and airborne capabilities. The conflict was of a low-intensity nature, and operations were mostly confined to small-scale infiltration, raids, and ambushes. Success was limited in the face of British air and naval superiority.

这并非意味着印度尼西亚没有应对真实或感知到的外部威胁的经验。在独立战争中，初建的印尼国民军曾与卷土重来的荷兰殖民统治者展开激烈的游击战，为最终通过外交途径解决问题争取了时间。在苏加诺执政期间，印尼与马来亚联邦爆发了“对抗运动”，冲突主要发生在婆罗洲岛，部分也波及马来半岛。对抗期间，印尼部署了轻步兵、突击队/特种部队，并展示了其两栖作战和空降能力。这场冲突属于低强度冲突，作战行动主要局限于小规模渗透、突袭和伏击。面对英国的海空优势，印尼的战果有限。

Finally, a geographical analysis of both Vietnam and Indonesia reveals that both face significant constraints.
In Vietnam’s case, it possesses a tremendous geographic advantage in the form of not one (Thailand only has one) but two territorial-population “cores”: the Red River Delta in the north and the Mekong River Delta in the south, both of which are highly productive in terms of their agricultural output, and commercially vital in terms of their access to seaborne and coastal trade. Both river deltas are lowland plains, meaning that they are highly conducive to military consolidation and political centralization as well. The Red River Delta is well shielded by mountains and jungles, rendering it defensible against invasion from the north.

最后，对越南和印度尼西亚的地理分析表明，两国都面临着重大制约。
就越南而言，它拥有一项巨大的地理优势：并非一个（泰国仅有一个），而是两个领土-人口“核心区”——北部的红河三角洲和南部的湄公河三角洲。这两个三角洲的农业产量极高，且凭借便捷的海上和沿海贸易通道，具有重要的商业价值。两者均为低地平原，这也非常有利于军事整合和政治集权。红河三角洲被山脉和丛林严密环绕，使其能够有效抵御来自北方的入侵。

But the disadvantage is that those two cores are separated by an extremely thin coastal spine, a strip of territory which, to make it worse, is very mountainous. Mountains are just about the best natural barrier you can ask for, meaning that this mountainous spine impedes connectivity between the northern and southern cores, exacerbating political and economic divisions (see: North and South Vietnam). Imagine having two brains or hearts but connected only by a fragile, narrow conduit of nervous tissue or blood vessels.

但劣势在于，这两个核心区被一条极其狭窄的沿海地带分隔，更糟糕的是，该地带多山。山脉是最佳的天然屏障之一，这意味着这条多山的狭长地带阻碍了南北核心区之间的联系，加剧了政治和经济分裂（参考：越南南北分裂时期）。这就好比一个人有两个大脑或心脏，却仅通过脆弱狭窄的神经组织或血管相连。

Another geographic problem (but also an opportunity) for Vietnam is that it is territorially contiguous with China - the two share a border. Now this has historically been good because Vietnam has benefited from the influx and absorption of the Chinese language, culture, political institutions, technology etc. But it also presents an occasional security threat, as a thousand years of Chinese domination and more recently the 1979 war have illustrated. China has demonstrated the increasing reach of its naval power as well in the case of the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands. Vietnam is of course powerful when compared with its Southeast Asian neighbours. But this intimate geographic access/proximity to and from China (which Myanmar and Laos do not share) means, if I may quote George R.R. Martin, “however bright a torch might burn it can never match the rising sun”.

越南另一个地理问题（但同时也是机遇）是与中国领土接壤。从历史上看，这曾是一件好事，因为越南从中国语言、文化、政治制度、技术等的传入和吸收中获益良多。但正如千年的中国统治以及近期1979年的战争所表明的，这也偶尔带来安全威胁。在有争议的西沙群岛和南沙群岛问题上，中国也展示了其日益增强的海军投射能力。与东南亚邻国相比，越南当然实力不俗。但这种与中国紧密的地理邻近性（缅甸和老挝并不具备）意味着，引用乔治·R·R·马丁的话来说：“无论火炬燃烧得多么明亮，都永远无法与冉冉升起的太阳相媲美。”

 What about Indonesia’s geography? The first thing that stands out is its size. Indonesia is very clearly and indisputably the largest member of ASEAN, meaning that it can likely support a population to match that size. Moreover Indonesia’s islands are endowed with an abundance of natural resources which can be transmuted into wealth: tin, oil, natural gas, copper, and spices. In the early years of development this fuelled a burgeoning primary-sector economy.

印度尼西亚的地理状况如何？最显著的一点是其国土面积。印度尼西亚无疑是东盟中面积最大的成员国，这意味着它有能力承载与之匹配的人口规模。此外，印度尼西亚的岛屿蕴藏着丰富的自然资源，这些资源可转化为财富，包括锡、石油、天然气、铜和香料等。在发展初期，这些资源推动了第一产业经济的蓬勃发展。

Indonesia’s other major geostrategic advantage is that it sits astride multiple key maritime lines of communication i.e. shipping routes . It is also a major gatekeeper of several vital strategic straits/maritime chokepoints in the First Island Chain (the Sunda Strait, the Malacca Strait, Makassar Strait etc). This means that it benefits greatly from the lifeblood of seaborne commerce circulating through maritime Southeast Asia; it also means that if Indonesia develops a sufficiently robust naval capability it is well-placed to exercise sea control and denial against potential adversaries.

印度尼西亚另一项重要的地缘战略优势是，它横跨多条关键海上交通线（即航运路线）。它也是第一岛链上多个重要战略海峡/海上咽喉要道（巽他海峡、马六甲海峡、望加锡海峡等）的主要守护者。这意味着它能从东南亚群岛地区流通的海上贸易命脉中受益匪浅；同时也意味着，若印度尼西亚能发展出足够强大的海军力量，它将处于有利地位，能够对潜在对手实施制海权和反介入作战。

But Indonesia is also constrained by one major geographic weakness, namely its archipelagic fragmentation. Its heartland is the island of Java, but the Indonesian state as a whole has a liquid core (the Java Sea). For Jakarta to exert political control over the disconnected outlying islands it must be able to project sea power across a vast stretch of scattered, dispersed islands. The lack of territorial contiguity is not conducive to political centralization. Instead it facilitates the emergence of regional identities and secessionist or separatist movements (Aceh, East Timor, etc.) Indonesia is hard-pressed to manage and administer its multiple islands and control its maritime core. This is a challenge that is very taxing in terms of resources and attention. Moreover, only about 6000 of Indonesia’s 17000 islands are populated - that’s a lot of potential left undeveloped.

但印度尼西亚也受到一项主要地理劣势的制约，即其群岛分散的格局。它的核心区域是爪哇岛，但整个印度尼西亚的国家核心是一片“液态”区域（爪哇海）。雅加达要对彼此隔离的外围岛屿施加政治控制，就必须能够跨越广阔分散的岛屿投射海权。领土不连续不利于政治集权，反而容易催生地区认同和分裂主义运动（如亚齐、东帝汶等）。印度尼西亚难以管理和治理其众多岛屿，也难以掌控其海上核心区域，这一挑战对资源和精力的消耗极大。此外，印度尼西亚的17000个岛屿中，仅有约6000个有人居住——这意味着大量潜力尚未开发。

So, what this all means, in geopolitical terms, is that Vietnam and Indonesia, if they achieve pre-eminence, will do so in their SEPARATE spheres of influence. And these spheres of influence are unlikely to encompass the whole of the mainland or maritime realms respectively, but only a PART thereof.
Historically, Vietnam’s sphere, although never fully achieved in reality during the three IndoChina wars, has been expressed in the form of an IndoChinese communist bloc encompassing Laos and Cambodia:
Indonesia’s sphere, also never fully realized during Konfrontasi, was historically articulated in terms of Sukarno’s Indonesia Raya encompassing Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore:

因此，从地缘政治角度来看，这一切意味着，越南和印度尼西亚即便取得主导地位，也将是在各自独立的势力范围内实现。而且这些势力范围不太可能分别覆盖整个东南亚大陆或群岛地区，而只能是其中的一部分。
历史上，越南的势力范围虽在三次印度支那战争期间从未完全实现，但曾以印度支那共产主义集团的形式呈现，涵盖老挝和柬埔寨：
印度尼西亚的势力范围在“对抗运动”期间也未完全实现，历史上以苏加诺提出的“大印度尼西亚”构想为代表，涵盖马来西亚、文莱和新加坡：

In any case, I do not think either Indonesia or Vietnam are close to achieving such a sphere of influence in the foreseeable future. Neither are likely to become pseudo-hegemons in the respective mainland and maritime subregions, much less become the sole hegemon of Southeast Asia.
But the fact that they already are, or are likely to become SUB-REGIONAL MIDDLE POWERS cannot be denied. This does not mean they will dominate their respective spheres - indeed we can see Singapore and Cambodia practicing power-balancing to hedge against that (Cambodia by seeking Chinese patronage, Singapore by maintaining a considerable military deterrent) - but rather, it means that Indonesia and Vietnam are or probably will be primus inter pares (first among equals) in their respective sub-regions by virtue of their geopolitical weight. They will always be important in the grand strategic calculus of the region, and neighboring states will take into consideration this importance.

无论如何，我认为在可预见的未来，印度尼西亚和越南都无法实现这样的势力范围。两国都不太可能成为各自所在的大陆或群岛次区域的准霸权国家，更不用说成为东南亚唯一的霸权国家了。
但不可否认的是，它们已经是或很可能成为次区域中等强国。这并不意味着它们会主导各自的势力范围——事实上，我们可以看到新加坡和柬埔寨在采取均势策略以防范这种情况（柬埔寨寻求中国的支持，新加坡则维持相当规模的军事威慑）——而是意味着，凭借自身的地缘政治分量，印度尼西亚和越南在各自的次区域中已经或很可能成为“同侪之首”。它们在该地区的大战略考量中始终占据重要地位，周边国家都会重视这一点。

In conclusion, competition is not, as OP’s question seems to suggest, a zero-sum game. There will be no “dethroning” simply because there is no “throne” of hegemony for any Southeast Asian state to sit on in the first place. The regional dynamics of Southeast Asia have always been characterized by complexity, diversity, plurality, and some degree of “multipolarity”.
I see this as a good thing for Southeast Asia and foresee a hopeful future for ASEAN: Indonesia and Vietnam will be a ballast for our otherwise lightweight region which is likely to be tossed about in the waves of Great Power competition (namely China and the US, but to a lesser extent Japan, India, etc.) in the decades to come. This is not to say that ASEAN will agree on everything, but incoherence has a virtue of its own. The point I am making is that having these two important sub-regional middle powers, with substantial weight of their own, exuding their own geopolitical gravity, will ground us (the smaller ASEAN states) more firmly and prevent us from being drawn into the orbit of one hegemonic Great Power or another. It is there, suspended between multiple gravitational fields, that we will find our maximum autonomy.

总之，竞争并非如提问者所暗示的那样是一场零和游戏。不会有“取代”一说，因为首先，没有任何东南亚国家能够坐上霸权的“王座”。东南亚的地区动态向来以复杂、多样、多元以及一定程度的“多极化”为特征。
我认为这对东南亚是一件好事，并对东盟的未来充满希望：在未来几十年里，东盟这个本就影响力有限的地区可能会在大国竞争（主要是中美，其次是日本、印度等）的浪潮中摇摆不定，而印度尼西亚和越南将成为这一地区的压舱石。这并非说东盟会在所有事情上达成一致，但不一致本身也有其优势。我的核心观点是，有这两个重要的次区域中等强国存在，它们凭借自身的分量和地缘政治影响力，将使我们（东盟中小国家）根基更稳固，避免被卷入某个霸权大国的轨道。正是在多个引力场之间的平衡地带，我们才能获得最大的自主权。

Otherwise we face the danger of being polarized and becoming beholden to one Great Power or another. Southeast Asia has been described as a potential “shatterbelt”: a fragile region caught between externally colliding/competing Great Powers, internally fractured by ethnic and cultural divisions, and under persistent geopolitical stress. Other “shatterbelts” include the Eastern European Balkans and the Middle East. With any luck, Vietnam and Indonesia will act as regional stabilizers, lending some geopolitical solidity to ensure we do not crumple and crack in the decades to come.

否则，我们将面临两极分化、依附于某个大国的危险。东南亚被描述为一个潜在的“破碎地带”：一个夹在外部碰撞竞争的大国之间、内部因种族和文化分裂而脆弱不堪、长期承受地缘政治压力的地区。其他“破碎地带”还包括东欧巴尔干地区和中东。幸运的是，越南和印度尼西亚将充当地区稳定器，提供一定的地缘政治稳定性，确保我们在未来几十年不会崩溃瓦解。

There is a Chinese proverb that goes: “As there cannot be two suns in the heavens, there cannot be two emperors on earth” (天无二日，地无二王). I will end by happily rebutting that proverb with another saying: “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” (百花齐放，百家争鸣)
Diversity is ASEAN’s destiny.
Below: Indonesia’s national animal, the Garuda, happily embraces Vietnam’s national animal, the Water Buffalo

中国有句谚语：“天无二日，地无二王。” 最后，我想用另一句名言来反驳它，我对此乐见其成：“百花齐放，百家争鸣。”
多样性是东盟的宿命。
下图：印度尼西亚的国鸟鹰隼（伽鲁达）与越南的国兽水牛愉快相拥

Short answer: Unlikely in the near future. Indonesia’s size, strategic depth, and institutional advantages make it the default regional heavyweight for the foreseeable term; Vietnam can close gaps in sexted areas (economy, military modernization, diplomacy) but not displace Indonesia’s overall regional primacy quickly.
Why Indonesia is the incumbent regional power
Demographics and market size: Indonesia is the world's fourth-most-populous country (~275–300 million in 2025 projections) with a large domestic market that attracts investment and sustains regional economic influence.

简短结论：近期不太可能。印尼的国土规模、战略纵深和制度优势使其在可预见的未来仍是默认的地区强国；越南虽能在部分领域（经济、军事现代化、外交）缩小差距，但无法快速撼动印尼的整体地区主导地位。
印尼为何是当前地区强国
人口与市场规模：印尼是全球第四人口大国（2025年预计约2.75亿至3亿人），庞大的国内市场吸引投资，支撑其地区经济影响力。

Economic scale and diversification: Indonesia’s GDP (PPP and nominal) and resource base—energy, minerals, agriculture—give it structural economic weight beyond Vietnam’s smaller but fast-growing economy.
Geographic position and archipelagic advantages: Situated across the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean entry, Indonesia controls critical sea lines and sits astride ASEAN’s maritime heart.
Institutional role in ASEAN: Indonesia is a founding and central actor in ASEAN diplomacy, routinely brokering regional initiatives and mediating intramural disputes.

经济规模与多元化：印尼的国内生产总值（购买力平价及名义值）和资源基础（能源、矿产、农业）赋予其结构性经济分量，远超越南规模较小但增长迅速的经济。
地理位置与群岛优势：印尼横跨马六甲海峡和印度洋入口，掌控关键海上航线，位居东盟海上核心地带。
东盟中的制度性角色：印尼是东盟创始成员国及核心参与方，常牵头地区倡议并调解内部争端。

Military reach and defense spending: Indonesia is investing in higher-end platforms (patrol ships, submarines, air defense) and has greater personnel and strategic depth than Vietnam, enabling broader conventional regional presence.
Political legitimacy and soft power: As the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the region, Indonesia projects cultural and diplomatic influence across ASEAN and the wider Muslim world.
Where Vietnam is gaining ground

军事覆盖与国防开支：印尼正投资于高端装备（巡逻舰、潜艇、防空系统），且在兵力和战略纵深上优于越南，能够实现更广泛的地区常规军事存在。
政治合法性与软实力：作为该地区最大的穆斯林占多数的民主国家，印尼向整个东盟及更广泛的穆斯林世界投射文化和外交影响力。
越南的优势提升领域

Economic dynamism: Rapid manufacturing-led growth, strong FDI inflows (electronics, garments), and integration into global value chains raise Vietnam’s regional economic profile.
Military modernization and asymmetric capability: Significant investments in submarines, coastal defense, and missile systems increase Vietnam’s ability to defend its maritime claims and influence South China Sea dynamics.
Strategic partnerships: Deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, India, Australia, and EU members expand Vietnam’s diplomatic bandwidth and access to technology and security cooperation.

经济活力：以制造业为主导的快速增长、强劲的外国直接投资流入（电子、服装行业）以及融入全球价值链，提升了越南的地区经济地位。
军事现代化与非对称作战能力：在潜艇、海岸防御和导弹系统方面的大量投资，增强了越南捍卫其海洋主张及影响南海局势的能力。
战略伙伴关系：与美国、日本、印度、澳大利亚及欧盟成员国深化合作，拓展了越南的外交空间，使其得以获取技术并开展安全合作。

Governance and reform momentum: Continued economic reforms, improvements in infrastructure and business climate, and demographic advantages (younger workforce) support medium-term growth.
Key constraints on Vietnamese displacement of Indonesia
Scale and time horizon: Indonesia’s population and economy are multiple orders larger; shifting structural primacy requires decades, not years.

治理与改革势头：持续的经济改革、基础设施与营商环境的改善，以及人口优势（更年轻的劳动力），为越南的中期增长提供了支撑。
越南难以取代印尼的关键制约因素
规模与时间跨度：印尼的人口和经济规模远超越南一个数量级；结构性主导地位的转移需要数十年，而非数年就能实现。

Geographic limitations: Vietnam’s strategic leverage is concentrated on the South China Sea and land borders with China and ASEAN mainland; it lacks Indonesia’s maritime choke-point control and archipelagic spread.
Institutional reach: Vietnam is not an ASEAN central broker in the same way; its political model and historical posture limit its ability to lead ASEAN-wide agendas broadly.
Dependence and vulnerability: Vietnam’s export-led growth exposes it to external shocks and supply-chain changes; its defense posture is focused and not designed for broad regional power projection.

地理局限：越南的战略影响力集中在南海及与中国、东盟大陆国家的陆地边境；它缺乏印尼对海上咽喉要道的控制权和群岛分布带来的优势。
制度性影响力：越南并非东盟中同等核心的协调者；其政治模式和历史姿态限制了它广泛主导东盟整体议程的能力。
依赖性与脆弱性：越南以出口为导向的增长使其易受外部冲击和供应链变动的影响；其国防布局较为集中，并非为广泛的地区力量投射而设计。

plausible scenarios where Vietnam’s regional influence rises materially
Continued high-growth convergence: If Vietnam sustains 6–8% growth, upgrades institutions, and climbs value chains, its economic clout could challenge Indonesia in specific sectors (electronics, manufacturing hubs) within 10–20 years.
Strategic alignment against coercion: If ASEAN fragmentation widens and middle powers coalesce around Vietnam for South China Sea balancing, Vietnam’s strategic profile could eclipse Indonesia’s in maritime security debates.

越南地区影响力大幅提升的合理情景
持续高增长趋同：若越南能维持6%至8%的增长率、完善制度并向价值链上游攀升，其经济影响力可能在10至20年内，在特定行业（电子、制造业中心）对印尼构成挑战。
对抗胁迫的战略联合：若东盟分裂加剧，中等强国为平衡南海局势而围绕越南联合，越南在海上安全议题中的战略地位可能会盖过印尼。

Indonesia’s relative decline: Economic mismanagement, political instability, or strategic retrenchment in Jakarta could compress Indonesia’s regional role, creating an opening for Vietnam—this is contingent and not the baseline expectation.
What “dethrone” would mean practically
Complete replacement: Leading ASEAN agenda-setting across all domains, outranking Indonesia in economy, military, and diplomacy across the region—extremely unlikely in the near term.

印尼相对衰落：雅加达方面若出现经济管理不善、政治不稳定或战略收缩，可能会削弱印尼的地区作用，为越南创造机会——但这是偶发情况，并非基准预期。
“取代”的实际含义
完全取代：在所有领域主导东盟议程制定，在地区经济、军事、外交方面全面超越印尼——近期极不可能实现。

Issue-specific leadership: Vietnam leading on maritime security, certain supply-chain sectors, or alignment with external powers—plausible and already occurring in pockets.
Bottom line — practical assessment
Near term (next 3–7 years): Vietnam will grow more influential in focused domains (South China Sea diplomacy, manufacturing hubs, security partnerships) but will not displace Indonesia as the region’s dominant actor.

特定议题主导：越南在海上安全、特定供应链领域或与外部大国的协作中发挥主导作用——这一情景合理，且已在部分领域出现。
核心结论——实际评估
短期（未来3至7年）：越南将在特定领域（南海外交、制造业中心、安全伙伴关系）提升影响力，但不会取代印尼成为地区主导力量。

Medium term (10–20 years): Vietnam could narrow gaps and become a co-equal regional power in certain dimensions if it sustains high growth, deepens institutions, and benefits from favorable geopolitics; still requires Indonesia to underperform for full displacement.
Strategic implication: Expect a multipolar Southeast Asia where Indonesia remains a heavyweight and Vietnam an increasingly consequential challenger in specific arenas; regional stability will depend on institutional ASEAN resilience and external great-power interactions.

中期（10至20年）：若越南维持高增长、深化制度建设并受益于有利的地缘政治环境，可能会缩小差距，在特定维度成为与印尼平起平坐的地区强国；但要实现完全取代，仍需印尼表现不佳。
战略启示：预计东南亚将呈现多极化格局，印尼仍为地区强国，越南则在特定领域成为日益重要的挑战者；地区稳定将取决于东盟的制度韧性及外部大国的互动。

Anh Lam Knows Vietnamese
安·拉姆 懂越南语

Both Vietnam and Indonesia are not regional powers. It can be said that both countries have the potential to be, but not right now.
Indonesia, despite its large size and population, actually has little influence over its neighbours. Culturally, its influence is less than Thailand, economically it’s not as rich as Singapore and Malaysia, and it doesn’t have any political influence on any of its neighbours.

越南和印度尼西亚都不是地区强国。可以说两国都有成为地区强国的潜力，但目前还未达到。
印度尼西亚尽管国土面积广阔、人口众多，但实际上对邻国的影响力很小。文化上，其影响力不及泰国；经济上，不如新加坡和马来西亚富裕；政治上，对任何邻国都没有实质性影响力。

Indonesia is often not talked about globally at all, except for Bali.
Vietnam is growing fast but Vietnamese should not be complacent, Vietnam has a long way to go. Though politically, Vietnam does have influence in Laos and Cambodia, but these are small, weak countries.
Vietnam should aim to have greater influence globally and outside of Southeast Asia.

除了巴厘岛，印度尼西亚在全球范围内通常很少被提及。
越南发展迅速，但越南民众不应自满，该国仍有很长的路要走。尽管在政治上，越南对老挝和柬埔寨确实有一定影响力，但这两个都是弱小国家。
越南应致力于在全球及东南亚以外地区扩大影响力。

Vietnam’s GDP is still small for its size. With the population of Vietnam, it must aim for at least 3 trillion USD in GDP. I believe the Vietnamese government knows this, which is why they are constantly talking about pushing Vietnam to be a highly industrialised country by 2025.
But more importantly, there’s no need to be a regional power. Just make the country prosperous, clean and developed, the people rich and the culture thriving. This is a better way to push the country forward.

相对于自身的规模而言，越南的国内生产总值仍显偏低。以越南的人口规模，其国内生产总值至少应瞄准3万亿美元。我相信越南政府明白这一点，这也是他们不断强调要在2025年前将越南打造成高度工业化国家的原因。但更重要的是，不一定非要成为地区强国。只需让国家繁荣、整洁、发达，人民富裕、文化繁荣，这才是推动国家向前发展的更佳路径。

J T Owner and Manager (2018–present)
2018年至今担任所有者及管理者，5年前更新

Originally Answered: Could Vietnam dethroned Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?
Answer:

原问题回答：越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？

No. Indonesia will always have the edge over the other ASEAN countries. Indonesia have big support from countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Myammar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam lately.
Indonesia has a trillion US dollar economy against Vietnam of US$300Billion. Indonesia has huge human resources, military assets and budgets/spending.
Having said this, Vietnam will always be a military and economic power in ASEAN.
ASEAN region will even be stronger if there will be cooperation to protect its resources, sovereignties and/or territories.

不能。印度尼西亚将始终比其他东盟国家更具优势。印度尼西亚近期获得了马来西亚、菲律宾、文莱、泰国、缅甸、柬埔寨、老挝和越南等国的大力支持。
印度尼西亚的经济规模达1万亿美元，而越南为3000亿美元。印度尼西亚拥有庞大的人力资源、军事资产以及充足的国防预算与开支。
尽管如此，越南仍将是东盟地区的军事和经济强国之一。
如果东盟各国能够通过合作保护自身资源、主权和领土，该地区将变得更加强大。

 Hari Senin  Lives in Indonesia (1945–present)
哈里·塞宁 1945年至今居住在印度尼西亚，2年前

As an Indonesian I don't think that Indonesia is a regional power of Southeast Asia. Yes Indonesia has the largest population, the highest GDP, the largest region, and the strongest military in Southeast Asia (disputed), but Indonesia has no power over Southeast Asia.
Let's see, there are people who are pushing for Southeast Asia to support China, and there are people who are preaching American values, and etc., but there is no Indonesia.

作为印度尼西亚人，我认为印度尼西亚并非东南亚的地区强国。诚然，印度尼西亚拥有东南亚最多的人口、最高的国内生产总值、最广阔的国土面积以及最强的军事力量（存在争议），但它对东南亚并无支配力。
你看，有人推动东南亚支持中国，也有人宣扬美国价值观等等，但其中并没有印度尼西亚的身影。

There is no Indonesian power outside Indonesia itself. In fact, Indonesia itself is subject to ASEAN, not controlling ASEAN.
Indonesia is the dominated, not the domineering.
So Vietnam cannot depose a king who never existed.

印度尼西亚在本国之外并无任何影响力。事实上，印度尼西亚自身受东盟约束，而非掌控东盟。
印度尼西亚是被主导者，而非主导者。
因此，越南无法推翻一个从未存在过的“国王”。

Less So  Grew up before the country opened up to Coca Cola
莱丝·索 在中国对外开放引入可口可乐之前长大

Originally Answered: Could Vietnam dethroned Indonesia as the regional power of Southeast Asia in the near future?
It is possible but not likely, as anyone who looks at a map with population counts will realize. Indonesia is so large that when and if they manage to wake up to their potential, they may well become a pan-Asian power. And I sure hope they manage that, since the whole South East Asia including Vietnam will most likely benefit from a strong Indonesian market.

原问题回答：越南能否在近期取代印度尼西亚，成为东南亚的地区强国？
这有可能，但可能性不大——任何看过带有人口数据的地图的人都会意识到这一点。印度尼西亚规模如此庞大，一旦它成功唤醒自身潜力，很可能成为一个泛亚强国。我真心希望它能做到这一点，因为包括越南在内的整个东南亚，都极有可能从强大的印度尼西亚市场中受益。

Abmong Tiranand  Lives in Thailand
阿蒙·蒂拉南 居住在泰国 

While anything is possible, it’s rather unlikely.
Vietnam would have to quadruple its GDP to match those of Indonesia, and that’s provided Indonesia’s GDP remains stagnant in the interim.
The more money a country has the more it can spend on military toys. And these days, he who has more toys is the bigger power. Vietnam can of course start spending a higher percentage of its GDP to try and match Indonesia’s military budget, but that would come at a cost to Vietnam’s developments in other areas.

虽然一切皆有可能，但这种情况相当渺茫。
越南的国内生产总值需要增长三倍才能与印尼持平，而这还是建立在印尼国内生产总值在此期间停滞不前的前提下。
一个国家的财力越雄厚，能在军事装备上投入的资金就越多。如今，拥有更多先进装备的国家就是更强大的力量。越南当然可以开始提高国内生产总值中用于军事的比例，试图与印尼的国防预算持平，但这将以牺牲越南其他领域的发展为代价。

It’s even debatable whether Vietnam is the #2 Power in ASEAN. Thailand has about the same military budget as Vietnam, but nearly twice the GDP, so if Thailand wanted to spend the same percentage of its GDP as Vietnam does, Thailand’s military budget would double those spent by Vietnam.
Singapore also can’t be counted out. It has a smaller force, but is the most modernized armed force in ASEAN.
Vietnam has a mountain to climb to dethrone Indonesia.

越南是否是东盟第二强国甚至都存在争议。泰国的国防预算与越南大致相当，但国内生产总值几乎是越南的两倍，因此如果泰国愿意将国内生产总值中相同比例的资金用于国防，其国防预算将是越南的两倍。
新加坡也不容忽视。它的军队规模较小，但却是东盟中最现代化的武装力量。
越南要取代印尼，还有很长的路要走（面临巨大挑战）。

James Wu  Knows Indonesian
詹姆斯·吴 懂印尼语

No they will not, Vietnam is a small and weak country, while they think they are big and strong. Their potentials almost max out, while Indonesia is a big country with plenty natural resources, they full potentials still long way to go. If you come to Indonesia and Jakarta specifically youll see its not a poor country like many outsiders think ….its advance and the people are stylist..there are undeveloped areas for sure, homeless etc, but we have homeless people everywhere right?even in the US….I didnt see poverty anywhere like poverty in africa, vietnam, and elsewhere depicted in the internet….pictures of slums and dirty people doesnt always mean poverty as you know

不会，越南是一个弱小的国家，却自认为强大。它的潜力几乎已经耗尽，而印尼是一个拥有丰富自然资源的大国，其全部潜力的发挥还有很长的路要走。如果你来到印尼，尤其是雅加达，你会发现它并不像许多外人认为的那样贫穷……它很发达，人们也很时尚。当然，印尼也有不发达的地区，有无家可归者等等，但世界各地不都有无家可归的人吗？即使是在美国也是如此……我从未见过像互联网上描绘的非洲、越南等地那样的贫困状况……要知道，贫民窟和衣衫褴褛的人的照片并不总是意味着贫困。

Hujn Sorhar Lives in Indonesia (2023–present)
胡恩·索尔哈尔 2023年至今居住在印度尼西亚 

Indonesia is not actually a regional power in Southeast Asia. Just because it has a large population, GDP and territory, it is labelled a "regional power". Indonesia's power sits only within Indonesia itself, with the exception of Muslim power.
So, could Vietnam dethrone Indonesia from the throne of Southeast Asian regional power in that sense in the future? Perhaps.
But I don't think the Vietnamese have ever thought of pursuing that, since it has never been a thing in the Vietnamese mind. And 98% of Indonesians don't care if the Southeast Asian regional power label goes to Vietnam.

印尼实际上并非东南亚的地区强国。只是因为它拥有庞大的人口、国内生产总值和广阔的领土，才被贴上了“地区强国”的标签。除了在穆斯林世界的影响力外，印尼的实力仅局限于本国境内。
那么，从这个意义上说，越南未来能否从印尼手中夺走东南亚地区强国的“王座”？或许有可能。
但我认为越南人从未想过要追求这一地位，因为这在越南人的意识中从未存在过。而且98%的印尼人并不在乎“东南亚地区强国”这一标签是否会落到越南头上。

 Felippe Castro  Master in public Admin from Mindanao State University (Main)
费利佩·卡斯特罗 毕业于棉兰老岛州立大学（主校区），公共管理硕士，3年前

Did you know why the Vietnam war was stopped. And all troops had withdrawn. Because Philippine President Called the G7 and all european, soviet, USA, australia. For Caucaus dialog meeting held in Manila. Pres. Marcos was presiding head on the meeting. After several hours. Media was asked to leave the room for close door meeting. After 2hrs. Therefore it was concluded. That all troops from Vietnam will be withdrawn and no shall western power wage war against any asian without Asian permision and consent according to president marcos. THAT IS REGIONAL POWER AND ENFLUENCED MADE BY The PHILIPPINES. Please see the Video on youtube. It still very clear.

你知道越南战争为何会结束、所有军队为何会撤离吗？因为菲律宾总统召集了七国集团（G7）以及所有欧洲国家、苏联、美国、澳大利亚的代表，在马尼拉举行了高加索对话会议。马科斯总统担任会议主席。数小时后，媒体被请出会场，会议转入闭门讨论。两小时后，会议达成结论：所有驻越军队将全部撤离，并且根据马科斯总统的提议，西方强国未经亚洲国家允许和同意，不得对任何亚洲国家发动战争。这才是菲律宾所拥有的地区实力和影响力。你可以去YouTube上查看相关视频，内容仍然清晰可辨。