“海军马鹿，陆军马粪”在其他国家军队的不同军种之间，有没有出现过二战日本陆海军之间的那种大内斗？
正文翻译
Other examples of extreme inter-branch rivalry like the IJA vs the IJN in WW2
原标题：有没有其他极端的军种间竞争的案例，就像二战期间的日本陆军与海军之间那种对抗
Have there been any other examples in modern military history where branches of the same military were so flagrantly hostile to each other?
现代军事史中，是否还有其它同一军队的不同兵种间出现如此公然敌对的案例？
Other examples of extreme inter-branch rivalry like the IJA vs the IJN in WW2
原标题：有没有其他极端的军种间竞争的案例，就像二战期间的日本陆军与海军之间那种对抗
Have there been any other examples in modern military history where branches of the same military were so flagrantly hostile to each other?
现代军事史中，是否还有其它同一军队的不同兵种间出现如此公然敌对的案例？
评论翻译
TaskForceCausality
1980s Argentina. As the British task force sailed for the Falklands/Malvinas, Argentina’s Air Force requested support from their navy. To set the bomb fuses properly, the air arm needed data that could only come from practicing attack runs on a real ship.
1980 年代的阿根廷。当英国特遣队驶向福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯群岛时，阿根廷空军向海军请求支援。为正确设置炸弹引信，航空部队需进行实舰攻击演练以获取关键数据。
The Argentine Navy rebuffed the request with prejudice. Result- when the British arrived and the Argentine Air Force bombed the task force, most of the bombs failed to detonate due to badly configured fuses. Without reliable data, the ground crews guesstimated the bomb fuse settings. Thus, a modern case of inter-military branch rivalry causing a tactical defeat in the field of battle.
而阿根廷海军断然拒绝了这一请求。结果当英军抵达、阿根廷空军轰炸特遣队时，绝大多数炸弹因引信设置不当未能引爆。由于缺乏可靠数据，地勤人员只能估算炸弹引信参数。这一现代军种间的内耗案例，最终导致该战场战术层面的溃败。
bldswtntrs
This is fascinating. Any info on why there was so much rivalry between the Argentine Navy and Air Force?
这太有意思了。关于阿根廷海军和空军之间为何存在如此激烈的竞争，有没有更多信息？
TaskForceCausality
Same problem as the imperial Japanese- Junta politics.
和日本帝国的问题一样——军政府政治。
With Argentina run by a council of generals, there was no civilian leader -or emperor - who could step in to order cooperation for the greater national good. So when the Argentine Navy said “no”, that was that. The air force couldn’t force the navy to comply, and there was nobody else at the top to escalate to.
由于阿根廷是由一个将军委员会统治，没有一位文职领导人——或皇帝——能够介入，为了国家更大的利益下令合作。因此，当阿根廷海军说"不"，事情就到此为止了。空军无法强迫海军服从，而且在最高层也没有其他人可以上报。
bldswtntrs
Man, that's wild. Talk about self-sabotage!
天哪，真是离谱，简直就是自毁长城！
squizzlebizzle
What motivated the navy to do that
是什么促使海军那样做？
oga_ogbeni
What data did the Argentine Air Force need from the Navy to fuse the bombs properly? My understanding is that the timing from weapon release until the fuse was armed was too long long given that the aircraft were attacking from low altitude. Had they attacked from higher altitudes, the weapons would have had a longer time of flight and would have worked just fine. Of course, the aircraft would have been detected by radar and shot down before they reached their release points. But I don't see how the Air Force needed the Navy to calculate the time from release until impact. That's basic kinematics. It seems more like a failure of Air Force tacticians to give the ordnancemen proper fuse settings.
阿根廷空军需要从海军获取哪些数据才能正确设定炸弹引信？据我理解，由于战机从低空发起攻击，从武器投放到引信解除保险之间的计时过长。倘若他们从更高空域实施打击，武器将有更长的飞行时间从而正常引爆。当然，战机在抵达投弹点前就可能被雷达发现并击落。但我不理解空军为何需要海军来计算从投放到撞击的时长——这只是基础运动学问题。这更像是空军战术人员未能向军械兵提供恰当引信设定的失误。
k890
AFAIK, it was WWII made bomb bought from UK by the Argentine Navy post-1945. I guess albeit Air Force receive bombs from stockpiles, technical manuals and other necessities required to set fuse properly were somewhere in Navy archives.
据我所知，这些是阿根廷海军在 1945 年后从英国采购的二战时期制造的炸弹。我推测尽管空军从库存中接收了炸弹，但正确设定引信所需的技术手册和其他必要文件仍存放在海军档案库的某个角落。
There is also the question how much was a fault of Air Force crews or the fact they do use bombs made at least in 1945 and stocked in god forsaken warehouse on the pampa since delivery from UK and never checked to sink ships decades later.
还有一个问题是，此事在多大程度上是空军机组的过错，还是因为他们使用的炸弹至少是在 1945 年制造的，并且自从从英国运来后就一直存放在潘帕斯草原上被遗忘的仓库中，数十年间从未检查过，就拿去炸船。
oga_ogbeni
The Argentines used US Mk-80 series bombs during that conflict. I don't think this example fits at all.
阿根廷人在那次冲突中使用了美国的 Mk-80 系列炸弹。我认为这个例子完全不适用。
ohnomrbil
Absolutely. The Battle of Saipan may have been the worst in US history.
确实有。塞班岛战役可能是美国历史上最惨烈的战役。
What the Marine Corps did to the Army on Saipan is something I will never forgive, as I had a great uncle with the Army’s 27th Infantry Division that never left the island (and this is just one of many examples of marines lying about and denigrating the Army). The Army bore the brunt of the attack on Saipan, particularly the largest banzai charge of the entire war. The 27th was tasked with the island’s toughest obxtives, like Mount Tapotchau, and including holding the line when the Japanese launched their multi-thousand man banzai charge.
我永远不会原谅海军陆战队在塞班岛对陆军所做之事，因为我有一位曾隶属陆军第 27 步兵师的叔祖父，他永远留在了那座岛上（这仅仅是海军陆战队诸多诋毁陆军行径中的一例）。在塞班岛战役中，陆军承受了主要攻击，尤其是面对整场战争中最庞大的"万岁冲锋"。第 27 师被指派攻克岛上最艰难的目标，如塔波乔山，并在日军发起数千人规模的"万岁冲锋"时坚守防线。
Their Backs Against the Sea is an excellent book on some of the inter-branch rivalry and the devastating effects it had on American lives.
《背水一战》是一部杰出的著作，深入探讨了军种间的内部竞争及其对美国士兵生命造成的毁灭性影响。
Marine Corps General Smith had personal beef with Army commander General Smith (no relation) and intentionally sabotaged his leadership during the battle. Eventually, Smith (USMC) replaced Smith (USA) with an unproven and ill-prepared General. Perhaps intentionally to further hamper the Army.
海军陆战队的史密斯将军与陆军指挥官史密斯将军（两人并无亲属关系）存在私人恩怨，并在战斗中故意破坏后者的指挥。最终，史密斯（海军陆战队）用一位未经考验且准备不足的将军替换了史密斯（陆军），此举或许是有意进一步削弱陆军。
Smith (USMC) never visited the front lines a single time during the entire battle, while Smith (USA) never left them while he was on the island (page 98, Their Backs Against the Sea). Even when the Army reported the severity of the banzai charge, Smith (USMC) refused to send them reinforcements (page 137, Their Backs Against the Sea). How many US Army soldiers did he indirectly, yet deliberately, kill? On top of all that, Smith (USMC) lied about the number of Japanese attacking the Army. He downplayed the Army’s role and grossly exaggerated the Japanese attacking marines. He even lied about marine artillery pieces (the same ones he confiscated from the Army) firing point blank at Japanese attackers. Just never happened (page 192, Their Backs Against the Sea).
在整个战役期间，美军陆战队史密斯一次都未踏足前线阵地，而陆军史密斯在岛上的时候却从未离开过前线（《背水一战》第 98 页）。即便陆军报告了日军"万岁冲锋"的猛烈程度，陆战队史密斯仍拒绝派兵增援（《背水一战》第 137 页）。他究竟间接而蓄意地导致了多少美国陆军士兵的牺牲？更甚的是，陆战队史密斯还谎报了攻击陆军的日军数量。他刻意贬低陆军的作战贡献，同时极度夸大了攻击海军陆战队的日军规模。他甚至捏造了陆战队炮兵（正是他从陆军收缴的那些火炮）抵近射击日军进攻者的虚假战报，事实上这种情况从未发生（《背水一战》第 192 页）。
After Smith (USMC) replaced Smith (USA), General Griner took over. He said, “[marine] Smith was so prejudiced against the Army that he could never expect a fair and honest uation. [marine] Smith confiscated our artillery pieces while we attacked Mount Tapotchau, the most heavily defended point on the island and those guns just sat there, the marines never used them (page 130, Their Backs Against the Sea).
陆战队史密斯接管陆军史密斯职务后，格里纳将军接任指挥。他指出："（陆战队）史密斯对陆军的偏见根深蒂固，我们根本无法期待他做出公正客观的评估。在我们进攻全岛防御最森严的塔波乔山时，（陆战队）史密斯收缴了我们的火炮，那些炮械就闲置在阵地里，海军陆战队从未使用过它们（《背水一战》第 130 页）。
In the 1986 book on the Smith vs. Smith situation, Harry A. Gailey summed it up by saying, “relieving [Army] Smith was uncalled for and the substitution of a new, untried commander to bring about a quicker victory on Saipan may even have lengthened the campaign and caused untold numbers of American deaths. The slurs [marine] Smith hurled at the Army in his articles and books were totally unwarranted, unconscionable, and untrue.”
在 1986 年关于史密斯对阵史密斯事件的著作中，哈里·A·盖利总结道："解除[陆军]史密斯的职务并无必要，而任命一位未经考验的新指挥官来加速塞班岛的胜利，反而可能延长了战役时间，造成了无数美军士兵的牺牲。[海军陆战队]史密斯在其文章和书籍中对陆军的诽谤完全是无理的、昧良心的和不真实的。"
In Their Backs Against The Sea, the lies by Smith (USMC) continue. On pages 194 and 195, reports show that Smith (USMC) lied about Japanese numbers that made the marine defense seem stronger and the Army defense seemed weaker. He flipped the numbers and lied about marines facing more men than they did, while downplaying what the Army was up against.
在《背水一战》一书中，史密斯（海军陆战队）的谎言仍在继续。在第 194 和 195 页的报告中显示，史密斯（海军陆战队）在日军兵力数据上造假，夸大陆军防线的薄弱，同时扭曲事实夸大海军陆战队面对的敌军规模，刻意淡化陆军实际面临的战斗压力。
On pages 259 and 260, there is also a list of several marines that fought in the battle that say Smith (USMC) was wrong on multiple fronts.
在第 259 和 260 页，还列举了多位参与该战役的海军陆战队员的证言，指出史密斯（海军陆战队）在多方面存在错误表述。
The Army had numerous Medals of Honor awarded for heroic lone-man stands against an overwhelming force, and countless examples of their savagery on Saipan, yet Smith (USMC) lied constantly about the Army never being aggressive.
陆军部队因士兵在压倒性敌军面前英勇的孤身作战而获颁众多荣誉勋章，在塞班岛战役中更不乏其骁勇善战的例证，然而史密斯（海军陆战队）却不断捏造陆军缺乏进攻性的虚假说法。
The entire fiasco also destroyed Marine Corps General Holland Smith’s career, essentially. He never led men “in combat” again after Saipan and was moved to a desk job after. I put in combat in quotations because, as I mentioned earlier, he never even visited the front lines on Saipan once, yet had the balls to accuse Army General Ralph Smith of not being aggressive.
这整个闹剧实质上还毁掉了海军陆战队上将霍兰·史密斯的职业生涯。他在塞班岛战役后便再未"实战"指挥过部队，随后被调任文职。我特意给"实战"二字加上引号，是因为正如前文所述——这位将军在塞班岛期间从未亲临前线一步，却敢指责陆军上将拉尔夫·史密斯作战不够勇猛。
Let’s keep in mind that Army General Smith fought in WW1, including in the bloodiest campaign of our nation’s history, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and received two Silver Stars and a Purple Heart during the course of his career.
我们必须铭记，陆军上将拉尔夫·史密斯曾参与第一次世界大战，经历过我国历史上最血腥的默兹-阿贡纳战役，职业生涯中两度荣获银星勋章，更获得象征战伤荣誉的紫心勋章。
***Side note: Marine Corps General Holland Smith also received a Purple Heart, but it was not for wounds sustained in combat, like Army Smith’s was. Holland Smith’s Purple Heart was converted from a Meritorious Service Citation Certificate. When the PH was first created, it wasn’t exclusively for combat wounds. I wanted to include this note in case someone cited that Holland Smith also had a PH. While true, it wasn’t for combat wounds and further separates him from a real combat leader like Ralph Smith.
***补充说明：海军陆战队上将霍兰·史密斯虽也获颁紫心勋章，但其性质与陆军上将拉尔夫因战负伤获得的勋章截然不同。霍兰的紫心勋章是由功绩嘉奖状转换而来——紫心勋章设立初期并非专属战伤荣誉。特此说明以免有人提及霍兰亦拥有紫心勋章。虽确有其事，但这枚非战伤性质的勋章，恰恰更凸显他与拉尔夫·史密斯这类真正战斗指挥官的本质区别。
I would argue another egregious offense of this (perhaps equally as much as Saipan) is what the Marine Corps did to the Army at the Chosin Reservoir. I won’t dive into it as much as Saipan above, but the Marine Corps lied about the Army at Chosin, calling them cowards and painted a false narrative that lasted for decades, all because the Marine Corps was being viewed as obsolete and eyeing disbandment and they used this false narrative to help argue they were still necessary to the US military.
我还会指出另一个同样严重的冒犯行为（可能堪比塞班岛事件），那就是海军陆战队在长津湖对陆军所做的一切。我不会像上面谈论塞班岛那样深入探讨，但海军陆战队确实对长津湖的陆军撒了谎，称他们是懦夫，并编造了一个持续数十年的虚假叙述，这全都因为当时海军陆战队被视为过时，面临解散，于是他们利用这个虚假故事来证明自己在美军中仍然不可或缺。
Algaean
Was Holland Smith a psycho or something? or was there some deranged reason for his animus? (don't have the book, sorry!)
霍兰德·史密斯是神经病还是咋了？或者说他怀恨在心有什么疯狂的原因吗？（抱歉，我没有这本书！）
ohnomrbil
I think he was just an egotistical piece of shit, but I don’t have a book to quote that from lol.
我认为他只是个自负的混蛋，但我也不知道这句话出自哪本书，哈哈。
lttesch
Think he was just butt hurt that after he was commissioned from ROTC, the Army rejected him for Federal service, but the Marines took him.
我想他只不过是因为自己被 ROTC（预备役军官训练营）任命后，陆军拒绝接纳他为联邦服役，但海军陆战队却收留了他，这让他耿耿于怀。
Also, I'll add that it wasn't just the Army. He had issues with the Navy as well. He was just a dick all around. I have a copy of his autobiography, Coral and Brass. He was actually asked by Nimitz (or maybe secnav, cant remember) I believe not to publish it as it was sure to piss off many in the fleet. The whole Saipan debacle only gets 2 pages. Bottom line, if you weren't a Marine, he had a problem with you.
另外，我还要补充一点，不仅仅是陆军，他与海军也有过节。他就是个彻头彻尾的混蛋。我有一本他的自传《珊瑚与黄铜》。我记得尼米兹（或者是海军部长，记不清了）曾要求他不要出版这本书，因为它肯定会激怒舰队里的许多人。关于塞班岛惨败的整个事件，他只用了两页纸来描述。总而言之，只要你不是海军陆战队员，他就会对你有意见。
Ro500
He was called Howlin’ Mad Holland Smith for a reason. Part of his thing against the army (and 27th ID in particular) goes back to Makin. The marines seized their obxtives quickly during Operation Galvanic but the 27th ID took a fair bit longer. This is mainly due to a conflict between how marines fought and army fought. I disagree with the ops characterization of marine corps tactics and point to Makin as to why. The navy and by extension the marines saw these operations as time limited windows that needed to be pushed hard. The longer the invasion takes the more likely Japanese submarines and air power are gonna pin down American ships and sink them. It wasn’t about reckless charging, it was about advancing quickly because losing valuable warships could be even more costly.
他被称为“咆哮的疯子”霍兰德·史密斯不是没有原因的。他对陆军（特别是第 27 步兵师）的部分反感可以追溯至马金岛战役。海军陆战队在“电流行动”中迅速攻占了目标，而第 27 步兵师则花费了相当长的时间。这主要源于海军陆战队和陆军作战方式的冲突。我对行动中海军陆战队战术的描述持不同意见，并以马金岛为例说明原因。海军以及由之延伸的海军陆战队视这些行动为有时间限制的窗口，必须全力推进。入侵时间越长，日军潜艇和空中力量就越有可能牵制并击沉美军舰船。这并非鲁莽冲锋，而是为了快速推进，因为损失宝贵的战舰可能代价更为惨重。
They had very good reasons to think this and the 27th IDs slow progress on Makin is one reason for the sinking of the carrier USS Liscome Bay resulting in the loss of 702 officers and sailors along with whatever aircraft were in the hangar (including the first black recipient of the navy cross for his actions at Pearl Harbor, Doris Miller and the first flag officer lost since the Friday the 13th brawl). The loss of the Liscomme Bay resulted in more deaths than the entirety of the army deaths during the Makin invasion many times over. Losses like that hurt a lot which is why the marines aggressively pursued their obxtives. Now that being said Holland Smith was a massive ass and his actions on Saipan were often reprehensible and disgusting.
他们有充分的理由这样认为，第 27 步兵师在马金岛的缓慢进展正是导致航空母舰利斯康湾号沉没的原因之一，该事件造成 702 名军官和水兵丧生，同时机库内的所有飞机也一并损失（包括首位因在珍珠港行动而获得海军十字勋章的黑人水手多丽丝·米勒，以及自 13 日星期五冲突以来首位阵亡的将级军官）。利斯康湾号的损失导致的人员伤亡，远超过陆军在整个马金岛入侵行动中的死亡人数，甚至高达数倍。如此惨重的损失令人痛心疾首，这也正是海军陆战队积极追求其目标的原因。不过话说回来，霍兰德·史密斯确实是个大混蛋，他在塞班岛的行径常常令人愤慨且恶心。
Uncreative-name12
Holland Smith was definitely a bastard on Saipan. Little correction though, he wasn't completely sidelined. He did lead US forces on Iwo Jima. And Nimitz wanted him to lead on Okinawa, but in the name of interservice diplomacy gave the job to army general Simon Bolivar Buckner.
在塞班岛战役中，霍兰·史密斯绝对是个混账。不过需要稍作修正的是，他并未完全被边缘化。他确实曾领导美军参与硫磺岛战役。而且尼米兹将军原本希望由他指挥冲绳战役，但出于军种间协调的考虑，最终将指挥权交给了陆军中将西蒙·玻利瓦尔·巴克纳。
jonewer
I'm going with Tedder and the other RAF big knobs in WW2
我和二战中的泰德以及其他英国皇家空军的大人物们共事。
They (the Air Barons) were obstructive throughout the campaign, during and after Normandy, for they were of a generation that had resolutely opposed army co-operation, except on their own terms, in the 1930s. They genuinely, if mistakenly, believed that the air force was the main instrument for the overthrow of the enemy.
这些空军巨头在整个战役期间、诺曼底登陆期间及之后都在阻挠行动，因为他们属于那一代人——在 1930 年代坚决反对陆军合作，除非条件符合他们的心意。他们真心地（尽管错误地）认为空军是推翻敌人的主要工具。
Basically in the middle of the Battle of Normandy, Tedder was scheming and politicking to get Montgomery sacked, did the same to Broadhurst because he was too cooperative with the Army, and was in the process of doing the same to Leigh-Mallory for the same reasons.
基本上，在诺曼底战役中期，泰德密谋策划并玩弄政治手段，企图让蒙哥马利被解职，对布罗德赫斯特也如法炮制，只因他与陆军合作过于密切；出于同样的原因，他也在对利-马洛里做同样的事情。
A Grade-A See You Next Tuesday.
活脱脱一个大傻逼。
F_to_the_Third
The arrogant, reckless, and incompetent leadership of Major General Edward “Ned” Almond as X Corps Commander during the period of September - December 1950 was especially egregious and put further unnecessary tension between the Army and USMC at a critical juncture of the Korean War.
1950 年 9 月至 12 月期间，爱德华·"内德"·阿尔蒙德少将作为第十军团司令官，其傲慢鲁莽且无能的领导行为尤其恶劣，在朝鲜战争的关键时刻进一步加剧了陆军与海军陆战队之间不必要的紧张关系。
Early in the Korean War, with UN Forces holding on to the toehold of the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur came up with his operational concept to conduct an amphibious assault deep in the rear of the besieging North Korean Army (NKPAj cutting off the flow of sustainment to the NKPA forces attacking the Pusan Perimeter, and eventually recapturing Seoul, the political and cultural capital of Korea. The port of Inchon was approved as the amphibious obxtive area despite its unsuitability due to radically shifting tides and massive mud flats.
朝鲜战争初期，当联合国军在釜山防线坚守据点时，麦克阿瑟构想了一项作战计划：在围困的朝鲜人民军后方深处进行两栖突击，切断攻击釜山防线的朝军补给线，并最终夺回韩国的政治文化中心首尔。尽管仁川港因急剧变化的潮汐和大片泥滩而不适宜登陆，但仍被确定为两栖作战目标区域。
No amphibious operation is ever easy, but Inchon was going to be above and beyond. MacArthur requested and received the 1st Marine Division, 7th Infantry Division (Army) and 3d Marine Air Wing as the core of the landing force. He then decided to create an ad hoc Corps level HQ to command and control this force which would directly report to MacArthur. Instead of designating a General Officer with WW2 Amphibious experience, of which the 1950 Army had plenty, he sexted his Chief of Staff Ned Almond to take command. As if commanding a hastily assembled Corps in a high risk operation was not enough, Almond was to simultaneously retain his duties as MacArthur’s Chief of Staff.
任何两栖作战都不会轻松，仁川登陆更是难上加难。麦克阿瑟将第一海军陆战师、第七步兵师（陆军）和第三海军陆战航空联队作为登陆部队的核心。他决定设立一个临时军级指挥部来指挥和控制这支直接向他汇报的部队，但没有任命二战两栖作战经验丰富的军官（1950 年的美军中此类人才济济），而是选择了他的参谋长内德·阿尔蒙德来担任指挥。阿尔蒙德不仅要指挥这支仓促组建的部队执行高风险任务，还必须同时继续履行麦克阿瑟参谋长的职责。
Almond’s experience and temperament were unsuited to the task at hand. He had zero amphibious experience and didn’t bother to get educated frequently dismissing the complex process of an amphibious assault as nothing more than an administrative movement by ship. He frequently embarrassed himself such as when he asked if the amphibian tractors used for ship-to-shore movement would actually float. Despite his complete lack of experience, he was dismissive of the 1st Marine Division Commanding General (CG) O.P. Smith who had three WW2 amphibious assaults under his belt (Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, Okinawa).
阿尔蒙德的资历与性情并不适合这项任务。他毫无两栖作战经验，也未曾主动学习，常将复杂的两栖突击简化理解为船舶运输的行政调度。其认知局限屡屡暴露，例如曾质疑用于船滩转运的两栖履带车是否真能浮水。尽管缺乏实战经验，他却对拥有三次二战两栖作战经验（格洛斯特角战役、贝里琉战役、冲绳战役）的第一海军陆战师师长奥利弗·P·史密斯少将嗤之以鼻。
While Almond had a noteworthy pre WW2 record, to include distinguished service in WW1, he was a mediocre Division Commander who blamed his lack of success on the black troops of his segregated 92nd Infantry Division. As opposed to accepting responsibility as the commander, he offered the following racist diatribe:
虽然阿尔蒙德在二战前履历出众，包括在一战中的卓越表现，但作为师长他表现平庸，并将麾下由非裔士兵组成的第 92 步兵师视为其战绩不佳的借口。这位指挥官非但没有承担领导责任，反而发表如下种族主义言论：
“No white man wants to be accused of leaving the battle line. The Negro doesn't care.... people think being from the South we don't like Negroes. Not at all, but we understand his capabilities. And we don't want to sit at the table with them.”
“白人绝不会被指控擅离战线。黑人根本不在乎……人们以为南方人厌恶黑人。绝非如此，但我们深知他们的能力界限。我们不愿与他们同桌而坐。”
His deeply seeded racism would cloud his judgment once again in the mountains of Northeast Korea to disastrous effect.
他根深蒂固的种族主义将再次在朝鲜东北部的山区蒙蔽他的判断力，造成灾难性后果。
When Almond finally realized he (and his staff) were over their skis planning one of the most complex amphibious operations ever, he had the good sense and judgment to let the 1st Marine Division and its veterans take the lead relegating himself to photo ops with MacArthur on the Flagship’s bridge.
当阿尔蒙德最终意识到他（及其参谋团队）在策划有史以来最复杂的登陆行动之一时力有不逮，便明智地决定让海军陆战队第一师及其经验丰富的老兵主导行动，自己则退居次位，仅在旗舰甲板上与麦克阿瑟合影作秀。
Once the landing force was ashore, he assumed command of subsequent operations ashore, as he should have, but instead of issuing orders to his division commanders and fighting X Corps, he frequently violated the chain of command directly issuing orders to regimental commanders, bypassing the division CGs and impacting their understanding of the operational environment and ultimately their decision making.
登陆部队上岸后，他按职责接掌了后续的岸上作战指挥权。然而，他并未通过正常指挥链向师级指挥官下达命令、协同第十军作战，反而屡次越级直接向团级指挥官发号施令。这种越权行为既绕过了师级指挥官，也干扰了他们对战场态势的研判，最终影响了作战决策的制定。
He also possessed the classic narcissistic personality traits that defined MacArthur to the point of needlessly sacrificing good Marines and Soldiers to feed his outsized ego. This was first evident in his insistence that Seoul be captured by the 25th of September, three months exactly after the initial North Korean invasion. He pushed, bullied and cajoled his commanders, Army and USMC, to sacrifice our nation’s greatest treasure to meet this arbitrary date which yielded no operational advantage and distracted from the primary obxtive of destroying NKPA remnants many of whom escaped to fight another day.
他还拥有典型的自恋型人格特征，这正是麦克阿瑟的写照，甚至不惜无谓地牺牲优秀的海军陆战队员和士兵来满足其膨胀的自我。这一点首先体现在他坚持要在 9 月 25 日，即朝鲜最初入侵整整三个月后夺取首尔。他推动、欺压并哄骗他的指挥官们，无论是陆军还是海军陆战队，牺牲我们国家最宝贵的财富来满足这个任意的日期，这并没有带来任何作战优势，反而分散了消灭朝鲜人民军残部的主要目标，其中许多人得以逃脱，以待来日再战。
These negative traits were even further pronounced during winter operations in Korea’s mountainous northeast. Ever the glory hound, Almond had his Corps strung out and largely incapable of mutual support in their headlong, reckless dash for the Yalu River. The combination of recklessness and unwillingness to accept the Chinese had entered the war full scale resulted in the destruction of TF Faith and the near annihilation of the 1st Marine Division. Almond, ever the arrogant, narcissistic, racist numbskull ignored the warnings about the Chinese, famously dismissing the Chinese forces as "remnants" or "Chinese laundrymen" and ordered X Corps to continue their rapid advance.
这些负面特质在朝鲜东北部山区的冬季作战中表现得尤为突出。阿尔蒙德向来争强好胜，他麾下的军团战线拉得过长，在向鸭绿江冒进时大多无法相互支援。鲁莽加上不愿承认中国已全面参战，导致"忠诚特遣队"被全歼，海军陆战队第一师几乎覆灭。阿尔蒙德这个一贯傲慢自大、充满种族主义思想的蠢材无视关于中国军队的警告，曾轻蔑地称中国军队为"残兵败将"或"中国洗衣工"，并下令第十军团继续快速推进。
In response to what he saw as reckless orders, OP Smith deliberately slowed the 1st Marine Division's march, established supply points, and built an airfield at Hagaru-ri to evacuate casualties and bring in supplies. This "near insubordination" frustrated Almond but ultimately provided the infrastructure that saved the division during the Chosin Reservoir breakout. Additionally, contrary to Almond’s orders, Smith refused to abandon equipment to speed up his Division’s withdrawal knowing that unlike the Army, he wasn’t going to see replacement equipment for quite some time and his Division would be combat ineffective without key capabilities (tanks, artillery, motor transport etc.).
面对他所认为的鲁莽命令，奥利弗·史密斯故意放缓了第一海军陆战师的进军速度，设立了补给点，并在下碣隅里修建了一个机场，以便撤离伤员和运送补给。这种"近乎抗命"的行为令阿尔蒙德感到沮丧，但最终为在长津湖突围期间拯救该师提供了基础设施。此外，与阿尔蒙德的命令相反，史密斯拒绝为了加速师的撤退而放弃装备，因为他知道，与陆军不同，他在相当长的时间内不会看到替换装备，而他的师若失去关键能力（坦克、火炮、摩托化运输等）将无法有效作战。
Only OP Smith’s refusal to yield to Almond’s aggressive timeline at the Chosin Reservoir prevented the total destruction of the 1st Marine Division. Following the Chosin campaign, Smith informed higher command that his division would no longer serve under Almond.
只有奥利弗·史密斯在长津湖拒绝屈从于阿尔蒙德的激进时间表，才避免了第一海军陆战师的全面覆灭。长津湖战役后，史密斯通知上级指挥部，他的师将不再在阿尔蒙德麾下服役。
Almond went on to continue command of X Corps followed by a final assignment as President of the Army War College. While holding that position, Almond’s career effectively ended due to a scandal involving the "costly renovation" of his official residence at Carlisle Barracks. An investigation revealed he had improperly used government resources for personal living quarters, leading to a formal letter of reprimand from the Army. He ultimately lacked integrity in addition to competency, tact, professionalism, and humility.
阿尔蒙德继续指挥第十军团后，被分配到陆军战争学院担任最后一任校长。然而就在此任内，因其在卡莱尔兵营官邸的"奢华翻修"丑闻，其军旅生涯戛然而止。调查揭露他违规挪用政府资源改善个人居所，为此陆军总部向其发出正式谴责函。这位将军最终被证明不仅在专业能力、处事手腕、职业素养与谦逊品德方面存在缺陷，更缺乏基本的人格操守。
Following his forced exit from the Army, Almond remained a controversial figure. He became a prominent voice in pro-segregationist movements, serving as a delegate to conferences that condemned desegregation and labeled the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education as an "enemy" of the state.
被强制要求退出军队后，阿尔蒙德仍然是一个备受争议的人物。他在支持种族隔离运动中崭露头角，成为一位突出的代言人，多次作为代表出席谴责废除种族隔离措施的会议，并将最高法院在布朗诉教育委员会案中的裁决称为国家的“敌人”。
Uncreative-name12
With TF Faith after the Chinese had begun their attack Almond ordered that regimental combat team to attack multiple Chinese divisions. Absolutely insane.
中国军队开始攻击后，阿尔蒙德命令那个团级战斗群去对抗多个中国师。简直是疯了。
Taira_Mai
Vietnam war - there were four or five air forces depending on how you counted them.
越南战争 - 依据不同的统计方式，存在着四到五支独立的空中力量。
USAF - Tactical Air Command vs. Strategic Air Command, different priorities mostly
美国空军 - 战术空军司令部与战略空军司令部之间，主要存在任务优先级的差异
USN - USMC
美国海军 - 美国海军陆战队
US Army Aviation
美国陆军航空队
The South Vietnamese Air Force (RVNAF)
越南共和国空军（RVNAF）
Getting all these groups to work together was a mess. It stayed that way well into Grenada.
想让这些部队协同作战简直一团糟。这种情况一直持续到格林纳达行动时期。
Each service had been doing it's own thing and the US Army and USAF had been at odds since the "Key West Agreement".
各军种向来各行其是，而美国陆军与空军自《基韦斯特协定》签署后就纷争不断。
The Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act put an end to each US service doing it's own thing and ensured that a single combatant commander would oversee each operation
《戈德华特-尼科尔斯改革法案》终结了美军各军种自行其是的局面，确保每次军事行动均由同一位作战指挥官统筹指挥。
1980s Argentina. As the British task force sailed for the Falklands/Malvinas, Argentina’s Air Force requested support from their navy. To set the bomb fuses properly, the air arm needed data that could only come from practicing attack runs on a real ship.
1980 年代的阿根廷。当英国特遣队驶向福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯群岛时，阿根廷空军向海军请求支援。为正确设置炸弹引信，航空部队需进行实舰攻击演练以获取关键数据。
The Argentine Navy rebuffed the request with prejudice. Result- when the British arrived and the Argentine Air Force bombed the task force, most of the bombs failed to detonate due to badly configured fuses. Without reliable data, the ground crews guesstimated the bomb fuse settings. Thus, a modern case of inter-military branch rivalry causing a tactical defeat in the field of battle.
而阿根廷海军断然拒绝了这一请求。结果当英军抵达、阿根廷空军轰炸特遣队时，绝大多数炸弹因引信设置不当未能引爆。由于缺乏可靠数据，地勤人员只能估算炸弹引信参数。这一现代军种间的内耗案例，最终导致该战场战术层面的溃败。
bldswtntrs
This is fascinating. Any info on why there was so much rivalry between the Argentine Navy and Air Force?
这太有意思了。关于阿根廷海军和空军之间为何存在如此激烈的竞争，有没有更多信息？
TaskForceCausality
Same problem as the imperial Japanese- Junta politics.
和日本帝国的问题一样——军政府政治。
With Argentina run by a council of generals, there was no civilian leader -or emperor - who could step in to order cooperation for the greater national good. So when the Argentine Navy said “no”, that was that. The air force couldn’t force the navy to comply, and there was nobody else at the top to escalate to.
由于阿根廷是由一个将军委员会统治，没有一位文职领导人——或皇帝——能够介入，为了国家更大的利益下令合作。因此，当阿根廷海军说"不"，事情就到此为止了。空军无法强迫海军服从，而且在最高层也没有其他人可以上报。
bldswtntrs
Man, that's wild. Talk about self-sabotage!
天哪，真是离谱，简直就是自毁长城！
squizzlebizzle
What motivated the navy to do that
是什么促使海军那样做？
oga_ogbeni
What data did the Argentine Air Force need from the Navy to fuse the bombs properly? My understanding is that the timing from weapon release until the fuse was armed was too long long given that the aircraft were attacking from low altitude. Had they attacked from higher altitudes, the weapons would have had a longer time of flight and would have worked just fine. Of course, the aircraft would have been detected by radar and shot down before they reached their release points. But I don't see how the Air Force needed the Navy to calculate the time from release until impact. That's basic kinematics. It seems more like a failure of Air Force tacticians to give the ordnancemen proper fuse settings.
阿根廷空军需要从海军获取哪些数据才能正确设定炸弹引信？据我理解，由于战机从低空发起攻击，从武器投放到引信解除保险之间的计时过长。倘若他们从更高空域实施打击，武器将有更长的飞行时间从而正常引爆。当然，战机在抵达投弹点前就可能被雷达发现并击落。但我不理解空军为何需要海军来计算从投放到撞击的时长——这只是基础运动学问题。这更像是空军战术人员未能向军械兵提供恰当引信设定的失误。
k890
AFAIK, it was WWII made bomb bought from UK by the Argentine Navy post-1945. I guess albeit Air Force receive bombs from stockpiles, technical manuals and other necessities required to set fuse properly were somewhere in Navy archives.
据我所知，这些是阿根廷海军在 1945 年后从英国采购的二战时期制造的炸弹。我推测尽管空军从库存中接收了炸弹，但正确设定引信所需的技术手册和其他必要文件仍存放在海军档案库的某个角落。
There is also the question how much was a fault of Air Force crews or the fact they do use bombs made at least in 1945 and stocked in god forsaken warehouse on the pampa since delivery from UK and never checked to sink ships decades later.
还有一个问题是，此事在多大程度上是空军机组的过错，还是因为他们使用的炸弹至少是在 1945 年制造的，并且自从从英国运来后就一直存放在潘帕斯草原上被遗忘的仓库中，数十年间从未检查过，就拿去炸船。
oga_ogbeni
The Argentines used US Mk-80 series bombs during that conflict. I don't think this example fits at all.
阿根廷人在那次冲突中使用了美国的 Mk-80 系列炸弹。我认为这个例子完全不适用。
ohnomrbil
Absolutely. The Battle of Saipan may have been the worst in US history.
确实有。塞班岛战役可能是美国历史上最惨烈的战役。
What the Marine Corps did to the Army on Saipan is something I will never forgive, as I had a great uncle with the Army’s 27th Infantry Division that never left the island (and this is just one of many examples of marines lying about and denigrating the Army). The Army bore the brunt of the attack on Saipan, particularly the largest banzai charge of the entire war. The 27th was tasked with the island’s toughest obxtives, like Mount Tapotchau, and including holding the line when the Japanese launched their multi-thousand man banzai charge.
我永远不会原谅海军陆战队在塞班岛对陆军所做之事，因为我有一位曾隶属陆军第 27 步兵师的叔祖父，他永远留在了那座岛上（这仅仅是海军陆战队诸多诋毁陆军行径中的一例）。在塞班岛战役中，陆军承受了主要攻击，尤其是面对整场战争中最庞大的"万岁冲锋"。第 27 师被指派攻克岛上最艰难的目标，如塔波乔山，并在日军发起数千人规模的"万岁冲锋"时坚守防线。
Their Backs Against the Sea is an excellent book on some of the inter-branch rivalry and the devastating effects it had on American lives.
《背水一战》是一部杰出的著作，深入探讨了军种间的内部竞争及其对美国士兵生命造成的毁灭性影响。
Marine Corps General Smith had personal beef with Army commander General Smith (no relation) and intentionally sabotaged his leadership during the battle. Eventually, Smith (USMC) replaced Smith (USA) with an unproven and ill-prepared General. Perhaps intentionally to further hamper the Army.
海军陆战队的史密斯将军与陆军指挥官史密斯将军（两人并无亲属关系）存在私人恩怨，并在战斗中故意破坏后者的指挥。最终，史密斯（海军陆战队）用一位未经考验且准备不足的将军替换了史密斯（陆军），此举或许是有意进一步削弱陆军。
Smith (USMC) never visited the front lines a single time during the entire battle, while Smith (USA) never left them while he was on the island (page 98, Their Backs Against the Sea). Even when the Army reported the severity of the banzai charge, Smith (USMC) refused to send them reinforcements (page 137, Their Backs Against the Sea). How many US Army soldiers did he indirectly, yet deliberately, kill? On top of all that, Smith (USMC) lied about the number of Japanese attacking the Army. He downplayed the Army’s role and grossly exaggerated the Japanese attacking marines. He even lied about marine artillery pieces (the same ones he confiscated from the Army) firing point blank at Japanese attackers. Just never happened (page 192, Their Backs Against the Sea).
在整个战役期间，美军陆战队史密斯一次都未踏足前线阵地，而陆军史密斯在岛上的时候却从未离开过前线（《背水一战》第 98 页）。即便陆军报告了日军"万岁冲锋"的猛烈程度，陆战队史密斯仍拒绝派兵增援（《背水一战》第 137 页）。他究竟间接而蓄意地导致了多少美国陆军士兵的牺牲？更甚的是，陆战队史密斯还谎报了攻击陆军的日军数量。他刻意贬低陆军的作战贡献，同时极度夸大了攻击海军陆战队的日军规模。他甚至捏造了陆战队炮兵（正是他从陆军收缴的那些火炮）抵近射击日军进攻者的虚假战报，事实上这种情况从未发生（《背水一战》第 192 页）。
After Smith (USMC) replaced Smith (USA), General Griner took over. He said, “[marine] Smith was so prejudiced against the Army that he could never expect a fair and honest uation. [marine] Smith confiscated our artillery pieces while we attacked Mount Tapotchau, the most heavily defended point on the island and those guns just sat there, the marines never used them (page 130, Their Backs Against the Sea).
陆战队史密斯接管陆军史密斯职务后，格里纳将军接任指挥。他指出："（陆战队）史密斯对陆军的偏见根深蒂固，我们根本无法期待他做出公正客观的评估。在我们进攻全岛防御最森严的塔波乔山时，（陆战队）史密斯收缴了我们的火炮，那些炮械就闲置在阵地里，海军陆战队从未使用过它们（《背水一战》第 130 页）。
In the 1986 book on the Smith vs. Smith situation, Harry A. Gailey summed it up by saying, “relieving [Army] Smith was uncalled for and the substitution of a new, untried commander to bring about a quicker victory on Saipan may even have lengthened the campaign and caused untold numbers of American deaths. The slurs [marine] Smith hurled at the Army in his articles and books were totally unwarranted, unconscionable, and untrue.”
在 1986 年关于史密斯对阵史密斯事件的著作中，哈里·A·盖利总结道："解除[陆军]史密斯的职务并无必要，而任命一位未经考验的新指挥官来加速塞班岛的胜利，反而可能延长了战役时间，造成了无数美军士兵的牺牲。[海军陆战队]史密斯在其文章和书籍中对陆军的诽谤完全是无理的、昧良心的和不真实的。"
In Their Backs Against The Sea, the lies by Smith (USMC) continue. On pages 194 and 195, reports show that Smith (USMC) lied about Japanese numbers that made the marine defense seem stronger and the Army defense seemed weaker. He flipped the numbers and lied about marines facing more men than they did, while downplaying what the Army was up against.
在《背水一战》一书中，史密斯（海军陆战队）的谎言仍在继续。在第 194 和 195 页的报告中显示，史密斯（海军陆战队）在日军兵力数据上造假，夸大陆军防线的薄弱，同时扭曲事实夸大海军陆战队面对的敌军规模，刻意淡化陆军实际面临的战斗压力。
On pages 259 and 260, there is also a list of several marines that fought in the battle that say Smith (USMC) was wrong on multiple fronts.
在第 259 和 260 页，还列举了多位参与该战役的海军陆战队员的证言，指出史密斯（海军陆战队）在多方面存在错误表述。
The Army had numerous Medals of Honor awarded for heroic lone-man stands against an overwhelming force, and countless examples of their savagery on Saipan, yet Smith (USMC) lied constantly about the Army never being aggressive.
陆军部队因士兵在压倒性敌军面前英勇的孤身作战而获颁众多荣誉勋章，在塞班岛战役中更不乏其骁勇善战的例证，然而史密斯（海军陆战队）却不断捏造陆军缺乏进攻性的虚假说法。
The entire fiasco also destroyed Marine Corps General Holland Smith’s career, essentially. He never led men “in combat” again after Saipan and was moved to a desk job after. I put in combat in quotations because, as I mentioned earlier, he never even visited the front lines on Saipan once, yet had the balls to accuse Army General Ralph Smith of not being aggressive.
这整个闹剧实质上还毁掉了海军陆战队上将霍兰·史密斯的职业生涯。他在塞班岛战役后便再未"实战"指挥过部队，随后被调任文职。我特意给"实战"二字加上引号，是因为正如前文所述——这位将军在塞班岛期间从未亲临前线一步，却敢指责陆军上将拉尔夫·史密斯作战不够勇猛。
Let’s keep in mind that Army General Smith fought in WW1, including in the bloodiest campaign of our nation’s history, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and received two Silver Stars and a Purple Heart during the course of his career.
我们必须铭记，陆军上将拉尔夫·史密斯曾参与第一次世界大战，经历过我国历史上最血腥的默兹-阿贡纳战役，职业生涯中两度荣获银星勋章，更获得象征战伤荣誉的紫心勋章。
***Side note: Marine Corps General Holland Smith also received a Purple Heart, but it was not for wounds sustained in combat, like Army Smith’s was. Holland Smith’s Purple Heart was converted from a Meritorious Service Citation Certificate. When the PH was first created, it wasn’t exclusively for combat wounds. I wanted to include this note in case someone cited that Holland Smith also had a PH. While true, it wasn’t for combat wounds and further separates him from a real combat leader like Ralph Smith.
***补充说明：海军陆战队上将霍兰·史密斯虽也获颁紫心勋章，但其性质与陆军上将拉尔夫因战负伤获得的勋章截然不同。霍兰的紫心勋章是由功绩嘉奖状转换而来——紫心勋章设立初期并非专属战伤荣誉。特此说明以免有人提及霍兰亦拥有紫心勋章。虽确有其事，但这枚非战伤性质的勋章，恰恰更凸显他与拉尔夫·史密斯这类真正战斗指挥官的本质区别。
I would argue another egregious offense of this (perhaps equally as much as Saipan) is what the Marine Corps did to the Army at the Chosin Reservoir. I won’t dive into it as much as Saipan above, but the Marine Corps lied about the Army at Chosin, calling them cowards and painted a false narrative that lasted for decades, all because the Marine Corps was being viewed as obsolete and eyeing disbandment and they used this false narrative to help argue they were still necessary to the US military.
我还会指出另一个同样严重的冒犯行为（可能堪比塞班岛事件），那就是海军陆战队在长津湖对陆军所做的一切。我不会像上面谈论塞班岛那样深入探讨，但海军陆战队确实对长津湖的陆军撒了谎，称他们是懦夫，并编造了一个持续数十年的虚假叙述，这全都因为当时海军陆战队被视为过时，面临解散，于是他们利用这个虚假故事来证明自己在美军中仍然不可或缺。
Algaean
Was Holland Smith a psycho or something? or was there some deranged reason for his animus? (don't have the book, sorry!)
霍兰德·史密斯是神经病还是咋了？或者说他怀恨在心有什么疯狂的原因吗？（抱歉，我没有这本书！）
ohnomrbil
I think he was just an egotistical piece of shit, but I don’t have a book to quote that from lol.
我认为他只是个自负的混蛋，但我也不知道这句话出自哪本书，哈哈。
lttesch
Think he was just butt hurt that after he was commissioned from ROTC, the Army rejected him for Federal service, but the Marines took him.
我想他只不过是因为自己被 ROTC（预备役军官训练营）任命后，陆军拒绝接纳他为联邦服役，但海军陆战队却收留了他，这让他耿耿于怀。
Also, I'll add that it wasn't just the Army. He had issues with the Navy as well. He was just a dick all around. I have a copy of his autobiography, Coral and Brass. He was actually asked by Nimitz (or maybe secnav, cant remember) I believe not to publish it as it was sure to piss off many in the fleet. The whole Saipan debacle only gets 2 pages. Bottom line, if you weren't a Marine, he had a problem with you.
另外，我还要补充一点，不仅仅是陆军，他与海军也有过节。他就是个彻头彻尾的混蛋。我有一本他的自传《珊瑚与黄铜》。我记得尼米兹（或者是海军部长，记不清了）曾要求他不要出版这本书，因为它肯定会激怒舰队里的许多人。关于塞班岛惨败的整个事件，他只用了两页纸来描述。总而言之，只要你不是海军陆战队员，他就会对你有意见。
Ro500
He was called Howlin’ Mad Holland Smith for a reason. Part of his thing against the army (and 27th ID in particular) goes back to Makin. The marines seized their obxtives quickly during Operation Galvanic but the 27th ID took a fair bit longer. This is mainly due to a conflict between how marines fought and army fought. I disagree with the ops characterization of marine corps tactics and point to Makin as to why. The navy and by extension the marines saw these operations as time limited windows that needed to be pushed hard. The longer the invasion takes the more likely Japanese submarines and air power are gonna pin down American ships and sink them. It wasn’t about reckless charging, it was about advancing quickly because losing valuable warships could be even more costly.
他被称为“咆哮的疯子”霍兰德·史密斯不是没有原因的。他对陆军（特别是第 27 步兵师）的部分反感可以追溯至马金岛战役。海军陆战队在“电流行动”中迅速攻占了目标，而第 27 步兵师则花费了相当长的时间。这主要源于海军陆战队和陆军作战方式的冲突。我对行动中海军陆战队战术的描述持不同意见，并以马金岛为例说明原因。海军以及由之延伸的海军陆战队视这些行动为有时间限制的窗口，必须全力推进。入侵时间越长，日军潜艇和空中力量就越有可能牵制并击沉美军舰船。这并非鲁莽冲锋，而是为了快速推进，因为损失宝贵的战舰可能代价更为惨重。
They had very good reasons to think this and the 27th IDs slow progress on Makin is one reason for the sinking of the carrier USS Liscome Bay resulting in the loss of 702 officers and sailors along with whatever aircraft were in the hangar (including the first black recipient of the navy cross for his actions at Pearl Harbor, Doris Miller and the first flag officer lost since the Friday the 13th brawl). The loss of the Liscomme Bay resulted in more deaths than the entirety of the army deaths during the Makin invasion many times over. Losses like that hurt a lot which is why the marines aggressively pursued their obxtives. Now that being said Holland Smith was a massive ass and his actions on Saipan were often reprehensible and disgusting.
他们有充分的理由这样认为，第 27 步兵师在马金岛的缓慢进展正是导致航空母舰利斯康湾号沉没的原因之一，该事件造成 702 名军官和水兵丧生，同时机库内的所有飞机也一并损失（包括首位因在珍珠港行动而获得海军十字勋章的黑人水手多丽丝·米勒，以及自 13 日星期五冲突以来首位阵亡的将级军官）。利斯康湾号的损失导致的人员伤亡，远超过陆军在整个马金岛入侵行动中的死亡人数，甚至高达数倍。如此惨重的损失令人痛心疾首，这也正是海军陆战队积极追求其目标的原因。不过话说回来，霍兰德·史密斯确实是个大混蛋，他在塞班岛的行径常常令人愤慨且恶心。
Uncreative-name12
Holland Smith was definitely a bastard on Saipan. Little correction though, he wasn't completely sidelined. He did lead US forces on Iwo Jima. And Nimitz wanted him to lead on Okinawa, but in the name of interservice diplomacy gave the job to army general Simon Bolivar Buckner.
在塞班岛战役中，霍兰·史密斯绝对是个混账。不过需要稍作修正的是，他并未完全被边缘化。他确实曾领导美军参与硫磺岛战役。而且尼米兹将军原本希望由他指挥冲绳战役，但出于军种间协调的考虑，最终将指挥权交给了陆军中将西蒙·玻利瓦尔·巴克纳。
jonewer
I'm going with Tedder and the other RAF big knobs in WW2
我和二战中的泰德以及其他英国皇家空军的大人物们共事。
They (the Air Barons) were obstructive throughout the campaign, during and after Normandy, for they were of a generation that had resolutely opposed army co-operation, except on their own terms, in the 1930s. They genuinely, if mistakenly, believed that the air force was the main instrument for the overthrow of the enemy.
这些空军巨头在整个战役期间、诺曼底登陆期间及之后都在阻挠行动，因为他们属于那一代人——在 1930 年代坚决反对陆军合作，除非条件符合他们的心意。他们真心地（尽管错误地）认为空军是推翻敌人的主要工具。
Basically in the middle of the Battle of Normandy, Tedder was scheming and politicking to get Montgomery sacked, did the same to Broadhurst because he was too cooperative with the Army, and was in the process of doing the same to Leigh-Mallory for the same reasons.
基本上，在诺曼底战役中期，泰德密谋策划并玩弄政治手段，企图让蒙哥马利被解职，对布罗德赫斯特也如法炮制，只因他与陆军合作过于密切；出于同样的原因，他也在对利-马洛里做同样的事情。
A Grade-A See You Next Tuesday.
活脱脱一个大傻逼。
F_to_the_Third
The arrogant, reckless, and incompetent leadership of Major General Edward “Ned” Almond as X Corps Commander during the period of September - December 1950 was especially egregious and put further unnecessary tension between the Army and USMC at a critical juncture of the Korean War.
1950 年 9 月至 12 月期间，爱德华·"内德"·阿尔蒙德少将作为第十军团司令官，其傲慢鲁莽且无能的领导行为尤其恶劣，在朝鲜战争的关键时刻进一步加剧了陆军与海军陆战队之间不必要的紧张关系。
Early in the Korean War, with UN Forces holding on to the toehold of the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur came up with his operational concept to conduct an amphibious assault deep in the rear of the besieging North Korean Army (NKPAj cutting off the flow of sustainment to the NKPA forces attacking the Pusan Perimeter, and eventually recapturing Seoul, the political and cultural capital of Korea. The port of Inchon was approved as the amphibious obxtive area despite its unsuitability due to radically shifting tides and massive mud flats.
朝鲜战争初期，当联合国军在釜山防线坚守据点时，麦克阿瑟构想了一项作战计划：在围困的朝鲜人民军后方深处进行两栖突击，切断攻击釜山防线的朝军补给线，并最终夺回韩国的政治文化中心首尔。尽管仁川港因急剧变化的潮汐和大片泥滩而不适宜登陆，但仍被确定为两栖作战目标区域。
No amphibious operation is ever easy, but Inchon was going to be above and beyond. MacArthur requested and received the 1st Marine Division, 7th Infantry Division (Army) and 3d Marine Air Wing as the core of the landing force. He then decided to create an ad hoc Corps level HQ to command and control this force which would directly report to MacArthur. Instead of designating a General Officer with WW2 Amphibious experience, of which the 1950 Army had plenty, he sexted his Chief of Staff Ned Almond to take command. As if commanding a hastily assembled Corps in a high risk operation was not enough, Almond was to simultaneously retain his duties as MacArthur’s Chief of Staff.
任何两栖作战都不会轻松，仁川登陆更是难上加难。麦克阿瑟将第一海军陆战师、第七步兵师（陆军）和第三海军陆战航空联队作为登陆部队的核心。他决定设立一个临时军级指挥部来指挥和控制这支直接向他汇报的部队，但没有任命二战两栖作战经验丰富的军官（1950 年的美军中此类人才济济），而是选择了他的参谋长内德·阿尔蒙德来担任指挥。阿尔蒙德不仅要指挥这支仓促组建的部队执行高风险任务，还必须同时继续履行麦克阿瑟参谋长的职责。
Almond’s experience and temperament were unsuited to the task at hand. He had zero amphibious experience and didn’t bother to get educated frequently dismissing the complex process of an amphibious assault as nothing more than an administrative movement by ship. He frequently embarrassed himself such as when he asked if the amphibian tractors used for ship-to-shore movement would actually float. Despite his complete lack of experience, he was dismissive of the 1st Marine Division Commanding General (CG) O.P. Smith who had three WW2 amphibious assaults under his belt (Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, Okinawa).
阿尔蒙德的资历与性情并不适合这项任务。他毫无两栖作战经验，也未曾主动学习，常将复杂的两栖突击简化理解为船舶运输的行政调度。其认知局限屡屡暴露，例如曾质疑用于船滩转运的两栖履带车是否真能浮水。尽管缺乏实战经验，他却对拥有三次二战两栖作战经验（格洛斯特角战役、贝里琉战役、冲绳战役）的第一海军陆战师师长奥利弗·P·史密斯少将嗤之以鼻。
While Almond had a noteworthy pre WW2 record, to include distinguished service in WW1, he was a mediocre Division Commander who blamed his lack of success on the black troops of his segregated 92nd Infantry Division. As opposed to accepting responsibility as the commander, he offered the following racist diatribe:
虽然阿尔蒙德在二战前履历出众，包括在一战中的卓越表现，但作为师长他表现平庸，并将麾下由非裔士兵组成的第 92 步兵师视为其战绩不佳的借口。这位指挥官非但没有承担领导责任，反而发表如下种族主义言论：
“No white man wants to be accused of leaving the battle line. The Negro doesn't care.... people think being from the South we don't like Negroes. Not at all, but we understand his capabilities. And we don't want to sit at the table with them.”
“白人绝不会被指控擅离战线。黑人根本不在乎……人们以为南方人厌恶黑人。绝非如此，但我们深知他们的能力界限。我们不愿与他们同桌而坐。”
His deeply seeded racism would cloud his judgment once again in the mountains of Northeast Korea to disastrous effect.
他根深蒂固的种族主义将再次在朝鲜东北部的山区蒙蔽他的判断力，造成灾难性后果。
When Almond finally realized he (and his staff) were over their skis planning one of the most complex amphibious operations ever, he had the good sense and judgment to let the 1st Marine Division and its veterans take the lead relegating himself to photo ops with MacArthur on the Flagship’s bridge.
当阿尔蒙德最终意识到他（及其参谋团队）在策划有史以来最复杂的登陆行动之一时力有不逮，便明智地决定让海军陆战队第一师及其经验丰富的老兵主导行动，自己则退居次位，仅在旗舰甲板上与麦克阿瑟合影作秀。
Once the landing force was ashore, he assumed command of subsequent operations ashore, as he should have, but instead of issuing orders to his division commanders and fighting X Corps, he frequently violated the chain of command directly issuing orders to regimental commanders, bypassing the division CGs and impacting their understanding of the operational environment and ultimately their decision making.
登陆部队上岸后，他按职责接掌了后续的岸上作战指挥权。然而，他并未通过正常指挥链向师级指挥官下达命令、协同第十军作战，反而屡次越级直接向团级指挥官发号施令。这种越权行为既绕过了师级指挥官，也干扰了他们对战场态势的研判，最终影响了作战决策的制定。
He also possessed the classic narcissistic personality traits that defined MacArthur to the point of needlessly sacrificing good Marines and Soldiers to feed his outsized ego. This was first evident in his insistence that Seoul be captured by the 25th of September, three months exactly after the initial North Korean invasion. He pushed, bullied and cajoled his commanders, Army and USMC, to sacrifice our nation’s greatest treasure to meet this arbitrary date which yielded no operational advantage and distracted from the primary obxtive of destroying NKPA remnants many of whom escaped to fight another day.
他还拥有典型的自恋型人格特征，这正是麦克阿瑟的写照，甚至不惜无谓地牺牲优秀的海军陆战队员和士兵来满足其膨胀的自我。这一点首先体现在他坚持要在 9 月 25 日，即朝鲜最初入侵整整三个月后夺取首尔。他推动、欺压并哄骗他的指挥官们，无论是陆军还是海军陆战队，牺牲我们国家最宝贵的财富来满足这个任意的日期，这并没有带来任何作战优势，反而分散了消灭朝鲜人民军残部的主要目标，其中许多人得以逃脱，以待来日再战。
These negative traits were even further pronounced during winter operations in Korea’s mountainous northeast. Ever the glory hound, Almond had his Corps strung out and largely incapable of mutual support in their headlong, reckless dash for the Yalu River. The combination of recklessness and unwillingness to accept the Chinese had entered the war full scale resulted in the destruction of TF Faith and the near annihilation of the 1st Marine Division. Almond, ever the arrogant, narcissistic, racist numbskull ignored the warnings about the Chinese, famously dismissing the Chinese forces as "remnants" or "Chinese laundrymen" and ordered X Corps to continue their rapid advance.
这些负面特质在朝鲜东北部山区的冬季作战中表现得尤为突出。阿尔蒙德向来争强好胜，他麾下的军团战线拉得过长，在向鸭绿江冒进时大多无法相互支援。鲁莽加上不愿承认中国已全面参战，导致"忠诚特遣队"被全歼，海军陆战队第一师几乎覆灭。阿尔蒙德这个一贯傲慢自大、充满种族主义思想的蠢材无视关于中国军队的警告，曾轻蔑地称中国军队为"残兵败将"或"中国洗衣工"，并下令第十军团继续快速推进。
In response to what he saw as reckless orders, OP Smith deliberately slowed the 1st Marine Division's march, established supply points, and built an airfield at Hagaru-ri to evacuate casualties and bring in supplies. This "near insubordination" frustrated Almond but ultimately provided the infrastructure that saved the division during the Chosin Reservoir breakout. Additionally, contrary to Almond’s orders, Smith refused to abandon equipment to speed up his Division’s withdrawal knowing that unlike the Army, he wasn’t going to see replacement equipment for quite some time and his Division would be combat ineffective without key capabilities (tanks, artillery, motor transport etc.).
面对他所认为的鲁莽命令，奥利弗·史密斯故意放缓了第一海军陆战师的进军速度，设立了补给点，并在下碣隅里修建了一个机场，以便撤离伤员和运送补给。这种"近乎抗命"的行为令阿尔蒙德感到沮丧，但最终为在长津湖突围期间拯救该师提供了基础设施。此外，与阿尔蒙德的命令相反，史密斯拒绝为了加速师的撤退而放弃装备，因为他知道，与陆军不同，他在相当长的时间内不会看到替换装备，而他的师若失去关键能力（坦克、火炮、摩托化运输等）将无法有效作战。
Only OP Smith’s refusal to yield to Almond’s aggressive timeline at the Chosin Reservoir prevented the total destruction of the 1st Marine Division. Following the Chosin campaign, Smith informed higher command that his division would no longer serve under Almond.
只有奥利弗·史密斯在长津湖拒绝屈从于阿尔蒙德的激进时间表，才避免了第一海军陆战师的全面覆灭。长津湖战役后，史密斯通知上级指挥部，他的师将不再在阿尔蒙德麾下服役。
Almond went on to continue command of X Corps followed by a final assignment as President of the Army War College. While holding that position, Almond’s career effectively ended due to a scandal involving the "costly renovation" of his official residence at Carlisle Barracks. An investigation revealed he had improperly used government resources for personal living quarters, leading to a formal letter of reprimand from the Army. He ultimately lacked integrity in addition to competency, tact, professionalism, and humility.
阿尔蒙德继续指挥第十军团后，被分配到陆军战争学院担任最后一任校长。然而就在此任内，因其在卡莱尔兵营官邸的"奢华翻修"丑闻，其军旅生涯戛然而止。调查揭露他违规挪用政府资源改善个人居所，为此陆军总部向其发出正式谴责函。这位将军最终被证明不仅在专业能力、处事手腕、职业素养与谦逊品德方面存在缺陷，更缺乏基本的人格操守。
Following his forced exit from the Army, Almond remained a controversial figure. He became a prominent voice in pro-segregationist movements, serving as a delegate to conferences that condemned desegregation and labeled the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education as an "enemy" of the state.
被强制要求退出军队后，阿尔蒙德仍然是一个备受争议的人物。他在支持种族隔离运动中崭露头角，成为一位突出的代言人，多次作为代表出席谴责废除种族隔离措施的会议，并将最高法院在布朗诉教育委员会案中的裁决称为国家的“敌人”。
Uncreative-name12
With TF Faith after the Chinese had begun their attack Almond ordered that regimental combat team to attack multiple Chinese divisions. Absolutely insane.
中国军队开始攻击后，阿尔蒙德命令那个团级战斗群去对抗多个中国师。简直是疯了。
Taira_Mai
Vietnam war - there were four or five air forces depending on how you counted them.
越南战争 - 依据不同的统计方式，存在着四到五支独立的空中力量。
USAF - Tactical Air Command vs. Strategic Air Command, different priorities mostly
美国空军 - 战术空军司令部与战略空军司令部之间，主要存在任务优先级的差异
USN - USMC
美国海军 - 美国海军陆战队
US Army Aviation
美国陆军航空队
The South Vietnamese Air Force (RVNAF)
越南共和国空军（RVNAF）
Getting all these groups to work together was a mess. It stayed that way well into Grenada.
想让这些部队协同作战简直一团糟。这种情况一直持续到格林纳达行动时期。
Each service had been doing it's own thing and the US Army and USAF had been at odds since the "Key West Agreement".
各军种向来各行其是，而美国陆军与空军自《基韦斯特协定》签署后就纷争不断。
The Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act put an end to each US service doing it's own thing and ensured that a single combatant commander would oversee each operation
《戈德华特-尼科尔斯改革法案》终结了美军各军种自行其是的局面，确保每次军事行动均由同一位作战指挥官统筹指挥。
