美国专家访谈：你关于中国与AI的认知可能都错了
正文翻译
题图：中国最近的每一次科技进步，都会刺痛大洋彼岸的某些人。
To hear San Francisco’s techies or Washington’s policy wonks tell it, the AI competition between the U.S. and China is the “Space Race” of our day. Only this time, the prize isn’t satellites orbiting the earth or footprints and flags frozen on the moon — it’s limitless economic and military potential.
听旧金山的科技精英或华盛顿的政策专家们讲述，中美之间的人工智能竞争堪称当代的“太空竞赛”。只是这一次，争夺的奖品不再是环绕地球的卫星或冻结在月球上的足迹与旗帜，而是无限的经济与军事潜力。
But according to journalist Yi-Ling Liu, the author of the new book, The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet, the narrative of an existential AI race between China and the U.S. risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. And she questions whether the tech hawkishness coming from Silicon Valley interests and their ideological allies is more about the pursuit of their own deregulatory agenda, even if it means making AI and the world less safe.
但据新书《墙后舞者：在中国互联网上寻找自由与联结》的作者、记者刘亦凌观察，关于中美之间关乎存亡的人工智能竞赛的叙事，正有演变成自我实现预言的风险。她质疑来自硅谷利益集团及其意识形态盟友的科技鹰派言论，是否更多是为了推进他们自身的去监管议程，哪怕这意味着让人工智能乃至整个世界变得更不安全。
“The biggest risk is this rolling back of regulation and accelerating ahead without safety parameters in the name of trying to beat [China],” she says in a new interview with POLITICO Magazine.
“最大的风险在于以击败中国为名，撤销监管措施，在没有安全参数的情况下加速前进。”她在接受《政客》杂志最新专访时表示。
Liu also explains the wave of “China envy” sweeping Silicon Valley, why the Trump administration may be unintentionally encouraging other countries to be more reliant on Chinese tech and how the world’s two greatest superpowers could join together to avert an AI catastrophe.
刘亦凌还阐释了席卷硅谷的“羡慕中国”浪潮，解释特朗普政府为何可能无意中促使其他国家更加依赖中国技术，并探讨世界上两个最强大的超级大国如何能够携手避免人工智能灾难。
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
本次访谈经过篇幅压缩与语意梳理。
Q: We often hear that the U.S. and China are engaged in an AI arms race. But you write that seeing it as a zero-sum game is counterproductive, and that the two countries need to work together to ensure emerging technologies are safe. That doesn’t seem to be happening any time soon. What are the biggest risks in this competition between the two great powers?
问：我们常听闻美国与中国正在展开人工智能军备竞赛。但您撰文指出，将其视为零和博弈适得其反，两国需要携手确保新兴技术的安全。然而这种合作似乎短期内难以实现。在两大强国的这场竞争中，最大的风险是什么？
A: Maybe one of the biggest issues and problems with this narrative of the race is that it might not actually be describing reality. Especially after the launch of [Chinese open-source AI model] DeepSeek-R1 last year — it’s a so-called “Sputnik moment” that kind of threw U.S. policymakers and industry people into a frenzy. This idea that both countries were somehow racing towards AGI, or artificial general intelligence, when we in fact have very little evidence that AGI is a national priority for China. And so one of the biggest risks of furthering this particular narrative is making it a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating a story where it didn't exist in the first place — and not stepping back and thinking about who are the people who are creating this narrative? To what extent is this narrative created by industry players who are trying to achieve their own corporate goals?
答：或许这种竞赛叙事最大的问题之一在于，它可能并未准确反映现实。尤其在去年中国开源人工智能模型DeepSeek-R1发布后——这场所谓的“斯普特尼克时刻”令美国政策制定者和产业界陷入恐慌。当前叙事总将两国描绘成正在竞相追逐通用人工智能，但我们几乎没有任何证据表明通用人工智能是中国的国家优先事项。因此，推动这种特定叙事最大的风险之一，就是使其成为自我实现的预言——构造出一个原本并不存在的故事框架，却未曾退后一步思考：是谁在塑造这种叙事？产业界参与者为了达成自身企业目标，又在多大程度上主导了这种叙事？
From the U.S. side, there's this idea: “If we don't move as fast as possible, China is going to beat us.” There's going to be a huge attempt to cut down and cut back on regulation, from creating sufficient safety uations and benchmarks on frontier AI models and making sure that labs are held accountable to the frontier safety policies they're putting out — instead of emboldening them to be like, “Well, go and speed ahead and accelerate, it doesn't matter if you are stepping across a line that might make a model a potential biohazard or present potential bio risks, because that might be directly contradictory to trying to beat China.”
美方抱持这样一种观念：“若不尽快行动，中国必将超越我们。”这种观念将引发大规模削减和弱化监管的企图——例如放弃建立充分的前沿人工智能模型安全评估与基准测试，也不再确保实验室对其安全政策负责。相反，它们会被纵容产生这样的心态：“尽管全速前进、加速突破，即便跨越可能使模型成为潜在生物危害或带来生物风险的界限也无妨，因为那样做可能会妨碍击败中国。”
The same can be said for things like intellectual property. Right now in the U.S., there's a huge ideological debate on, to what extent can we feed these models the intellectual property of artists and writers? And there could be a rolling back of regulation in response to claims that China, for example, has really limited intellectual property rights, and they're just feeding their models everything. And so I think the biggest risk is this rolling back of regulation and accelerating ahead without safety parameters in the name of trying to beat the other.
知识产权领域同样如此。当前美国正进行一场重大的意识形态辩论：我们能在多大程度上将艺术家和作家的知识产权投喂给这些模型？而为了回应所谓“中国知识产权保护极为有限，他们正将一切数据投喂给模型”的论调，监管措施可能出现倒退。因此我认为最大的风险在于：以超越对方为名，在缺乏安全参数的情况下弱化监管、贸然加速。
Q: Is there an alternative to the arms race? What would a more collaborative approach look like?
问：军备竞赛是否存在替代方案？更具协作性的路径将呈现何种面貌？
A: One of the smallest things that is happening right now that I think could be done at a much larger scale are track-two dialogues between the two countries. Track-one dialogues are dialogues that take place between government leaders — heads of state, presidents, prime ministers. Track-two dialogues are those that take place between scientists on both sides, civil society organizations on both sides, people who have direct levels of influence in the government on both sides.
答：当前正在推进的诸多事务中，我认为最具潜力大规模拓展的领域之一，是中美之间的“第二轨道对话”。所谓“第一轨道对话”，是指政府领导人——国家元首、总统、总理——之间的正式对话。而“第二轨道对话”则发生在两国科学家、民间社会组织、以及双方政府内部具有直接影响力的各界人士之间。
It’s very important to bring these two parties together to discuss, for example, red lines that won't be crossed or established, like a common set of safety standards for models, to just get these people together and have some sense of dialogue and common ground. And to have a sense of what's going on in each country before jumping to conclusions and using those poorly sketched-out conclusions to drive policy back home.
将这些群体汇聚一堂进行磋商至关重要，例如可以探讨不可逾越的底线或建立共识的准则，比如制定一套通用的模型安全标准。通过促成这类交流，既能建立对话机制与共同认知基础，也能在仓促得出结论前，更准确地把握两国各自的发展态势，避免依据粗浅臆断来制定本国政策。
Q: You write about a wave of “China envy” sweeping policy circles and Silicon Valley. What is making them so jealous?
问：您在文章中提及政策界与硅谷正席卷一股“羡慕中国”浪潮。是什么引发了这种强烈的艳羡情绪？
A: Yeah, this is definitely a dynamic of the past year. I can trace the roots to two explicit events: I would say the first is probably the launch of DeepSeek-R1. Everyone was freaking out about that.
答：确实，这无疑是过去一年来的显著动态。其根源可追溯至两个具体事件：首当其冲的当属DeepSeek-R1的发布，此事当时引发了各界震动。
I'd say the other, funnily enough, was the moment when a lot of TikTok refugees were migrating to RedNote, the Chinese social media app, in the wake of the TikTok ban. I would say that it really started more among policy wonks — the intellectual, chattering-class, abundance folks. I think this also spans both the left and the right, where China was becoming this rhetorical mirror onto which Americans started to project their fears and aspirations.
有趣的是，另一时刻则是TikTok禁令后，大量用户迁往中国社交媒体应用“小红书”之际。我认为这股情绪最初更多是在政策研究者——那些知识阶层、善于议论的“丰饶派”（鼓吹技术带来物质极大丰富的人）人士中兴起。这种现象跨越了左右阵营，中国逐渐成为一面投射之镜，美国人开始将自己的恐惧与渴望投射其上。
I started to notice a bunch of pundits and CEOs and Silicon Valley tech people all going to China for these two-week trips to chronicle their observations of Chinese technology. And it was almost always through the lens of American stagnation. There was always this, “Oh my gosh, China can build humanoids! China can build bridges!” There's this obsession with China's ability to build high-speed rail, despite the fact that Chinese people have been building high-speed rail for like a decade now. I think this kind of obsession with China's ability to build things and build infrastructure in the physical world is at the root of a lot of this envy, and a lot of it is rooted in a U.S. realization and awareness of their own inability to build infrastructure in the physical world.
我开始注意到一批专家、首席执行官和硅谷科技人士纷纷前往中国，进行为期两周的考察，记录他们对中国科技的观察。而他们的视角几乎总是带着“美国停滞”的滤镜。总有人惊叹：“天啊，中国能造人形机器人！中国能建桥梁！”尽管中国建设高铁已有十年之久，外界仍执着于中国建设高铁的能力。我认为这种对中国实体世界建造能力和基础设施建设的痴迷，正是诸多艳羡情绪的根源，其中很大程度上源于美国对自身在实体世界基建能力不足的认知与觉醒。
I think it also is driven by this awareness of the erosion of the U.S.’ own political system. I think that's driving a lot of more of the China envy on the popular front, within the mainstream consciousness, where you see people like the influencer IShowSpeed, or Hasan Piker going to China and doing these little YouTube videos, talking about how good China is at building drones and buildings. It's much less about China itself. If I were to talk to people in China about how much their world has transformed in the past year? Not that radically. It's not like it suddenly became shinier and bigger and better. It's more what has shifted in Americans’ perspective of China.
我认为，这也源于对美国自身政治体系衰败的认知。这种认知在很大程度上推动了大众层面、主流意识中对“羡慕中国”的蔓延。你可以看到像网红Speed或哈桑-派克这样的人前往中国，制作那些简短的YouTube视频，谈论中国在建造无人机和高楼大厦方面多么出色。这其实并不完全关乎中国本身。如果我去问问中国人，他们过去一年的世界发生了多大变化？并没有那么翻天覆地。一切并不是突然之间就变得更光鲜、更宏大、更美好。更多的，是美国人对中国的看法发生了转变。
There’s a long history of Silicon Valley tech CEOs having China envy. Back in 2019, when WeChat was becoming huge — I mean, it's always been this huge platform, but I remember Mark Zuckerberg being described as having “WeChat envy” because he wanted to build Facebook into the monolith that WeChat was, where it was not just a messaging platform, but had its tentacles in every facet of public life. I think Elon Musk definitely has some level of China envy, where he wants to be able to move fast and break things and build things, and there definitely is this sense of envy in Silicon Valley with the speed with which China moves.
硅谷科技公司CEO们对中国产生羡慕情绪由来已久。早在2019年，当微信变得无比庞大时——我的意思是，它一直是个巨大的平台，但我记得马克-扎克伯格曾被描述为患有“微信羡慕症”，因为他想把Facebook打造成微信那样的巨无霸，不仅是一个通讯平台，更要将触角伸入公共生活的方方面面。我认为埃隆-马斯克肯定在某种程度上羡慕中国，他希望能快速行动、打破常规、建设事物，硅谷确实对中国的发展速度怀有这种羡慕之情。
Q: As the U.S. pulls back from the world stage and allies seek “digital sovereignty,” how might that reshape other countries’ relationship with China?
问：随着美国从世界舞台收缩，而其盟友寻求“数字主权”，这可能会如何重塑其他国家与中国的关系？
A: That’s something I'm going to be watching closely. For a long time among a lot of U.S. allies, there's a sense that [the U.S.] is a reliable player that we can count on, this is a digital ecosystem that we can be part of. Even if there were rules around AI governance, for example, these are rules that we can co-create and assume that the United States will also participate in. And that's essentially thrown out of the window.
答：这正是我将密切关注的问题。长期以来，许多美国盟友都有一种感觉，即美国是一个我们可以信赖的可靠参与者，这是一个我们可以参与的数字生态系统。例如，即使存在人工智能治理相关的规则，这些也是我们可以共同制定，并默认美国也会参与的规则。而现在，这种认知基本上已被抛之窗外。
I think the question that a lot of other countries now face is, “In this increasingly or already multipolar world, how are we going to navigate these two gigantic superpowers? Where are we going to fit in? How much more dependent will we have to be on China when this relationship with the U.S. is no longer sustainable?”
我认为，如今许多其他国家面临的问题是：“在这个日益多极化或已经多极化的世界里，我们将如何在这两个巨大的超级大国之间周旋？我们将置身何处？当与美国的关系不再可持续时，我们将在多大程度上不得不更加依赖中国？”
I think this is going to mean much greater dependency on China from other countries with regards to hardware. Europe is going to have to think very deeply about its car market and EVs, and what that relationship is going to look like with China. The Middle East — I think everywhere is going to have to think about to what extent they're going to rely on digital infrastructure from China, humanoids from China. So much advanced technology is going to be coming out of China that navigating that dependency is going to be a crucial question for many countries in the years to come.
我认为，这将意味着其他国家在硬件方面将更加依赖中国。欧洲将不得不深入思考其汽车市场和电动汽车，以及与中国的关系将如何发展。我认为中东地区——以至于世界各地都必须思考，他们将在多大程度上依赖来自中国的数字基础设施、来自中国的人形机器人。如此多的先进技术将来自中国，如何应对这种依赖性，将成为未来许多国家面临的关键问题。
When it comes to AI governance as well, other countries are going to have to rely on China to be a more reliable player and stakeholder in drafting up these agreements, defining standards, etc., in a way that the U.S. used to play a much more central role.
在人工智能治理方面，其他国家也将不得不依赖中国成为更可靠的参与者和利益相关方，在起草协议、制定标准等方面发挥关键作用，就像美国曾经扮演的核心角色那样。
Q: The “dance” in your book refers in part to the push and pull on the Chinese internet between government crackdowns and censorship and public freedom of expression and connection. How has that dance impacted your view of how countries like the U.S. approach internet freedoms? Is America doing a “dance” of its own?
问：您书中提到的“共舞”部分指的是中国互联网上政府管控与公众表达自由之间的拉锯关系。这种“共舞”如何影响您对美国等国家处理互联网自由问题的看法？美国是否也在进行自己的“共舞”？
A: Absolutely. And this is something that I didn't expect as I started writing this book. One of the examples that I can just think off the top of my head is this recent TikTok sale. For a long time, we were thinking about TikTok as a dance between the Chinese state and Chinese tech companies and the Chinese people — or later on, the Chinese state, Chinese tech companies and the rest of the world, the American people. To what extent can Bytedance — given its control of the algorithm — or the Chinese state — given its relationship to Bytedance — shape what's appearing on our feeds? And to what extent can users not be used by that, or adapt to that or find creative ways around Chinese censorship domestically as well?
答：确实如此。这其实是我开始写这本书时未曾预料到的。我立刻想到的一个例子是最近的TikTok出售事件。长期以来，我们一直将TikTok视为中国政府、中国科技公司与中国民众之间的共舞——后来演变为中国政府、中国科技公司与世界其他地区、美国民众之间的共舞。考虑到字节跳动对算法的控制力，或是中国政府与字节跳动的关系，它们能在多大程度上塑造我们信息流中的内容？用户又能在多大程度上不被其利用，或是适应这种局面，甚至在中国国内审查中找到创造性的应对方式？
People were asking me about the implications of this TikTok sale. Sure, the owner has changed. The majority stake is going to be held by a set of American investors. But the question now is to what extent does Oracle have control over the content moderation of this platform and what appears on these feeds? To what extent does Oracle's relationship with the Trump administration shape what's taking place on these feeds? And then in response to that, how much power do users have to bypass that influence, or be shaped by or shape that influence? And so, what we once saw as a dance that was unique between the Chinese government, Chinese tech companies and the Chinese people, I feel like is now very much playing out on U.S. turf.
人们曾向我询问此次TikTok出售事件的影响。诚然，所有者已经变更。多数股权将由一批美国投资者持有。但现在的关键是，甲骨文公司在多大程度上能控制该平台的内容审核及信息流呈现？甲骨文公司与特朗普政府的关系又在多大程度上影响着信息流的内容？而作为回应，用户又具备多大能力来规避这种影响，或被其塑造，甚至反过来塑造这种影响？因此，我们曾视为中国政府、中国科技公司与中国民众之间特有的“共舞”，如今似乎正淋漓尽致地在美国本土上演。
I think the other thing we're seeing that I didn't realize was just the relationship between Silicon Valley's tech leaders and the Trump administration. Back when I was reporting in China, it was obvious to me that there was this relationship of patronage and interdependency between the Chinese government and Chinese tech companies. Chinese tech companies provided innovation, but they needed the government stamp of approval to get policies across, or bypass regulations or to operate in the way they wanted to operate. And I was really struck to see last year, after the inauguration, essentially all of Silicon Valley's big tech CEOs showing up to kowtow to the new leader and align their rhetoric and the direction of their policies such that it kind of follows — you know, dances with, so to speak — the tune of the current administration.
我认为我们看到的另一件出乎意料之事，是硅谷科技领袖与特朗普政府之间的关系。当初我在中国进行报道时，中国政府与中国科技公司之间那种庇护与相互依存的关系对我来说显而易见。中国科技公司提供创新，但它们需要政府的认可来推动政策、规避监管或以它们希望的方式运营。而去年就职典礼后，我震惊地看到，硅谷几乎所有大型科技公司的首席执行官都前去向美国新领导人卑躬屈膝，并调整他们的言论和政策方向，使其在某种程度上跟随——或者说是“共舞”于——当前政府的步调。
Q: What are some of the biggest misconceptions you encounter about China, the internet and technology, particularly in American politics?
问：在美国政治语境中，关于中国、互联网和科技方面，你遇到的最大误解有哪些？
A: China is always addressed as a monolith. For some reason, there is this feeling that everyone is the same. This has historically been the case and continues to be the case, that it serves as this kind of two-dimensional projection onto which people in the U.S. project their fears and desires. I think the other assumption that's tied to that is, the Chinese state is a monolith — and therefore, in relation to that, you can only be a patriot or a dissident, you can only be an apologist or an opponent of the state. A Chinese person can only have one of two identities, when, obviously, it is possible to hold a whole, wide spectrum of identities and relationships in relation to the state.
答：中国总是被当作一个铁板一块的整体来讨论。出于某种原因，人们总感觉那里每个人都一模一样。这种观念历来存在且延续至今——中国仿佛成了一个二维投影，美国人将自己的恐惧与欲望投射其上。我认为与此相关的另一种假设是：中国政府也是一个铁板一块的整体——因此，与之相对应地，你只能成为爱国者或异见者，只能做体制的辩护者或反对者。中国人似乎只能拥有两种身份之一，但显而易见的是，个人完全可能在与国家的关系中持有广泛而多元的身份认同。
Those are the two main [misconceptions], and also that it's possible for a place to hold two seemingly contradictory identities at once. It is possible that China is a technological powerhouse and building some of the most advanced technologies in the world, but also economically stagnant, and its people are struggling with employment. They are feeling really down about future prospects. It's suffering from demographic decline.
以上是两种主要的误解，此外还有一种误解是：人们不相信某个地方能够同时容纳两种看似矛盾的身份。事实上，中国完全可能既是科技强国、正在打造某些世界顶尖技术，又同时面临经济停滞、民众就业困难的问题。人们对未来前景感到极度悲观，国家也正遭受人口衰退的困扰。
For some reason, in the American public imagination, it's only possible for China to be this superpower economic juggernaut or this stunning oppressive regime where people have no agency. It’s very important for us to be able to hold the multitude of different identities that this one country can be and people can be.
出于某种原因，在美国公众的想象中，中国似乎只能是两种形象：要么是经济腾飞的超级大国，要么是人民毫无自主权的惊人 ya迫性郑泉。但我们必须认识到，这个国家及其人民能够承载多重不同的身份认同，这一点至关重要。
题图：中国最近的每一次科技进步，都会刺痛大洋彼岸的某些人。
To hear San Francisco’s techies or Washington’s policy wonks tell it, the AI competition between the U.S. and China is the “Space Race” of our day. Only this time, the prize isn’t satellites orbiting the earth or footprints and flags frozen on the moon — it’s limitless economic and military potential.
听旧金山的科技精英或华盛顿的政策专家们讲述，中美之间的人工智能竞争堪称当代的“太空竞赛”。只是这一次，争夺的奖品不再是环绕地球的卫星或冻结在月球上的足迹与旗帜，而是无限的经济与军事潜力。
But according to journalist Yi-Ling Liu, the author of the new book, The Wall Dancers: Searching for Freedom and Connection on the Chinese Internet, the narrative of an existential AI race between China and the U.S. risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. And she questions whether the tech hawkishness coming from Silicon Valley interests and their ideological allies is more about the pursuit of their own deregulatory agenda, even if it means making AI and the world less safe.
但据新书《墙后舞者：在中国互联网上寻找自由与联结》的作者、记者刘亦凌观察，关于中美之间关乎存亡的人工智能竞赛的叙事，正有演变成自我实现预言的风险。她质疑来自硅谷利益集团及其意识形态盟友的科技鹰派言论，是否更多是为了推进他们自身的去监管议程，哪怕这意味着让人工智能乃至整个世界变得更不安全。
“The biggest risk is this rolling back of regulation and accelerating ahead without safety parameters in the name of trying to beat [China],” she says in a new interview with POLITICO Magazine.
“最大的风险在于以击败中国为名，撤销监管措施，在没有安全参数的情况下加速前进。”她在接受《政客》杂志最新专访时表示。
Liu also explains the wave of “China envy” sweeping Silicon Valley, why the Trump administration may be unintentionally encouraging other countries to be more reliant on Chinese tech and how the world’s two greatest superpowers could join together to avert an AI catastrophe.
刘亦凌还阐释了席卷硅谷的“羡慕中国”浪潮，解释特朗普政府为何可能无意中促使其他国家更加依赖中国技术，并探讨世界上两个最强大的超级大国如何能够携手避免人工智能灾难。
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
本次访谈经过篇幅压缩与语意梳理。
Q: We often hear that the U.S. and China are engaged in an AI arms race. But you write that seeing it as a zero-sum game is counterproductive, and that the two countries need to work together to ensure emerging technologies are safe. That doesn’t seem to be happening any time soon. What are the biggest risks in this competition between the two great powers?
问：我们常听闻美国与中国正在展开人工智能军备竞赛。但您撰文指出，将其视为零和博弈适得其反，两国需要携手确保新兴技术的安全。然而这种合作似乎短期内难以实现。在两大强国的这场竞争中，最大的风险是什么？
A: Maybe one of the biggest issues and problems with this narrative of the race is that it might not actually be describing reality. Especially after the launch of [Chinese open-source AI model] DeepSeek-R1 last year — it’s a so-called “Sputnik moment” that kind of threw U.S. policymakers and industry people into a frenzy. This idea that both countries were somehow racing towards AGI, or artificial general intelligence, when we in fact have very little evidence that AGI is a national priority for China. And so one of the biggest risks of furthering this particular narrative is making it a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating a story where it didn't exist in the first place — and not stepping back and thinking about who are the people who are creating this narrative? To what extent is this narrative created by industry players who are trying to achieve their own corporate goals?
答：或许这种竞赛叙事最大的问题之一在于，它可能并未准确反映现实。尤其在去年中国开源人工智能模型DeepSeek-R1发布后——这场所谓的“斯普特尼克时刻”令美国政策制定者和产业界陷入恐慌。当前叙事总将两国描绘成正在竞相追逐通用人工智能，但我们几乎没有任何证据表明通用人工智能是中国的国家优先事项。因此，推动这种特定叙事最大的风险之一，就是使其成为自我实现的预言——构造出一个原本并不存在的故事框架，却未曾退后一步思考：是谁在塑造这种叙事？产业界参与者为了达成自身企业目标，又在多大程度上主导了这种叙事？
From the U.S. side, there's this idea: “If we don't move as fast as possible, China is going to beat us.” There's going to be a huge attempt to cut down and cut back on regulation, from creating sufficient safety uations and benchmarks on frontier AI models and making sure that labs are held accountable to the frontier safety policies they're putting out — instead of emboldening them to be like, “Well, go and speed ahead and accelerate, it doesn't matter if you are stepping across a line that might make a model a potential biohazard or present potential bio risks, because that might be directly contradictory to trying to beat China.”
美方抱持这样一种观念：“若不尽快行动，中国必将超越我们。”这种观念将引发大规模削减和弱化监管的企图——例如放弃建立充分的前沿人工智能模型安全评估与基准测试，也不再确保实验室对其安全政策负责。相反，它们会被纵容产生这样的心态：“尽管全速前进、加速突破，即便跨越可能使模型成为潜在生物危害或带来生物风险的界限也无妨，因为那样做可能会妨碍击败中国。”
The same can be said for things like intellectual property. Right now in the U.S., there's a huge ideological debate on, to what extent can we feed these models the intellectual property of artists and writers? And there could be a rolling back of regulation in response to claims that China, for example, has really limited intellectual property rights, and they're just feeding their models everything. And so I think the biggest risk is this rolling back of regulation and accelerating ahead without safety parameters in the name of trying to beat the other.
知识产权领域同样如此。当前美国正进行一场重大的意识形态辩论：我们能在多大程度上将艺术家和作家的知识产权投喂给这些模型？而为了回应所谓“中国知识产权保护极为有限，他们正将一切数据投喂给模型”的论调，监管措施可能出现倒退。因此我认为最大的风险在于：以超越对方为名，在缺乏安全参数的情况下弱化监管、贸然加速。
Q: Is there an alternative to the arms race? What would a more collaborative approach look like?
问：军备竞赛是否存在替代方案？更具协作性的路径将呈现何种面貌？
A: One of the smallest things that is happening right now that I think could be done at a much larger scale are track-two dialogues between the two countries. Track-one dialogues are dialogues that take place between government leaders — heads of state, presidents, prime ministers. Track-two dialogues are those that take place between scientists on both sides, civil society organizations on both sides, people who have direct levels of influence in the government on both sides.
答：当前正在推进的诸多事务中，我认为最具潜力大规模拓展的领域之一，是中美之间的“第二轨道对话”。所谓“第一轨道对话”，是指政府领导人——国家元首、总统、总理——之间的正式对话。而“第二轨道对话”则发生在两国科学家、民间社会组织、以及双方政府内部具有直接影响力的各界人士之间。
It’s very important to bring these two parties together to discuss, for example, red lines that won't be crossed or established, like a common set of safety standards for models, to just get these people together and have some sense of dialogue and common ground. And to have a sense of what's going on in each country before jumping to conclusions and using those poorly sketched-out conclusions to drive policy back home.
将这些群体汇聚一堂进行磋商至关重要，例如可以探讨不可逾越的底线或建立共识的准则，比如制定一套通用的模型安全标准。通过促成这类交流，既能建立对话机制与共同认知基础，也能在仓促得出结论前，更准确地把握两国各自的发展态势，避免依据粗浅臆断来制定本国政策。
Q: You write about a wave of “China envy” sweeping policy circles and Silicon Valley. What is making them so jealous?
问：您在文章中提及政策界与硅谷正席卷一股“羡慕中国”浪潮。是什么引发了这种强烈的艳羡情绪？
A: Yeah, this is definitely a dynamic of the past year. I can trace the roots to two explicit events: I would say the first is probably the launch of DeepSeek-R1. Everyone was freaking out about that.
答：确实，这无疑是过去一年来的显著动态。其根源可追溯至两个具体事件：首当其冲的当属DeepSeek-R1的发布，此事当时引发了各界震动。
I'd say the other, funnily enough, was the moment when a lot of TikTok refugees were migrating to RedNote, the Chinese social media app, in the wake of the TikTok ban. I would say that it really started more among policy wonks — the intellectual, chattering-class, abundance folks. I think this also spans both the left and the right, where China was becoming this rhetorical mirror onto which Americans started to project their fears and aspirations.
有趣的是，另一时刻则是TikTok禁令后，大量用户迁往中国社交媒体应用“小红书”之际。我认为这股情绪最初更多是在政策研究者——那些知识阶层、善于议论的“丰饶派”（鼓吹技术带来物质极大丰富的人）人士中兴起。这种现象跨越了左右阵营，中国逐渐成为一面投射之镜，美国人开始将自己的恐惧与渴望投射其上。
I started to notice a bunch of pundits and CEOs and Silicon Valley tech people all going to China for these two-week trips to chronicle their observations of Chinese technology. And it was almost always through the lens of American stagnation. There was always this, “Oh my gosh, China can build humanoids! China can build bridges!” There's this obsession with China's ability to build high-speed rail, despite the fact that Chinese people have been building high-speed rail for like a decade now. I think this kind of obsession with China's ability to build things and build infrastructure in the physical world is at the root of a lot of this envy, and a lot of it is rooted in a U.S. realization and awareness of their own inability to build infrastructure in the physical world.
我开始注意到一批专家、首席执行官和硅谷科技人士纷纷前往中国，进行为期两周的考察，记录他们对中国科技的观察。而他们的视角几乎总是带着“美国停滞”的滤镜。总有人惊叹：“天啊，中国能造人形机器人！中国能建桥梁！”尽管中国建设高铁已有十年之久，外界仍执着于中国建设高铁的能力。我认为这种对中国实体世界建造能力和基础设施建设的痴迷，正是诸多艳羡情绪的根源，其中很大程度上源于美国对自身在实体世界基建能力不足的认知与觉醒。
I think it also is driven by this awareness of the erosion of the U.S.’ own political system. I think that's driving a lot of more of the China envy on the popular front, within the mainstream consciousness, where you see people like the influencer IShowSpeed, or Hasan Piker going to China and doing these little YouTube videos, talking about how good China is at building drones and buildings. It's much less about China itself. If I were to talk to people in China about how much their world has transformed in the past year? Not that radically. It's not like it suddenly became shinier and bigger and better. It's more what has shifted in Americans’ perspective of China.
我认为，这也源于对美国自身政治体系衰败的认知。这种认知在很大程度上推动了大众层面、主流意识中对“羡慕中国”的蔓延。你可以看到像网红Speed或哈桑-派克这样的人前往中国，制作那些简短的YouTube视频，谈论中国在建造无人机和高楼大厦方面多么出色。这其实并不完全关乎中国本身。如果我去问问中国人，他们过去一年的世界发生了多大变化？并没有那么翻天覆地。一切并不是突然之间就变得更光鲜、更宏大、更美好。更多的，是美国人对中国的看法发生了转变。
There’s a long history of Silicon Valley tech CEOs having China envy. Back in 2019, when WeChat was becoming huge — I mean, it's always been this huge platform, but I remember Mark Zuckerberg being described as having “WeChat envy” because he wanted to build Facebook into the monolith that WeChat was, where it was not just a messaging platform, but had its tentacles in every facet of public life. I think Elon Musk definitely has some level of China envy, where he wants to be able to move fast and break things and build things, and there definitely is this sense of envy in Silicon Valley with the speed with which China moves.
硅谷科技公司CEO们对中国产生羡慕情绪由来已久。早在2019年，当微信变得无比庞大时——我的意思是，它一直是个巨大的平台，但我记得马克-扎克伯格曾被描述为患有“微信羡慕症”，因为他想把Facebook打造成微信那样的巨无霸，不仅是一个通讯平台，更要将触角伸入公共生活的方方面面。我认为埃隆-马斯克肯定在某种程度上羡慕中国，他希望能快速行动、打破常规、建设事物，硅谷确实对中国的发展速度怀有这种羡慕之情。
Q: As the U.S. pulls back from the world stage and allies seek “digital sovereignty,” how might that reshape other countries’ relationship with China?
问：随着美国从世界舞台收缩，而其盟友寻求“数字主权”，这可能会如何重塑其他国家与中国的关系？
A: That’s something I'm going to be watching closely. For a long time among a lot of U.S. allies, there's a sense that [the U.S.] is a reliable player that we can count on, this is a digital ecosystem that we can be part of. Even if there were rules around AI governance, for example, these are rules that we can co-create and assume that the United States will also participate in. And that's essentially thrown out of the window.
答：这正是我将密切关注的问题。长期以来，许多美国盟友都有一种感觉，即美国是一个我们可以信赖的可靠参与者，这是一个我们可以参与的数字生态系统。例如，即使存在人工智能治理相关的规则，这些也是我们可以共同制定，并默认美国也会参与的规则。而现在，这种认知基本上已被抛之窗外。
I think the question that a lot of other countries now face is, “In this increasingly or already multipolar world, how are we going to navigate these two gigantic superpowers? Where are we going to fit in? How much more dependent will we have to be on China when this relationship with the U.S. is no longer sustainable?”
我认为，如今许多其他国家面临的问题是：“在这个日益多极化或已经多极化的世界里，我们将如何在这两个巨大的超级大国之间周旋？我们将置身何处？当与美国的关系不再可持续时，我们将在多大程度上不得不更加依赖中国？”
I think this is going to mean much greater dependency on China from other countries with regards to hardware. Europe is going to have to think very deeply about its car market and EVs, and what that relationship is going to look like with China. The Middle East — I think everywhere is going to have to think about to what extent they're going to rely on digital infrastructure from China, humanoids from China. So much advanced technology is going to be coming out of China that navigating that dependency is going to be a crucial question for many countries in the years to come.
我认为，这将意味着其他国家在硬件方面将更加依赖中国。欧洲将不得不深入思考其汽车市场和电动汽车，以及与中国的关系将如何发展。我认为中东地区——以至于世界各地都必须思考，他们将在多大程度上依赖来自中国的数字基础设施、来自中国的人形机器人。如此多的先进技术将来自中国，如何应对这种依赖性，将成为未来许多国家面临的关键问题。
When it comes to AI governance as well, other countries are going to have to rely on China to be a more reliable player and stakeholder in drafting up these agreements, defining standards, etc., in a way that the U.S. used to play a much more central role.
在人工智能治理方面，其他国家也将不得不依赖中国成为更可靠的参与者和利益相关方，在起草协议、制定标准等方面发挥关键作用，就像美国曾经扮演的核心角色那样。
Q: The “dance” in your book refers in part to the push and pull on the Chinese internet between government crackdowns and censorship and public freedom of expression and connection. How has that dance impacted your view of how countries like the U.S. approach internet freedoms? Is America doing a “dance” of its own?
问：您书中提到的“共舞”部分指的是中国互联网上政府管控与公众表达自由之间的拉锯关系。这种“共舞”如何影响您对美国等国家处理互联网自由问题的看法？美国是否也在进行自己的“共舞”？
A: Absolutely. And this is something that I didn't expect as I started writing this book. One of the examples that I can just think off the top of my head is this recent TikTok sale. For a long time, we were thinking about TikTok as a dance between the Chinese state and Chinese tech companies and the Chinese people — or later on, the Chinese state, Chinese tech companies and the rest of the world, the American people. To what extent can Bytedance — given its control of the algorithm — or the Chinese state — given its relationship to Bytedance — shape what's appearing on our feeds? And to what extent can users not be used by that, or adapt to that or find creative ways around Chinese censorship domestically as well?
答：确实如此。这其实是我开始写这本书时未曾预料到的。我立刻想到的一个例子是最近的TikTok出售事件。长期以来，我们一直将TikTok视为中国政府、中国科技公司与中国民众之间的共舞——后来演变为中国政府、中国科技公司与世界其他地区、美国民众之间的共舞。考虑到字节跳动对算法的控制力，或是中国政府与字节跳动的关系，它们能在多大程度上塑造我们信息流中的内容？用户又能在多大程度上不被其利用，或是适应这种局面，甚至在中国国内审查中找到创造性的应对方式？
People were asking me about the implications of this TikTok sale. Sure, the owner has changed. The majority stake is going to be held by a set of American investors. But the question now is to what extent does Oracle have control over the content moderation of this platform and what appears on these feeds? To what extent does Oracle's relationship with the Trump administration shape what's taking place on these feeds? And then in response to that, how much power do users have to bypass that influence, or be shaped by or shape that influence? And so, what we once saw as a dance that was unique between the Chinese government, Chinese tech companies and the Chinese people, I feel like is now very much playing out on U.S. turf.
人们曾向我询问此次TikTok出售事件的影响。诚然，所有者已经变更。多数股权将由一批美国投资者持有。但现在的关键是，甲骨文公司在多大程度上能控制该平台的内容审核及信息流呈现？甲骨文公司与特朗普政府的关系又在多大程度上影响着信息流的内容？而作为回应，用户又具备多大能力来规避这种影响，或被其塑造，甚至反过来塑造这种影响？因此，我们曾视为中国政府、中国科技公司与中国民众之间特有的“共舞”，如今似乎正淋漓尽致地在美国本土上演。
I think the other thing we're seeing that I didn't realize was just the relationship between Silicon Valley's tech leaders and the Trump administration. Back when I was reporting in China, it was obvious to me that there was this relationship of patronage and interdependency between the Chinese government and Chinese tech companies. Chinese tech companies provided innovation, but they needed the government stamp of approval to get policies across, or bypass regulations or to operate in the way they wanted to operate. And I was really struck to see last year, after the inauguration, essentially all of Silicon Valley's big tech CEOs showing up to kowtow to the new leader and align their rhetoric and the direction of their policies such that it kind of follows — you know, dances with, so to speak — the tune of the current administration.
我认为我们看到的另一件出乎意料之事，是硅谷科技领袖与特朗普政府之间的关系。当初我在中国进行报道时，中国政府与中国科技公司之间那种庇护与相互依存的关系对我来说显而易见。中国科技公司提供创新，但它们需要政府的认可来推动政策、规避监管或以它们希望的方式运营。而去年就职典礼后，我震惊地看到，硅谷几乎所有大型科技公司的首席执行官都前去向美国新领导人卑躬屈膝，并调整他们的言论和政策方向，使其在某种程度上跟随——或者说是“共舞”于——当前政府的步调。
Q: What are some of the biggest misconceptions you encounter about China, the internet and technology, particularly in American politics?
问：在美国政治语境中，关于中国、互联网和科技方面，你遇到的最大误解有哪些？
A: China is always addressed as a monolith. For some reason, there is this feeling that everyone is the same. This has historically been the case and continues to be the case, that it serves as this kind of two-dimensional projection onto which people in the U.S. project their fears and desires. I think the other assumption that's tied to that is, the Chinese state is a monolith — and therefore, in relation to that, you can only be a patriot or a dissident, you can only be an apologist or an opponent of the state. A Chinese person can only have one of two identities, when, obviously, it is possible to hold a whole, wide spectrum of identities and relationships in relation to the state.
答：中国总是被当作一个铁板一块的整体来讨论。出于某种原因，人们总感觉那里每个人都一模一样。这种观念历来存在且延续至今——中国仿佛成了一个二维投影，美国人将自己的恐惧与欲望投射其上。我认为与此相关的另一种假设是：中国政府也是一个铁板一块的整体——因此，与之相对应地，你只能成为爱国者或异见者，只能做体制的辩护者或反对者。中国人似乎只能拥有两种身份之一，但显而易见的是，个人完全可能在与国家的关系中持有广泛而多元的身份认同。
Those are the two main [misconceptions], and also that it's possible for a place to hold two seemingly contradictory identities at once. It is possible that China is a technological powerhouse and building some of the most advanced technologies in the world, but also economically stagnant, and its people are struggling with employment. They are feeling really down about future prospects. It's suffering from demographic decline.
以上是两种主要的误解，此外还有一种误解是：人们不相信某个地方能够同时容纳两种看似矛盾的身份。事实上，中国完全可能既是科技强国、正在打造某些世界顶尖技术，又同时面临经济停滞、民众就业困难的问题。人们对未来前景感到极度悲观，国家也正遭受人口衰退的困扰。
For some reason, in the American public imagination, it's only possible for China to be this superpower economic juggernaut or this stunning oppressive regime where people have no agency. It’s very important for us to be able to hold the multitude of different identities that this one country can be and people can be.
出于某种原因，在美国公众的想象中，中国似乎只能是两种形象：要么是经济腾飞的超级大国，要么是人民毫无自主权的惊人 ya迫性郑泉。但我们必须认识到，这个国家及其人民能够承载多重不同的身份认同，这一点至关重要。
评论翻译
@KENT
The author is just coping with China's rise. China IS the industrial superpower in the world already. The rise is real and the American public is rightfully to worry that China's cohesiveness, long-term planning and steadfast methodical progress is superior to the US and will win at the end. Losing to China is inevitable.
作者不过是在自我安慰，无法面对中国崛起的事实。中国现在已经是世界工业超级大国了。这种崛起是实实在在的，美国民众有理由担心，中国的凝聚力、长远规划和有条不紊的坚定推进方式确实优于美国，并终将胜出。输给中国是不可避免的。
@StevenH
US strategy has been blocking China's progress from every direction as dirty as it gets. Building a smaller yard with a high wall. Well it is stupid from the beginning with. Simply has isolated itself without realization. Chinese is the most capable race in this planet at least one of them. That is why it is the only continuous civilization for 5000 thousands in the human history.
美国的策略就是无所不用其极地从各个方向阻挠中国发展，手段极其卑劣。搞什么“小院高墙”，这从一开始就是蠢招。结果自己不知不觉就被孤立了。中国人是这个星球上最有能力的族群之一，这也是为什么中华文明能成为人类历史上唯一延续五千年的文明。
@Paul
Correct. China is already #1, we've just missed it .
没错。中国已经是第一了，只是我们之前没注意到罢了。
@liudachris
American AI companies hyping up China AI threat to force deregulation and seeing China as a monolith when actually it’s a huge country with multiple interest groups just like the US.
美国AI公司大肆炒作中国AI威胁，试图以此迫使政府放松监管，还把中国看作铁板一块。但实际上中国和美国一样，也是个幅员辽阔、利益集团众多的国家。
@John
The fact we have this type of article is showing the pace of Chinese innovations. Chna have the heft, finance,, market, manufacturing, and talent to battle the US in tech innovations. The US is 1o years ahead in chips, but is not the 50 years lead in 2000.
这类文章的出现本身就说明了中国创新的速度。中国拥有与美国在科技创新领域竞争的体量、资金、市场、制造能力和人才。美国在芯片领域领先十年，但已不像2000年时期那样领先五十年了。
@serfnterf
China is a demographic decline. Who is going to build the robots when their population is cut in half in the next few decades? No one is immigrating there and the population is getting older by the day.
中国正处于人口衰退之中。未来几十年人口减半后，谁来造机器人？那里没人移民过去，人口还一天比一天老龄化。
@liudachris
The robots will build the robots. Same thing Elon said to the point that the U.S. doesnt have ppl who want to be in manufacturing
机器人会制造机器人。马斯克说的也是这个意思，直指美国现在没人愿意从事制造业了。
@Keystone
But then you have nothing to worry about... but then the West is 5-alarms over China. Your words don't reflect what you truly believe.
但真要那样你就没什么可担心的了……可西方却对中国的动向高度警惕（原意：拉响五级警报）。你的言辞并未反映你真实的信念。
@Homie
China can win AI race, long as they can buy Nvidia chips
中国能赢下AI竞赛，只要他们能买到英伟达芯片。
@Kevin
There is only one planet in our solar system capable of growing food and China is wrong part of earth for producing it...unless they attack Russia.
太阳系里只有一颗行星能种粮食，而中国却偏偏位于地球上不太适合粮食生产的区域……除非他们去打俄罗斯的主意。
@Paul
Why are you always supporting war? China has the most border neighbors of any country on earth and does well to stay out of wars.
你为什么总是支持战争？中国是世界上邻国最多的国家，却能很好地避免卷入战争。
The author is just coping with China's rise. China IS the industrial superpower in the world already. The rise is real and the American public is rightfully to worry that China's cohesiveness, long-term planning and steadfast methodical progress is superior to the US and will win at the end. Losing to China is inevitable.
作者不过是在自我安慰，无法面对中国崛起的事实。中国现在已经是世界工业超级大国了。这种崛起是实实在在的，美国民众有理由担心，中国的凝聚力、长远规划和有条不紊的坚定推进方式确实优于美国，并终将胜出。输给中国是不可避免的。
@StevenH
US strategy has been blocking China's progress from every direction as dirty as it gets. Building a smaller yard with a high wall. Well it is stupid from the beginning with. Simply has isolated itself without realization. Chinese is the most capable race in this planet at least one of them. That is why it is the only continuous civilization for 5000 thousands in the human history.
美国的策略就是无所不用其极地从各个方向阻挠中国发展，手段极其卑劣。搞什么“小院高墙”，这从一开始就是蠢招。结果自己不知不觉就被孤立了。中国人是这个星球上最有能力的族群之一，这也是为什么中华文明能成为人类历史上唯一延续五千年的文明。
@Paul
Correct. China is already #1, we've just missed it .
没错。中国已经是第一了，只是我们之前没注意到罢了。
@liudachris
American AI companies hyping up China AI threat to force deregulation and seeing China as a monolith when actually it’s a huge country with multiple interest groups just like the US.
美国AI公司大肆炒作中国AI威胁，试图以此迫使政府放松监管，还把中国看作铁板一块。但实际上中国和美国一样，也是个幅员辽阔、利益集团众多的国家。
@John
The fact we have this type of article is showing the pace of Chinese innovations. Chna have the heft, finance,, market, manufacturing, and talent to battle the US in tech innovations. The US is 1o years ahead in chips, but is not the 50 years lead in 2000.
这类文章的出现本身就说明了中国创新的速度。中国拥有与美国在科技创新领域竞争的体量、资金、市场、制造能力和人才。美国在芯片领域领先十年，但已不像2000年时期那样领先五十年了。
@serfnterf
China is a demographic decline. Who is going to build the robots when their population is cut in half in the next few decades? No one is immigrating there and the population is getting older by the day.
中国正处于人口衰退之中。未来几十年人口减半后，谁来造机器人？那里没人移民过去，人口还一天比一天老龄化。
@liudachris
The robots will build the robots. Same thing Elon said to the point that the U.S. doesnt have ppl who want to be in manufacturing
机器人会制造机器人。马斯克说的也是这个意思，直指美国现在没人愿意从事制造业了。
@Keystone
But then you have nothing to worry about... but then the West is 5-alarms over China. Your words don't reflect what you truly believe.
但真要那样你就没什么可担心的了……可西方却对中国的动向高度警惕（原意：拉响五级警报）。你的言辞并未反映你真实的信念。
@Homie
China can win AI race, long as they can buy Nvidia chips
中国能赢下AI竞赛，只要他们能买到英伟达芯片。
@Kevin
There is only one planet in our solar system capable of growing food and China is wrong part of earth for producing it...unless they attack Russia.
太阳系里只有一颗行星能种粮食，而中国却偏偏位于地球上不太适合粮食生产的区域……除非他们去打俄罗斯的主意。
@Paul
Why are you always supporting war? China has the most border neighbors of any country on earth and does well to stay out of wars.
你为什么总是支持战争？中国是世界上邻国最多的国家，却能很好地避免卷入战争。
