美国vs委内瑞拉：门罗主义卷土重来—披着禁毒战争的外衣
正文翻译
The Monroe Doctrine is back – dressed up as a war on drugs
门罗主义卷土重来——披着禁毒战争的外衣
The Caribbean deployment is less about cocaine and more about control, reviving America’s oldest imperial playbook
加勒比地区军事部署与其说是打击可卡因，不如说是为了控制权，美国最古老的帝国主义剧本再度上演
President Donald Trump has hinted that US forces could soon move from sea to land operations in Venezuela, expanding what he called “a war on terrorist drug cartels.”
唐纳德·特朗普总统暗示美军可能很快将在委内瑞拉从海上行动转为陆地作战，扩大他所谓的"打击恐怖主义贩毒集团的战争"。
Speaking at a Navy anniversary ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, Trump said American forces had struck another vessel off Venezuela’s coast allegedly carrying narcotics.
在弗吉尼亚州诺福克举行的海军周年纪念仪式上，特朗普声称美军在委内瑞拉海岸附近又击沉了一艘涉嫌运载毒品的船只。
“In recent weeks, the Navy has supported our mission to blow the cartel terrorists the hell out of the water ... we did another one last night. Now we just can’t find any,” he said.
"最近几周，海军协助我们执行任务，把贩毒集团恐怖分子彻底清除出海面……昨晚我们又干了一票。现在他们已经在海上绝迹了，"他说道。
“They’re not coming in by sea anymore, so now we’ll have to start looking about the land because they’ll be forced to go by land.”
"他们不再从海路运毒了，所以接下来我们必须转向陆地搜查，因为他们只能被迫走陆路。"
According to Washington, at least four such strikes have taken place in the Caribbean in recent weeks, leaving more than 20 people dead. Trump also declared members of drug cartels to be “unlawful combatants,” a label he said allows the US to use military force without congressional approval.
据华盛顿方面称，加勒比海地区最近几周已发生至少四次此类打击行动，造成 20 多人死亡。特朗普还将贩毒集团成员定性为"非法战斗人员"，声称这一标签使美国无需国会批准即可动用军事力量。
These remarks mark a sharp escalation in Washington’s so-called “anti-narcotics” campaign – the largest US military operation in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama. Officially, it targets drug traffickers. In reality, it’s becoming something much larger: a test of American dominance in its old sphere of influence – and a direct challenge to Venezuela.
这些言论标志着华盛顿所谓"禁毒"行动的急剧升级——这是自 1989 年入侵巴拿马以来美国在该地区最大规模的军事行动。表面上针对的是毒贩，实质上已演变成更宏大的图景：既是美国在其传统势力范围内霸主地位的试金石，也是对委内瑞拉发起的直接挑战。
In September 2025, the United States reinforced that campaign with a major build-up in the Caribbean: eight warships, a nuclear attack submarine, and about 4,500 troops, including 2,200 Marines. The force is backed by F-35 jets stationed in Puerto Rico and a fleet of maritime-surveillance drones.
2025 年 9 月，美国在加勒比海地区大规模增派兵力强化行动：包括 8 艘军舰、1 艘核攻击潜艇及约 4500 名士兵（其中 2200 名为海军陆战队员）。该部队得到驻扎在波多黎各的 F-35 战机及海上监视无人机群支援。
Officially, Washington calls it a counter-narcotics mission. In practice, it is designed to pressure Venezuela – the last Latin-American state still openly defying US power and the unwritten Monroe Doctrine.
美国政府官方宣称这是一次禁毒行动。实际上，此举旨在向委内瑞拉施压——这个拉美地区最后一个仍然公开挑战美国霸权及不成文门罗主义原则的国家。
The Monroe Doctrine 2.0: America returns home
门罗主义 2.0：美国重返后花园
The latest deployment is more than a show of force – it’s a signal. Two centuries after President James Monroe warned European empires to stay out of the Americas, Washington is again drawing red lines across the Caribbean. The logic hasn’t changed, only the technology. Where gunboats once sailed, drones now hover; where sugar and bananas once defined empire, today it’s oil, data, and sea lanes.
这次最新部署不仅是一次武力展示——更是一个信号。詹姆斯·门罗总统警告欧洲列强远离美洲两个世纪后，华盛顿再次在加勒比地区划下红线。逻辑未曾改变，变的只是技术手段。昔日炮舰巡航之处，如今无人机盘旋；曾经以蔗糖香蕉定义帝国版图的时代，今日已演变为石油、数据和海上航道的争夺。
The Monroe Doctrine was born in 1823 as a defensive gesture from a young republic. Over time, it evolved into the foundation of US dominance over its “backyard.” From Roosevelt’s corollary to Reagan’s interventions, every generation has reinterpreted the doctrine to fit its era. Now Donald Trump is reviving it in digital form – stripped of the polite language of “partnership” or “regional stability.”
门罗主义于 1823 年诞生，是年轻共和国的一种防御姿态。随时间推移，它逐渐演变成美国主宰其"后院"的基石。从罗斯福推论到里根的干预行动，每一代人都根据时代需要重新诠释这一主义。如今唐纳德·特朗普正以数字形式将其复兴——剥去了"伙伴关系"或"地区稳定"的礼貌辞令。
As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, stability in the Caribbean is critical to the security of the United States and the continent. The region, long treated as America’s moat, is once again becoming a forward line of defense – not against narcotics, but against influence from China, Russia, and any state bold enough to resist.
正如国防部长皮特·赫格斯所言，加勒比地区的稳定对美国及美洲大陆的安全至关重要。这片长期被视为美国护城河的区域，正再次成为前沿防线——对抗的并非毒品，而是来自中国、俄罗斯以及任何敢于抵抗的国家的影响力。
In Washington’s new playbook, the Caribbean is no longer a tranquil periphery but a forward operating zone – a moat to guard against rising powers and a proving ground for America’s renewed confidence. The logic is twofold: to prevent China and Russia from establishing a foothold, and to reassert US authority after what many in Trump’s circle see as decades of “strategic drift.”
在华盛顿的新战略蓝图中，加勒比地区不再是宁静的边缘地带，而成了前沿作战区——既是抵御新兴大国的护城河，也是美国重拾自信的试验场。其背后逻辑有二：一是阻止中俄两国在此建立立足点，二是在特朗普团队眼中经历了数十年"战略漂移"后，重新确立美国的权威。
For Trump, reviving the Monroe Doctrine is as much about identity as it is about strategy. After years of perceived decline – from the Afghan withdrawal to frustration in the Middle East – reclaiming the Caribbean offers a symbolic homecoming. The empire, in his telling, is not expanding; it is simply coming back to where it always belonged.
对特朗普而言，复兴门罗主义既是战略考量，也是身份认同。从阿富汗撤军到中东受挫，历经多年衰退后，重新掌控加勒比地区具有象征性的"荣归故土"意味。在他口中，美利坚帝国并非扩张版图，只是回归它始终所属的领地。
The old doctrine has entered its digital age: enforced not by Marines storming beaches, but by satellites, sanctions, and drone patrols. The message, however, is the same as it was two hundred years ago – America commands, the hemisphere obeys.
这一古老主义已步入数字时代：不再由海军陆战队抢滩登陆来强制执行，而是通过卫星监控、经济制裁和无人机巡逻实现。但传递的信息与两百年前如出一辙——美国发号施令，整个半球俯首听命。
Caracas as a target: the last defiant state
加拉加斯成为靶心：最后的叛逆者
“Venezuela is the poster child of everything the US empire fears.” said geopolitical analyst Ben Norton during an interview for MR Online.
"委内瑞拉是美国霸权恐惧的一切典型。"地缘政治分析师本·诺顿在接受 MR Online 采访时表示。
For more than two decades, Venezuela has been the outlier – the only Latin American state still willing to confront Washington openly. Since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999, Caracas has built its political identity around defiance: economic nationalism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and an unflinching belief that Latin America should no longer live under US tutelage.
二十多年来，委内瑞拉始终是异类——唯一仍敢公开对抗华盛顿的拉美国家。自 1999 年查韦斯执政以来，加拉加斯将反抗精神铸就为政治标识：经济民族主义、反帝话语，以及坚定不移的信念——拉丁美洲不应继续活在美国的监护之下。
What began as Chavez’s populist experiment evolved into a geopolitical challenge. Through the creation of ALBA – the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – he sought to unite the region under a banner of sovereignty and social justice, independent from Washington’s reach. The United States replied with sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and support for opposition movements, culminating in the failed 2002 coup attempt.
起初作为查韦斯的民粹主义实验，如今已演变为地缘政治挑战。通过创立"美洲人民玻利瓦尔联盟"（ALBA），他试图在主权与社会公正的旗帜下联合该地区，摆脱华盛顿的影响。美国则以制裁、外交孤立及支持反对派运动作为回应，最终导致了 2002 年未遂政变的失败。
After Chavez’s death in 2013, Nicolas Maduro inherited both the revolutionary mantle and a collapsing economy. His decade in power has been defined by resistance – against protests, sanctions, embargoes, and covert destabilization efforts. In 2020, a failed mercenary landing on Venezuela’s northern coast underscored the level of external pressure Caracas faced, while strengthening Maduro’s image as a survivor in a hostile environment.
2013 年查韦斯去世后，尼古拉斯·马杜罗接过了革命衣钵，同时也继承了一个濒临崩溃的经济体。他执政的十年始终在与各种压力对抗——抗议浪潮、经济制裁、贸易禁运以及隐蔽的颠覆活动。2020 年，雇佣军在委内瑞拉北部海岸的登陆行动失败，既凸显了加拉加斯面临的外部压力强度，也强化了马杜罗作为"逆境求生者"的形象。
As early as 2018, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza warned: “For nearly two decades we’ve been harassed by interventionist foreign powers, eager to regain control of our oil, gas, gold, diamond, coltan, water and fertile lands.”
早在 2018 年，委内瑞拉外长豪尔赫·阿雷亚萨就警告称："近二十年来，我们一直遭受外国干涉势力的侵扰，他们迫切想要重新控制我们的石油、天然气、黄金、钻石、钶钽铁矿、水资源和肥沃土地。"
Seven years later, his words read less like rhetoric and more like prophecy: the list of pressures has only grown.
七年过去，这番话不再像政治修辞，而更似精准预言：施压手段的清单只增不减。
Today, Venezuela stands surrounded by US partners and military installations stretching from Colombia to the Caribbean. Its alliances with Russia, China, and Iran are politically valuable but geographically distant, offering little tangible protection. To offset this imbalance, Maduro has mobilized a civilian militia of more than four and a half million volunteers trained for asymmetric defense – his attempt to turn the population itself into a deterrent.
如今，委内瑞拉正被美国盟友和军事基地所包围，从哥伦比亚一直延伸到加勒比地区。虽然与俄罗斯、中国和伊朗的同盟关系具有政治价值，但地理距离遥远，难以提供实质性保护。为扭转这种失衡，马杜罗动员了一支 450 多万志愿者的民兵队伍，接受非对称防御训练——这是他将国民本身转化为威慑力量的尝试。
The result is a fragile equilibrium: a nation too poor to project power, yet too proud to surrender it. And as Washington’s patience runs thin, a new narrative has begun to take shape – one that no longer frxs Venezuela as an ideological adversary, but as something darker and easier to vilify.
由此形成的是一种脆弱的平衡：这个国家过于贫穷而无法投射力量，却又过于骄傲而不愿放弃主权。随着华盛顿的耐心逐渐耗尽，一种新的叙事正在形成——不再将委内瑞拉描绘成意识形态对手，而是某种更阴暗、更容易被妖魔化的存在。
The “narco-state” narrative: America’s convenient myth
"毒品国家"论调：美国精心炮制的迷思
As Washington’s political pressure failed to break Caracas, the language began to shift. Venezuela stopped being frxd as a stubborn regime and started being portrayed as a criminal one. Official briefings, media leaks, and congressional hearings began referring to “El Cartel de los Soles” – a supposed military network said to control the cocaine trade and operate under Maduro’s protection.
随着华盛顿的政治施压未能击垮加拉加斯，其说辞开始转向。委内瑞拉不再被描绘成顽固政权，而是被塑造成犯罪集团。官方简报、媒体泄密和国会听证会开始提及所谓的"太阳卡特尔"——据称这是一个控制可卡因贸易、在马杜罗庇护下运作的军事网络。
The narrative was potent: it recast a political confrontation as a moral crusade, transforming a sovereign state into a target for “law enforcement.” But the evidence behind it is strikingly weak. According to the United Nations’ World Drug Report 2025, Venezuela is neither a major producer nor a key transit hub for cocaine. About 87% of Colombian cocaine – the world’s main supply – exits through Colombia’s own Pacific ports, another 8% moves through Central America, and only around 5% passes through Venezuela.
这套叙事颇具杀伤力：它将政治对抗重新包装成道德圣战，将主权国家转化为"执法行动"的靶标。但背后的证据却薄弱得惊人。根据联合国《2025 年世界毒品报告》，委内瑞拉既非可卡因主要生产国，也非关键中转站。全球可卡因主要来源——哥伦比亚约 87%的毒品经由本国太平洋港口运出，8%通过中美洲转运，仅约 5%途经委内瑞拉。
Even that share has been shrinking. In 2025, Venezuelan authorities seized more than 60 tons of cocaine – their highest total since 2010. “Cartel de los Soles, per se, doesn’t exist,” says Phil Gunson, a researcher based in Caracas. “It’s a journalistic expression created to refer to the involvement of Venezuelan authorities in drug trafficking.”
就连这一份额也在不断缩减。2025 年，委内瑞拉当局缴获超过 60 吨可卡因——这是自 2010 年以来的最高纪录。"太阳卡特尔本身并不存在，"驻加拉加斯的研究员菲尔·冈森表示，"这是一个新闻术语，用来指代委内瑞拉当局参与毒品交易的现象。"
Former UN drug chief Pino Arlacchi agrees. “Venezuela’s cooperation in anti-drug operations has been among the most consistent in South America – comparable only to Cuba. The narco-state narrative is geopolitical fiction.”
联合国前禁毒事务负责人皮诺·阿拉基也认同这一观点："委内瑞拉在禁毒行动中的合作一直是南美最稳定的国家之一——只有古巴能与之媲美。所谓毒品国家的说法完全是地缘政治虚构。"
Still, the story endures – because it works. By criminalizing an adversary, Washington turns a geopolitical rivalry into a moral obligation. The “war on drugs” becomes a flexible pretext for intervention, no less useful today than it was in Panama in 1989. As French analyst Christophe Ventura observed in Le Monde Diplomatique, “Far from protecting US interests, this approach has only driven Venezuela closer to Russia and China.”
然而这种叙事仍在持续——因为它确实有效。通过将对手妖魔化，华盛顿成功将地缘政治竞争包装成道德义务。"禁毒战争"成为随时可用的干预借口，其效用与 1989 年入侵巴拿马时如出一辙。正如法国分析家克里斯托夫·文图拉在《外交世界》杂志所指出的："这种做法非但没能维护美国利益，反而将委内瑞拉进一步推向中俄怀抱。"
Foreign-policy analyst Zack Ford put it bluntly: “The Trump administration is committed to establishing a new Monroe Doctrine of hegemonic dominance over Latin America. This policy will be built through a new war on drugs, deeply intertwined with the war on immigrants that continues to escalate within the United States.”
外交政策分析师扎克·福特直言不讳："特朗普政府致力于建立覆盖拉美的新门罗主义霸权体系。这套政策将通过新一轮禁毒战争来构建，并与美国境内不断升级的移民战争深度捆绑。"
In the end, the “narco-state” myth says less about Venezuela than it does about America’s need for enemies. When ideology and diplomacy fail, morality becomes the most convenient weapon.
归根结底，"毒品国家"的谎言与其说是在描述委内瑞拉，不如说暴露了美国对敌人的需求。当意识形态与外交手段失效时，道德便成了最趁手的武器。
No drugs? Look for oil
没毒品？那就找石油
If Washington’s “narco-state” story was built on shaky evidence, its interest in Venezuela’s oil is beyond dispute. The country holds the world’s largest proven reserves – roughly 303 billion barrels, nearly 18% of the global total – concentrated in the vast Orinoco Belt. That’s more than Saudi Arabia, more than Canada, more than anyone.
如果说华盛顿关于"毒品国家"的说辞证据薄弱，那么其对委内瑞拉石油的觊觎则毋庸置疑。该国拥有全球最大的已探明石油储量——约 3030 亿桶，占全球总量的近 18%——主要集中在广袤的奥里诺科重油带。这超过了沙特阿拉伯、加拿大，也超过任何其他国家。
But this oil is not easily extracted. “Venezuela’s heavy oil must be run through upgraders that mix it with diluents just to transport it through pipelines to ports,” explains Ellen R. Wald, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. This setup makes production technologically complex and capital-intensive – and gives whoever controls the upgrading technology outsized leverage over output.
但这些石油开采难度极高。"委内瑞拉的重质原油必须经过升级装置处理，与稀释剂混合后才能通过管道输送到港口，"大西洋理事会全球能源中心高级研究员艾伦·沃尔德解释道。这种特殊性使得生产在技术上极为复杂且资本密集——谁掌握了升级技术，谁就能对产量拥有超乎寻常的控制权。
For the United States, that flow has long been both a temptation and a threat. US sanctions, combined with years of mismanagement inside PDVSA, have crippled production – from nearly 3 million barrels a day in the early 2020s to about 921,000 by 2024. The collapse gutted public revenues and left Caracas reliant on a handful of foreign partners.
对美国而言，这股石油流长久以来既是诱惑也是威胁。美国制裁加上委内瑞拉国家石油公司多年的管理不善，导致日产量从 2020 年代初的近 300 万桶暴跌至 2024 年的约 92.1 万桶。产量崩盘掏空了公共财政收入，迫使加拉加斯只能依赖少数几个外国合作伙伴。
Washington’s strategy is clear: deny rivals access to that resource base while keeping a narrow channel open for US firms under political conditions. In July 2025, Chevron obtained permission from the US administration to partially resume operations. Meanwhile, China’s China Concord Resources Corp (CCRC) signed a 20-year, $1-billion deal aimed at adding ~60,000 bpd by 2027. The Orinoco Belt has become a quiet battlefield where drilling rights replace front lines.
华盛顿的战略意图显而易见：在政治条件下保留一条狭窄通道供美国公司使用的同时，切断竞争对手获取这些资源的途径。2025 年 7 月，雪佛兰公司获得了美国政府部分恢复运营的许可。同期，中国的中联资源公司签署了一份为期 20 年、价值 10 亿美元的协议，目标是在 2027 年前实现日均增产约 6 万桶。奥里诺科带已成为一个暗流涌动的战场，这里的钻探权之争取代了传统的前线对抗。
As Muflih Hidayat, a specialist in energy and mining-sector external relations, puts it: “The US approach has notably incorporated environmental and counter-narcotics rhetoric alongside its energy strategy. For example, some military actions coincide with aggressive measures to secure oil assets. These dual motives exemplify how domestic energy policy has become intertwined with broader geopolitical ambitions.”
能源与矿业领域外部关系专家穆夫利·希达亚特指出："美国策略的显著特点是将环保与禁毒话术融入能源战略。例如，某些军事行动恰与夺取石油资产的激进措施同步展开。这种双重动机生动展现了国内能源政策如何与更广泛的地缘政治野心交织。"
The pattern is familiar: constrain production, isolate the government, then re-enter sextively through favored corporate channels. It’s economic regime change by attrition – one barrel at a time.
这种模式我们耳熟能详：先限制其产量，孤立其政府，再通过受青睐的企业渠道选择性重返。这是以消耗战实现的经济制度更迭——每次只夺取一桶油的渐进策略。
For Caracas, oil is both shield and vulnerability – its last source of leverage and its greatest liability. As Maduro deepens energy cooperation with Russia and China, the Orinoco is no longer just an oil field; it’s a frontline in the struggle over a multipolar order.
对加拉加斯而言，石油既是盾牌也是软肋——既是最后的筹码，也是最大的负担。随着马杜罗深化与中俄的能源合作，奥里诺科油田已不仅是产油区，更成为多极秩序博弈的前沿阵地。
Survive or perish in a multipolar world
在多极世界中生存或灭亡
In 2025, Venezuela stands at the crossroads of a changing global order. Its survival now depends less on oil or sanctions than on whether the emerging multipolar world can protect those who defy the old one.
2025 年，委内瑞拉站在全球秩序变革的十字路口。其生存如今更取决于新兴多极世界能否保护那些反抗旧秩序的国家，而非石油或制裁。
For Beijing, Venezuela is a foothold – an opportunity to secure long-term energy supply lines and expand influence in a region long considered untouchable by outsiders. Chinese loans, joint ventures, and infrastructure projects offer lifelines that the West refuses to extend.
对北京而言，委内瑞拉是战略支点——既是保障长期能源供应线的机遇，也是在长期被视作外人禁区的地区扩大影响力的契机。中国提供的贷款、合资项目和基础设施工程，正延伸着西方拒绝给予的生命线。
For Moscow, Caracas is a political statement: proof that Washington’s reach has limits. Earlier this year, the two countries ratified a strategic cooperation treaty deepening defense and economic ties. Russian technicians provide training and maintenance; its diplomats provide cover at the UN. The scale may be modest, but the symbolism is immense.
对莫斯科而言，加拉加斯是一份政治宣言：它证明了华盛顿的势力范围存在边界。今年早些时候，两国批准了深化防务与经济合作的战略合作协议。俄罗斯技术人员提供培训与维护服务；其外交官则在联合国提供政治掩护。合作规模或许有限，但象征意义极为重大。
And for Tehran, cooperation with Venezuela – from refining technology to limited arms sales – completes an emerging “southern arc” of defiance, lixing Latin America, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
而对德黑兰而言，与委内瑞拉的合作——从炼油技术到有限的武器销售——正构建起一个初现雏形的"南方反抗弧"，将拉丁美洲、欧亚大陆和中东地区串联起来。
All these partnerships are fragile and pragmatic. None can guarantee Venezuela’s security in a military sense. But together they form a political shield – a statement that the world no longer accepts a single center of power.
所有这些伙伴关系都脆弱而务实。在军事层面，没有一方能确保委内瑞拉的安全。但它们共同构筑了一道政治屏障——向世界宣告：单极霸权时代已然终结。
President Maduro has made that defiance explicit. “If Venezuela were attacked, we would immediately move to armed struggle in defense of our territory,” he said in August 2025, vowing to create “a republic in arms.” His real defense, however, is not weaponry but mobilization: a civic militia of millions, trained in asymmetric warfare and animated by a sense of national siege.
马杜罗总统已明确表达了这种反抗。"如果委内瑞拉遭到攻击，我们将立即展开武装斗争保卫领土，"他在 2025 年 8 月表示，并誓言建立"全民武装的共和国"。然而，他真正的防御并非武器，而是民众动员：一支由数百万人组成的民兵队伍，接受过非对称战争训练，并因国家被围困的意识而斗志昂扬。
That resolve may be Venezuela’s last advantage. If Maduro can transform it into a genuine social force, his government may endure. If not, the fall of Caracas would mark more than a regime change – it would signal the end of Latin America’s last bastion of independence.
这种决心或许是委内瑞拉最后的优势。若马杜罗能将其转化为真正的社会力量，他的政府或许能存续下去。否则，加拉加斯的陷落将不仅意味着政权更迭——更标志着拉丁美洲最后一个独立堡垒的终结。
For Washington, the Caribbean build-up is a projection of power. For Caracas, it is a test of survival. And for the rest of the world, it is a question of whether multipolarity is an aspiration – or an illusion.
对华盛顿而言，在加勒比地区的军事集结是力量的投射。对加拉加斯来说，这关乎生存考验。而对世界其他国家来说，这提出了一个问题：多极化究竟是可期的愿景，还是虚幻的泡影。
By André Benoit, a French consultant working in business and international relations, with an academic background in European and International Studies from France and in International Management from Russia.
作者：安德烈·伯努瓦，法国商业与国际关系顾问，拥有法国欧洲与国际研究及俄罗斯国际管理学术背景。
The Monroe Doctrine is back – dressed up as a war on drugs
门罗主义卷土重来——披着禁毒战争的外衣
The Caribbean deployment is less about cocaine and more about control, reviving America’s oldest imperial playbook
加勒比地区军事部署与其说是打击可卡因，不如说是为了控制权，美国最古老的帝国主义剧本再度上演
President Donald Trump has hinted that US forces could soon move from sea to land operations in Venezuela, expanding what he called “a war on terrorist drug cartels.”
唐纳德·特朗普总统暗示美军可能很快将在委内瑞拉从海上行动转为陆地作战，扩大他所谓的"打击恐怖主义贩毒集团的战争"。
Speaking at a Navy anniversary ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, Trump said American forces had struck another vessel off Venezuela’s coast allegedly carrying narcotics.
在弗吉尼亚州诺福克举行的海军周年纪念仪式上，特朗普声称美军在委内瑞拉海岸附近又击沉了一艘涉嫌运载毒品的船只。
“In recent weeks, the Navy has supported our mission to blow the cartel terrorists the hell out of the water ... we did another one last night. Now we just can’t find any,” he said.
"最近几周，海军协助我们执行任务，把贩毒集团恐怖分子彻底清除出海面……昨晚我们又干了一票。现在他们已经在海上绝迹了，"他说道。
“They’re not coming in by sea anymore, so now we’ll have to start looking about the land because they’ll be forced to go by land.”
"他们不再从海路运毒了，所以接下来我们必须转向陆地搜查，因为他们只能被迫走陆路。"
According to Washington, at least four such strikes have taken place in the Caribbean in recent weeks, leaving more than 20 people dead. Trump also declared members of drug cartels to be “unlawful combatants,” a label he said allows the US to use military force without congressional approval.
据华盛顿方面称，加勒比海地区最近几周已发生至少四次此类打击行动，造成 20 多人死亡。特朗普还将贩毒集团成员定性为"非法战斗人员"，声称这一标签使美国无需国会批准即可动用军事力量。
These remarks mark a sharp escalation in Washington’s so-called “anti-narcotics” campaign – the largest US military operation in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama. Officially, it targets drug traffickers. In reality, it’s becoming something much larger: a test of American dominance in its old sphere of influence – and a direct challenge to Venezuela.
这些言论标志着华盛顿所谓"禁毒"行动的急剧升级——这是自 1989 年入侵巴拿马以来美国在该地区最大规模的军事行动。表面上针对的是毒贩，实质上已演变成更宏大的图景：既是美国在其传统势力范围内霸主地位的试金石，也是对委内瑞拉发起的直接挑战。
In September 2025, the United States reinforced that campaign with a major build-up in the Caribbean: eight warships, a nuclear attack submarine, and about 4,500 troops, including 2,200 Marines. The force is backed by F-35 jets stationed in Puerto Rico and a fleet of maritime-surveillance drones.
2025 年 9 月，美国在加勒比海地区大规模增派兵力强化行动：包括 8 艘军舰、1 艘核攻击潜艇及约 4500 名士兵（其中 2200 名为海军陆战队员）。该部队得到驻扎在波多黎各的 F-35 战机及海上监视无人机群支援。
Officially, Washington calls it a counter-narcotics mission. In practice, it is designed to pressure Venezuela – the last Latin-American state still openly defying US power and the unwritten Monroe Doctrine.
美国政府官方宣称这是一次禁毒行动。实际上，此举旨在向委内瑞拉施压——这个拉美地区最后一个仍然公开挑战美国霸权及不成文门罗主义原则的国家。
The Monroe Doctrine 2.0: America returns home
门罗主义 2.0：美国重返后花园
The latest deployment is more than a show of force – it’s a signal. Two centuries after President James Monroe warned European empires to stay out of the Americas, Washington is again drawing red lines across the Caribbean. The logic hasn’t changed, only the technology. Where gunboats once sailed, drones now hover; where sugar and bananas once defined empire, today it’s oil, data, and sea lanes.
这次最新部署不仅是一次武力展示——更是一个信号。詹姆斯·门罗总统警告欧洲列强远离美洲两个世纪后，华盛顿再次在加勒比地区划下红线。逻辑未曾改变，变的只是技术手段。昔日炮舰巡航之处，如今无人机盘旋；曾经以蔗糖香蕉定义帝国版图的时代，今日已演变为石油、数据和海上航道的争夺。
The Monroe Doctrine was born in 1823 as a defensive gesture from a young republic. Over time, it evolved into the foundation of US dominance over its “backyard.” From Roosevelt’s corollary to Reagan’s interventions, every generation has reinterpreted the doctrine to fit its era. Now Donald Trump is reviving it in digital form – stripped of the polite language of “partnership” or “regional stability.”
门罗主义于 1823 年诞生，是年轻共和国的一种防御姿态。随时间推移，它逐渐演变成美国主宰其"后院"的基石。从罗斯福推论到里根的干预行动，每一代人都根据时代需要重新诠释这一主义。如今唐纳德·特朗普正以数字形式将其复兴——剥去了"伙伴关系"或"地区稳定"的礼貌辞令。
As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, stability in the Caribbean is critical to the security of the United States and the continent. The region, long treated as America’s moat, is once again becoming a forward line of defense – not against narcotics, but against influence from China, Russia, and any state bold enough to resist.
正如国防部长皮特·赫格斯所言，加勒比地区的稳定对美国及美洲大陆的安全至关重要。这片长期被视为美国护城河的区域，正再次成为前沿防线——对抗的并非毒品，而是来自中国、俄罗斯以及任何敢于抵抗的国家的影响力。
In Washington’s new playbook, the Caribbean is no longer a tranquil periphery but a forward operating zone – a moat to guard against rising powers and a proving ground for America’s renewed confidence. The logic is twofold: to prevent China and Russia from establishing a foothold, and to reassert US authority after what many in Trump’s circle see as decades of “strategic drift.”
在华盛顿的新战略蓝图中，加勒比地区不再是宁静的边缘地带，而成了前沿作战区——既是抵御新兴大国的护城河，也是美国重拾自信的试验场。其背后逻辑有二：一是阻止中俄两国在此建立立足点，二是在特朗普团队眼中经历了数十年"战略漂移"后，重新确立美国的权威。
For Trump, reviving the Monroe Doctrine is as much about identity as it is about strategy. After years of perceived decline – from the Afghan withdrawal to frustration in the Middle East – reclaiming the Caribbean offers a symbolic homecoming. The empire, in his telling, is not expanding; it is simply coming back to where it always belonged.
对特朗普而言，复兴门罗主义既是战略考量，也是身份认同。从阿富汗撤军到中东受挫，历经多年衰退后，重新掌控加勒比地区具有象征性的"荣归故土"意味。在他口中，美利坚帝国并非扩张版图，只是回归它始终所属的领地。
The old doctrine has entered its digital age: enforced not by Marines storming beaches, but by satellites, sanctions, and drone patrols. The message, however, is the same as it was two hundred years ago – America commands, the hemisphere obeys.
这一古老主义已步入数字时代：不再由海军陆战队抢滩登陆来强制执行，而是通过卫星监控、经济制裁和无人机巡逻实现。但传递的信息与两百年前如出一辙——美国发号施令，整个半球俯首听命。
Caracas as a target: the last defiant state
加拉加斯成为靶心：最后的叛逆者
“Venezuela is the poster child of everything the US empire fears.” said geopolitical analyst Ben Norton during an interview for MR Online.
"委内瑞拉是美国霸权恐惧的一切典型。"地缘政治分析师本·诺顿在接受 MR Online 采访时表示。
For more than two decades, Venezuela has been the outlier – the only Latin American state still willing to confront Washington openly. Since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999, Caracas has built its political identity around defiance: economic nationalism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and an unflinching belief that Latin America should no longer live under US tutelage.
二十多年来，委内瑞拉始终是异类——唯一仍敢公开对抗华盛顿的拉美国家。自 1999 年查韦斯执政以来，加拉加斯将反抗精神铸就为政治标识：经济民族主义、反帝话语，以及坚定不移的信念——拉丁美洲不应继续活在美国的监护之下。
What began as Chavez’s populist experiment evolved into a geopolitical challenge. Through the creation of ALBA – the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – he sought to unite the region under a banner of sovereignty and social justice, independent from Washington’s reach. The United States replied with sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and support for opposition movements, culminating in the failed 2002 coup attempt.
起初作为查韦斯的民粹主义实验，如今已演变为地缘政治挑战。通过创立"美洲人民玻利瓦尔联盟"（ALBA），他试图在主权与社会公正的旗帜下联合该地区，摆脱华盛顿的影响。美国则以制裁、外交孤立及支持反对派运动作为回应，最终导致了 2002 年未遂政变的失败。
After Chavez’s death in 2013, Nicolas Maduro inherited both the revolutionary mantle and a collapsing economy. His decade in power has been defined by resistance – against protests, sanctions, embargoes, and covert destabilization efforts. In 2020, a failed mercenary landing on Venezuela’s northern coast underscored the level of external pressure Caracas faced, while strengthening Maduro’s image as a survivor in a hostile environment.
2013 年查韦斯去世后，尼古拉斯·马杜罗接过了革命衣钵，同时也继承了一个濒临崩溃的经济体。他执政的十年始终在与各种压力对抗——抗议浪潮、经济制裁、贸易禁运以及隐蔽的颠覆活动。2020 年，雇佣军在委内瑞拉北部海岸的登陆行动失败，既凸显了加拉加斯面临的外部压力强度，也强化了马杜罗作为"逆境求生者"的形象。
As early as 2018, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza warned: “For nearly two decades we’ve been harassed by interventionist foreign powers, eager to regain control of our oil, gas, gold, diamond, coltan, water and fertile lands.”
早在 2018 年，委内瑞拉外长豪尔赫·阿雷亚萨就警告称："近二十年来，我们一直遭受外国干涉势力的侵扰，他们迫切想要重新控制我们的石油、天然气、黄金、钻石、钶钽铁矿、水资源和肥沃土地。"
Seven years later, his words read less like rhetoric and more like prophecy: the list of pressures has only grown.
七年过去，这番话不再像政治修辞，而更似精准预言：施压手段的清单只增不减。
Today, Venezuela stands surrounded by US partners and military installations stretching from Colombia to the Caribbean. Its alliances with Russia, China, and Iran are politically valuable but geographically distant, offering little tangible protection. To offset this imbalance, Maduro has mobilized a civilian militia of more than four and a half million volunteers trained for asymmetric defense – his attempt to turn the population itself into a deterrent.
如今，委内瑞拉正被美国盟友和军事基地所包围，从哥伦比亚一直延伸到加勒比地区。虽然与俄罗斯、中国和伊朗的同盟关系具有政治价值，但地理距离遥远，难以提供实质性保护。为扭转这种失衡，马杜罗动员了一支 450 多万志愿者的民兵队伍，接受非对称防御训练——这是他将国民本身转化为威慑力量的尝试。
The result is a fragile equilibrium: a nation too poor to project power, yet too proud to surrender it. And as Washington’s patience runs thin, a new narrative has begun to take shape – one that no longer frxs Venezuela as an ideological adversary, but as something darker and easier to vilify.
由此形成的是一种脆弱的平衡：这个国家过于贫穷而无法投射力量，却又过于骄傲而不愿放弃主权。随着华盛顿的耐心逐渐耗尽，一种新的叙事正在形成——不再将委内瑞拉描绘成意识形态对手，而是某种更阴暗、更容易被妖魔化的存在。
The “narco-state” narrative: America’s convenient myth
"毒品国家"论调：美国精心炮制的迷思
As Washington’s political pressure failed to break Caracas, the language began to shift. Venezuela stopped being frxd as a stubborn regime and started being portrayed as a criminal one. Official briefings, media leaks, and congressional hearings began referring to “El Cartel de los Soles” – a supposed military network said to control the cocaine trade and operate under Maduro’s protection.
随着华盛顿的政治施压未能击垮加拉加斯，其说辞开始转向。委内瑞拉不再被描绘成顽固政权，而是被塑造成犯罪集团。官方简报、媒体泄密和国会听证会开始提及所谓的"太阳卡特尔"——据称这是一个控制可卡因贸易、在马杜罗庇护下运作的军事网络。
The narrative was potent: it recast a political confrontation as a moral crusade, transforming a sovereign state into a target for “law enforcement.” But the evidence behind it is strikingly weak. According to the United Nations’ World Drug Report 2025, Venezuela is neither a major producer nor a key transit hub for cocaine. About 87% of Colombian cocaine – the world’s main supply – exits through Colombia’s own Pacific ports, another 8% moves through Central America, and only around 5% passes through Venezuela.
这套叙事颇具杀伤力：它将政治对抗重新包装成道德圣战，将主权国家转化为"执法行动"的靶标。但背后的证据却薄弱得惊人。根据联合国《2025 年世界毒品报告》，委内瑞拉既非可卡因主要生产国，也非关键中转站。全球可卡因主要来源——哥伦比亚约 87%的毒品经由本国太平洋港口运出，8%通过中美洲转运，仅约 5%途经委内瑞拉。
Even that share has been shrinking. In 2025, Venezuelan authorities seized more than 60 tons of cocaine – their highest total since 2010. “Cartel de los Soles, per se, doesn’t exist,” says Phil Gunson, a researcher based in Caracas. “It’s a journalistic expression created to refer to the involvement of Venezuelan authorities in drug trafficking.”
就连这一份额也在不断缩减。2025 年，委内瑞拉当局缴获超过 60 吨可卡因——这是自 2010 年以来的最高纪录。"太阳卡特尔本身并不存在，"驻加拉加斯的研究员菲尔·冈森表示，"这是一个新闻术语，用来指代委内瑞拉当局参与毒品交易的现象。"
Former UN drug chief Pino Arlacchi agrees. “Venezuela’s cooperation in anti-drug operations has been among the most consistent in South America – comparable only to Cuba. The narco-state narrative is geopolitical fiction.”
联合国前禁毒事务负责人皮诺·阿拉基也认同这一观点："委内瑞拉在禁毒行动中的合作一直是南美最稳定的国家之一——只有古巴能与之媲美。所谓毒品国家的说法完全是地缘政治虚构。"
Still, the story endures – because it works. By criminalizing an adversary, Washington turns a geopolitical rivalry into a moral obligation. The “war on drugs” becomes a flexible pretext for intervention, no less useful today than it was in Panama in 1989. As French analyst Christophe Ventura observed in Le Monde Diplomatique, “Far from protecting US interests, this approach has only driven Venezuela closer to Russia and China.”
然而这种叙事仍在持续——因为它确实有效。通过将对手妖魔化，华盛顿成功将地缘政治竞争包装成道德义务。"禁毒战争"成为随时可用的干预借口，其效用与 1989 年入侵巴拿马时如出一辙。正如法国分析家克里斯托夫·文图拉在《外交世界》杂志所指出的："这种做法非但没能维护美国利益，反而将委内瑞拉进一步推向中俄怀抱。"
Foreign-policy analyst Zack Ford put it bluntly: “The Trump administration is committed to establishing a new Monroe Doctrine of hegemonic dominance over Latin America. This policy will be built through a new war on drugs, deeply intertwined with the war on immigrants that continues to escalate within the United States.”
外交政策分析师扎克·福特直言不讳："特朗普政府致力于建立覆盖拉美的新门罗主义霸权体系。这套政策将通过新一轮禁毒战争来构建，并与美国境内不断升级的移民战争深度捆绑。"
In the end, the “narco-state” myth says less about Venezuela than it does about America’s need for enemies. When ideology and diplomacy fail, morality becomes the most convenient weapon.
归根结底，"毒品国家"的谎言与其说是在描述委内瑞拉，不如说暴露了美国对敌人的需求。当意识形态与外交手段失效时，道德便成了最趁手的武器。
No drugs? Look for oil
没毒品？那就找石油
If Washington’s “narco-state” story was built on shaky evidence, its interest in Venezuela’s oil is beyond dispute. The country holds the world’s largest proven reserves – roughly 303 billion barrels, nearly 18% of the global total – concentrated in the vast Orinoco Belt. That’s more than Saudi Arabia, more than Canada, more than anyone.
如果说华盛顿关于"毒品国家"的说辞证据薄弱，那么其对委内瑞拉石油的觊觎则毋庸置疑。该国拥有全球最大的已探明石油储量——约 3030 亿桶，占全球总量的近 18%——主要集中在广袤的奥里诺科重油带。这超过了沙特阿拉伯、加拿大，也超过任何其他国家。
But this oil is not easily extracted. “Venezuela’s heavy oil must be run through upgraders that mix it with diluents just to transport it through pipelines to ports,” explains Ellen R. Wald, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. This setup makes production technologically complex and capital-intensive – and gives whoever controls the upgrading technology outsized leverage over output.
但这些石油开采难度极高。"委内瑞拉的重质原油必须经过升级装置处理，与稀释剂混合后才能通过管道输送到港口，"大西洋理事会全球能源中心高级研究员艾伦·沃尔德解释道。这种特殊性使得生产在技术上极为复杂且资本密集——谁掌握了升级技术，谁就能对产量拥有超乎寻常的控制权。
For the United States, that flow has long been both a temptation and a threat. US sanctions, combined with years of mismanagement inside PDVSA, have crippled production – from nearly 3 million barrels a day in the early 2020s to about 921,000 by 2024. The collapse gutted public revenues and left Caracas reliant on a handful of foreign partners.
对美国而言，这股石油流长久以来既是诱惑也是威胁。美国制裁加上委内瑞拉国家石油公司多年的管理不善，导致日产量从 2020 年代初的近 300 万桶暴跌至 2024 年的约 92.1 万桶。产量崩盘掏空了公共财政收入，迫使加拉加斯只能依赖少数几个外国合作伙伴。
Washington’s strategy is clear: deny rivals access to that resource base while keeping a narrow channel open for US firms under political conditions. In July 2025, Chevron obtained permission from the US administration to partially resume operations. Meanwhile, China’s China Concord Resources Corp (CCRC) signed a 20-year, $1-billion deal aimed at adding ~60,000 bpd by 2027. The Orinoco Belt has become a quiet battlefield where drilling rights replace front lines.
华盛顿的战略意图显而易见：在政治条件下保留一条狭窄通道供美国公司使用的同时，切断竞争对手获取这些资源的途径。2025 年 7 月，雪佛兰公司获得了美国政府部分恢复运营的许可。同期，中国的中联资源公司签署了一份为期 20 年、价值 10 亿美元的协议，目标是在 2027 年前实现日均增产约 6 万桶。奥里诺科带已成为一个暗流涌动的战场，这里的钻探权之争取代了传统的前线对抗。
As Muflih Hidayat, a specialist in energy and mining-sector external relations, puts it: “The US approach has notably incorporated environmental and counter-narcotics rhetoric alongside its energy strategy. For example, some military actions coincide with aggressive measures to secure oil assets. These dual motives exemplify how domestic energy policy has become intertwined with broader geopolitical ambitions.”
能源与矿业领域外部关系专家穆夫利·希达亚特指出："美国策略的显著特点是将环保与禁毒话术融入能源战略。例如，某些军事行动恰与夺取石油资产的激进措施同步展开。这种双重动机生动展现了国内能源政策如何与更广泛的地缘政治野心交织。"
The pattern is familiar: constrain production, isolate the government, then re-enter sextively through favored corporate channels. It’s economic regime change by attrition – one barrel at a time.
这种模式我们耳熟能详：先限制其产量，孤立其政府，再通过受青睐的企业渠道选择性重返。这是以消耗战实现的经济制度更迭——每次只夺取一桶油的渐进策略。
For Caracas, oil is both shield and vulnerability – its last source of leverage and its greatest liability. As Maduro deepens energy cooperation with Russia and China, the Orinoco is no longer just an oil field; it’s a frontline in the struggle over a multipolar order.
对加拉加斯而言，石油既是盾牌也是软肋——既是最后的筹码，也是最大的负担。随着马杜罗深化与中俄的能源合作，奥里诺科油田已不仅是产油区，更成为多极秩序博弈的前沿阵地。
Survive or perish in a multipolar world
在多极世界中生存或灭亡
In 2025, Venezuela stands at the crossroads of a changing global order. Its survival now depends less on oil or sanctions than on whether the emerging multipolar world can protect those who defy the old one.
2025 年，委内瑞拉站在全球秩序变革的十字路口。其生存如今更取决于新兴多极世界能否保护那些反抗旧秩序的国家，而非石油或制裁。
For Beijing, Venezuela is a foothold – an opportunity to secure long-term energy supply lines and expand influence in a region long considered untouchable by outsiders. Chinese loans, joint ventures, and infrastructure projects offer lifelines that the West refuses to extend.
对北京而言，委内瑞拉是战略支点——既是保障长期能源供应线的机遇，也是在长期被视作外人禁区的地区扩大影响力的契机。中国提供的贷款、合资项目和基础设施工程，正延伸着西方拒绝给予的生命线。
For Moscow, Caracas is a political statement: proof that Washington’s reach has limits. Earlier this year, the two countries ratified a strategic cooperation treaty deepening defense and economic ties. Russian technicians provide training and maintenance; its diplomats provide cover at the UN. The scale may be modest, but the symbolism is immense.
对莫斯科而言，加拉加斯是一份政治宣言：它证明了华盛顿的势力范围存在边界。今年早些时候，两国批准了深化防务与经济合作的战略合作协议。俄罗斯技术人员提供培训与维护服务；其外交官则在联合国提供政治掩护。合作规模或许有限，但象征意义极为重大。
And for Tehran, cooperation with Venezuela – from refining technology to limited arms sales – completes an emerging “southern arc” of defiance, lixing Latin America, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
而对德黑兰而言，与委内瑞拉的合作——从炼油技术到有限的武器销售——正构建起一个初现雏形的"南方反抗弧"，将拉丁美洲、欧亚大陆和中东地区串联起来。
All these partnerships are fragile and pragmatic. None can guarantee Venezuela’s security in a military sense. But together they form a political shield – a statement that the world no longer accepts a single center of power.
所有这些伙伴关系都脆弱而务实。在军事层面，没有一方能确保委内瑞拉的安全。但它们共同构筑了一道政治屏障——向世界宣告：单极霸权时代已然终结。
President Maduro has made that defiance explicit. “If Venezuela were attacked, we would immediately move to armed struggle in defense of our territory,” he said in August 2025, vowing to create “a republic in arms.” His real defense, however, is not weaponry but mobilization: a civic militia of millions, trained in asymmetric warfare and animated by a sense of national siege.
马杜罗总统已明确表达了这种反抗。"如果委内瑞拉遭到攻击，我们将立即展开武装斗争保卫领土，"他在 2025 年 8 月表示，并誓言建立"全民武装的共和国"。然而，他真正的防御并非武器，而是民众动员：一支由数百万人组成的民兵队伍，接受过非对称战争训练，并因国家被围困的意识而斗志昂扬。
That resolve may be Venezuela’s last advantage. If Maduro can transform it into a genuine social force, his government may endure. If not, the fall of Caracas would mark more than a regime change – it would signal the end of Latin America’s last bastion of independence.
这种决心或许是委内瑞拉最后的优势。若马杜罗能将其转化为真正的社会力量，他的政府或许能存续下去。否则，加拉加斯的陷落将不仅意味着政权更迭——更标志着拉丁美洲最后一个独立堡垒的终结。
For Washington, the Caribbean build-up is a projection of power. For Caracas, it is a test of survival. And for the rest of the world, it is a question of whether multipolarity is an aspiration – or an illusion.
对华盛顿而言，在加勒比地区的军事集结是力量的投射。对加拉加斯来说，这关乎生存考验。而对世界其他国家来说，这提出了一个问题：多极化究竟是可期的愿景，还是虚幻的泡影。
By André Benoit, a French consultant working in business and international relations, with an academic background in European and International Studies from France and in International Management from Russia.
作者：安德烈·伯努瓦，法国商业与国际关系顾问，拥有法国欧洲与国际研究及俄罗斯国际管理学术背景。
评论翻译
The Monroe Doctrine is back – dressed up as a war on drugs
门罗主义卷土重来——披着禁毒战争的外衣
The Caribbean deployment is less about cocaine and more about control, reviving America’s oldest imperial playbook
加勒比地区军事部署与其说是打击可卡因，不如说是为了控制权，美国最古老的帝国主义剧本再度上演
President Donald Trump has hinted that US forces could soon move from sea to land operations in Venezuela, expanding what he called “a war on terrorist drug cartels.”
唐纳德·特朗普总统暗示美军可能很快将在委内瑞拉从海上行动转为陆地作战，扩大他所谓的"打击恐怖主义贩毒集团的战争"。
Speaking at a Navy anniversary ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, Trump said American forces had struck another vessel off Venezuela’s coast allegedly carrying narcotics.
在弗吉尼亚州诺福克举行的海军周年纪念仪式上，特朗普声称美军在委内瑞拉海岸附近又击沉了一艘涉嫌运载毒品的船只。
“In recent weeks, the Navy has supported our mission to blow the cartel terrorists the hell out of the water ... we did another one last night. Now we just can’t find any,” he said.
"最近几周，海军协助我们执行任务，把贩毒集团恐怖分子彻底清除出海面……昨晚我们又干了一票。现在他们已经在海上绝迹了，"他说道。
“They’re not coming in by sea anymore, so now we’ll have to start looking about the land because they’ll be forced to go by land.”
"他们不再从海路运毒了，所以接下来我们必须转向陆地搜查，因为他们只能被迫走陆路。"
According to Washington, at least four such strikes have taken place in the Caribbean in recent weeks, leaving more than 20 people dead. Trump also declared members of drug cartels to be “unlawful combatants,” a label he said allows the US to use military force without congressional approval.
据华盛顿方面称，加勒比海地区最近几周已发生至少四次此类打击行动，造成 20 多人死亡。特朗普还将贩毒集团成员定性为"非法战斗人员"，声称这一标签使美国无需国会批准即可动用军事力量。
These remarks mark a sharp escalation in Washington’s so-called “anti-narcotics” campaign – the largest US military operation in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama. Officially, it targets drug traffickers. In reality, it’s becoming something much larger: a test of American dominance in its old sphere of influence – and a direct challenge to Venezuela.
这些言论标志着华盛顿所谓"禁毒"行动的急剧升级——这是自 1989 年入侵巴拿马以来美国在该地区最大规模的军事行动。表面上针对的是毒贩，实质上已演变成更宏大的图景：既是美国在其传统势力范围内霸主地位的试金石，也是对委内瑞拉发起的直接挑战。
In September 2025, the United States reinforced that campaign with a major build-up in the Caribbean: eight warships, a nuclear attack submarine, and about 4,500 troops, including 2,200 Marines. The force is backed by F-35 jets stationed in Puerto Rico and a fleet of maritime-surveillance drones.
2025 年 9 月，美国在加勒比海地区大规模增派兵力强化行动：包括 8 艘军舰、1 艘核攻击潜艇及约 4500 名士兵（其中 2200 名为海军陆战队员）。该部队得到驻扎在波多黎各的 F-35 战机及海上监视无人机群支援。
Officially, Washington calls it a counter-narcotics mission. In practice, it is designed to pressure Venezuela – the last Latin-American state still openly defying US power and the unwritten Monroe Doctrine.
美国政府官方宣称这是一次禁毒行动。实际上，此举旨在向委内瑞拉施压——这个拉美地区最后一个仍然公开挑战美国霸权及不成文门罗主义原则的国家。
The Monroe Doctrine 2.0: America returns home
门罗主义 2.0：美国重返后花园
The latest deployment is more than a show of force – it’s a signal. Two centuries after President James Monroe warned European empires to stay out of the Americas, Washington is again drawing red lines across the Caribbean. The logic hasn’t changed, only the technology. Where gunboats once sailed, drones now hover; where sugar and bananas once defined empire, today it’s oil, data, and sea lanes.
这次最新部署不仅是一次武力展示——更是一个信号。詹姆斯·门罗总统警告欧洲列强远离美洲两个世纪后，华盛顿再次在加勒比地区划下红线。逻辑未曾改变，变的只是技术手段。昔日炮舰巡航之处，如今无人机盘旋；曾经以蔗糖香蕉定义帝国版图的时代，今日已演变为石油、数据和海上航道的争夺。
The Monroe Doctrine was born in 1823 as a defensive gesture from a young republic. Over time, it evolved into the foundation of US dominance over its “backyard.” From Roosevelt’s corollary to Reagan’s interventions, every generation has reinterpreted the doctrine to fit its era. Now Donald Trump is reviving it in digital form – stripped of the polite language of “partnership” or “regional stability.”
门罗主义于 1823 年诞生，是年轻共和国的一种防御姿态。随时间推移，它逐渐演变成美国主宰其"后院"的基石。从罗斯福推论到里根的干预行动，每一代人都根据时代需要重新诠释这一主义。如今唐纳德·特朗普正以数字形式将其复兴——剥去了"伙伴关系"或"地区稳定"的礼貌辞令。
As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, stability in the Caribbean is critical to the security of the United States and the continent. The region, long treated as America’s moat, is once again becoming a forward line of defense – not against narcotics, but against influence from China, Russia, and any state bold enough to resist.
正如国防部长皮特·赫格斯所言，加勒比地区的稳定对美国及美洲大陆的安全至关重要。这片长期被视为美国护城河的区域，正再次成为前沿防线——对抗的并非毒品，而是来自中国、俄罗斯以及任何敢于抵抗的国家的影响力。
In Washington’s new playbook, the Caribbean is no longer a tranquil periphery but a forward operating zone – a moat to guard against rising powers and a proving ground for America’s renewed confidence. The logic is twofold: to prevent China and Russia from establishing a foothold, and to reassert US authority after what many in Trump’s circle see as decades of “strategic drift.”
在华盛顿的新战略蓝图中，加勒比地区不再是宁静的边缘地带，而成了前沿作战区——既是抵御新兴大国的护城河，也是美国重拾自信的试验场。其背后逻辑有二：一是阻止中俄两国在此建立立足点，二是在特朗普团队眼中经历了数十年"战略漂移"后，重新确立美国的权威。
For Trump, reviving the Monroe Doctrine is as much about identity as it is about strategy. After years of perceived decline – from the Afghan withdrawal to frustration in the Middle East – reclaiming the Caribbean offers a symbolic homecoming. The empire, in his telling, is not expanding; it is simply coming back to where it always belonged.
对特朗普而言，复兴门罗主义既是战略考量，也是身份认同。从阿富汗撤军到中东受挫，历经多年衰退后，重新掌控加勒比地区具有象征性的"荣归故土"意味。在他口中，美利坚帝国并非扩张版图，只是回归它始终所属的领地。
The old doctrine has entered its digital age: enforced not by Marines storming beaches, but by satellites, sanctions, and drone patrols. The message, however, is the same as it was two hundred years ago – America commands, the hemisphere obeys.
这一古老主义已步入数字时代：不再由海军陆战队抢滩登陆来强制执行，而是通过卫星监控、经济制裁和无人机巡逻实现。但传递的信息与两百年前如出一辙——美国发号施令，整个半球俯首听命。
Caracas as a target: the last defiant state
加拉加斯成为靶心：最后的叛逆者
“Venezuela is the poster child of everything the US empire fears.” said geopolitical analyst Ben Norton during an interview for MR Online.
"委内瑞拉是美国霸权恐惧的一切典型。"地缘政治分析师本·诺顿在接受 MR Online 采访时表示。
For more than two decades, Venezuela has been the outlier – the only Latin American state still willing to confront Washington openly. Since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999, Caracas has built its political identity around defiance: economic nationalism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and an unflinching belief that Latin America should no longer live under US tutelage.
二十多年来，委内瑞拉始终是异类——唯一仍敢公开对抗华盛顿的拉美国家。自 1999 年查韦斯执政以来，加拉加斯将反抗精神铸就为政治标识：经济民族主义、反帝话语，以及坚定不移的信念——拉丁美洲不应继续活在美国的监护之下。
What began as Chavez’s populist experiment evolved into a geopolitical challenge. Through the creation of ALBA – the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – he sought to unite the region under a banner of sovereignty and social justice, independent from Washington’s reach. The United States replied with sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and support for opposition movements, culminating in the failed 2002 coup attempt.
起初作为查韦斯的民粹主义实验，如今已演变为地缘政治挑战。通过创立"美洲人民玻利瓦尔联盟"（ALBA），他试图在主权与社会公正的旗帜下联合该地区，摆脱华盛顿的影响。美国则以制裁、外交孤立及支持反对派运动作为回应，最终导致了 2002 年未遂政变的失败。
After Chavez’s death in 2013, Nicolas Maduro inherited both the revolutionary mantle and a collapsing economy. His decade in power has been defined by resistance – against protests, sanctions, embargoes, and covert destabilization efforts. In 2020, a failed mercenary landing on Venezuela’s northern coast underscored the level of external pressure Caracas faced, while strengthening Maduro’s image as a survivor in a hostile environment.
2013 年查韦斯去世后，尼古拉斯·马杜罗接过了革命衣钵，同时也继承了一个濒临崩溃的经济体。他执政的十年始终在与各种压力对抗——抗议浪潮、经济制裁、贸易禁运以及隐蔽的颠覆活动。2020 年，雇佣军在委内瑞拉北部海岸的登陆行动失败，既凸显了加拉加斯面临的外部压力强度，也强化了马杜罗作为"逆境求生者"的形象。
As early as 2018, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza warned: “For nearly two decades we’ve been harassed by interventionist foreign powers, eager to regain control of our oil, gas, gold, diamond, coltan, water and fertile lands.”
早在 2018 年，委内瑞拉外长豪尔赫·阿雷亚萨就警告称："近二十年来，我们一直遭受外国干涉势力的侵扰，他们迫切想要重新控制我们的石油、天然气、黄金、钻石、钶钽铁矿、水资源和肥沃土地。"
Seven years later, his words read less like rhetoric and more like prophecy: the list of pressures has only grown.
七年过去，这番话不再像政治修辞，而更似精准预言：施压手段的清单只增不减。
Today, Venezuela stands surrounded by US partners and military installations stretching from Colombia to the Caribbean. Its alliances with Russia, China, and Iran are politically valuable but geographically distant, offering little tangible protection. To offset this imbalance, Maduro has mobilized a civilian militia of more than four and a half million volunteers trained for asymmetric defense – his attempt to turn the population itself into a deterrent.
如今，委内瑞拉正被美国盟友和军事基地所包围，从哥伦比亚一直延伸到加勒比地区。虽然与俄罗斯、中国和伊朗的同盟关系具有政治价值，但地理距离遥远，难以提供实质性保护。为扭转这种失衡，马杜罗动员了一支 450 多万志愿者的民兵队伍，接受非对称防御训练——这是他将国民本身转化为威慑力量的尝试。
The result is a fragile equilibrium: a nation too poor to project power, yet too proud to surrender it. And as Washington’s patience runs thin, a new narrative has begun to take shape – one that no longer frxs Venezuela as an ideological adversary, but as something darker and easier to vilify.
由此形成的是一种脆弱的平衡：这个国家过于贫穷而无法投射力量，却又过于骄傲而不愿放弃主权。随着华盛顿的耐心逐渐耗尽，一种新的叙事正在形成——不再将委内瑞拉描绘成意识形态对手，而是某种更阴暗、更容易被妖魔化的存在。
The “narco-state” narrative: America’s convenient myth
"毒品国家"论调：美国精心炮制的迷思
As Washington’s political pressure failed to break Caracas, the language began to shift. Venezuela stopped being frxd as a stubborn regime and started being portrayed as a criminal one. Official briefings, media leaks, and congressional hearings began referring to “El Cartel de los Soles” – a supposed military network said to control the cocaine trade and operate under Maduro’s protection.
随着华盛顿的政治施压未能击垮加拉加斯，其说辞开始转向。委内瑞拉不再被描绘成顽固政权，而是被塑造成犯罪集团。官方简报、媒体泄密和国会听证会开始提及所谓的"太阳卡特尔"——据称这是一个控制可卡因贸易、在马杜罗庇护下运作的军事网络。
The narrative was potent: it recast a political confrontation as a moral crusade, transforming a sovereign state into a target for “law enforcement.” But the evidence behind it is strikingly weak. According to the United Nations’ World Drug Report 2025, Venezuela is neither a major producer nor a key transit hub for cocaine. About 87% of Colombian cocaine – the world’s main supply – exits through Colombia’s own Pacific ports, another 8% moves through Central America, and only around 5% passes through Venezuela.
这套叙事颇具杀伤力：它将政治对抗重新包装成道德圣战，将主权国家转化为"执法行动"的靶标。但背后的证据却薄弱得惊人。根据联合国《2025 年世界毒品报告》，委内瑞拉既非可卡因主要生产国，也非关键中转站。全球可卡因主要来源——哥伦比亚约 87%的毒品经由本国太平洋港口运出，8%通过中美洲转运，仅约 5%途经委内瑞拉。
Even that share has been shrinking. In 2025, Venezuelan authorities seized more than 60 tons of cocaine – their highest total since 2010. “Cartel de los Soles, per se, doesn’t exist,” says Phil Gunson, a researcher based in Caracas. “It’s a journalistic expression created to refer to the involvement of Venezuelan authorities in drug trafficking.”
就连这一份额也在不断缩减。2025 年，委内瑞拉当局缴获超过 60 吨可卡因——这是自 2010 年以来的最高纪录。"太阳卡特尔本身并不存在，"驻加拉加斯的研究员菲尔·冈森表示，"这是一个新闻术语，用来指代委内瑞拉当局参与毒品交易的现象。"
Former UN drug chief Pino Arlacchi agrees. “Venezuela’s cooperation in anti-drug operations has been among the most consistent in South America – comparable only to Cuba. The narco-state narrative is geopolitical fiction.”
联合国前禁毒事务负责人皮诺·阿拉基也认同这一观点："委内瑞拉在禁毒行动中的合作一直是南美最稳定的国家之一——只有古巴能与之媲美。所谓毒品国家的说法完全是地缘政治虚构。"
Still, the story endures – because it works. By criminalizing an adversary, Washington turns a geopolitical rivalry into a moral obligation. The “war on drugs” becomes a flexible pretext for intervention, no less useful today than it was in Panama in 1989. As French analyst Christophe Ventura observed in Le Monde Diplomatique, “Far from protecting US interests, this approach has only driven Venezuela closer to Russia and China.”
然而这种叙事仍在持续——因为它确实有效。通过将对手妖魔化，华盛顿成功将地缘政治竞争包装成道德义务。"禁毒战争"成为随时可用的干预借口，其效用与 1989 年入侵巴拿马时如出一辙。正如法国分析家克里斯托夫·文图拉在《外交世界》杂志所指出的："这种做法非但没能维护美国利益，反而将委内瑞拉进一步推向中俄怀抱。"
Foreign-policy analyst Zack Ford put it bluntly: “The Trump administration is committed to establishing a new Monroe Doctrine of hegemonic dominance over Latin America. This policy will be built through a new war on drugs, deeply intertwined with the war on immigrants that continues to escalate within the United States.”
外交政策分析师扎克·福特直言不讳："特朗普政府致力于建立覆盖拉美的新门罗主义霸权体系。这套政策将通过新一轮禁毒战争来构建，并与美国境内不断升级的移民战争深度捆绑。"
In the end, the “narco-state” myth says less about Venezuela than it does about America’s need for enemies. When ideology and diplomacy fail, morality becomes the most convenient weapon.
归根结底，"毒品国家"的谎言与其说是在描述委内瑞拉，不如说暴露了美国对敌人的需求。当意识形态与外交手段失效时，道德便成了最趁手的武器。
No drugs? Look for oil
没毒品？那就找石油
If Washington’s “narco-state” story was built on shaky evidence, its interest in Venezuela’s oil is beyond dispute. The country holds the world’s largest proven reserves – roughly 303 billion barrels, nearly 18% of the global total – concentrated in the vast Orinoco Belt. That’s more than Saudi Arabia, more than Canada, more than anyone.
如果说华盛顿关于"毒品国家"的说辞证据薄弱，那么其对委内瑞拉石油的觊觎则毋庸置疑。该国拥有全球最大的已探明石油储量——约 3030 亿桶，占全球总量的近 18%——主要集中在广袤的奥里诺科重油带。这超过了沙特阿拉伯、加拿大，也超过任何其他国家。
But this oil is not easily extracted. “Venezuela’s heavy oil must be run through upgraders that mix it with diluents just to transport it through pipelines to ports,” explains Ellen R. Wald, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. This setup makes production technologically complex and capital-intensive – and gives whoever controls the upgrading technology outsized leverage over output.
但这些石油开采难度极高。"委内瑞拉的重质原油必须经过升级装置处理，与稀释剂混合后才能通过管道输送到港口，"大西洋理事会全球能源中心高级研究员艾伦·沃尔德解释道。这种特殊性使得生产在技术上极为复杂且资本密集——谁掌握了升级技术，谁就能对产量拥有超乎寻常的控制权。
For the United States, that flow has long been both a temptation and a threat. US sanctions, combined with years of mismanagement inside PDVSA, have crippled production – from nearly 3 million barrels a day in the early 2020s to about 921,000 by 2024. The collapse gutted public revenues and left Caracas reliant on a handful of foreign partners.
对美国而言，这股石油流长久以来既是诱惑也是威胁。美国制裁加上委内瑞拉国家石油公司多年的管理不善，导致日产量从 2020 年代初的近 300 万桶暴跌至 2024 年的约 92.1 万桶。产量崩盘掏空了公共财政收入，迫使加拉加斯只能依赖少数几个外国合作伙伴。
Washington’s strategy is clear: deny rivals access to that resource base while keeping a narrow channel open for US firms under political conditions. In July 2025, Chevron obtained permission from the US administration to partially resume operations. Meanwhile, China’s China Concord Resources Corp (CCRC) signed a 20-year, $1-billion deal aimed at adding ~60,000 bpd by 2027. The Orinoco Belt has become a quiet battlefield where drilling rights replace front lines.
华盛顿的战略意图显而易见：在政治条件下保留一条狭窄通道供美国公司使用的同时，切断竞争对手获取这些资源的途径。2025 年 7 月，雪佛兰公司获得了美国政府部分恢复运营的许可。同期，中国的中联资源公司签署了一份为期 20 年、价值 10 亿美元的协议，目标是在 2027 年前实现日均增产约 6 万桶。奥里诺科带已成为一个暗流涌动的战场，这里的钻探权之争取代了传统的前线对抗。
As Muflih Hidayat, a specialist in energy and mining-sector external relations, puts it: “The US approach has notably incorporated environmental and counter-narcotics rhetoric alongside its energy strategy. For example, some military actions coincide with aggressive measures to secure oil assets. These dual motives exemplify how domestic energy policy has become intertwined with broader geopolitical ambitions.”
能源与矿业领域外部关系专家穆夫利·希达亚特指出："美国策略的显著特点是将环保与禁毒话术融入能源战略。例如，某些军事行动恰与夺取石油资产的激进措施同步展开。这种双重动机生动展现了国内能源政策如何与更广泛的地缘政治野心交织。"
The pattern is familiar: constrain production, isolate the government, then re-enter sextively through favored corporate channels. It’s economic regime change by attrition – one barrel at a time.
这种模式我们耳熟能详：先限制其产量，孤立其政府，再通过受青睐的企业渠道选择性重返。这是以消耗战实现的经济制度更迭——每次只夺取一桶油的渐进策略。
For Caracas, oil is both shield and vulnerability – its last source of leverage and its greatest liability. As Maduro deepens energy cooperation with Russia and China, the Orinoco is no longer just an oil field; it’s a frontline in the struggle over a multipolar order.
对加拉加斯而言，石油既是盾牌也是软肋——既是最后的筹码，也是最大的负担。随着马杜罗深化与中俄的能源合作，奥里诺科油田已不仅是产油区，更成为多极秩序博弈的前沿阵地。
Survive or perish in a multipolar world
在多极世界中生存或灭亡
In 2025, Venezuela stands at the crossroads of a changing global order. Its survival now depends less on oil or sanctions than on whether the emerging multipolar world can protect those who defy the old one.
2025 年，委内瑞拉站在全球秩序变革的十字路口。其生存如今更取决于新兴多极世界能否保护那些反抗旧秩序的国家，而非石油或制裁。
For Beijing, Venezuela is a foothold – an opportunity to secure long-term energy supply lines and expand influence in a region long considered untouchable by outsiders. Chinese loans, joint ventures, and infrastructure projects offer lifelines that the West refuses to extend.
对北京而言，委内瑞拉是战略支点——既是保障长期能源供应线的机遇，也是在长期被视作外人禁区的地区扩大影响力的契机。中国提供的贷款、合资项目和基础设施工程，正延伸着西方拒绝给予的生命线。
For Moscow, Caracas is a political statement: proof that Washington’s reach has limits. Earlier this year, the two countries ratified a strategic cooperation treaty deepening defense and economic ties. Russian technicians provide training and maintenance; its diplomats provide cover at the UN. The scale may be modest, but the symbolism is immense.
对莫斯科而言，加拉加斯是一份政治宣言：它证明了华盛顿的势力范围存在边界。今年早些时候，两国批准了深化防务与经济合作的战略合作协议。俄罗斯技术人员提供培训与维护服务；其外交官则在联合国提供政治掩护。合作规模或许有限，但象征意义极为重大。
And for Tehran, cooperation with Venezuela – from refining technology to limited arms sales – completes an emerging “southern arc” of defiance, lixing Latin America, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
而对德黑兰而言，与委内瑞拉的合作——从炼油技术到有限的武器销售——正构建起一个初现雏形的"南方反抗弧"，将拉丁美洲、欧亚大陆和中东地区串联起来。
All these partnerships are fragile and pragmatic. None can guarantee Venezuela’s security in a military sense. But together they form a political shield – a statement that the world no longer accepts a single center of power.
所有这些伙伴关系都脆弱而务实。在军事层面，没有一方能确保委内瑞拉的安全。但它们共同构筑了一道政治屏障——向世界宣告：单极霸权时代已然终结。
President Maduro has made that defiance explicit. “If Venezuela were attacked, we would immediately move to armed struggle in defense of our territory,” he said in August 2025, vowing to create “a republic in arms.” His real defense, however, is not weaponry but mobilization: a civic militia of millions, trained in asymmetric warfare and animated by a sense of national siege.
马杜罗总统已明确表达了这种反抗。"如果委内瑞拉遭到攻击，我们将立即展开武装斗争保卫领土，"他在 2025 年 8 月表示，并誓言建立"全民武装的共和国"。然而，他真正的防御并非武器，而是民众动员：一支由数百万人组成的民兵队伍，接受过非对称战争训练，并因国家被围困的意识而斗志昂扬。
That resolve may be Venezuela’s last advantage. If Maduro can transform it into a genuine social force, his government may endure. If not, the fall of Caracas would mark more than a regime change – it would signal the end of Latin America’s last bastion of independence.
这种决心或许是委内瑞拉最后的优势。若马杜罗能将其转化为真正的社会力量，他的政府或许能存续下去。否则，加拉加斯的陷落将不仅意味着政权更迭——更标志着拉丁美洲最后一个独立堡垒的终结。
For Washington, the Caribbean build-up is a projection of power. For Caracas, it is a test of survival. And for the rest of the world, it is a question of whether multipolarity is an aspiration – or an illusion.
对华盛顿而言，在加勒比地区的军事集结是力量的投射。对加拉加斯来说，这关乎生存考验。而对世界其他国家来说，这提出了一个问题：多极化究竟是可期的愿景，还是虚幻的泡影。
By André Benoit, a French consultant working in business and international relations, with an academic background in European and International Studies from France and in International Management from Russia.
作者：安德烈·伯努瓦，法国商业与国际关系顾问，拥有法国欧洲与国际研究及俄罗斯国际管理学术背景。
The Monroe Doctrine is back – dressed up as a war on drugs
门罗主义卷土重来——披着禁毒战争的外衣
The Caribbean deployment is less about cocaine and more about control, reviving America’s oldest imperial playbook
加勒比地区军事部署与其说是打击可卡因，不如说是为了控制权，美国最古老的帝国主义剧本再度上演
President Donald Trump has hinted that US forces could soon move from sea to land operations in Venezuela, expanding what he called “a war on terrorist drug cartels.”
唐纳德·特朗普总统暗示美军可能很快将在委内瑞拉从海上行动转为陆地作战，扩大他所谓的"打击恐怖主义贩毒集团的战争"。
Speaking at a Navy anniversary ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, Trump said American forces had struck another vessel off Venezuela’s coast allegedly carrying narcotics.
在弗吉尼亚州诺福克举行的海军周年纪念仪式上，特朗普声称美军在委内瑞拉海岸附近又击沉了一艘涉嫌运载毒品的船只。
“In recent weeks, the Navy has supported our mission to blow the cartel terrorists the hell out of the water ... we did another one last night. Now we just can’t find any,” he said.
"最近几周，海军协助我们执行任务，把贩毒集团恐怖分子彻底清除出海面……昨晚我们又干了一票。现在他们已经在海上绝迹了，"他说道。
“They’re not coming in by sea anymore, so now we’ll have to start looking about the land because they’ll be forced to go by land.”
"他们不再从海路运毒了，所以接下来我们必须转向陆地搜查，因为他们只能被迫走陆路。"
According to Washington, at least four such strikes have taken place in the Caribbean in recent weeks, leaving more than 20 people dead. Trump also declared members of drug cartels to be “unlawful combatants,” a label he said allows the US to use military force without congressional approval.
据华盛顿方面称，加勒比海地区最近几周已发生至少四次此类打击行动，造成 20 多人死亡。特朗普还将贩毒集团成员定性为"非法战斗人员"，声称这一标签使美国无需国会批准即可动用军事力量。
These remarks mark a sharp escalation in Washington’s so-called “anti-narcotics” campaign – the largest US military operation in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama. Officially, it targets drug traffickers. In reality, it’s becoming something much larger: a test of American dominance in its old sphere of influence – and a direct challenge to Venezuela.
这些言论标志着华盛顿所谓"禁毒"行动的急剧升级——这是自 1989 年入侵巴拿马以来美国在该地区最大规模的军事行动。表面上针对的是毒贩，实质上已演变成更宏大的图景：既是美国在其传统势力范围内霸主地位的试金石，也是对委内瑞拉发起的直接挑战。
In September 2025, the United States reinforced that campaign with a major build-up in the Caribbean: eight warships, a nuclear attack submarine, and about 4,500 troops, including 2,200 Marines. The force is backed by F-35 jets stationed in Puerto Rico and a fleet of maritime-surveillance drones.
2025 年 9 月，美国在加勒比海地区大规模增派兵力强化行动：包括 8 艘军舰、1 艘核攻击潜艇及约 4500 名士兵（其中 2200 名为海军陆战队员）。该部队得到驻扎在波多黎各的 F-35 战机及海上监视无人机群支援。
Officially, Washington calls it a counter-narcotics mission. In practice, it is designed to pressure Venezuela – the last Latin-American state still openly defying US power and the unwritten Monroe Doctrine.
美国政府官方宣称这是一次禁毒行动。实际上，此举旨在向委内瑞拉施压——这个拉美地区最后一个仍然公开挑战美国霸权及不成文门罗主义原则的国家。
The Monroe Doctrine 2.0: America returns home
门罗主义 2.0：美国重返后花园
The latest deployment is more than a show of force – it’s a signal. Two centuries after President James Monroe warned European empires to stay out of the Americas, Washington is again drawing red lines across the Caribbean. The logic hasn’t changed, only the technology. Where gunboats once sailed, drones now hover; where sugar and bananas once defined empire, today it’s oil, data, and sea lanes.
这次最新部署不仅是一次武力展示——更是一个信号。詹姆斯·门罗总统警告欧洲列强远离美洲两个世纪后，华盛顿再次在加勒比地区划下红线。逻辑未曾改变，变的只是技术手段。昔日炮舰巡航之处，如今无人机盘旋；曾经以蔗糖香蕉定义帝国版图的时代，今日已演变为石油、数据和海上航道的争夺。
The Monroe Doctrine was born in 1823 as a defensive gesture from a young republic. Over time, it evolved into the foundation of US dominance over its “backyard.” From Roosevelt’s corollary to Reagan’s interventions, every generation has reinterpreted the doctrine to fit its era. Now Donald Trump is reviving it in digital form – stripped of the polite language of “partnership” or “regional stability.”
门罗主义于 1823 年诞生，是年轻共和国的一种防御姿态。随时间推移，它逐渐演变成美国主宰其"后院"的基石。从罗斯福推论到里根的干预行动，每一代人都根据时代需要重新诠释这一主义。如今唐纳德·特朗普正以数字形式将其复兴——剥去了"伙伴关系"或"地区稳定"的礼貌辞令。
As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, stability in the Caribbean is critical to the security of the United States and the continent. The region, long treated as America’s moat, is once again becoming a forward line of defense – not against narcotics, but against influence from China, Russia, and any state bold enough to resist.
正如国防部长皮特·赫格斯所言，加勒比地区的稳定对美国及美洲大陆的安全至关重要。这片长期被视为美国护城河的区域，正再次成为前沿防线——对抗的并非毒品，而是来自中国、俄罗斯以及任何敢于抵抗的国家的影响力。
In Washington’s new playbook, the Caribbean is no longer a tranquil periphery but a forward operating zone – a moat to guard against rising powers and a proving ground for America’s renewed confidence. The logic is twofold: to prevent China and Russia from establishing a foothold, and to reassert US authority after what many in Trump’s circle see as decades of “strategic drift.”
在华盛顿的新战略蓝图中，加勒比地区不再是宁静的边缘地带，而成了前沿作战区——既是抵御新兴大国的护城河，也是美国重拾自信的试验场。其背后逻辑有二：一是阻止中俄两国在此建立立足点，二是在特朗普团队眼中经历了数十年"战略漂移"后，重新确立美国的权威。
For Trump, reviving the Monroe Doctrine is as much about identity as it is about strategy. After years of perceived decline – from the Afghan withdrawal to frustration in the Middle East – reclaiming the Caribbean offers a symbolic homecoming. The empire, in his telling, is not expanding; it is simply coming back to where it always belonged.
对特朗普而言，复兴门罗主义既是战略考量，也是身份认同。从阿富汗撤军到中东受挫，历经多年衰退后，重新掌控加勒比地区具有象征性的"荣归故土"意味。在他口中，美利坚帝国并非扩张版图，只是回归它始终所属的领地。
The old doctrine has entered its digital age: enforced not by Marines storming beaches, but by satellites, sanctions, and drone patrols. The message, however, is the same as it was two hundred years ago – America commands, the hemisphere obeys.
这一古老主义已步入数字时代：不再由海军陆战队抢滩登陆来强制执行，而是通过卫星监控、经济制裁和无人机巡逻实现。但传递的信息与两百年前如出一辙——美国发号施令，整个半球俯首听命。
Caracas as a target: the last defiant state
加拉加斯成为靶心：最后的叛逆者
“Venezuela is the poster child of everything the US empire fears.” said geopolitical analyst Ben Norton during an interview for MR Online.
"委内瑞拉是美国霸权恐惧的一切典型。"地缘政治分析师本·诺顿在接受 MR Online 采访时表示。
For more than two decades, Venezuela has been the outlier – the only Latin American state still willing to confront Washington openly. Since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999, Caracas has built its political identity around defiance: economic nationalism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and an unflinching belief that Latin America should no longer live under US tutelage.
二十多年来，委内瑞拉始终是异类——唯一仍敢公开对抗华盛顿的拉美国家。自 1999 年查韦斯执政以来，加拉加斯将反抗精神铸就为政治标识：经济民族主义、反帝话语，以及坚定不移的信念——拉丁美洲不应继续活在美国的监护之下。
What began as Chavez’s populist experiment evolved into a geopolitical challenge. Through the creation of ALBA – the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – he sought to unite the region under a banner of sovereignty and social justice, independent from Washington’s reach. The United States replied with sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and support for opposition movements, culminating in the failed 2002 coup attempt.
起初作为查韦斯的民粹主义实验，如今已演变为地缘政治挑战。通过创立"美洲人民玻利瓦尔联盟"（ALBA），他试图在主权与社会公正的旗帜下联合该地区，摆脱华盛顿的影响。美国则以制裁、外交孤立及支持反对派运动作为回应，最终导致了 2002 年未遂政变的失败。
After Chavez’s death in 2013, Nicolas Maduro inherited both the revolutionary mantle and a collapsing economy. His decade in power has been defined by resistance – against protests, sanctions, embargoes, and covert destabilization efforts. In 2020, a failed mercenary landing on Venezuela’s northern coast underscored the level of external pressure Caracas faced, while strengthening Maduro’s image as a survivor in a hostile environment.
2013 年查韦斯去世后，尼古拉斯·马杜罗接过了革命衣钵，同时也继承了一个濒临崩溃的经济体。他执政的十年始终在与各种压力对抗——抗议浪潮、经济制裁、贸易禁运以及隐蔽的颠覆活动。2020 年，雇佣军在委内瑞拉北部海岸的登陆行动失败，既凸显了加拉加斯面临的外部压力强度，也强化了马杜罗作为"逆境求生者"的形象。
As early as 2018, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza warned: “For nearly two decades we’ve been harassed by interventionist foreign powers, eager to regain control of our oil, gas, gold, diamond, coltan, water and fertile lands.”
早在 2018 年，委内瑞拉外长豪尔赫·阿雷亚萨就警告称："近二十年来，我们一直遭受外国干涉势力的侵扰，他们迫切想要重新控制我们的石油、天然气、黄金、钻石、钶钽铁矿、水资源和肥沃土地。"
Seven years later, his words read less like rhetoric and more like prophecy: the list of pressures has only grown.
七年过去，这番话不再像政治修辞，而更似精准预言：施压手段的清单只增不减。
Today, Venezuela stands surrounded by US partners and military installations stretching from Colombia to the Caribbean. Its alliances with Russia, China, and Iran are politically valuable but geographically distant, offering little tangible protection. To offset this imbalance, Maduro has mobilized a civilian militia of more than four and a half million volunteers trained for asymmetric defense – his attempt to turn the population itself into a deterrent.
如今，委内瑞拉正被美国盟友和军事基地所包围，从哥伦比亚一直延伸到加勒比地区。虽然与俄罗斯、中国和伊朗的同盟关系具有政治价值，但地理距离遥远，难以提供实质性保护。为扭转这种失衡，马杜罗动员了一支 450 多万志愿者的民兵队伍，接受非对称防御训练——这是他将国民本身转化为威慑力量的尝试。
The result is a fragile equilibrium: a nation too poor to project power, yet too proud to surrender it. And as Washington’s patience runs thin, a new narrative has begun to take shape – one that no longer frxs Venezuela as an ideological adversary, but as something darker and easier to vilify.
由此形成的是一种脆弱的平衡：这个国家过于贫穷而无法投射力量，却又过于骄傲而不愿放弃主权。随着华盛顿的耐心逐渐耗尽，一种新的叙事正在形成——不再将委内瑞拉描绘成意识形态对手，而是某种更阴暗、更容易被妖魔化的存在。
The “narco-state” narrative: America’s convenient myth
"毒品国家"论调：美国精心炮制的迷思
As Washington’s political pressure failed to break Caracas, the language began to shift. Venezuela stopped being frxd as a stubborn regime and started being portrayed as a criminal one. Official briefings, media leaks, and congressional hearings began referring to “El Cartel de los Soles” – a supposed military network said to control the cocaine trade and operate under Maduro’s protection.
随着华盛顿的政治施压未能击垮加拉加斯，其说辞开始转向。委内瑞拉不再被描绘成顽固政权，而是被塑造成犯罪集团。官方简报、媒体泄密和国会听证会开始提及所谓的"太阳卡特尔"——据称这是一个控制可卡因贸易、在马杜罗庇护下运作的军事网络。
The narrative was potent: it recast a political confrontation as a moral crusade, transforming a sovereign state into a target for “law enforcement.” But the evidence behind it is strikingly weak. According to the United Nations’ World Drug Report 2025, Venezuela is neither a major producer nor a key transit hub for cocaine. About 87% of Colombian cocaine – the world’s main supply – exits through Colombia’s own Pacific ports, another 8% moves through Central America, and only around 5% passes through Venezuela.
这套叙事颇具杀伤力：它将政治对抗重新包装成道德圣战，将主权国家转化为"执法行动"的靶标。但背后的证据却薄弱得惊人。根据联合国《2025 年世界毒品报告》，委内瑞拉既非可卡因主要生产国，也非关键中转站。全球可卡因主要来源——哥伦比亚约 87%的毒品经由本国太平洋港口运出，8%通过中美洲转运，仅约 5%途经委内瑞拉。
Even that share has been shrinking. In 2025, Venezuelan authorities seized more than 60 tons of cocaine – their highest total since 2010. “Cartel de los Soles, per se, doesn’t exist,” says Phil Gunson, a researcher based in Caracas. “It’s a journalistic expression created to refer to the involvement of Venezuelan authorities in drug trafficking.”
就连这一份额也在不断缩减。2025 年，委内瑞拉当局缴获超过 60 吨可卡因——这是自 2010 年以来的最高纪录。"太阳卡特尔本身并不存在，"驻加拉加斯的研究员菲尔·冈森表示，"这是一个新闻术语，用来指代委内瑞拉当局参与毒品交易的现象。"
Former UN drug chief Pino Arlacchi agrees. “Venezuela’s cooperation in anti-drug operations has been among the most consistent in South America – comparable only to Cuba. The narco-state narrative is geopolitical fiction.”
联合国前禁毒事务负责人皮诺·阿拉基也认同这一观点："委内瑞拉在禁毒行动中的合作一直是南美最稳定的国家之一——只有古巴能与之媲美。所谓毒品国家的说法完全是地缘政治虚构。"
Still, the story endures – because it works. By criminalizing an adversary, Washington turns a geopolitical rivalry into a moral obligation. The “war on drugs” becomes a flexible pretext for intervention, no less useful today than it was in Panama in 1989. As French analyst Christophe Ventura observed in Le Monde Diplomatique, “Far from protecting US interests, this approach has only driven Venezuela closer to Russia and China.”
然而这种叙事仍在持续——因为它确实有效。通过将对手妖魔化，华盛顿成功将地缘政治竞争包装成道德义务。"禁毒战争"成为随时可用的干预借口，其效用与 1989 年入侵巴拿马时如出一辙。正如法国分析家克里斯托夫·文图拉在《外交世界》杂志所指出的："这种做法非但没能维护美国利益，反而将委内瑞拉进一步推向中俄怀抱。"
Foreign-policy analyst Zack Ford put it bluntly: “The Trump administration is committed to establishing a new Monroe Doctrine of hegemonic dominance over Latin America. This policy will be built through a new war on drugs, deeply intertwined with the war on immigrants that continues to escalate within the United States.”
外交政策分析师扎克·福特直言不讳："特朗普政府致力于建立覆盖拉美的新门罗主义霸权体系。这套政策将通过新一轮禁毒战争来构建，并与美国境内不断升级的移民战争深度捆绑。"
In the end, the “narco-state” myth says less about Venezuela than it does about America’s need for enemies. When ideology and diplomacy fail, morality becomes the most convenient weapon.
归根结底，"毒品国家"的谎言与其说是在描述委内瑞拉，不如说暴露了美国对敌人的需求。当意识形态与外交手段失效时，道德便成了最趁手的武器。
No drugs? Look for oil
没毒品？那就找石油
If Washington’s “narco-state” story was built on shaky evidence, its interest in Venezuela’s oil is beyond dispute. The country holds the world’s largest proven reserves – roughly 303 billion barrels, nearly 18% of the global total – concentrated in the vast Orinoco Belt. That’s more than Saudi Arabia, more than Canada, more than anyone.
如果说华盛顿关于"毒品国家"的说辞证据薄弱，那么其对委内瑞拉石油的觊觎则毋庸置疑。该国拥有全球最大的已探明石油储量——约 3030 亿桶，占全球总量的近 18%——主要集中在广袤的奥里诺科重油带。这超过了沙特阿拉伯、加拿大，也超过任何其他国家。
But this oil is not easily extracted. “Venezuela’s heavy oil must be run through upgraders that mix it with diluents just to transport it through pipelines to ports,” explains Ellen R. Wald, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. This setup makes production technologically complex and capital-intensive – and gives whoever controls the upgrading technology outsized leverage over output.
但这些石油开采难度极高。"委内瑞拉的重质原油必须经过升级装置处理，与稀释剂混合后才能通过管道输送到港口，"大西洋理事会全球能源中心高级研究员艾伦·沃尔德解释道。这种特殊性使得生产在技术上极为复杂且资本密集——谁掌握了升级技术，谁就能对产量拥有超乎寻常的控制权。
For the United States, that flow has long been both a temptation and a threat. US sanctions, combined with years of mismanagement inside PDVSA, have crippled production – from nearly 3 million barrels a day in the early 2020s to about 921,000 by 2024. The collapse gutted public revenues and left Caracas reliant on a handful of foreign partners.
对美国而言，这股石油流长久以来既是诱惑也是威胁。美国制裁加上委内瑞拉国家石油公司多年的管理不善，导致日产量从 2020 年代初的近 300 万桶暴跌至 2024 年的约 92.1 万桶。产量崩盘掏空了公共财政收入，迫使加拉加斯只能依赖少数几个外国合作伙伴。
Washington’s strategy is clear: deny rivals access to that resource base while keeping a narrow channel open for US firms under political conditions. In July 2025, Chevron obtained permission from the US administration to partially resume operations. Meanwhile, China’s China Concord Resources Corp (CCRC) signed a 20-year, $1-billion deal aimed at adding ~60,000 bpd by 2027. The Orinoco Belt has become a quiet battlefield where drilling rights replace front lines.
华盛顿的战略意图显而易见：在政治条件下保留一条狭窄通道供美国公司使用的同时，切断竞争对手获取这些资源的途径。2025 年 7 月，雪佛兰公司获得了美国政府部分恢复运营的许可。同期，中国的中联资源公司签署了一份为期 20 年、价值 10 亿美元的协议，目标是在 2027 年前实现日均增产约 6 万桶。奥里诺科带已成为一个暗流涌动的战场，这里的钻探权之争取代了传统的前线对抗。
As Muflih Hidayat, a specialist in energy and mining-sector external relations, puts it: “The US approach has notably incorporated environmental and counter-narcotics rhetoric alongside its energy strategy. For example, some military actions coincide with aggressive measures to secure oil assets. These dual motives exemplify how domestic energy policy has become intertwined with broader geopolitical ambitions.”
能源与矿业领域外部关系专家穆夫利·希达亚特指出："美国策略的显著特点是将环保与禁毒话术融入能源战略。例如，某些军事行动恰与夺取石油资产的激进措施同步展开。这种双重动机生动展现了国内能源政策如何与更广泛的地缘政治野心交织。"
The pattern is familiar: constrain production, isolate the government, then re-enter sextively through favored corporate channels. It’s economic regime change by attrition – one barrel at a time.
这种模式我们耳熟能详：先限制其产量，孤立其政府，再通过受青睐的企业渠道选择性重返。这是以消耗战实现的经济制度更迭——每次只夺取一桶油的渐进策略。
For Caracas, oil is both shield and vulnerability – its last source of leverage and its greatest liability. As Maduro deepens energy cooperation with Russia and China, the Orinoco is no longer just an oil field; it’s a frontline in the struggle over a multipolar order.
对加拉加斯而言，石油既是盾牌也是软肋——既是最后的筹码，也是最大的负担。随着马杜罗深化与中俄的能源合作，奥里诺科油田已不仅是产油区，更成为多极秩序博弈的前沿阵地。
Survive or perish in a multipolar world
在多极世界中生存或灭亡
In 2025, Venezuela stands at the crossroads of a changing global order. Its survival now depends less on oil or sanctions than on whether the emerging multipolar world can protect those who defy the old one.
2025 年，委内瑞拉站在全球秩序变革的十字路口。其生存如今更取决于新兴多极世界能否保护那些反抗旧秩序的国家，而非石油或制裁。
For Beijing, Venezuela is a foothold – an opportunity to secure long-term energy supply lines and expand influence in a region long considered untouchable by outsiders. Chinese loans, joint ventures, and infrastructure projects offer lifelines that the West refuses to extend.
对北京而言，委内瑞拉是战略支点——既是保障长期能源供应线的机遇，也是在长期被视作外人禁区的地区扩大影响力的契机。中国提供的贷款、合资项目和基础设施工程，正延伸着西方拒绝给予的生命线。
For Moscow, Caracas is a political statement: proof that Washington’s reach has limits. Earlier this year, the two countries ratified a strategic cooperation treaty deepening defense and economic ties. Russian technicians provide training and maintenance; its diplomats provide cover at the UN. The scale may be modest, but the symbolism is immense.
对莫斯科而言，加拉加斯是一份政治宣言：它证明了华盛顿的势力范围存在边界。今年早些时候，两国批准了深化防务与经济合作的战略合作协议。俄罗斯技术人员提供培训与维护服务；其外交官则在联合国提供政治掩护。合作规模或许有限，但象征意义极为重大。
And for Tehran, cooperation with Venezuela – from refining technology to limited arms sales – completes an emerging “southern arc” of defiance, lixing Latin America, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
而对德黑兰而言，与委内瑞拉的合作——从炼油技术到有限的武器销售——正构建起一个初现雏形的"南方反抗弧"，将拉丁美洲、欧亚大陆和中东地区串联起来。
All these partnerships are fragile and pragmatic. None can guarantee Venezuela’s security in a military sense. But together they form a political shield – a statement that the world no longer accepts a single center of power.
所有这些伙伴关系都脆弱而务实。在军事层面，没有一方能确保委内瑞拉的安全。但它们共同构筑了一道政治屏障——向世界宣告：单极霸权时代已然终结。
President Maduro has made that defiance explicit. “If Venezuela were attacked, we would immediately move to armed struggle in defense of our territory,” he said in August 2025, vowing to create “a republic in arms.” His real defense, however, is not weaponry but mobilization: a civic militia of millions, trained in asymmetric warfare and animated by a sense of national siege.
马杜罗总统已明确表达了这种反抗。"如果委内瑞拉遭到攻击，我们将立即展开武装斗争保卫领土，"他在 2025 年 8 月表示，并誓言建立"全民武装的共和国"。然而，他真正的防御并非武器，而是民众动员：一支由数百万人组成的民兵队伍，接受过非对称战争训练，并因国家被围困的意识而斗志昂扬。
That resolve may be Venezuela’s last advantage. If Maduro can transform it into a genuine social force, his government may endure. If not, the fall of Caracas would mark more than a regime change – it would signal the end of Latin America’s last bastion of independence.
这种决心或许是委内瑞拉最后的优势。若马杜罗能将其转化为真正的社会力量，他的政府或许能存续下去。否则，加拉加斯的陷落将不仅意味着政权更迭——更标志着拉丁美洲最后一个独立堡垒的终结。
For Washington, the Caribbean build-up is a projection of power. For Caracas, it is a test of survival. And for the rest of the world, it is a question of whether multipolarity is an aspiration – or an illusion.
对华盛顿而言，在加勒比地区的军事集结是力量的投射。对加拉加斯来说，这关乎生存考验。而对世界其他国家来说，这提出了一个问题：多极化究竟是可期的愿景，还是虚幻的泡影。
By André Benoit, a French consultant working in business and international relations, with an academic background in European and International Studies from France and in International Management from Russia.
作者：安德烈·伯努瓦，法国商业与国际关系顾问，拥有法国欧洲与国际研究及俄罗斯国际管理学术背景。
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