希特勒为什么要攻击苏联？
正文翻译
从希特勒的角度来看，这样做并不是一个错误。
评论翻译
Ahmed Rayyan
Allow me to preface this answer by saying that it was NOT a mistake to do so from Hitler’s perspective.
Strategically it made sense to attack the Soviet unx while they were weak and unprepared for war. Hitler knew that as he made progress on the Western front, Stalin grew increasingly nervous about the growing power of Germany. The poor performance of the USSR in the Winter War also motivated Hitler.
请允许我在回答前说明，从希特勒的角度来看，这样做并不是一个错误。
从战略上讲，在苏联疲弱且未为战争做好准备时进攻是有意义的。希特勒知道，随着他在西线取得进展，斯大林对德国日益增长的力量感到越来越紧张。苏联在冬季战争中的糟糕表现也促使了希特勒的决定。
If Hitler's commanders had done what Hitler had wanted, which was to rush as fast as possible to Moscow, then it is possible that the USSR would have fallen. You have to consider that the USSR was a superpower, sure, but not the superpower we saw from 1945 to 1991. The USSR’s army was in shambles. It was ill-equipped and all it had was quantity.
如果希特勒的指挥官们按照希特勒的意愿行事，尽可能迅速地冲向莫斯科，那么苏联有可能会沦陷。你必须考虑到苏联确实是一个超级大国，但并不是我们在 1945 到 1991 年间看到的那种超级大国。苏联的军队一片混乱，装备不足，所拥有的只是人数上的数量。
Hitler had made a lot of progress on the Western front so he had some time to concentrate here. This is a map of Europe on 22 June 1941, the day when Operation Barbarossa was started.
You can see that Europe was almost entirely neutral or controlled by Germany. So don’t be deluded into thinking that Germany was losing on that front while it attacked the USSR.
希特勒在西线取得了很多进展，所以他在这里有一些时间可以集中力量。这是 1941 年 6 月 22 日的欧洲地图，也是巴巴罗萨行动开始的那一天。
你可以看到欧洲几乎完全是中立或被德国控制的。所以不要自欺欺人地认为德国在进攻苏联时在那一战线处于劣势。
The USSR’s army was in poor condition, but was rapidly improving. The longer Hitler waited, the harder it would’ve been to eventually conquer the USSR. Stalin and Hitler were not real allies, they only had a non-aggression pact, and both were not exactly known to be trustworthy. Stalin was also, at times, gullible and Hitler took advantage of this diplomatically. Even when warned that Germany was going to invade, Stalin dismissed his advisers. Moreover, Nazi Germany needed oil to keep fighting and needed a lot of it - far more than it was producing. There is a lot of oil in the Caucasus and this area was controlled by the USSR. Victory over the USSR would fulfill Germany’s oil needs.
苏联的军队状况很差，但正在迅速改善。希特勒等得越久，最终征服苏联就会越难。斯大林和希特勒并不是真正的盟友，他们只是签订了互不侵犯条约，而且双方都不以可靠著称。斯大林有时也很轻信，希特勒在外交上利用了这一点。即便在被警告德国将入侵时，斯大林也驳回了顾问的意见。此外，纳粹德国需要石油来继续作战，而且需求量很大——远远超过其产量。高加索地区有大量石油，而该地区由苏联控制。战胜苏联将满足德国的石油需求。
Taking into account all these factors, the thought probably never occurred to Hitler and his officers that the Soviet unx would ever be able to launch any kind of counter attack. It took quite some time and the United States to intervene for the Soviet unx to really begin its successful counter-offensive.
考虑到所有这些因素，希特勒和他的军官们大概从未想到苏联会有能力发动任何形式的反击。苏联真正开始取得成功的反攻花了相当长的时间，而且还需要美国的介入。
It's hard to find actual proof of what was going on through Hitler's mind when he took on this risky operation. However, we do know that these had been a part of his plans for years. It was probably thought at the time that the odds were in Nazi Germany's favor. In the war, the USSR suffered 4.9 million casualties, while Germany only suffered about 1 million, so Germany was very close to victory. In all reality, the Germans had a pretty good chance of winning the war within six months, perhaps if just a few variables had changed they might actually have pulled it off. If they could have gotten there a month earlier, they probably would have won. Great Britain was absolutely in no position to put up any kind of resistance except for the occasional bombing run, which was producing much larger losses than they could keep up with equipment wise.
很难找到确凿的证据说明希特勒在发动这次冒险行动时心里在想什么。不过，我们确实知道这些计划已经酝酿多年。当时很可能认为战争的局势对纳粹德国有利。在战争中，苏联付出了 490 万人的伤亡，而德国仅约 100 万，所以德国离胜利非常接近。实际上，德国人在六个月内赢得战争的机会相当大，也许只要改变几个变量，他们就可能真的做到了。如果他们能早一个月到达目的地，可能就会获胜。大不列颠根本无力进行任何实质性抵抗，除了偶尔的轰炸行动外，而这些轰炸在装备上造成的损失远超其能承受的范围。
The operation was blundered because the blitzkrieg was not fast enough, Hitler underestimated the kind of force the Soviet unx could pull together and he underestimated the severity of the cold winter. The plan was also delayed because of setbacks in the Balkans and helping the Italians out where they had failed. If instead of helping the Italians, he had used those forces in the USSR, or he made some better estimations, he could’ve won. The Soviet unx was a rising power which would be even harder to defeat in the future. So this was Germany’s only opportunity to conquer the USSR, which if done, would’ve made Germany far stronger.
但这次行动弄糟了，因为闪电战进展不够快，希特勒低估了苏联能够召集起来的兵力，也低估了严冬的严重程度。由于在巴尔干的挫折以及去救助在那儿失败的意大利人，计划也被拖延了。如果他没有去帮助意大利人，而是把那些兵力投入到苏联，或者他做出了一些更准确的判断，他本可以获胜。苏联是一个正在崛起的强国，未来会更难以征服。所以这是德国唯一一次征服苏联的机会，如果成功，德国本会强大得多。
From Hitler’s perspective, it absolutely was worth it and was necessary since Germany desperately needed oil.
Hitler, though a cruel piece of shit, was not a fool.
从希特勒的角度来看，这绝对是值得的，也是必要的，因为德国急需石油。
希特勒虽然是个残忍的混蛋，但不是个傻子。
Beau Blinder
Hitler's invasion of the Soviet unx was fueled primarily by his ideology -- his belief that the Slavs themselves were weak, inferior people that deserved (needed) to be subjugated. Hitler made no effort to hide his contempt for the Slavs, which is what made the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact so shocking. Suddenly, two countries whose ideologies clashed, whose people disliked each other, and who seemed to be on a crash-course for war since German unification, were bonded in a strange alliance.
希特勒入侵苏联主要由他的意识形态推动——他认为斯拉夫人本身是软弱、低等的民族，理应（需要）被征服。希特勒对斯拉夫人的蔑视根本不加掩饰，这也正是《莫洛托夫—里宾特洛甫条约》如此令人震惊的原因。突然间，两个意识形态互相冲突、人民互相嫌恶、且自德国统一以来看似注定要走向战争的国家，竟以一种奇怪的方式结成了同盟。
By the time Hitler and the general staff began planning Operation Barbarossa, it was clear that the Soviet Army was in shambles. Just two years earlier, the Soviets had waged the disastrous Winter War against Finland, in which a poorly supplied, numerically inferior enemy, inflicted severe casualties on the Russians and ultimately forced them to accept less than what they had planned on.
到希特勒和参谋总局开始策划巴巴罗萨行动时，苏联红军已经显得一片混乱。就在两年前，苏联与芬兰爆发了灾难性的冬季战争，一支补给不足且人数劣势的敌人，对俄军造成了严重伤亡，并最终迫使他们接受了低于原计划的结果。
Barbarossa was supposed to be a quick campaign, lasting no longer than six to eight weeks and which would end with the complete surrender of the Soviet unx. After initially routing the Soviet armies located along the Russian / German border, the three German army groups expected to race across the countryside and only encounter token, uncoordinated resistance. Every part of this plan hinged on a quick victory because the Germans knew that they would have to start preparing for the eventually American flood of troops, weapons, and supplies.
巴巴罗萨本应是一场速战速决的战役，不超过六到八周，最终以苏联的彻底投降告终。在最初击溃驻守俄德边境的苏联军队后，三个德军集团预计将横扫乡野，只遭遇象征性、无组织的抵抗。这一切计划都取决于迅速的胜利，因为德军知道他们必须开始为最终将至的美军洪流——包括部队、武器和补给——做准备。
Whether or not this plan was realistic has been a hotly contested subject. The Germans mostly certainly believed that they could win. They thought they were fighting an inferior enemy with a population that greatly resented the central government in Moscow. Given the brutality with which Stalin ruled, they believed that nobody would rise up in his defense, no new armies would be raised, and the entire Soviet system would crumble under the weight of the German military advance.
无论这个计划是否现实，一直是一个备受争议的话题。德国人几乎可以肯定他们相信自己能获胜。他们认为自己在与一个较弱的敌人作战，这个敌人的人口对莫斯科的中央政府非常不满。鉴于斯大林统治的残酷，他们相信不会有人起来为他辩护，不会再组建新军队，整个苏维埃体制会在德国军事进攻的重压下崩溃。
Obviously, things didn't go according to plan. Delays in the launch of Barbarossa were a problem for the Germans, but the larger issue was that the Soviets began to reorganize their military force, mobilize their population, and gear up for war. Had the Wehrmacht been able to capture the factories that dotted western Russia, things might have gone differently, but the story of the Eastern Front isn't one of dramatic decisive battles, but rather a slow methodical change in the balance of power between two incredibly strong and committed combatants.
显然，事情并未按计划进行。巴巴罗萨行动推迟对德国人是一个问题，但更大的问题是苏联开始重组他们的军队，动员民众，并为战争做准备。若德意志国防军能够占领点缀于俄罗斯西部的那些工厂，局势可能会不同，但东线的故事并不是关于戏剧性决定性战役的，而是一场在两个极其强大且忠于各自信念的交战方之间权力平衡缓慢而有条不紊的变化。
When the German strategic planners sat down, they obviously saw the potential for victory. The Red Army was a broken, incoherent mess of communist idealism, inferior weaponry, and ineptitude. They looked at their own highly mobilized and highly professionalized force and believed, rightly so, that any battle they engaged in they would win. And they did win over and over again. Germany lost 900,000 men during Barbarossa, the Soviets lost millions, yet the war continued. What they didn't count on was Soviet resolve, Stalin's ability to rally the entire country to his cause, the massive Soviet remobilization effort, nor the Soviets being able to pick up their entire industrial base and move it east.
当德国的战略策划者坐下来制定计划时，他们显然看到了胜利的潜力。红军是一团破碎、混乱的东西，充斥着共产主义的理想主义、劣势的武器和无能。他们看着自己高度动员且高度职业化的军队，并且正确地相信，只要参战，他们就会获胜。事实也确实如此，他们一次又一次地获胜。德国在巴巴罗萨行动中损失了 90 万军人，苏联人损失了数百万，然而战争仍在继续。他们没有预料到的是苏联人的决心、斯大林将整个国家团结到他麾下的能力、苏联大规模重新动员的努力，以及苏联能够将整个工业基地搬到东方的能力。
Tobin Sparfeld
In order to understand why a Hitler would do something so "crazy," we must first recognize that what Hitler believed to be true differs from what we believe to be true. So let's examine what Hitler and some of the Germans believed then.
为了理解希特勒为什么会做出如此“疯狂”的事，我们必须首先认识到希特勒所相信的与我们所相信的不同。所以让我们来审视当时希特勒和一些德国人所相信的。
1. The Soviet unx was not very industrialized. Up to this point, the Soviet unx had not been very industrialized. That had changed by WWII, but the Germans were horribly mistaken. The Soviets had about 23,000 tanks by the time of the invasion, and their economy was considerably more modern than the primitive country Germany had taken them to be.
2. The Soviet army had weak leadership that was untested. This was actually true. Stalin had killed about 30,000 troops in his Great Purge before 1939. Many generals and experienced commanders were removed from office at this time. They couldn't even beat Finland in 1939 with superior numbers and equipment. Finland!
1. 苏联并不是很工业化。到那时为止，苏联并不是很工业化。虽然到二战时这种情况已发生变化，但德国人严重地误判了这一点。到入侵时，苏联大约拥有 23,000 辆坦克，而且他们的经济比德国人所认为的原始国家要现代得多。
2. 苏联军队的指挥薄弱且未经考验。这实际上是真的。斯大林在 1939 年前的大清洗中处决了大约 3 万名军人。许多将领和有经验的指挥官在此期间被免职。他们在 1939 年甚至无法以优势兵力和装备击败芬兰。芬兰！
3. The Soviet unx was not expecting an invasion. Germany and the Soviets had just signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939. The Soviets were not gearing up for war with Germany.
4. The German Wehrmacht was essentially invincible. People were shocked about how quickly the French fell. At the time, the Maginot line seemed so well fortified that a German invasion seemed foolhardy. The Blitzkrieg strategy ended the war with France, a country with superior troop numbers and equipment defending its home territory and sovereignty.
3. 苏联并未预料到会被入侵。德国和苏联在 1939 年 8 月刚签署了互不侵犯条约。苏联当时并未为与德国开战做准备。
4. 德国国防军几乎不可战胜。人们对法国沦陷的速度感到震惊。当时的马奇诺防线看起来固若金汤，以致德国入侵显得鲁莽。闪电战策略结束了对法国的战争——一个在本土保卫主权、拥有更优兵力和装备的国家。
5. They could accomplish their obxtives in a few months. Therefore, any concerns about the winter or supply lines would not be an issue in this case.
6. Soviet forces were unlikely to retreat (like they did against Napoleon) because they needed the Baltic States, Moscow, Leningrad, and Ukraine. Moscow and Leningrad are the essential cities, and Ukraine has great agricultural potential. Therefore, the Soviets had to protect this territory.
5. 他们可以在几个月内完成目标。因此，任何关于冬季或补给线的担忧在这种情况下都不会成为问题。
6. 苏联军队不太可能像对拿破仑那样撤退，因为他们需要波罗的海国家、莫斯科、列宁格勒和乌克兰。莫斯科和列宁格勒是关键城市，乌克兰具有巨大的农业潜力。因此，苏联必须保卫这些领土。
So, let's look at it from Hitler's perspective. You just outmaneuvered and humiliated your strongest opponent in mainland Europe in six weeks (France). The Soviets are inexperienced, untested, have low morale, and have no idea you are about to attack. You are going up against an unindustrialized nation that is largely landlocked (Leningrad is the only port), that has little farmland and basic infrastructure. And moreover, you don't want the whole country. You just want to annex part of the Ukraine for agriculture, get oil, and get some labor for German industry. If you can capture Leningrad and Moscow and a little more, you can negotiate a peaceful surrender and then focus on Great Britain.
所以，从希特勒的角度来看。你刚在六周内以机动战术挫败并羞辱了你在欧洲大陆最强的对手（法国）。苏联人缺乏经验、未经考验、士气低落，而且完全不知道你即将发动攻击。你将面对一个不够工业化、基本上是内陆国家（列宁格勒是唯一的港口）、耕地和基础设施都很少的国家。而且，你并不想要整个国家。你只是想吞并部分乌克兰以获取农业资源、石油，并为德国工业获取一些劳动力。如果你能占领列宁格勒和莫斯科再略有推进，你就可以谈判达成和平投降，然后将注意力集中在英国。
Looking at it from that perspective, it doesn't seem so crazy. Of course, Hitler and the Germans were wrong -- after early losses the Soviets put up much more of a fight than the Germans expected, which meant that the winter and supply lines did matter. They never captured those cities and took heavy casualties. And eventually the opening of a second front made things even worse for them. The decision to invade turned out to be an immensely costly one.
从那个角度看，这似乎并不那么疯狂。当然，希特勒和德国人是错的——在初期损失之后，苏联人比德国人预期的要更加顽强地抵抗，这意味着冬季和补给线确实很重要。他们从未攻下那些城市并且付出了沉重的伤亡。而且最终第二战线的开辟让情况对他们更加不利。入侵的决定结果证明代价极其高昂。
Michael Kosh
What better place to start than with a quote from Hitler himself
"Everything I undertake is directed against Russia. If the West is too stupid and too blind to comprehend this, I will be forced to reach an understanding with the Russians, turn and strike the West, and then after their defeat turn back against the Soviet unx with my collected strength. I need the Ukraine and with that no one can starve us out as they did in the last war."
有什么比希特勒自己的话更好的出发点呢
“我所做的一切都是针对俄罗斯的。如果西方愚蠢到看不懂这一点，我将被迫与俄国人达成谅解，转而打击西方，然后在他们被击败后以我集中的力量转回对付苏联。我需要乌克兰，有了它就没有人能像上次战争那样把我们饿死。”
This, along with the annexation of parts of Czechoslovakia and the partitioning and later defeat of Poland were all part of the Nazi Lebensraum ideology. This was particularly in conflict with the ideology of Pan-Slavism which reached its zenith around the time of WWI, but still held a lot of influence up through the foundation of the Soviet unx following WWII. Hitler had violently suppressed the communists when he was in the process of coming to power so the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (aka The Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the unx of Soviet Socialist Republics) was a strange marriage until you consider the weakness of Russia at the time and the desire of Germany not to fight on two fronts simultaneously. Stalin was no fool, he knew that Hitler was not to be trusted but he hoped that Hitler would wear himself out before turning towards Russia and he therefore formed the pact with him.
这一点，加上吞并捷克斯洛伐克的部分领土以及对波兰的分裂和随后击败，都是纳粹“生存空间”意识形态的一部分。这与泛斯拉夫主义的意识形态尤其冲突，后者在第一次世界大战时期达到了顶峰，但直到第二次世界大战后苏联成立前仍有很大影响。希特勒在上台过程中曾对gcd人进行残酷镇压，因此《莫洛托夫—里宾特洛甫条约》（又称《德意志与苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟不侵略条约》）是一段奇怪的联姻，除非你考虑到当时俄罗斯的软弱以及德国不想同时在两个战线上作战的愿望。斯大林并非愚蠢，他知道希特勒不可信，但他希望希特勒在转向俄罗斯之前先把自己消耗掉，因此与他缔结了该条约。
Keep in mind that Russia and Germany both lost territory as a result of WWI and Poland not only became a buffer between these two countries, but a common (and weak) enemy (purely due to territorial grievances). Before Hitler even attacked the two sides postured in various ways. In the case of the Soviets, most notably through the Winter War in which Russia attacked Finland in order to create a buffer zone for St. Petersburg (known as Leningrad at the time).
请记住，作为一战的结果，俄罗斯和德国都失去了领土，波兰不仅成为这两个国家之间的缓冲区，而且由于领土纠纷还成为共同的（且较弱的）敌人。在希特勒发动进攻之前，双方已经以各种方式摆出姿态。就苏联而言，最显著的是通过冬季战争，俄罗斯进攻芬兰以在圣彼得堡（当时称列宁格勒）周围建立缓冲区。
When Hitler finally did attack he made a few major miscalculations (had he not, he could have possibly actually defeated Russia). First, he underestimated the Russian winters. Similarly, he underestimated how difficult it would be to defeat Stalingrad (Volgograd). In fact, one could argue that he shouldn't have even attacked it in the first place and instead focused on the oil fields in the Caucasus rather than diverting his forces.
当希特勒最终发动进攻时，他犯了几个重大的误判（如果没有这些失误，他很可能实际上会击败俄罗斯）。首先，他低估了俄罗斯的冬天。同样，他低估了要攻克斯大林格勒（伏尔加格勒）的困难。事实上，有人可能会认为他根本就不该进攻那里，而应将注意力集中在高加索的油田上，而不是分散兵力。
Finally, it's important to keep in mind that at the time his only major enemy that he had yet to defeat was Great Britain. Hitler was at the pinnacle of his success and his hubris would ultimately lead to his downfall.
最后，重要的是要记住，在当时他尚未击败的主要敌人只有大不列颠。希特勒当时处于成功的顶峰，而他的傲慢最终将导致他的灭亡。
Andy Duffell
Why: it was his main obxtive for the war. The Nazis wanted to create a Greater German Reich, an ethnostate in which Germans had all the resources and land they needed to survive independently of the rest of the world.
为什么：那是他发动战争的主要目标。纳粹想要建立一个大德意志帝国，一个民族国家，使德国人拥有他们独立于世界其余部分生存所需的一切资源和土地。
Hitler and the Nazis thought all other countries were headed for collapse and that only a pure Aryan nation could survive. Most of the resources and land he wanted lay in Eastern Europe, so he needed to take them off the USSR, and also defeat Communism, which he saw as the main rival to Fascism.
Ultimate result: total destruction of the Third Reich. The Wehrmacht is annihilated by the Red Army, Germany is invaded, conquered and partitioned for nearly 50 years. 30 million people die.
希特勒和纳粹认为其他国家终将崩溃，只有纯粹的雅利安民族国家才能生存。他想要的大部分资源和土地都在东欧，所以他需要从苏联手中夺取这些地区，同时还要打败他视为法西斯主义主要对手的共产主义。
最终结果：第三帝国的彻底毁灭。德国国防军被红军歼灭，德国被入侵、征服并被分裂近 50 年。三千万人死亡。
Robert Hansen
It was the inevitable outcome of Nazi economic, political, and cultural ideology and practice. In the moment, it was an economic necessity; Barbarossa was the only way to attain long-term, unlimited access to the resources to bypass the British blockade. With America backing Britain with infinite credit in the West and an ever-strengthening Red Army looming in the East, Germany’s only alternative was inevitable defeat.
这是纳粹的经济、政治和文化意识形态与实践所导致的必然结果。就当时而言，这是一个经济上的必要选择；“巴巴罗萨行动”是获得长期、无限制资源以突破英国封锁的唯一途径。在西方美国以无限信贷支持英国、而东方又有不断壮大的红军逼近的情况下，德国唯一的出路就是不可避免的失败。
However, Germany only reached this situation because of the ideologically driven economic and foreign policy decisions of the past seven years.
然而，德国之所以陷入这种境地，完全是因为过去七年中意识形态驱动的经济和外交政策决策所致。
Germany could make up its shortfalls through trade with the USSR, but the Soviet unx often played hardball in negotiations and both sides understood their current accord as a time-saving measure. In 1941, Germany was much more prepared for war and this terrified Stalin and gave Germany a great deal of leverage. However, the Red Army was rapidly becoming stronger and it would eventually have all of the leverage to either coerce territorial and economic concessions from Germany or to simply invade at a moment of opportunity.
德国可以通过与苏联的贸易来弥补其短缺，但苏联在谈判中经常采取强硬态度，双方都把当时的协定视为一种节省时间的权宜之计。到 1941 年，德国为战争做好了更充分的准备，这让斯大林感到恐惧，也为德国提供了极大的筹码。然而，红军正在迅速壮大，最终会掌握全部主动，或者通过胁迫迫使德国在领土和经济上做出让步，或者在时机成熟时直接发动入侵。
Despite having won nothing but overwhelming victories for two years, Germany was on a course to inevitable defeat. To this end, they crafted a military plan (Operation Barbarossa) to annihilate the Red Army in three months and gain unlimited access to the natural wealth of the European SSRs. This would enable them to bypass the British blockade and wage war indefinitely, fighting on until the British agreed to recognize German dominion over Europe. Of course, the atomic bomb would have undone this theory, but it’s understandable in the moment.
尽管连续两年取得压倒性胜利，德国实际上正走向不可避免的失败。为此，他们制定了一个军事计划（巴巴罗萨行动），计划在三个月内歼灭红军并获取欧洲苏维埃社会主义共和国的无限自然资源。这将使他们能够绕过英国的封锁并无限期地进行战争，直到英国同意承认德国对欧洲的统治。当然，原子弹会推翻这一理论，但在当时这一想法是可以理解的。
What’s also important is the method by which Germany intended to exploit the natural resources of the European SSR. Party functionaries and figures such as Goering settled on a series of economic policies to “liquidate the surplus population” of the occupied territories, as this was a necessity to create the food surplus Germany desired. Modern historians categorize these plans together as “The Hunger plan,” which intended to kill between 30 and 100 million people.
同样重要的是，德国打算如何开发欧洲苏维埃社会主义共和国的自然资源这一方法。党内官员和戈林等人确定了一系列经济政策，旨在“清除被占领土上的剩余人口”，因为这是创造德国所需粮食剩余的必要手段。现代历史学家将这些计划统称为“饥饿计划”，其目标是造成 3000 万到 1 亿人的死亡。
This was of course beyond contemplation for any normal society. When millions of Bengals starved under the extraordinarily racist watch of Churchill, famine relief was still attempted throughout the event. It was bungled and ineffectual, but there is little case to be made that the mass death was deliberate.
这当然是任何正常社会都无法想象的。当数百万孟加拉人在极端种族主义的丘吉尔统治下饿死时，尽管救济行动笨拙且无效，但在整个事件中仍尝试进行了救济；很难证明这些大规模死亡是有意为之。
Even in the brutality, inhumanity, and paranoia of Stalin’s USSR, the famines that wracked Ukraine and Kazakhstan killed upwards of five million people and resulted in a birth deficit of double that were not deliberate products of the system. The Soviet governor of Kazakhstan was executed for his role in GENOCIDE there. In 1932–1933, Moscow scaled grain exports down and purchased grain from Central Asia, as it had become clear that the “Kulaks” were an imaginary enemy invented by a system dominated by promotion-seeking middle managers who had systematically exaggerated grain production during a famine.
即便在斯大林苏联的残暴、非人性和偏执之中，使乌克兰和哈萨克斯坦饥荒肆虐的那些灾难也夺去了五百多万人性命，并造成了相当于两倍于此的出生缺口，但这些并非制度刻意制造的产物。哈萨克斯坦的苏维埃地方长官因在那里的种族灭绝中所扮演的角色被处决。1932–1933 年，莫斯科缩减了谷物出口并从中亚购买粮食，因为已变得明显，“富农”（Kulaks）是一个被由寻求晋升的中层管理者主导的体制捏造出来的虚构敌人，这些人在人为的饥荒期间系统性地夸大了粮食产量。
All this to say that it’s nearly impossible to find true analogs to the unique horror of the Holocaust beyond the Belgian Congo or the Cambodian killing fields. Yet, Nazi party functionaries were eagerly casual to conduct an even larger Holocaust should they win in the East.
It was nothing but an accounting issue.
所有这些都说明，除了比利时刚果或柬埔寨的屠杀场之外，几乎不可能找到与大屠杀那种独特恐怖相当的真实类比。然而，纳粹党功能人员若在东方获胜，热衷且轻率地准备制造一个更大规模的大屠杀。
这无非是一个会计问题。
This is important because Nazi ideology is intrinsically woven into all of Germany’s actions, not just on the surface layer but down to the roots of the economic conduct that made their wars not only possible but “necessary.” Nazi ideology is precisely what delivered Germany to the conquer-or-die situation of the summer of 1941.
How Germany Got to 1941
这很重要，因为纳粹意识形态贯穿于德国的一切行动之中，不仅仅是表层，而是深入到使其战争不仅成为可能而且被视为“必要”的经济行为根源。正是纳粹意识形态把德国推到了 1941 年夏天那种非征服即亡的境地。
德国如何走到 1941 年
But the question becomes more interesting as you look back further into the past. None of this had to happen; by 1933, Germany’s economy was mounting a steady, healthy recovery from the Great Depression. It had thrived economically as a fairly normal country from 1924 up to 1929, and it would do so again. The Nazis’ popularity had even declined slightly for the first time in the election immediately before establishment politicians gave them the keys to the kingdom.
但如果回溯得更远，问题就更有趣。所有这些本不必发生；到 1933 年时，德国经济已在从大萧条中稳步、健康地恢复。从 1924 年到 1929 年，它作为一个相当正常的国家在经济上表现良好，而且以后也会如此。纳粹的支持率甚至在他们被体制内政治家交付“王国钥匙”之前的那次选举中首次略有下降。
Instead of Germany continuing to exist as a relatively normal country, the Nazis spent Germany to the edge of bankruptcy. In a matter of years, only annexation and conquest could give them the hard currency to keep the economy afloat, expand rearmament, and maintain the sense of false prosperity they’d created. But why do all of this?
A terrible answer to this same question, written by one of our resident Nazi apologists alleges that Germany pursued self-sufficiency and military conquest because all of the other countries had been embargoing Germany. This is bewilderingly false — France was one of Germany’s principal trade partners until the day the tanks rolled into Poland.
然而德国并没有继续作为一个相对正常的国家存在，纳粹把德国的开支推到了破产边缘。几年之间，只有兼并与征服才能为他们提供维持经济运转、扩张重整军备并保持他们创造的那种虚假的繁荣所需的硬通货。但为什么要做这一切呢？
一个对同一问题的糟糕回答，由我们的一位常驻纳粹辩护者所写，声称德国追求自给自足和军事征服是因为其他所有国家都在对德国实施禁运。这荒谬得令人困惑——直到坦克开进波兰那天，法国一直是德国的主要贸易伙伴之一。
Rather, it was because of a variety of ghosts of Hitler’s own creation. He believed, in essence, that the demographic transitions that came with industrialization together with the industrialization of the poor countries would enable the Jews to destroy the world.
In essence, the wealthy and industrialized countries would not be able to feed themselves, and the semi-industrial poor countries would see such population growth and declining food production that they would have to keep their food to themselves and would not export it in exchange for European machine tools. At this point, Europe would fall into mass starvation.
相反，这更是因为希特勒自己制造的各种幽灵。本质上他相信，随工业化而来的生育率变化以及贫穷国家的工业化会使犹太人有能力摧毁世界。
本质上，富裕且工业化的国家将无法自给自足，而半工业化的贫穷国家会出现如此大的人口增长和粮食产量下降，以至于它们不得不自己留住粮食，不会为换取欧洲的机器工具而出口粮食。到那时，欧洲将陷入大规模饥荒。
This was, of course, a Jewish plot to plunge Europe into a communist revolution and open the way for Jewish race-mixing to pollute the Aryan race and destroy all civilization and culture. To Hitler’s mind, using military force to create a self-sufficient Aryan superstate within a matter of decades was of course a matter of saving the world.
这当然是犹太人的阴谋，目的是将欧洲推入共产主义革命，为犹太人与雅利安人通婚混淆种族，污染雅利安种族并摧毁所有文明和文化打开道路。在希特勒看来，利用军事力量在几十年内创建一个自给自足的雅利安超级国家，当然是拯救世界的事情。
Ultimately, a combination of bad economics and insane racism motivated an entire nation to throw itself down a narrow path to oblivion. Germany’s debt-fueled rearmament put Germany into a strategic straitjacket — they had to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia to keep the economy afloat, they had to invade Poland and open the way to the USSR, they had to invade Scandinavia and Western Europe to secure more resources and eliminate the threat in the West, and then they had to invade the USSR.
归根结底，是糟糕的经济政策和疯狂的种族主义驱使整个民族把自己推上了一条狭窄的自取灭亡之路。德国靠债务驱动的再军备把国家套进了战略的紧箍咒——他们不得不吞并奥地利和捷克斯洛伐克以维持经济运转，不得不入侵波兰并为进攻苏联打开通道，不得不入侵斯堪的纳维亚和西欧以获取更多资源并消除西线威胁，接着他们又不得不入侵苏联。
The Nazis warped the country into a military vulture economy that was reliant on new wars and new loot to keep itself afloat. Hitler’s fixation on lebensraum and expansion in the East was the cause of and solution to all of Germany’s problems.
While Youtube historian TIK is an extremely mixed bag, he has some entertaining and thoroughly detailed videos on these topics where he pulls direct quotations from Mein Kampf.
纳粹把国家扭曲成一种依赖新战争和新掠夺来维持生计的军事秃鹫经济。希特勒对生存空间和向东扩张的执着既是德国所有问题的根源，也是他认为的解决之道。
虽然 YouTube 历史博主 TIK 水平参差不齐，但他有一些既有趣又详尽的视频，讨论这些话题时会直接引用《我的奋斗》中的原文。
Allow me to preface this answer by saying that it was NOT a mistake to do so from Hitler’s perspective.
Strategically it made sense to attack the Soviet unx while they were weak and unprepared for war. Hitler knew that as he made progress on the Western front, Stalin grew increasingly nervous about the growing power of Germany. The poor performance of the USSR in the Winter War also motivated Hitler.
请允许我在回答前说明，从希特勒的角度来看，这样做并不是一个错误。
从战略上讲，在苏联疲弱且未为战争做好准备时进攻是有意义的。希特勒知道，随着他在西线取得进展，斯大林对德国日益增长的力量感到越来越紧张。苏联在冬季战争中的糟糕表现也促使了希特勒的决定。
If Hitler's commanders had done what Hitler had wanted, which was to rush as fast as possible to Moscow, then it is possible that the USSR would have fallen. You have to consider that the USSR was a superpower, sure, but not the superpower we saw from 1945 to 1991. The USSR’s army was in shambles. It was ill-equipped and all it had was quantity.
如果希特勒的指挥官们按照希特勒的意愿行事，尽可能迅速地冲向莫斯科，那么苏联有可能会沦陷。你必须考虑到苏联确实是一个超级大国，但并不是我们在 1945 到 1991 年间看到的那种超级大国。苏联的军队一片混乱，装备不足，所拥有的只是人数上的数量。
Hitler had made a lot of progress on the Western front so he had some time to concentrate here. This is a map of Europe on 22 June 1941, the day when Operation Barbarossa was started.
You can see that Europe was almost entirely neutral or controlled by Germany. So don’t be deluded into thinking that Germany was losing on that front while it attacked the USSR.
希特勒在西线取得了很多进展，所以他在这里有一些时间可以集中力量。这是 1941 年 6 月 22 日的欧洲地图，也是巴巴罗萨行动开始的那一天。
你可以看到欧洲几乎完全是中立或被德国控制的。所以不要自欺欺人地认为德国在进攻苏联时在那一战线处于劣势。
The USSR’s army was in poor condition, but was rapidly improving. The longer Hitler waited, the harder it would’ve been to eventually conquer the USSR. Stalin and Hitler were not real allies, they only had a non-aggression pact, and both were not exactly known to be trustworthy. Stalin was also, at times, gullible and Hitler took advantage of this diplomatically. Even when warned that Germany was going to invade, Stalin dismissed his advisers. Moreover, Nazi Germany needed oil to keep fighting and needed a lot of it - far more than it was producing. There is a lot of oil in the Caucasus and this area was controlled by the USSR. Victory over the USSR would fulfill Germany’s oil needs.
苏联的军队状况很差，但正在迅速改善。希特勒等得越久，最终征服苏联就会越难。斯大林和希特勒并不是真正的盟友，他们只是签订了互不侵犯条约，而且双方都不以可靠著称。斯大林有时也很轻信，希特勒在外交上利用了这一点。即便在被警告德国将入侵时，斯大林也驳回了顾问的意见。此外，纳粹德国需要石油来继续作战，而且需求量很大——远远超过其产量。高加索地区有大量石油，而该地区由苏联控制。战胜苏联将满足德国的石油需求。
Taking into account all these factors, the thought probably never occurred to Hitler and his officers that the Soviet unx would ever be able to launch any kind of counter attack. It took quite some time and the United States to intervene for the Soviet unx to really begin its successful counter-offensive.
考虑到所有这些因素，希特勒和他的军官们大概从未想到苏联会有能力发动任何形式的反击。苏联真正开始取得成功的反攻花了相当长的时间，而且还需要美国的介入。
It's hard to find actual proof of what was going on through Hitler's mind when he took on this risky operation. However, we do know that these had been a part of his plans for years. It was probably thought at the time that the odds were in Nazi Germany's favor. In the war, the USSR suffered 4.9 million casualties, while Germany only suffered about 1 million, so Germany was very close to victory. In all reality, the Germans had a pretty good chance of winning the war within six months, perhaps if just a few variables had changed they might actually have pulled it off. If they could have gotten there a month earlier, they probably would have won. Great Britain was absolutely in no position to put up any kind of resistance except for the occasional bombing run, which was producing much larger losses than they could keep up with equipment wise.
很难找到确凿的证据说明希特勒在发动这次冒险行动时心里在想什么。不过，我们确实知道这些计划已经酝酿多年。当时很可能认为战争的局势对纳粹德国有利。在战争中，苏联付出了 490 万人的伤亡，而德国仅约 100 万，所以德国离胜利非常接近。实际上，德国人在六个月内赢得战争的机会相当大，也许只要改变几个变量，他们就可能真的做到了。如果他们能早一个月到达目的地，可能就会获胜。大不列颠根本无力进行任何实质性抵抗，除了偶尔的轰炸行动外，而这些轰炸在装备上造成的损失远超其能承受的范围。
The operation was blundered because the blitzkrieg was not fast enough, Hitler underestimated the kind of force the Soviet unx could pull together and he underestimated the severity of the cold winter. The plan was also delayed because of setbacks in the Balkans and helping the Italians out where they had failed. If instead of helping the Italians, he had used those forces in the USSR, or he made some better estimations, he could’ve won. The Soviet unx was a rising power which would be even harder to defeat in the future. So this was Germany’s only opportunity to conquer the USSR, which if done, would’ve made Germany far stronger.
但这次行动弄糟了，因为闪电战进展不够快，希特勒低估了苏联能够召集起来的兵力，也低估了严冬的严重程度。由于在巴尔干的挫折以及去救助在那儿失败的意大利人，计划也被拖延了。如果他没有去帮助意大利人，而是把那些兵力投入到苏联，或者他做出了一些更准确的判断，他本可以获胜。苏联是一个正在崛起的强国，未来会更难以征服。所以这是德国唯一一次征服苏联的机会，如果成功，德国本会强大得多。
From Hitler’s perspective, it absolutely was worth it and was necessary since Germany desperately needed oil.
Hitler, though a cruel piece of shit, was not a fool.
从希特勒的角度来看，这绝对是值得的，也是必要的，因为德国急需石油。
希特勒虽然是个残忍的混蛋，但不是个傻子。
Beau Blinder
Hitler's invasion of the Soviet unx was fueled primarily by his ideology -- his belief that the Slavs themselves were weak, inferior people that deserved (needed) to be subjugated. Hitler made no effort to hide his contempt for the Slavs, which is what made the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact so shocking. Suddenly, two countries whose ideologies clashed, whose people disliked each other, and who seemed to be on a crash-course for war since German unification, were bonded in a strange alliance.
希特勒入侵苏联主要由他的意识形态推动——他认为斯拉夫人本身是软弱、低等的民族，理应（需要）被征服。希特勒对斯拉夫人的蔑视根本不加掩饰，这也正是《莫洛托夫—里宾特洛甫条约》如此令人震惊的原因。突然间，两个意识形态互相冲突、人民互相嫌恶、且自德国统一以来看似注定要走向战争的国家，竟以一种奇怪的方式结成了同盟。
By the time Hitler and the general staff began planning Operation Barbarossa, it was clear that the Soviet Army was in shambles. Just two years earlier, the Soviets had waged the disastrous Winter War against Finland, in which a poorly supplied, numerically inferior enemy, inflicted severe casualties on the Russians and ultimately forced them to accept less than what they had planned on.
到希特勒和参谋总局开始策划巴巴罗萨行动时，苏联红军已经显得一片混乱。就在两年前，苏联与芬兰爆发了灾难性的冬季战争，一支补给不足且人数劣势的敌人，对俄军造成了严重伤亡，并最终迫使他们接受了低于原计划的结果。
Barbarossa was supposed to be a quick campaign, lasting no longer than six to eight weeks and which would end with the complete surrender of the Soviet unx. After initially routing the Soviet armies located along the Russian / German border, the three German army groups expected to race across the countryside and only encounter token, uncoordinated resistance. Every part of this plan hinged on a quick victory because the Germans knew that they would have to start preparing for the eventually American flood of troops, weapons, and supplies.
巴巴罗萨本应是一场速战速决的战役，不超过六到八周，最终以苏联的彻底投降告终。在最初击溃驻守俄德边境的苏联军队后，三个德军集团预计将横扫乡野，只遭遇象征性、无组织的抵抗。这一切计划都取决于迅速的胜利，因为德军知道他们必须开始为最终将至的美军洪流——包括部队、武器和补给——做准备。
Whether or not this plan was realistic has been a hotly contested subject. The Germans mostly certainly believed that they could win. They thought they were fighting an inferior enemy with a population that greatly resented the central government in Moscow. Given the brutality with which Stalin ruled, they believed that nobody would rise up in his defense, no new armies would be raised, and the entire Soviet system would crumble under the weight of the German military advance.
无论这个计划是否现实，一直是一个备受争议的话题。德国人几乎可以肯定他们相信自己能获胜。他们认为自己在与一个较弱的敌人作战，这个敌人的人口对莫斯科的中央政府非常不满。鉴于斯大林统治的残酷，他们相信不会有人起来为他辩护，不会再组建新军队，整个苏维埃体制会在德国军事进攻的重压下崩溃。
Obviously, things didn't go according to plan. Delays in the launch of Barbarossa were a problem for the Germans, but the larger issue was that the Soviets began to reorganize their military force, mobilize their population, and gear up for war. Had the Wehrmacht been able to capture the factories that dotted western Russia, things might have gone differently, but the story of the Eastern Front isn't one of dramatic decisive battles, but rather a slow methodical change in the balance of power between two incredibly strong and committed combatants.
显然，事情并未按计划进行。巴巴罗萨行动推迟对德国人是一个问题，但更大的问题是苏联开始重组他们的军队，动员民众，并为战争做准备。若德意志国防军能够占领点缀于俄罗斯西部的那些工厂，局势可能会不同，但东线的故事并不是关于戏剧性决定性战役的，而是一场在两个极其强大且忠于各自信念的交战方之间权力平衡缓慢而有条不紊的变化。
When the German strategic planners sat down, they obviously saw the potential for victory. The Red Army was a broken, incoherent mess of communist idealism, inferior weaponry, and ineptitude. They looked at their own highly mobilized and highly professionalized force and believed, rightly so, that any battle they engaged in they would win. And they did win over and over again. Germany lost 900,000 men during Barbarossa, the Soviets lost millions, yet the war continued. What they didn't count on was Soviet resolve, Stalin's ability to rally the entire country to his cause, the massive Soviet remobilization effort, nor the Soviets being able to pick up their entire industrial base and move it east.
当德国的战略策划者坐下来制定计划时，他们显然看到了胜利的潜力。红军是一团破碎、混乱的东西，充斥着共产主义的理想主义、劣势的武器和无能。他们看着自己高度动员且高度职业化的军队，并且正确地相信，只要参战，他们就会获胜。事实也确实如此，他们一次又一次地获胜。德国在巴巴罗萨行动中损失了 90 万军人，苏联人损失了数百万，然而战争仍在继续。他们没有预料到的是苏联人的决心、斯大林将整个国家团结到他麾下的能力、苏联大规模重新动员的努力，以及苏联能够将整个工业基地搬到东方的能力。
Tobin Sparfeld
In order to understand why a Hitler would do something so "crazy," we must first recognize that what Hitler believed to be true differs from what we believe to be true. So let's examine what Hitler and some of the Germans believed then.
为了理解希特勒为什么会做出如此“疯狂”的事，我们必须首先认识到希特勒所相信的与我们所相信的不同。所以让我们来审视当时希特勒和一些德国人所相信的。
1. The Soviet unx was not very industrialized. Up to this point, the Soviet unx had not been very industrialized. That had changed by WWII, but the Germans were horribly mistaken. The Soviets had about 23,000 tanks by the time of the invasion, and their economy was considerably more modern than the primitive country Germany had taken them to be.
2. The Soviet army had weak leadership that was untested. This was actually true. Stalin had killed about 30,000 troops in his Great Purge before 1939. Many generals and experienced commanders were removed from office at this time. They couldn't even beat Finland in 1939 with superior numbers and equipment. Finland!
1. 苏联并不是很工业化。到那时为止，苏联并不是很工业化。虽然到二战时这种情况已发生变化，但德国人严重地误判了这一点。到入侵时，苏联大约拥有 23,000 辆坦克，而且他们的经济比德国人所认为的原始国家要现代得多。
2. 苏联军队的指挥薄弱且未经考验。这实际上是真的。斯大林在 1939 年前的大清洗中处决了大约 3 万名军人。许多将领和有经验的指挥官在此期间被免职。他们在 1939 年甚至无法以优势兵力和装备击败芬兰。芬兰！
3. The Soviet unx was not expecting an invasion. Germany and the Soviets had just signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939. The Soviets were not gearing up for war with Germany.
4. The German Wehrmacht was essentially invincible. People were shocked about how quickly the French fell. At the time, the Maginot line seemed so well fortified that a German invasion seemed foolhardy. The Blitzkrieg strategy ended the war with France, a country with superior troop numbers and equipment defending its home territory and sovereignty.
3. 苏联并未预料到会被入侵。德国和苏联在 1939 年 8 月刚签署了互不侵犯条约。苏联当时并未为与德国开战做准备。
4. 德国国防军几乎不可战胜。人们对法国沦陷的速度感到震惊。当时的马奇诺防线看起来固若金汤，以致德国入侵显得鲁莽。闪电战策略结束了对法国的战争——一个在本土保卫主权、拥有更优兵力和装备的国家。
5. They could accomplish their obxtives in a few months. Therefore, any concerns about the winter or supply lines would not be an issue in this case.
6. Soviet forces were unlikely to retreat (like they did against Napoleon) because they needed the Baltic States, Moscow, Leningrad, and Ukraine. Moscow and Leningrad are the essential cities, and Ukraine has great agricultural potential. Therefore, the Soviets had to protect this territory.
5. 他们可以在几个月内完成目标。因此，任何关于冬季或补给线的担忧在这种情况下都不会成为问题。
6. 苏联军队不太可能像对拿破仑那样撤退，因为他们需要波罗的海国家、莫斯科、列宁格勒和乌克兰。莫斯科和列宁格勒是关键城市，乌克兰具有巨大的农业潜力。因此，苏联必须保卫这些领土。
So, let's look at it from Hitler's perspective. You just outmaneuvered and humiliated your strongest opponent in mainland Europe in six weeks (France). The Soviets are inexperienced, untested, have low morale, and have no idea you are about to attack. You are going up against an unindustrialized nation that is largely landlocked (Leningrad is the only port), that has little farmland and basic infrastructure. And moreover, you don't want the whole country. You just want to annex part of the Ukraine for agriculture, get oil, and get some labor for German industry. If you can capture Leningrad and Moscow and a little more, you can negotiate a peaceful surrender and then focus on Great Britain.
所以，从希特勒的角度来看。你刚在六周内以机动战术挫败并羞辱了你在欧洲大陆最强的对手（法国）。苏联人缺乏经验、未经考验、士气低落，而且完全不知道你即将发动攻击。你将面对一个不够工业化、基本上是内陆国家（列宁格勒是唯一的港口）、耕地和基础设施都很少的国家。而且，你并不想要整个国家。你只是想吞并部分乌克兰以获取农业资源、石油，并为德国工业获取一些劳动力。如果你能占领列宁格勒和莫斯科再略有推进，你就可以谈判达成和平投降，然后将注意力集中在英国。
Looking at it from that perspective, it doesn't seem so crazy. Of course, Hitler and the Germans were wrong -- after early losses the Soviets put up much more of a fight than the Germans expected, which meant that the winter and supply lines did matter. They never captured those cities and took heavy casualties. And eventually the opening of a second front made things even worse for them. The decision to invade turned out to be an immensely costly one.
从那个角度看，这似乎并不那么疯狂。当然，希特勒和德国人是错的——在初期损失之后，苏联人比德国人预期的要更加顽强地抵抗，这意味着冬季和补给线确实很重要。他们从未攻下那些城市并且付出了沉重的伤亡。而且最终第二战线的开辟让情况对他们更加不利。入侵的决定结果证明代价极其高昂。
Michael Kosh
What better place to start than with a quote from Hitler himself
"Everything I undertake is directed against Russia. If the West is too stupid and too blind to comprehend this, I will be forced to reach an understanding with the Russians, turn and strike the West, and then after their defeat turn back against the Soviet unx with my collected strength. I need the Ukraine and with that no one can starve us out as they did in the last war."
有什么比希特勒自己的话更好的出发点呢
“我所做的一切都是针对俄罗斯的。如果西方愚蠢到看不懂这一点，我将被迫与俄国人达成谅解，转而打击西方，然后在他们被击败后以我集中的力量转回对付苏联。我需要乌克兰，有了它就没有人能像上次战争那样把我们饿死。”
This, along with the annexation of parts of Czechoslovakia and the partitioning and later defeat of Poland were all part of the Nazi Lebensraum ideology. This was particularly in conflict with the ideology of Pan-Slavism which reached its zenith around the time of WWI, but still held a lot of influence up through the foundation of the Soviet unx following WWII. Hitler had violently suppressed the communists when he was in the process of coming to power so the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (aka The Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the unx of Soviet Socialist Republics) was a strange marriage until you consider the weakness of Russia at the time and the desire of Germany not to fight on two fronts simultaneously. Stalin was no fool, he knew that Hitler was not to be trusted but he hoped that Hitler would wear himself out before turning towards Russia and he therefore formed the pact with him.
这一点，加上吞并捷克斯洛伐克的部分领土以及对波兰的分裂和随后击败，都是纳粹“生存空间”意识形态的一部分。这与泛斯拉夫主义的意识形态尤其冲突，后者在第一次世界大战时期达到了顶峰，但直到第二次世界大战后苏联成立前仍有很大影响。希特勒在上台过程中曾对gcd人进行残酷镇压，因此《莫洛托夫—里宾特洛甫条约》（又称《德意志与苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟不侵略条约》）是一段奇怪的联姻，除非你考虑到当时俄罗斯的软弱以及德国不想同时在两个战线上作战的愿望。斯大林并非愚蠢，他知道希特勒不可信，但他希望希特勒在转向俄罗斯之前先把自己消耗掉，因此与他缔结了该条约。
Keep in mind that Russia and Germany both lost territory as a result of WWI and Poland not only became a buffer between these two countries, but a common (and weak) enemy (purely due to territorial grievances). Before Hitler even attacked the two sides postured in various ways. In the case of the Soviets, most notably through the Winter War in which Russia attacked Finland in order to create a buffer zone for St. Petersburg (known as Leningrad at the time).
请记住，作为一战的结果，俄罗斯和德国都失去了领土，波兰不仅成为这两个国家之间的缓冲区，而且由于领土纠纷还成为共同的（且较弱的）敌人。在希特勒发动进攻之前，双方已经以各种方式摆出姿态。就苏联而言，最显著的是通过冬季战争，俄罗斯进攻芬兰以在圣彼得堡（当时称列宁格勒）周围建立缓冲区。
When Hitler finally did attack he made a few major miscalculations (had he not, he could have possibly actually defeated Russia). First, he underestimated the Russian winters. Similarly, he underestimated how difficult it would be to defeat Stalingrad (Volgograd). In fact, one could argue that he shouldn't have even attacked it in the first place and instead focused on the oil fields in the Caucasus rather than diverting his forces.
当希特勒最终发动进攻时，他犯了几个重大的误判（如果没有这些失误，他很可能实际上会击败俄罗斯）。首先，他低估了俄罗斯的冬天。同样，他低估了要攻克斯大林格勒（伏尔加格勒）的困难。事实上，有人可能会认为他根本就不该进攻那里，而应将注意力集中在高加索的油田上，而不是分散兵力。
Finally, it's important to keep in mind that at the time his only major enemy that he had yet to defeat was Great Britain. Hitler was at the pinnacle of his success and his hubris would ultimately lead to his downfall.
最后，重要的是要记住，在当时他尚未击败的主要敌人只有大不列颠。希特勒当时处于成功的顶峰，而他的傲慢最终将导致他的灭亡。
Andy Duffell
Why: it was his main obxtive for the war. The Nazis wanted to create a Greater German Reich, an ethnostate in which Germans had all the resources and land they needed to survive independently of the rest of the world.
为什么：那是他发动战争的主要目标。纳粹想要建立一个大德意志帝国，一个民族国家，使德国人拥有他们独立于世界其余部分生存所需的一切资源和土地。
Hitler and the Nazis thought all other countries were headed for collapse and that only a pure Aryan nation could survive. Most of the resources and land he wanted lay in Eastern Europe, so he needed to take them off the USSR, and also defeat Communism, which he saw as the main rival to Fascism.
Ultimate result: total destruction of the Third Reich. The Wehrmacht is annihilated by the Red Army, Germany is invaded, conquered and partitioned for nearly 50 years. 30 million people die.
希特勒和纳粹认为其他国家终将崩溃，只有纯粹的雅利安民族国家才能生存。他想要的大部分资源和土地都在东欧，所以他需要从苏联手中夺取这些地区，同时还要打败他视为法西斯主义主要对手的共产主义。
最终结果：第三帝国的彻底毁灭。德国国防军被红军歼灭，德国被入侵、征服并被分裂近 50 年。三千万人死亡。
Robert Hansen
It was the inevitable outcome of Nazi economic, political, and cultural ideology and practice. In the moment, it was an economic necessity; Barbarossa was the only way to attain long-term, unlimited access to the resources to bypass the British blockade. With America backing Britain with infinite credit in the West and an ever-strengthening Red Army looming in the East, Germany’s only alternative was inevitable defeat.
这是纳粹的经济、政治和文化意识形态与实践所导致的必然结果。就当时而言，这是一个经济上的必要选择；“巴巴罗萨行动”是获得长期、无限制资源以突破英国封锁的唯一途径。在西方美国以无限信贷支持英国、而东方又有不断壮大的红军逼近的情况下，德国唯一的出路就是不可避免的失败。
However, Germany only reached this situation because of the ideologically driven economic and foreign policy decisions of the past seven years.
然而，德国之所以陷入这种境地，完全是因为过去七年中意识形态驱动的经济和外交政策决策所致。
Germany could make up its shortfalls through trade with the USSR, but the Soviet unx often played hardball in negotiations and both sides understood their current accord as a time-saving measure. In 1941, Germany was much more prepared for war and this terrified Stalin and gave Germany a great deal of leverage. However, the Red Army was rapidly becoming stronger and it would eventually have all of the leverage to either coerce territorial and economic concessions from Germany or to simply invade at a moment of opportunity.
德国可以通过与苏联的贸易来弥补其短缺，但苏联在谈判中经常采取强硬态度，双方都把当时的协定视为一种节省时间的权宜之计。到 1941 年，德国为战争做好了更充分的准备，这让斯大林感到恐惧，也为德国提供了极大的筹码。然而，红军正在迅速壮大，最终会掌握全部主动，或者通过胁迫迫使德国在领土和经济上做出让步，或者在时机成熟时直接发动入侵。
Despite having won nothing but overwhelming victories for two years, Germany was on a course to inevitable defeat. To this end, they crafted a military plan (Operation Barbarossa) to annihilate the Red Army in three months and gain unlimited access to the natural wealth of the European SSRs. This would enable them to bypass the British blockade and wage war indefinitely, fighting on until the British agreed to recognize German dominion over Europe. Of course, the atomic bomb would have undone this theory, but it’s understandable in the moment.
尽管连续两年取得压倒性胜利，德国实际上正走向不可避免的失败。为此，他们制定了一个军事计划（巴巴罗萨行动），计划在三个月内歼灭红军并获取欧洲苏维埃社会主义共和国的无限自然资源。这将使他们能够绕过英国的封锁并无限期地进行战争，直到英国同意承认德国对欧洲的统治。当然，原子弹会推翻这一理论，但在当时这一想法是可以理解的。
What’s also important is the method by which Germany intended to exploit the natural resources of the European SSR. Party functionaries and figures such as Goering settled on a series of economic policies to “liquidate the surplus population” of the occupied territories, as this was a necessity to create the food surplus Germany desired. Modern historians categorize these plans together as “The Hunger plan,” which intended to kill between 30 and 100 million people.
同样重要的是，德国打算如何开发欧洲苏维埃社会主义共和国的自然资源这一方法。党内官员和戈林等人确定了一系列经济政策，旨在“清除被占领土上的剩余人口”，因为这是创造德国所需粮食剩余的必要手段。现代历史学家将这些计划统称为“饥饿计划”，其目标是造成 3000 万到 1 亿人的死亡。
This was of course beyond contemplation for any normal society. When millions of Bengals starved under the extraordinarily racist watch of Churchill, famine relief was still attempted throughout the event. It was bungled and ineffectual, but there is little case to be made that the mass death was deliberate.
这当然是任何正常社会都无法想象的。当数百万孟加拉人在极端种族主义的丘吉尔统治下饿死时，尽管救济行动笨拙且无效，但在整个事件中仍尝试进行了救济；很难证明这些大规模死亡是有意为之。
Even in the brutality, inhumanity, and paranoia of Stalin’s USSR, the famines that wracked Ukraine and Kazakhstan killed upwards of five million people and resulted in a birth deficit of double that were not deliberate products of the system. The Soviet governor of Kazakhstan was executed for his role in GENOCIDE there. In 1932–1933, Moscow scaled grain exports down and purchased grain from Central Asia, as it had become clear that the “Kulaks” were an imaginary enemy invented by a system dominated by promotion-seeking middle managers who had systematically exaggerated grain production during a famine.
即便在斯大林苏联的残暴、非人性和偏执之中，使乌克兰和哈萨克斯坦饥荒肆虐的那些灾难也夺去了五百多万人性命，并造成了相当于两倍于此的出生缺口，但这些并非制度刻意制造的产物。哈萨克斯坦的苏维埃地方长官因在那里的种族灭绝中所扮演的角色被处决。1932–1933 年，莫斯科缩减了谷物出口并从中亚购买粮食，因为已变得明显，“富农”（Kulaks）是一个被由寻求晋升的中层管理者主导的体制捏造出来的虚构敌人，这些人在人为的饥荒期间系统性地夸大了粮食产量。
All this to say that it’s nearly impossible to find true analogs to the unique horror of the Holocaust beyond the Belgian Congo or the Cambodian killing fields. Yet, Nazi party functionaries were eagerly casual to conduct an even larger Holocaust should they win in the East.
It was nothing but an accounting issue.
所有这些都说明，除了比利时刚果或柬埔寨的屠杀场之外，几乎不可能找到与大屠杀那种独特恐怖相当的真实类比。然而，纳粹党功能人员若在东方获胜，热衷且轻率地准备制造一个更大规模的大屠杀。
这无非是一个会计问题。
This is important because Nazi ideology is intrinsically woven into all of Germany’s actions, not just on the surface layer but down to the roots of the economic conduct that made their wars not only possible but “necessary.” Nazi ideology is precisely what delivered Germany to the conquer-or-die situation of the summer of 1941.
How Germany Got to 1941
这很重要，因为纳粹意识形态贯穿于德国的一切行动之中，不仅仅是表层，而是深入到使其战争不仅成为可能而且被视为“必要”的经济行为根源。正是纳粹意识形态把德国推到了 1941 年夏天那种非征服即亡的境地。
德国如何走到 1941 年
But the question becomes more interesting as you look back further into the past. None of this had to happen; by 1933, Germany’s economy was mounting a steady, healthy recovery from the Great Depression. It had thrived economically as a fairly normal country from 1924 up to 1929, and it would do so again. The Nazis’ popularity had even declined slightly for the first time in the election immediately before establishment politicians gave them the keys to the kingdom.
但如果回溯得更远，问题就更有趣。所有这些本不必发生；到 1933 年时，德国经济已在从大萧条中稳步、健康地恢复。从 1924 年到 1929 年，它作为一个相当正常的国家在经济上表现良好，而且以后也会如此。纳粹的支持率甚至在他们被体制内政治家交付“王国钥匙”之前的那次选举中首次略有下降。
Instead of Germany continuing to exist as a relatively normal country, the Nazis spent Germany to the edge of bankruptcy. In a matter of years, only annexation and conquest could give them the hard currency to keep the economy afloat, expand rearmament, and maintain the sense of false prosperity they’d created. But why do all of this?
A terrible answer to this same question, written by one of our resident Nazi apologists alleges that Germany pursued self-sufficiency and military conquest because all of the other countries had been embargoing Germany. This is bewilderingly false — France was one of Germany’s principal trade partners until the day the tanks rolled into Poland.
然而德国并没有继续作为一个相对正常的国家存在，纳粹把德国的开支推到了破产边缘。几年之间，只有兼并与征服才能为他们提供维持经济运转、扩张重整军备并保持他们创造的那种虚假的繁荣所需的硬通货。但为什么要做这一切呢？
一个对同一问题的糟糕回答，由我们的一位常驻纳粹辩护者所写，声称德国追求自给自足和军事征服是因为其他所有国家都在对德国实施禁运。这荒谬得令人困惑——直到坦克开进波兰那天，法国一直是德国的主要贸易伙伴之一。
Rather, it was because of a variety of ghosts of Hitler’s own creation. He believed, in essence, that the demographic transitions that came with industrialization together with the industrialization of the poor countries would enable the Jews to destroy the world.
In essence, the wealthy and industrialized countries would not be able to feed themselves, and the semi-industrial poor countries would see such population growth and declining food production that they would have to keep their food to themselves and would not export it in exchange for European machine tools. At this point, Europe would fall into mass starvation.
相反，这更是因为希特勒自己制造的各种幽灵。本质上他相信，随工业化而来的生育率变化以及贫穷国家的工业化会使犹太人有能力摧毁世界。
本质上，富裕且工业化的国家将无法自给自足，而半工业化的贫穷国家会出现如此大的人口增长和粮食产量下降，以至于它们不得不自己留住粮食，不会为换取欧洲的机器工具而出口粮食。到那时，欧洲将陷入大规模饥荒。
This was, of course, a Jewish plot to plunge Europe into a communist revolution and open the way for Jewish race-mixing to pollute the Aryan race and destroy all civilization and culture. To Hitler’s mind, using military force to create a self-sufficient Aryan superstate within a matter of decades was of course a matter of saving the world.
这当然是犹太人的阴谋，目的是将欧洲推入共产主义革命，为犹太人与雅利安人通婚混淆种族，污染雅利安种族并摧毁所有文明和文化打开道路。在希特勒看来，利用军事力量在几十年内创建一个自给自足的雅利安超级国家，当然是拯救世界的事情。
Ultimately, a combination of bad economics and insane racism motivated an entire nation to throw itself down a narrow path to oblivion. Germany’s debt-fueled rearmament put Germany into a strategic straitjacket — they had to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia to keep the economy afloat, they had to invade Poland and open the way to the USSR, they had to invade Scandinavia and Western Europe to secure more resources and eliminate the threat in the West, and then they had to invade the USSR.
归根结底，是糟糕的经济政策和疯狂的种族主义驱使整个民族把自己推上了一条狭窄的自取灭亡之路。德国靠债务驱动的再军备把国家套进了战略的紧箍咒——他们不得不吞并奥地利和捷克斯洛伐克以维持经济运转，不得不入侵波兰并为进攻苏联打开通道，不得不入侵斯堪的纳维亚和西欧以获取更多资源并消除西线威胁，接着他们又不得不入侵苏联。
The Nazis warped the country into a military vulture economy that was reliant on new wars and new loot to keep itself afloat. Hitler’s fixation on lebensraum and expansion in the East was the cause of and solution to all of Germany’s problems.
While Youtube historian TIK is an extremely mixed bag, he has some entertaining and thoroughly detailed videos on these topics where he pulls direct quotations from Mein Kampf.
纳粹把国家扭曲成一种依赖新战争和新掠夺来维持生计的军事秃鹫经济。希特勒对生存空间和向东扩张的执着既是德国所有问题的根源，也是他认为的解决之道。
虽然 YouTube 历史博主 TIK 水平参差不齐，但他有一些既有趣又详尽的视频，讨论这些话题时会直接引用《我的奋斗》中的原文。
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