尽管进行了谈判，但与伊朗发生战争的风险正在增加
正文翻译
Current negotiations between Tehran and Washington are an opportunity – but a narrow one, surrounded by sharp edges
当前德黑兰和华盛顿之间的谈判是一个机会，但机会渺茫，处处充满荆棘。
The resumption of contacts between Washington and Tehran in early February 2026 has reopened a narrow diplomatic corridor that many observers had already written off. The first indirect round in Muscat, mediated by Oman, produced the kind of cautious, mutually face-saving language that usually signals one thing more than any breakthrough. Both sides want room to keep talking. For a region that has lived for years with the expectation of sudden escalation, even that is not nothing.
2026年2月初，华盛顿和德黑兰恢复接触，重新开启了一条此前许多观察家认为已经失去希望的狭窄外交通道。在阿曼斡旋下于马斯喀特举行的首轮间接会谈，双方措辞谨慎，都力求维护各自的颜面，这种做法通常比任何突破都更能说明一个问题：双方都希望留有对话的空间。对于一个多年来一直生活在局势可能突然升级阴影下的地区而言，即便如此，也意义非凡。
It is tempting to treat the very fact of renewed dialogue as evidence that a pragmatic compromise is finally within reach. There are reasons to hope. Iran has publicly floated the idea of diluting its stock of highly enriched uranium if the financial sanctions regime is lifted, and that is a meaningful signal because it touches the most sensitive technical parameter in the nuclear file. The US has also shown, at least tactically, that it is willing to sit in a format that Tehran can accept, namely indirect talks with an intermediary rather than face to face negotiation that would be politically costly for the Iranian leadership at home.
人们很容易将重启对话这一事实本身，视为务实妥协终于触手可及的证据。的确，希望并非没有道理。伊朗已公开表示，如果金融制裁解除，它将稀释其高浓缩铀库存。
这是一个意义重大的信号，因为它触及了核问题中最敏感的技术参数。美国也至少在策略上表明，它愿意以德黑兰可以接受的方式进行谈判，即通过中间人进行间接会谈，而不是面对面谈判——因为面对面谈判会给伊朗领导层在国内带来沉重的政治代价。
Still, hope is not the same as probability. The structural problem is that the parties are starting from positions that remain far apart, and the gap is not only about numbers and timelines. It is about what each side believes the negotiation is supposed to achieve. Washington is signaling that it wants a wider agenda that reaches beyond the nuclear program to Iran’s missile arsenal, its regional partnerships with armed groups, and even its internal governance. Tehran insists the conversation must stay strictly within the nuclear file, arguing that any attempt to widen the agenda is an attempt to turn diplomacy into a tool for strategic rollback and domestic pressure. Those are not minor differences of emphasis. They are incompatible negotiating frxworks, and when frxworks clash, even technical progress can collapse overnight.
然而，希望并不等同于概率。结构性问题在于，双方的立场依然相距甚远，而这种分歧不仅体现在数字和时间表上，更体现在双方对谈判预期目标的理解上。
华盛顿方面发出信号，希望谈判议程更加广泛，不仅涵盖核计划，还包括伊朗的导弹武库、与武装团体的地区伙伴关系，甚至其内部治理。德黑兰方面则坚持认为，对话必须严格围绕核问题展开，任何试图扩大议程的做法都是将外交变成战略倒退和国内施压的工具。
这些并非无关紧要的侧重点差异，而是相互冲突的谈判框架。一旦框架发生碰撞，即使是技术层面的进展也可能在一夜之间化为乌有。
The history of the last year underlines how quickly things can unravel. The experience of summer 2025 showed that the diplomatic track is exceptionally fragile when military dynamics shift. After Israel’s June 2025 strike, described by Israel as preemptive, the region moved into an escalatory spiral in which mediation channels existed but bargaining space shrank dramatically. Iran signaled through intermediaries that it would not negotiate while it was under attack and would only consider serious talks after responding. That is the logic of deterrence, not of compromise, and once that logic dominates, diplomacy becomes a side show rather than the steering wheel.
过去一年的历史凸显了局势瞬息万变。2025年夏季的经验表明，当军事动态发生变化时，外交途径异常脆弱。以色列于2025年6月发动了被其称为先发制人的袭击，此后该地区陷入了不断升级的螺旋式冲突，尽管调解渠道依然存在，但谈判空间却急剧缩小。
伊朗通过中间人发出信号，表示在遭受攻击期间不会进行谈判，只有在做出回应后才会考虑进行严肃的对话。这是一种威慑逻辑，而非妥协逻辑。一旦这种逻辑占据主导地位，外交就沦为配角，而非核心。
That precedent matters because the current talks are taking place in an environment where military signaling is again intense. Reuters reporting in early February 2026 describes heightened tensions and an American buildup in the region, alongside repeated warnings and counter-warnings. In parallel, Iran’s foreign minister has openly stated that if the US attacks, Iran will strike American bases in the Middle East. These statements are part of a deterrence conversation that can harden perceptions and narrow the room for political leaders to accept compromise without appearing weak.
这一先例至关重要，因为当前的谈判是在军事信号再次密集出现的背景下进行的。路透社2026年2月初的报道描述了该地区紧张局势加剧，美国正在该地区增兵，同时双方不断发出警告和反警告。
与此同时，伊朗外长公开表示，如果美国发动攻击，伊朗将打击美国在中东的军事基地。这些声明是威慑性对话的一部分，可能会加剧各方的紧张关系，并缩小政治领导人在不显得软弱的情况下接受妥协的空间。
The risk is amplified by the position of Israel. Israeli politics and security doctrine have long treated a potential American accommodation with Iran as a strategic threat, especially if any arrangement is perceived as leaving Iran with residual capability that could be expanded later. In recent days, Israeli media reporting has described warnings to Washington that Israel may act alone if Iran crosses an Israeli red line related to ballistic missiles. Other reporting suggests the Israeli leadership is closely tracking the missile issue and remains wary that a negotiation focused narrowly on the nuclear file could leave the missile dimension untouched. Even if some of this is messaging intended to shape American negotiating posture, it still adds pressure to an already precarious process, because it forces every diplomatic step to be judged against the possibility of unilateral military action.
以色列的立场加剧了这种风险。长期以来，以色列的政治和安全战略一直将美国可能与伊朗达成的妥协视为战略威胁，尤其是任何被认为会给伊朗留下未来可能扩大的剩余能力的安排。
近日，以色列媒体报道称，以色列已向华盛顿发出警告，如果伊朗越过以色列在弹道导弹问题上的红线，以色列可能会单独采取行动。其他报道则表明，以色列领导层正密切关注导弹问题，并仍然担心，如果谈判仅仅聚焦于核问题，可能会忽略导弹层面。
即便其中一些信息旨在影响美国的谈判立场，但这仍然给本已岌岌可危的谈判进程增添了压力，因为它迫使每一步外交举措都必须以单边军事行动的可能性为考量。
From Tehran’s perspective, that Israeli factor is central. Iranian officials argue that they cannot negotiate missiles while Israel retains military freedom of action and continues to frx preventive strikes as legitimate. They also point to the asymmetry of being asked to limit deterrent capabilities while facing threats from a state that Iran sees as hostile and militarily superior in key domains. From Washington’s perspective, Israel’s concerns are not easily separated from American interests, both because of alliance politics and because missiles are lixed to regional escalation risk. This triangle makes compromise harder because each side believes it is negotiating not only with the other party, but with the other party’s security partners and domestic constraints as well.
从德黑兰的角度来看，以色列因素至关重要。伊朗官员认为，只要以色列保持军事行动自由，并继续将预防性打击视为合法行动，伊朗就无法就导弹问题进行谈判。
他们还指出，一方面被要求限制威慑能力，另一方面却要面对一个伊朗视为敌对国家且在关键领域拥有军事优势的国家的威胁，这种做法是不对称的。
从华盛顿的角度来看，以色列的担忧与美国的利益难以割裂，这既是因为联盟政治，也是因为导弹与地区局势升级风险密切相关。这种三角关系使得妥协更加困难，因为双方都认为自己不仅要与对方谈判，还要与对方的安全伙伴和国内制约因素进行谈判。
This is why the optimistic reading of the Muscat round should be tempered. Indirect talks can be useful as a way to test intentions, but they also make it easier for the parties to talk past each other. Each can claim it offered reasonable terms while blaming the intermediary or the other side for miscommunication. The early reporting suggests that both governments want to keep the channel alive, yet the same reporting highlights deep rifts and a continuing sanctions and pressure track that runs parallel to diplomacy. That combination often produces a pattern of short cycles, one step forward through talks, one step back through new measures or new threats, and then a return to the brink.
因此，对马斯喀特回合谈判的乐观解读应保持谨慎。间接会谈可以作为检验双方意图的有效途径，但也更容易让各方各执一词。任何一方都可以声称自己提出了合理的条件，同时将沟通不畅的责任归咎于中间人或对方。
早期报道显示，两国政府都希望维持对话渠道畅通，但同样的报道也凸显了双方之间存在的深刻分歧，以及与外交活动并行的持续制裁和施压。这种组合往往导致一种短周期的循环：通过谈判取得进展，通过新的措施或威胁又退一步，然后再次回到僵局边缘。
The most dangerous outcome is not necessarily a deliberate choice for war, but a convergence of incentives that makes escalation more likely than de-escalation. Israel may calculate that time works in Iran’s favor and therefore preemption is rational. Iran may calculate that concessions invite more pressure and therefore resistance is rational. Washington may calculate that visible firmness is necessary both to extract nuclear limits and to deter regional attacks, even if that firmness is read in Tehran as preparation for regime change. When all three logics operate simultaneously, a diplomatic process can survive on paper while the political and military environment shifts toward confrontation.
最危险的结果未必是蓄意发动战争，而是各种利益的汇聚使得局势升级的可能性大于降级的可能性。
以色列可能认为时间对伊朗有利，因此先发制人是理性的。
伊朗可能认为让步会招致更大的压力，因此抵抗是理性的。
华盛顿可能认为，公开的强硬姿态对于争取核限制和阻止地区袭击都是必要的，即使这种强硬姿态在德黑兰看来是为政权更迭做准备。
当这三种逻辑同时发挥作用时，外交进程或许还能维持在纸面上，而政治和军事环境却在向对抗方向转变。
The Iran case also cannot be understood as a purely regional question for the US. It has become a geopolitical hinge with consequences that reach into the strategic interests of China and Russia. For Beijing, Iran is not simply another Middle Eastern partner. It is part of a broader energy security matrix and a corridor in the wider geography of connectivity that China promotes. Analyses of China’s Iran relationship emphasize that China remains the dominant buyer of Iranian crude, and that China’s imports account for a very large share of Iran’s seaborne oil exports. If Iran were destabilized or its export capacity was sharply constrained by war or regime collapse, China would face both immediate market turbulence and longer term strategic uncertainty across routes and projects lixed to its Belt and Road ambitions.
对美国而言，伊朗问题也不能仅仅被视为一个地区性问题。它已成为一个地缘政治枢纽，其影响波及中国和俄罗斯的战略利益。
对北京而言，伊朗并非仅仅是另一个中东伙伴，而是更广泛的能源安全体系的一部分，也是中国所倡导的互联互通战略中的重要一环。对中伊关系的分析强调，中国仍然是伊朗原油的主要买家，中国的进口量占伊朗海运石油出口的很大一部分。
如果伊朗局势动荡，或者其出口能力因战争或政权垮台而受到严重限制，中国将面临短期的市场动荡，以及与其“一带一路”倡议相关的路线和项目在长期战略上的不确定性。
There is also a political dimension. Beijing has invested in the idea that major non-Western states can sustain strategic autonomy despite American pressure. Iran has been an emblematic case in that narrative, a sanctioned state that still trades, still builds regional partnerships, and still signals that it will not accept externally imposed political conditions. A dramatic weakening of Iran through war or internal collapse would weaken a visible example of resistance that is important for China’s broader messaging about multipolarity and the limits of unilateral coercion. In that sense, the Iran file intersects with the credibility of China’s regional diplomacy and its ability to protect partners from sudden strategic shocks.
这其中也存在政治层面。北京一直坚信，主要的非西方国家能够在承受美国压力的情况下保持战略自主。伊朗一直是这种叙事的典型例子，这个受到制裁的国家仍然进行贸易，仍然建立地区伙伴关系，并且仍然表明它不会接受外部强加的政治条件。
伊朗若因战争或内部崩溃而实力急剧削弱，将削弱一个对中国而言至关重要的、展现抵抗力量的鲜明例证，而这对于中国传递关于多极化和单边胁迫局限性的更广泛信息至关重要。从这个意义上讲，伊朗问题关系到中国地区外交的信誉及其保护伙伴免受突发战略冲击的能力。
For Russia, the risks are different and often discussed in more nuanced terms. Moscow has indeed treated Iran as an important partner in the region, especially as Western pressure and sanctions have encouraged closer coordination between the two. Yet Russia’s position in the Middle East is not built on a single relationship. It rests on a more diversified set of ties with multiple regional actors, which gives Moscow additional room to maneuver even if the Iranian track becomes more volatile.
对俄罗斯而言，风险有所不同，讨论起来也往往更加细致入微。莫斯科确实将伊朗视为该地区的重要伙伴，尤其是在西方施压和制裁促使两国加强协调之后。
然而，俄罗斯在中东的地位并非建立在单一关系之上，而是建立在与多个地区参与者的多元化联系之上。即便伊朗局势变得更加动荡，这种多元化的联系也为莫斯科提供了更大的回旋余地。
At the same time, some in Washington may view a weakening of Iran as an opportunity to reshape regional balances and potentially, global energy dynamics in ways that could complicate Russia’s interests. In this reading, a post-crisis Iran that reenters markets quickly under arrangements acceptable to the US, combined with a broader easing of constraints on other sanctioned producers such as Venezuela, could add supply and increase downward pressure on prices. None of this is predetermined and it would depend on many contingencies, from infrastructure damage to political continuity and the pace of reintegration. Still, the concern is that energy could become one more lever in a wider competition, affecting commodity-dependent economies, including Russia, at a moment when economic resilience has become part of strategic rivalry.
与此同时，华盛顿的一些人可能将伊朗的衰落视为重塑地区平衡乃至全球能源格局的契机，而这可能会对俄罗斯的利益造成不利影响。
在这种解读下，危机后的伊朗若能在美国可接受的安排下迅速重返市场，再加上对委内瑞拉等其他受制裁产油国的限制进一步放松，则可能增加供应，并加大价格下行压力。当然，这一切都并非板上钉钉，而是取决于诸多不确定因素，例如基础设施受损程度、政治稳定性以及重新融入市场的步伐。
尽管如此，令人担忧的是，能源可能成为更广泛竞争中的一个杠杆，影响到包括俄罗斯在内的依赖大宗商品的经济体，而此时经济韧性已成为战略竞争的一部分。
This is where speculation about American motives becomes politically potent. Critics of Washington’s approach argue that the US may see regime change, or at least strategic crippling of Iran, as a way to reset the regional order and weaken rival powers indirectly. Even if that is not the explicit goal, the perception exists, and perceptions drive behavior. Tehran tends to interpret pressure campaigns not as bargaining tools but as steps on a ladder toward overthrow. In that environment, every demand that goes beyond nuclear limits, including demands on missiles and regional partnerships, is read as part of an attempt to hollow out Iran’s deterrence and prepare the ground for coercion. Washington, in turn, often interprets Iranian reluctance as proof that Iran is seeking to preserve a breakout option, and therefore concludes that only stronger pressure can force compliance.
正是这一点，使得对美国动机的猜测，变得具有强大的政治影响力。批评华盛顿做法的人士认为，美国可能将政权更迭，或者至少是战略性地削弱伊朗，视为重塑地区秩序并间接削弱竞争对手的一种方式。
即便这并非其明确目标，但这种看法已经存在，而认知会影响行为。德黑兰倾向于将施压行动解读为通往政权更迭的阶梯，而非谈判筹码。在这种背景下，任何超出核限制的要求，包括对导弹和地区伙伴关系的要求，都被解读为削弱伊朗威慑力、为胁迫铺路的企图。
反过来，华盛顿往往将伊朗的犹豫不决解读为伊朗试图保留突破选项的证据，因此得出结论：只有更大的压力才能迫使伊朗屈服。
At the same time, Washington also understands the dangers of war with Iran. Iran is not a marginal actor with limited capacity. It has a large population, significant military and paramilitary structures, and years of preparation for scenarios of external attack. It has developed strategies that prioritize survivability, dispersion, and asymmetric response, and it has influence across multiple arenas where US forces and partners could be targeted. That means any conflict would be expensive, unpredictable, and difficult to contain. The uncertainty goes beyond battlefield dynamics and into political outcomes. Regime change is not a switch that can be flipped without consequences. Even a military campaign that damages nuclear sites could produce the opposite strategic result by incentivizing Iran to rebuild with greater urgency and by strengthening hardline narratives about survival.
与此同时，华盛顿也深知与伊朗开战的危险。伊朗并非实力有限的边缘国家。它拥有庞大的人口、强大的军事和准军事力量，并已为应对外部攻击进行了多年的准备。伊朗制定了以生存、分散和非对称反击为优先的战略，其影响力遍及多个可能成为美国及其盟友攻击目标的领域。
这意味着任何冲突都将代价高昂、难以预测且难以控制。这种不确定性不仅体现在战场动态上，还延伸至政治结果。政权更迭并非轻而易举，必将带来严重后果。即使是破坏核设施的军事行动，也可能产生相反的战略效果，促使伊朗更加迫切地重建，并强化其关于生存的强硬论调。
This uncertainty creates a paradox. The very risks of war should make diplomacy more attractive. Yet the same risks can also encourage brinkmanship, because each side believes that credible threats are necessary to prevent the other from taking advantage of restraint. The US may feel it must demonstrate readiness, through force posture and sanctions, to avoid appearing weak. Iran may feel it must demonstrate readiness, through retaliation warnings, to avoid being cornered. Israel may feel it must demonstrate readiness, through talk of unilateral action, to ensure its red lines are taken seriously. In such a triangle, the probability of miscalculation rises.
这种不确定性造成了一种悖论。战争的风险本身应该使外交更具吸引力。然而，同样的风险也可能助长边缘政策，因为双方都认为，必须发出可信的威胁才能防止对方利用克制。美国可能觉得必须通过武力部署和制裁来展现战备状态，以免显得软弱。
伊朗可能觉得必须通过发出报复警告来展现战备状态，以免被逼入绝境。以色列可能觉得必须通过谈论单边行动来展现战备状态，以确保其划定的红线得到认真对待。在这种三角关系中，误判的可能性就会增加。
So where does this leave the current round of talks? It leaves them as a genuine opportunity, but one surrounded by sharp edges. A narrow deal that focuses on uranium levels and verification could, in theory, reduce immediate risk, especially if it includes credible sanctions relief that Iran can actually feel and therefore defend domestically. But Washington’s interest in a broader agenda and Tehran’s insistence on a narrow one suggest that even a technical understanding could stall over the definition of what is on the table.
那么，目前的谈判走向何方？它仍然是一个真正的机会，但同时也暗藏着诸多棘手的问题。一项聚焦于铀储量和核查的狭义协议，理论上可以降低眼前的风险，尤其是在协议包含伊朗能够切实感受到并因此在国内捍卫的可信制裁豁免的情况下。
然而，华盛顿希望达成更广泛的协议，而德黑兰则坚持狭义的协议，这意味着即便达成技术层面的共识，也可能因为对谈判内容的定义存在分歧而陷入僵局。
Meanwhile, Israel’s posture complicates the timeline. If Israeli leaders believe negotiations are creating a window for Iran to consolidate capabilities, they may push for action sooner rather than later. Whether those threats are intended as leverage or reflect genuine operational intent, they increase the temperature of the crisis and can provoke Iranian counter moves that then justify further escalation.
与此同时，以色列的姿态使局势更加复杂。如果以色列领导人认为谈判会为伊朗巩固自身实力创造机会，他们可能会推动尽快采取行动。无论这些威胁的目的是为了施压还是反映出真正的行动意图，它们都会加剧危机，并可能引发伊朗的反制措施，从而为局势进一步升级提供借口。
For China and Russia, the stakes are high enough that they will likely watch this process not as a local bargaining episode but as a test of whether the US is willing and able to reengineer the regional order through force, and whether partners can be protected from that. For the broader international system, the Iran file is a reminder that energy security, connectivity projects, and regional deterrence architectures are intertwined. A war that interrupts Gulf shipping or triggers retaliatory dynamics would not stay regional for long, as markets respond and political alignments shift.
对中国和俄罗斯而言，利害关系重大，它们很可能不会将此进程视为一场局部谈判，而是将其视为对美国是否愿意且有能力以武力重塑地区秩序，以及伙伴国能否免受其害的一次考验。
对更广泛的国际体系而言，伊朗问题提醒我们，能源安全、互联互通项目和区域威慑架构是相互交织的。一场扰乱海湾航运或引发报复性冲突的战争不会长期局限于地区层面，因为市场会做出反应，政治格局也会随之改变。
All of this points to a sober conclusion. It is reasonable to hope that the Muscat track produces something stabilizing, because the alternative is grim and the costs would be enormous. Yet it is equally reasonable to acknowledge that the risk of military action remains high. The distance between the parties is real. The memory of how quickly diplomacy can collapse under the pressure of strikes is recent. And the presence of an Israeli factor that is openly skeptical of any US-Iran accommodation adds a volatile accelerant.
这一切都指向一个冷静的结论。我们有理由希望马斯喀特进程能够带来一些稳定局面的成果，因为另一种选择前景黯淡，代价也将极其巨大。然而，同样合理的是，我们必须承认军事行动的风险依然很高。双方之间的分歧是真实存在的。
外交手段在打击的压力下迅速崩溃的惨痛教训至今仍历历在目。此外，以色列公开质疑任何美伊妥协方案，这无疑为局势增添了一个不稳定的催化剂。
The best case is a diplomatic package that is narrow, verifiable, and economically tangible enough to give leaders on both sides political cover. The worst case is a return to the summer 2025 pattern where military action drives the agenda and negotiation becomes a secondary channel used mainly to manage escalation rather than to prevent it. Given the current signals, the world is still uncomfortably closer to the second scenario than it wants to admit.
最好的情况是达成一项范围窄、可核查且经济效益足够显著的外交方案，从而为双方领导人提供政治掩护。最糟糕的情况是重蹈2025年夏季的覆辙，军事行动主导一切，谈判沦为次要渠道，主要用于控制局势升级而非阻止其发生。鉴于目前的种种迹象，世界距离第二种局面仍然比人们愿意承认的要近得多，这令人不安。
Current negotiations between Tehran and Washington are an opportunity – but a narrow one, surrounded by sharp edges
当前德黑兰和华盛顿之间的谈判是一个机会，但机会渺茫，处处充满荆棘。
The resumption of contacts between Washington and Tehran in early February 2026 has reopened a narrow diplomatic corridor that many observers had already written off. The first indirect round in Muscat, mediated by Oman, produced the kind of cautious, mutually face-saving language that usually signals one thing more than any breakthrough. Both sides want room to keep talking. For a region that has lived for years with the expectation of sudden escalation, even that is not nothing.
2026年2月初，华盛顿和德黑兰恢复接触，重新开启了一条此前许多观察家认为已经失去希望的狭窄外交通道。在阿曼斡旋下于马斯喀特举行的首轮间接会谈，双方措辞谨慎，都力求维护各自的颜面，这种做法通常比任何突破都更能说明一个问题：双方都希望留有对话的空间。对于一个多年来一直生活在局势可能突然升级阴影下的地区而言，即便如此，也意义非凡。
It is tempting to treat the very fact of renewed dialogue as evidence that a pragmatic compromise is finally within reach. There are reasons to hope. Iran has publicly floated the idea of diluting its stock of highly enriched uranium if the financial sanctions regime is lifted, and that is a meaningful signal because it touches the most sensitive technical parameter in the nuclear file. The US has also shown, at least tactically, that it is willing to sit in a format that Tehran can accept, namely indirect talks with an intermediary rather than face to face negotiation that would be politically costly for the Iranian leadership at home.
人们很容易将重启对话这一事实本身，视为务实妥协终于触手可及的证据。的确，希望并非没有道理。伊朗已公开表示，如果金融制裁解除，它将稀释其高浓缩铀库存。
这是一个意义重大的信号，因为它触及了核问题中最敏感的技术参数。美国也至少在策略上表明，它愿意以德黑兰可以接受的方式进行谈判，即通过中间人进行间接会谈，而不是面对面谈判——因为面对面谈判会给伊朗领导层在国内带来沉重的政治代价。
Still, hope is not the same as probability. The structural problem is that the parties are starting from positions that remain far apart, and the gap is not only about numbers and timelines. It is about what each side believes the negotiation is supposed to achieve. Washington is signaling that it wants a wider agenda that reaches beyond the nuclear program to Iran’s missile arsenal, its regional partnerships with armed groups, and even its internal governance. Tehran insists the conversation must stay strictly within the nuclear file, arguing that any attempt to widen the agenda is an attempt to turn diplomacy into a tool for strategic rollback and domestic pressure. Those are not minor differences of emphasis. They are incompatible negotiating frxworks, and when frxworks clash, even technical progress can collapse overnight.
然而，希望并不等同于概率。结构性问题在于，双方的立场依然相距甚远，而这种分歧不仅体现在数字和时间表上，更体现在双方对谈判预期目标的理解上。
华盛顿方面发出信号，希望谈判议程更加广泛，不仅涵盖核计划，还包括伊朗的导弹武库、与武装团体的地区伙伴关系，甚至其内部治理。德黑兰方面则坚持认为，对话必须严格围绕核问题展开，任何试图扩大议程的做法都是将外交变成战略倒退和国内施压的工具。
这些并非无关紧要的侧重点差异，而是相互冲突的谈判框架。一旦框架发生碰撞，即使是技术层面的进展也可能在一夜之间化为乌有。
The history of the last year underlines how quickly things can unravel. The experience of summer 2025 showed that the diplomatic track is exceptionally fragile when military dynamics shift. After Israel’s June 2025 strike, described by Israel as preemptive, the region moved into an escalatory spiral in which mediation channels existed but bargaining space shrank dramatically. Iran signaled through intermediaries that it would not negotiate while it was under attack and would only consider serious talks after responding. That is the logic of deterrence, not of compromise, and once that logic dominates, diplomacy becomes a side show rather than the steering wheel.
过去一年的历史凸显了局势瞬息万变。2025年夏季的经验表明，当军事动态发生变化时，外交途径异常脆弱。以色列于2025年6月发动了被其称为先发制人的袭击，此后该地区陷入了不断升级的螺旋式冲突，尽管调解渠道依然存在，但谈判空间却急剧缩小。
伊朗通过中间人发出信号，表示在遭受攻击期间不会进行谈判，只有在做出回应后才会考虑进行严肃的对话。这是一种威慑逻辑，而非妥协逻辑。一旦这种逻辑占据主导地位，外交就沦为配角，而非核心。
That precedent matters because the current talks are taking place in an environment where military signaling is again intense. Reuters reporting in early February 2026 describes heightened tensions and an American buildup in the region, alongside repeated warnings and counter-warnings. In parallel, Iran’s foreign minister has openly stated that if the US attacks, Iran will strike American bases in the Middle East. These statements are part of a deterrence conversation that can harden perceptions and narrow the room for political leaders to accept compromise without appearing weak.
这一先例至关重要，因为当前的谈判是在军事信号再次密集出现的背景下进行的。路透社2026年2月初的报道描述了该地区紧张局势加剧，美国正在该地区增兵，同时双方不断发出警告和反警告。
与此同时，伊朗外长公开表示，如果美国发动攻击，伊朗将打击美国在中东的军事基地。这些声明是威慑性对话的一部分，可能会加剧各方的紧张关系，并缩小政治领导人在不显得软弱的情况下接受妥协的空间。
The risk is amplified by the position of Israel. Israeli politics and security doctrine have long treated a potential American accommodation with Iran as a strategic threat, especially if any arrangement is perceived as leaving Iran with residual capability that could be expanded later. In recent days, Israeli media reporting has described warnings to Washington that Israel may act alone if Iran crosses an Israeli red line related to ballistic missiles. Other reporting suggests the Israeli leadership is closely tracking the missile issue and remains wary that a negotiation focused narrowly on the nuclear file could leave the missile dimension untouched. Even if some of this is messaging intended to shape American negotiating posture, it still adds pressure to an already precarious process, because it forces every diplomatic step to be judged against the possibility of unilateral military action.
以色列的立场加剧了这种风险。长期以来，以色列的政治和安全战略一直将美国可能与伊朗达成的妥协视为战略威胁，尤其是任何被认为会给伊朗留下未来可能扩大的剩余能力的安排。
近日，以色列媒体报道称，以色列已向华盛顿发出警告，如果伊朗越过以色列在弹道导弹问题上的红线，以色列可能会单独采取行动。其他报道则表明，以色列领导层正密切关注导弹问题，并仍然担心，如果谈判仅仅聚焦于核问题，可能会忽略导弹层面。
即便其中一些信息旨在影响美国的谈判立场，但这仍然给本已岌岌可危的谈判进程增添了压力，因为它迫使每一步外交举措都必须以单边军事行动的可能性为考量。
From Tehran’s perspective, that Israeli factor is central. Iranian officials argue that they cannot negotiate missiles while Israel retains military freedom of action and continues to frx preventive strikes as legitimate. They also point to the asymmetry of being asked to limit deterrent capabilities while facing threats from a state that Iran sees as hostile and militarily superior in key domains. From Washington’s perspective, Israel’s concerns are not easily separated from American interests, both because of alliance politics and because missiles are lixed to regional escalation risk. This triangle makes compromise harder because each side believes it is negotiating not only with the other party, but with the other party’s security partners and domestic constraints as well.
从德黑兰的角度来看，以色列因素至关重要。伊朗官员认为，只要以色列保持军事行动自由，并继续将预防性打击视为合法行动，伊朗就无法就导弹问题进行谈判。
他们还指出，一方面被要求限制威慑能力，另一方面却要面对一个伊朗视为敌对国家且在关键领域拥有军事优势的国家的威胁，这种做法是不对称的。
从华盛顿的角度来看，以色列的担忧与美国的利益难以割裂，这既是因为联盟政治，也是因为导弹与地区局势升级风险密切相关。这种三角关系使得妥协更加困难，因为双方都认为自己不仅要与对方谈判，还要与对方的安全伙伴和国内制约因素进行谈判。
This is why the optimistic reading of the Muscat round should be tempered. Indirect talks can be useful as a way to test intentions, but they also make it easier for the parties to talk past each other. Each can claim it offered reasonable terms while blaming the intermediary or the other side for miscommunication. The early reporting suggests that both governments want to keep the channel alive, yet the same reporting highlights deep rifts and a continuing sanctions and pressure track that runs parallel to diplomacy. That combination often produces a pattern of short cycles, one step forward through talks, one step back through new measures or new threats, and then a return to the brink.
因此，对马斯喀特回合谈判的乐观解读应保持谨慎。间接会谈可以作为检验双方意图的有效途径，但也更容易让各方各执一词。任何一方都可以声称自己提出了合理的条件，同时将沟通不畅的责任归咎于中间人或对方。
早期报道显示，两国政府都希望维持对话渠道畅通，但同样的报道也凸显了双方之间存在的深刻分歧，以及与外交活动并行的持续制裁和施压。这种组合往往导致一种短周期的循环：通过谈判取得进展，通过新的措施或威胁又退一步，然后再次回到僵局边缘。
The most dangerous outcome is not necessarily a deliberate choice for war, but a convergence of incentives that makes escalation more likely than de-escalation. Israel may calculate that time works in Iran’s favor and therefore preemption is rational. Iran may calculate that concessions invite more pressure and therefore resistance is rational. Washington may calculate that visible firmness is necessary both to extract nuclear limits and to deter regional attacks, even if that firmness is read in Tehran as preparation for regime change. When all three logics operate simultaneously, a diplomatic process can survive on paper while the political and military environment shifts toward confrontation.
最危险的结果未必是蓄意发动战争，而是各种利益的汇聚使得局势升级的可能性大于降级的可能性。
以色列可能认为时间对伊朗有利，因此先发制人是理性的。
伊朗可能认为让步会招致更大的压力，因此抵抗是理性的。
华盛顿可能认为，公开的强硬姿态对于争取核限制和阻止地区袭击都是必要的，即使这种强硬姿态在德黑兰看来是为政权更迭做准备。
当这三种逻辑同时发挥作用时，外交进程或许还能维持在纸面上，而政治和军事环境却在向对抗方向转变。
The Iran case also cannot be understood as a purely regional question for the US. It has become a geopolitical hinge with consequences that reach into the strategic interests of China and Russia. For Beijing, Iran is not simply another Middle Eastern partner. It is part of a broader energy security matrix and a corridor in the wider geography of connectivity that China promotes. Analyses of China’s Iran relationship emphasize that China remains the dominant buyer of Iranian crude, and that China’s imports account for a very large share of Iran’s seaborne oil exports. If Iran were destabilized or its export capacity was sharply constrained by war or regime collapse, China would face both immediate market turbulence and longer term strategic uncertainty across routes and projects lixed to its Belt and Road ambitions.
对美国而言，伊朗问题也不能仅仅被视为一个地区性问题。它已成为一个地缘政治枢纽，其影响波及中国和俄罗斯的战略利益。
对北京而言，伊朗并非仅仅是另一个中东伙伴，而是更广泛的能源安全体系的一部分，也是中国所倡导的互联互通战略中的重要一环。对中伊关系的分析强调，中国仍然是伊朗原油的主要买家，中国的进口量占伊朗海运石油出口的很大一部分。
如果伊朗局势动荡，或者其出口能力因战争或政权垮台而受到严重限制，中国将面临短期的市场动荡，以及与其“一带一路”倡议相关的路线和项目在长期战略上的不确定性。
There is also a political dimension. Beijing has invested in the idea that major non-Western states can sustain strategic autonomy despite American pressure. Iran has been an emblematic case in that narrative, a sanctioned state that still trades, still builds regional partnerships, and still signals that it will not accept externally imposed political conditions. A dramatic weakening of Iran through war or internal collapse would weaken a visible example of resistance that is important for China’s broader messaging about multipolarity and the limits of unilateral coercion. In that sense, the Iran file intersects with the credibility of China’s regional diplomacy and its ability to protect partners from sudden strategic shocks.
这其中也存在政治层面。北京一直坚信，主要的非西方国家能够在承受美国压力的情况下保持战略自主。伊朗一直是这种叙事的典型例子，这个受到制裁的国家仍然进行贸易，仍然建立地区伙伴关系，并且仍然表明它不会接受外部强加的政治条件。
伊朗若因战争或内部崩溃而实力急剧削弱，将削弱一个对中国而言至关重要的、展现抵抗力量的鲜明例证，而这对于中国传递关于多极化和单边胁迫局限性的更广泛信息至关重要。从这个意义上讲，伊朗问题关系到中国地区外交的信誉及其保护伙伴免受突发战略冲击的能力。
For Russia, the risks are different and often discussed in more nuanced terms. Moscow has indeed treated Iran as an important partner in the region, especially as Western pressure and sanctions have encouraged closer coordination between the two. Yet Russia’s position in the Middle East is not built on a single relationship. It rests on a more diversified set of ties with multiple regional actors, which gives Moscow additional room to maneuver even if the Iranian track becomes more volatile.
对俄罗斯而言，风险有所不同，讨论起来也往往更加细致入微。莫斯科确实将伊朗视为该地区的重要伙伴，尤其是在西方施压和制裁促使两国加强协调之后。
然而，俄罗斯在中东的地位并非建立在单一关系之上，而是建立在与多个地区参与者的多元化联系之上。即便伊朗局势变得更加动荡，这种多元化的联系也为莫斯科提供了更大的回旋余地。
At the same time, some in Washington may view a weakening of Iran as an opportunity to reshape regional balances and potentially, global energy dynamics in ways that could complicate Russia’s interests. In this reading, a post-crisis Iran that reenters markets quickly under arrangements acceptable to the US, combined with a broader easing of constraints on other sanctioned producers such as Venezuela, could add supply and increase downward pressure on prices. None of this is predetermined and it would depend on many contingencies, from infrastructure damage to political continuity and the pace of reintegration. Still, the concern is that energy could become one more lever in a wider competition, affecting commodity-dependent economies, including Russia, at a moment when economic resilience has become part of strategic rivalry.
与此同时，华盛顿的一些人可能将伊朗的衰落视为重塑地区平衡乃至全球能源格局的契机，而这可能会对俄罗斯的利益造成不利影响。
在这种解读下，危机后的伊朗若能在美国可接受的安排下迅速重返市场，再加上对委内瑞拉等其他受制裁产油国的限制进一步放松，则可能增加供应，并加大价格下行压力。当然，这一切都并非板上钉钉，而是取决于诸多不确定因素，例如基础设施受损程度、政治稳定性以及重新融入市场的步伐。
尽管如此，令人担忧的是，能源可能成为更广泛竞争中的一个杠杆，影响到包括俄罗斯在内的依赖大宗商品的经济体，而此时经济韧性已成为战略竞争的一部分。
This is where speculation about American motives becomes politically potent. Critics of Washington’s approach argue that the US may see regime change, or at least strategic crippling of Iran, as a way to reset the regional order and weaken rival powers indirectly. Even if that is not the explicit goal, the perception exists, and perceptions drive behavior. Tehran tends to interpret pressure campaigns not as bargaining tools but as steps on a ladder toward overthrow. In that environment, every demand that goes beyond nuclear limits, including demands on missiles and regional partnerships, is read as part of an attempt to hollow out Iran’s deterrence and prepare the ground for coercion. Washington, in turn, often interprets Iranian reluctance as proof that Iran is seeking to preserve a breakout option, and therefore concludes that only stronger pressure can force compliance.
正是这一点，使得对美国动机的猜测，变得具有强大的政治影响力。批评华盛顿做法的人士认为，美国可能将政权更迭，或者至少是战略性地削弱伊朗，视为重塑地区秩序并间接削弱竞争对手的一种方式。
即便这并非其明确目标，但这种看法已经存在，而认知会影响行为。德黑兰倾向于将施压行动解读为通往政权更迭的阶梯，而非谈判筹码。在这种背景下，任何超出核限制的要求，包括对导弹和地区伙伴关系的要求，都被解读为削弱伊朗威慑力、为胁迫铺路的企图。
反过来，华盛顿往往将伊朗的犹豫不决解读为伊朗试图保留突破选项的证据，因此得出结论：只有更大的压力才能迫使伊朗屈服。
At the same time, Washington also understands the dangers of war with Iran. Iran is not a marginal actor with limited capacity. It has a large population, significant military and paramilitary structures, and years of preparation for scenarios of external attack. It has developed strategies that prioritize survivability, dispersion, and asymmetric response, and it has influence across multiple arenas where US forces and partners could be targeted. That means any conflict would be expensive, unpredictable, and difficult to contain. The uncertainty goes beyond battlefield dynamics and into political outcomes. Regime change is not a switch that can be flipped without consequences. Even a military campaign that damages nuclear sites could produce the opposite strategic result by incentivizing Iran to rebuild with greater urgency and by strengthening hardline narratives about survival.
与此同时，华盛顿也深知与伊朗开战的危险。伊朗并非实力有限的边缘国家。它拥有庞大的人口、强大的军事和准军事力量，并已为应对外部攻击进行了多年的准备。伊朗制定了以生存、分散和非对称反击为优先的战略，其影响力遍及多个可能成为美国及其盟友攻击目标的领域。
这意味着任何冲突都将代价高昂、难以预测且难以控制。这种不确定性不仅体现在战场动态上，还延伸至政治结果。政权更迭并非轻而易举，必将带来严重后果。即使是破坏核设施的军事行动，也可能产生相反的战略效果，促使伊朗更加迫切地重建，并强化其关于生存的强硬论调。
This uncertainty creates a paradox. The very risks of war should make diplomacy more attractive. Yet the same risks can also encourage brinkmanship, because each side believes that credible threats are necessary to prevent the other from taking advantage of restraint. The US may feel it must demonstrate readiness, through force posture and sanctions, to avoid appearing weak. Iran may feel it must demonstrate readiness, through retaliation warnings, to avoid being cornered. Israel may feel it must demonstrate readiness, through talk of unilateral action, to ensure its red lines are taken seriously. In such a triangle, the probability of miscalculation rises.
这种不确定性造成了一种悖论。战争的风险本身应该使外交更具吸引力。然而，同样的风险也可能助长边缘政策，因为双方都认为，必须发出可信的威胁才能防止对方利用克制。美国可能觉得必须通过武力部署和制裁来展现战备状态，以免显得软弱。
伊朗可能觉得必须通过发出报复警告来展现战备状态，以免被逼入绝境。以色列可能觉得必须通过谈论单边行动来展现战备状态，以确保其划定的红线得到认真对待。在这种三角关系中，误判的可能性就会增加。
So where does this leave the current round of talks? It leaves them as a genuine opportunity, but one surrounded by sharp edges. A narrow deal that focuses on uranium levels and verification could, in theory, reduce immediate risk, especially if it includes credible sanctions relief that Iran can actually feel and therefore defend domestically. But Washington’s interest in a broader agenda and Tehran’s insistence on a narrow one suggest that even a technical understanding could stall over the definition of what is on the table.
那么，目前的谈判走向何方？它仍然是一个真正的机会，但同时也暗藏着诸多棘手的问题。一项聚焦于铀储量和核查的狭义协议，理论上可以降低眼前的风险，尤其是在协议包含伊朗能够切实感受到并因此在国内捍卫的可信制裁豁免的情况下。
然而，华盛顿希望达成更广泛的协议，而德黑兰则坚持狭义的协议，这意味着即便达成技术层面的共识，也可能因为对谈判内容的定义存在分歧而陷入僵局。
Meanwhile, Israel’s posture complicates the timeline. If Israeli leaders believe negotiations are creating a window for Iran to consolidate capabilities, they may push for action sooner rather than later. Whether those threats are intended as leverage or reflect genuine operational intent, they increase the temperature of the crisis and can provoke Iranian counter moves that then justify further escalation.
与此同时，以色列的姿态使局势更加复杂。如果以色列领导人认为谈判会为伊朗巩固自身实力创造机会，他们可能会推动尽快采取行动。无论这些威胁的目的是为了施压还是反映出真正的行动意图，它们都会加剧危机，并可能引发伊朗的反制措施，从而为局势进一步升级提供借口。
For China and Russia, the stakes are high enough that they will likely watch this process not as a local bargaining episode but as a test of whether the US is willing and able to reengineer the regional order through force, and whether partners can be protected from that. For the broader international system, the Iran file is a reminder that energy security, connectivity projects, and regional deterrence architectures are intertwined. A war that interrupts Gulf shipping or triggers retaliatory dynamics would not stay regional for long, as markets respond and political alignments shift.
对中国和俄罗斯而言，利害关系重大，它们很可能不会将此进程视为一场局部谈判，而是将其视为对美国是否愿意且有能力以武力重塑地区秩序，以及伙伴国能否免受其害的一次考验。
对更广泛的国际体系而言，伊朗问题提醒我们，能源安全、互联互通项目和区域威慑架构是相互交织的。一场扰乱海湾航运或引发报复性冲突的战争不会长期局限于地区层面，因为市场会做出反应，政治格局也会随之改变。
All of this points to a sober conclusion. It is reasonable to hope that the Muscat track produces something stabilizing, because the alternative is grim and the costs would be enormous. Yet it is equally reasonable to acknowledge that the risk of military action remains high. The distance between the parties is real. The memory of how quickly diplomacy can collapse under the pressure of strikes is recent. And the presence of an Israeli factor that is openly skeptical of any US-Iran accommodation adds a volatile accelerant.
这一切都指向一个冷静的结论。我们有理由希望马斯喀特进程能够带来一些稳定局面的成果，因为另一种选择前景黯淡，代价也将极其巨大。然而，同样合理的是，我们必须承认军事行动的风险依然很高。双方之间的分歧是真实存在的。
外交手段在打击的压力下迅速崩溃的惨痛教训至今仍历历在目。此外，以色列公开质疑任何美伊妥协方案，这无疑为局势增添了一个不稳定的催化剂。
The best case is a diplomatic package that is narrow, verifiable, and economically tangible enough to give leaders on both sides political cover. The worst case is a return to the summer 2025 pattern where military action drives the agenda and negotiation becomes a secondary channel used mainly to manage escalation rather than to prevent it. Given the current signals, the world is still uncomfortably closer to the second scenario than it wants to admit.
最好的情况是达成一项范围窄、可核查且经济效益足够显著的外交方案，从而为双方领导人提供政治掩护。最糟糕的情况是重蹈2025年夏季的覆辙，军事行动主导一切，谈判沦为次要渠道，主要用于控制局势升级而非阻止其发生。鉴于目前的种种迹象，世界距离第二种局面仍然比人们愿意承认的要近得多，这令人不安。
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