指挥以色列轰炸加沙的人工智能机器 - “薰衣草”（三）

STEP 4: AUTHORIZING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
‘We attacked almost without considering collateral damage’
One source said that when attacking junior operatives, including those marked by AI systems like Lavender, the number of civilians they were allowed to kill alongside each target was fixed during the initial weeks of the war at up to 20. Another source claimed the fixed number was up to 15. These “collateral damage degrees,” as the military calls them, were applied broadly to all suspected junior militants, the sources said, regardless of their rank, military importance, and age, and with no specific case-by-case examination to weigh the military advantage of assassinating them against the expected harm to civilians.

第四步：授权造成平民伤亡
“我们几乎没有考虑附带损害就发动了攻击”
一位消息人士称，在攻击初级特工时，包括那些被薰衣草等人工智能系统标记的人员，他们在战争开始的几周内被允许杀死的每个目标的平民数量是固定的，最多为 20 人。另一名消息人士称，固定数字最高为 15 人。消息人士称，军方称这些“附带损害程度”广泛适用于所有疑似初级武装分子，无论其军衔、军事重要性和年龄如何，而且没有具体逐案审查来衡量暗杀他们的军事优势与预期对平民造成的伤害。

According to A., who was an officer in a target operation room in the current war, the army’s international law department has never before given such “sweeping approval” for such a high collateral damage degree. “It’s not just that you can kill any person who is a Hamas soldier, which is clearly permitted and legitimate in terms of international law,” A. said. “But they directly tell you: ‘You are allowed to kill them along with many civilians.’

据曾任本场战争目标作战室军官的A介绍，陆军国际法部门此前从未对如此高的附带损害程度做出过“如此全面的批准”。“你不只是可以杀死任何一名哈马斯士兵，这在国际法上显然是被允许和合法的，”A. 说。“但他们直接告诉你：‘你可以杀死他们和许多平民。’”

“Every person who wore a Hamas uniform in the past year or two could be bombed with 20 [civilians killed as] collateral damage, even without special permission,” A. continued. “In practice, the principle of proportionality did not exist.”

“过去一两年中，每个穿着哈马斯制服的人都可能遭到轰炸，造成 20 名平民死亡，甚至没有特别许可，”A. 继续说道。“实际上，比例原则并不存在。”

According to A., this was the policy for most of the time that he served. Only later did the military lower the collateral damage degree. “In this calculation, it could also be 20 children for a junior operative … It really wasn’t like that in the past,” A. explained. Asked about the security rationale behind this policy, A. replied: “Lethality.”

据 A. 说，他服役期间大部分时间都是这个政策。直到后来，军方才降低了附带伤害程度。“按照这个计算，一名初级特工可能要杀死 20 名儿童……过去真的不是这样的，”A. 解释道。当被问及这项政策背后的安全理由时，A. 回答说：“致命性。”

The predetermined and fixed collateral damage degree helped accelerate the mass creation of targets using the Lavender machine, sources said, because it saved time. B. claimed that the number of civilians they were permitted to kill in the first week of the war per suspected junior militant marked by AI was fifteen, but that this number “went up and down” over time.

消息人士称，预定和固定的附带损害程度有助于加速使用薰衣草机器大规模制造目标，因为它节省了时间。B. 声称，在战争的第一周，他们被允许杀死的每个被 AI 标记的疑似初级武装分子的平民数量为 15 人，但这个数字随着时间的推移“上下波动”。

“At first we attacked almost without considering collateral damage,” B. said of the first week after October 7. “In practice, you didn’t really count people [in each house that is bombed], because you couldn’t really tell if they’re at home or not. After a week, restrictions on collateral damage began. The number dropped [from 15] to five, which made it really difficult for us to attack, because if the whole family was home, we couldn’t bomb it. Then they raised the number again.”

“一开始，我们几乎没有考虑附带损害就发动了袭击，”B 在谈到 10 月 7 日之后的第一个星期时说道。“实际上，你并没有真正计算出 [每所被炸房屋里的] 人数，因为你无法真正判断他们是否在家。“一周后，对附带损害的限制开始生效。人数从 15 人减少到 5 人，这让我们的袭击变得非常困难，因为如果全家人都在家里，我们就不能轰炸。然后他们又提高了人数。”

‘We knew we would kill over 100 civilians’
Sources told +972 and Local Call that now, partly due to American pressure, the Israeli army is no longer mass-generating junior human targets for bombing in civilian homes. The fact that most homes in the Gaza Strip were already destroyed or damaged, and almost the entire population has been displaced, also impaired the army’s ability to rely on intelligence databases and automated house-locating programs.

“我们知道我们会杀死100多名平民”
消息人士告诉当地媒体，现在，部分由于美国的压力，以色列军队不再大规模制造初级人质目标，轰炸平民住宅。加沙地带的大多数房屋已被摧毁或损坏，几乎所有人口都流离失所，这也削弱了军队依赖情报数据库和自动房屋定位程序的能力。

E. claimed that the massive bombardment of junior militants took place only in the first week or two of the war, and then was stopped mainly so as not to waste bombs. “There is a munitions economy,” E. said. “They were always afraid that there would be [a war] in the northern arena [with Hezbollah in Lebanon]. They don’t attack these kinds of [junior] people at all anymore.”

E.声称，对初级武装分子的大规模轰炸只在战争开始的一两周内发生，之后就停止了，主要是为了不浪费炸弹。“他们有军火经济，”E. 说。“他们一直担心北方地区（与黎巴嫩真主党）会发生战争。他们现在根本不会攻击这些（初级）人了。”

However, airstrikes against senior ranking Hamas commanders are still ongoing, and sources said that for these attacks, the military is authorizing the killing of “hundreds” of civilians per target — an official policy for which there is no historical precedent in Israel, or even in recent U.S. military operations.

然而，针对哈马斯高级指挥官的空袭仍在继续，有消息称，对于这些袭击，军方授权杀死每个目标“数百名”平民——这一官方政策在以色列历史上是没有先例的，甚至在最近的美国军事行动中也是如此。

“In the bombing of the commander of the Shuja’iya Battalion, we knew that we would kill over 100 civilians,” B. recalled of a Dec. 2 bombing that the IDF Spokesperson said was aimed at assassinating Wisam Farhat. “For me, psychologically, it was unusual. Over 100 civilians — it crosses some red line.”

“在轰炸舒贾伊亚营指挥官时，我们知道我们会杀死 100 多名平民，”B. 回忆起 12 月 2 日的一次爆炸事件，以色列国防军发言人称这次爆炸旨在暗杀维萨姆·法哈特。“对我来说，从心理上来说，这是不寻常的。超过 100 名平民——这已经越过了红线。”
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

Amjad Al-Sheikh, a young Palestinian from Gaza, said many of his family members were killed in that bombing. A resident of Shuja’iya, east of Gaza City, he was at a local supermarket that day when he heard five blasts that shattered the glass windows.

来自加沙的巴勒斯坦青年阿姆贾德·谢赫说，他的许多家人在那次爆炸中丧生。他是加沙城东部舒贾伊亚的居民，那天他在当地一家超市时听到五声爆炸声，玻璃窗碎裂。

“I ran to my family’s house, but there were no buildings there anymore,” Al-Sheikh told +972 and Local Call. “The street was filled with screams and smoke. Entire residential blocks turned to mountains of rubble and deep pits. People began to search in the cement, using their hands, and so did I, looking for signs of my family’s house.”

“我跑到我家，但那里已经没有建筑了，”Al-Sheikh 告诉当地媒体。“街上充满了尖叫声和烟雾。整个住宅区都变成了瓦砾山和深坑。人们开始用手在水泥地上搜寻，我也一样，寻找我家房子的踪迹。”
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Al-Sheikh’s wife and baby daughter survived — protected from the rubble by a closet that fell on top of them — but he found 11 other members of his family, among them his sisters, brothers, and their young children, dead under the rubble. According to the human rights group B’Tselem, the bombing that day destroyed dozens of buildings, killed dozens of people, and buried hundreds under the ruins of their homes.

阿尔谢赫的妻子和女儿幸免于难——倒塌的衣柜压在了她们身上，保护了她们不被瓦砾砸中——但他发现，包括姐妹、兄弟和他们年幼的孩子在内的其他 11 名家庭成员都死在了废墟之下。据人权组织 B’Tselem 称，当天的轰炸摧毁了数十座建筑物，造成数十人死亡，数百人被埋在家园的废墟之下。

‘Entire families were killed’
Intelligence sources told +972 and Local Call they took part in even deadlier strikes. In order to assassinate Ayman Nofal, the commander of Hamas’ Central Gaza Brigade, a source said the army authorized the killing of approximately 300 civilians, destroying several buildings in airstrikes on Al-Bureij refugee camp on Oct. 17, based on an imprecise pinpointing of Nofal. Satellite footage and videos from the scene show the destruction of several large multi-storey apartment buildings.

“全家人都被杀了”
情报人员告诉当地媒体，他们参加了更为致命的袭击。消息人士称，为了暗杀哈马斯中央加沙旅指挥官艾曼·诺法尔，军方根据对诺法尔不精确的定位，于10月17日批准杀害约300名平民，并在对布雷吉难民营的空袭中摧毁了数座建筑。现场的卫星图像和视频显示，几栋大型多层公寓楼被毁。

“Between 16 to 18 houses were wiped out in the attack,” Amro Al-Khatib, a resident of the camp, told +972 and Local Call. “We couldn’t tell one apartment from the other — they all got mixed up in the rubble, and we found human body parts everywhere.”

“袭击中摧毁了 16 到 18 栋房屋，”营地居民 Amro Al-Khatib 告诉当地媒体。“我们无法分辨出每间公寓——它们都混在废墟里，到处都是人体残骸。”

In the aftermath, Al-Khatib recalled around 50 dead bodies being pulled out of the rubble, and around 200 people wounded, many of them gravely. But that was just the first day. The camp’s residents spent five days pulling the dead and injured out, he said.

事后，哈提卜回忆说，大约有 50 具尸体从废墟中被拖出，约有 200 人受伤，其中许多人伤势严重。但那只是第一天。他说，营地居民花了五天时间才把死者和伤者拖出来。

Nael Al-Bahisi, a paramedic, was one of the first on the scene. He counted between 50-70 casualties on that first day. “At a certain moment, we understood the target of the strike was Hamas commander Ayman Nofal,” he told +972 and Local Call. “They killed him, and also many people who didn’t know he was there. Entire families with children were killed.”

医护人员纳埃尔·巴希西是第一批到达现场的人员之一。他统计，第一天就有 50-70 人伤亡。“在某个时刻，我们明白袭击的目标是哈马斯指挥官艾曼·诺法尔，”他告诉当地媒体。“他们杀了他，还杀了许多不知道他在那里的人。整个有孩子的家庭都被杀了。”

Another intelligence source told +972 and Local Call that the army destroyed a high-rise building in Rafah in mid-December, killing “dozens of civilians,” in order to try to kill Mohammed Shabaneh, the commander of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade (it is not clear whether or not he was killed in the attack). Often, the source said, the senior commanders hide in tunnels that pass under civilian buildings, and therefore the choice to assassinate them with an airstrike necessarily kills civilians.

另一名情报人士告诉当地媒体，军队12月中旬摧毁了拉法赫的一座高层建筑，造成“数十名平民死亡”，目的是试图杀死哈马斯拉法旅指挥官穆罕默德·沙巴内（目前尚不清楚他是否在袭击中丧生）。消息人士称，高级指挥官通常躲在穿过平民建筑的隧道中，因此选择用空袭暗杀他们必然会导致平民死亡。

“Most of those injured were children,” said Wael Al-Sir, 55, who witnessed the large-scale strike believed by some Gazans to have been the assassination attempt. He told +972 and Local Call that the bombing on Dec. 20 destroyed an “entire residential block” and killed at least 10 children.

“大多数伤者都是儿童，”55 岁的瓦埃尔·阿尔西尔目睹了这次大规模袭击，一些加沙人认为这是一次暗杀企图。他告诉当地媒体，12 月 20 日的爆炸摧毁了“整个住宅区”，并造成至少 10 名儿童死亡。

“There was a completely permissive policy regarding the casualties of [bombing] operations — so permissive that in my opinion it had an element of revenge,” D., an intelligence source, claimed. “The core of this was the assassinations of senior [Hamas and PIJ commanders] for whom they were willing to kill hundreds of civilians. We had a calculation: how many for a brigade commander, how many for a battalion commander, and so on.”

情报部门消息人士 D 声称：“对于（轰炸）行动的伤亡，政府采取了完全宽容的政策 —— 这种宽容在我看来带有报复的成分。”“事件的核心是暗杀高级指挥官（哈马斯和巴基斯坦伊斯兰圣战者组织指挥官），他们愿意为这些指挥官杀害数百名平民。我们进行了盘算：旅长要杀多少人，营长要杀多少人，等等。”
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“There were regulations, but they were just very lenient,” said E., another intelligence source. “We’ve killed people with collateral damage in the high double-digits, if not low triple-digits. These are things that haven’t happened before.”

“虽然有规定，但非常宽松，”另一位情报人员 E 说。“我们杀人造成的附带损失高达两位数，甚至三位数。这些事情以前从未发生过。”

Such a high rate of “collateral damage” is exceptional not only compared to what the Israeli army previously deemed acceptable, but also compared to the wars waged by the United States in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

如此高的“附带损害”率不仅与以色列军队此前认为可以接受的水平相比，而且与美国在伊拉克、叙利亚和阿富汗发动的战争相比都是异常的。

General Peter Gersten, Deputy Commander for Operations and Intelligence in the operation to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria, told a U.S. defense magazine in 2021 that an attack with collateral damage of 15 civilians deviated from procedure; to carry it out, he had to obtain special permission from the head of the U.S. Central Command, General Lloyd Austin, who is now Secretary of Defense.

2021 年，负责伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国行动的作战和情报副指挥官彼得·格斯滕将军对美国一家国防杂志表示，一次造成 15 名平民附带伤害的袭击偏离了程序；为了实施这一袭击，他必须获得美国中央司令部司令、现任国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀将军的特别许可。

“With Osama Bin Laden, you’d have an NCV [Non-combatant Casualty Value] of 30, but if you had a low-level commander, his NCV was typically zero,” Gersten said. “We ran zero for the longest time.”

“对付奥萨马·本·拉登，非战斗人员伤亡值会达到 30，但如果是低级别指挥官，他的非战斗人员伤亡值通常为零，”格斯滕说。“我们长期以来的伤亡值都是零。”

‘We were told: “Whatever you can, bomb”’
All the sources interviewed for this investigation said that Hamas’ massacres on October 7 and kidnapping of hostages greatly influenced the army’s fire policy and collateral damage degrees. “At first, the atmosphere was painful and vindictive,” said B., who was drafted into the army immediately after October 7, and served in a target operation room. “The rules were very lenient. They took down four buildings when they knew the target was in one of them. It was crazy.

“有人对我们说：‘尽你所能，轰炸一切’”
所有接受调查的消息人士都表示，哈马斯10月7日的屠杀和绑架人质事件极大地影响了军队的射击政策和附带损害程度。“一开始，气氛很痛苦，充满报复心理，”B 说，他在 10 月 7 日之后立即被征召入伍，在目标行动室服役。“规则非常宽松。当他们知道目标在四座建筑中时，他们就拆除了其中一座。这太疯狂了。

“There was a dissonance: on the one hand, people here were frustrated that we were not attacking enough,” B. continued. “On the other hand, you see at the end of the day that another thousand Gazans have died, most of them civilians.”

“存在着矛盾：一方面，这里的人们对我们的攻击不够感到沮丧，”B. 继续说道。“另一方面，你会看到，到最后又有 1000 名加沙人死亡，其中大多数是平民。”

“There was hysteria in the professional ranks,” said D., who was also drafted immediately after October 7. “They had no idea how to react at all. The only thing they knew to do was to just start bombing like madmen to try to dismantle Hamas’ capabilities.”

“专业队伍里一片恐慌，”同样在 10 月 7 日之后被征召入伍的 D 说。“他们完全不知道该如何应对。他们唯一知道的就是开始疯狂轰炸，试图摧毁哈马斯的能力。”

D. stressed that they were not explicitly told that the army’s goal was “revenge,” but expressed that “as soon as every target connected to Hamas becomes legitimate, and with almost any collateral damage being approved, it is clear to you that thousands of people are going to be killed. Even if officially every target is connected to Hamas, when the policy is so permissive, it loses all meaning.”

D. 强调，他们并没有被明确告知军队的目标是“报复”，但他表示“一旦与哈马斯有关的每一个目标都变得合法，并且几乎所有的附带损害都得到批准，那么你们就会明白，成千上万的人将会被杀害。即使官方认为每个目标都与哈马斯有关，但当政策如此宽容时，它就失去了一切意义。”

A. also used the word “revenge” to describe the atmosphere inside the army after October 7. “No one thought about what to do afterward, when the war is over, or how it will be possible to live in Gaza and what they will do with it,” A. said. “We were told: now we have to fuck up Hamas, no matter what the cost. Whatever you can, you bomb.”

A. 还用“复仇”这个词来形容 10 月 7 日之后军队内部的气氛。“没有人想过战争结束后该怎么办，也没有人想过如何才能在加沙生活，以及他们会如何处理这些事情，”A. 说。“我们被告知：现在我们必须搞垮哈马斯，无论付出什么代价。只要你能，就轰炸它。”

B., the senior intelligence source, said that in retrospect, he believes this “disproportionate” policy of killing Palestinians in Gaza also endangers Israelis, and that this was one of the reasons he decided to be interviewed.

高级情报人士B表示，回想起来，他认为这种在加沙杀害巴勒斯坦人的“不相称”的政策也危及以色列人，这也是他决定接受采访的原因之一。

“In the short term, we are safer, because we hurt Hamas. But I think we’re less secure in the long run. I see how all the bereaved families in Gaza — which is nearly everyone — will raise the motivation for [people to join] Hamas 10 years down the line. And it will be much easier for [Hamas] to recruit them.”

“从短期来看，我们比较安全，因为我们打击了哈马斯。但我认为从长远来看，我们的安全感会降低。我看到加沙所有失去亲人的家庭——几乎是所有人——将在 10 年后激发人们加入哈马斯的积极性。而且哈马斯招募他们也会容易得多。”

In a statement to +972 and Local Call, the Israeli army denied much of what the sources told us, claiming that “each target is examined individually, while an individual assessment is made of the military advantage and collateral damage expected from the attack … The IDF does not carry out attacks when the collateral damage expected from the attack is excessive in relation to the military advantage.”

在向当地媒体发表的声明中，以色列军方否认了消息人士所说的大部分内容，声称“对每个目标都进行单独审查，对袭击预计带来的军事优势和附带损害也进行单独评估……当袭击预计造成的附带损害相对于军事优势过大时，以色列国防军不会发动袭击。”

STEP 5: CALCULATING COLLATERAL DAMAGE
‘The model was not connected to reality’
According to the intelligence sources, the Israeli army’s calculation of the number of civilians expected to be killed in each house alongside a target — a procedure examined in a previous investigation by +972 and Local Call — was conducted with the help of automatic and inaccurate tools. In previous wars, intelligence personnel would spend a lot of time verifying how many people were in a house that was set to be bombed, with the number of civilians liable to be killed listed as part of a “target file.” After October 7, however, this thorough verification was largely abandoned in favor of automation.

第五步：计算附带损害
“该模型与现实脱节”
据情报部门消息称，以色列军队对每所房屋中预计被杀害的平民人数的计算——这一程序在当地媒体之前的调查中进行了检查——是借助自动和不准确的工具进行的。在以往的战争中，情报人员会花费大量时间核实一所即将被轰炸的房屋里有多少人，并将可能被炸死的平民人数列为“目标文件”的一部分。然而，在 10 月 7 日之后，这种彻底的核实工作基本上被放弃了，取而代之的是自动化。

In October, The New York Times reported on a system operated from a special base in southern Israel, which collects information from mobile phones in the Gaza Strip and provided the military with a live estimate of the number of Palestinians who fled the northern Gaza Strip southward. Brig. General Udi Ben Muha told the Times that “It’s not a 100 percent perfect system — but it gives you the information you need to make a decision.” The system operates according to colors: red marks areas where there are many people, and green and yellow mark areas that have been relatively cleared of residents.

10月份，《纽约时报》报道了以色列南部一个特殊基地运行的系统，该系统通过收集加沙地带手机信息，向军方提供从加沙地带北部向南逃亡的巴勒斯坦人数的实时估计值。准将乌迪·本·穆哈 (Udi Ben Muha) 告诉《纽约时报》：“这不是一个 100% 完美的系统——但它能为你提供做出决定所需的信息。”该系统根据颜色进行操作：红色标记人口众多的区域，绿色和黄色标记相对没有居民的区域。

The sources who spoke to +972 and Local Call described a similar system for calculating collateral damage, which was used to decide whether to bomb a building in Gaza. They said that the software calculated the number of civilians residing in each home before the war — by assessing the size of the building and reviewing its list of residents — and then reduced those numbers by the proportion of residents who supposedly evacuated the neighborhood.

接受当地媒体采访的消息人士描述了一种类似的计算附带损害的系统，该系统用于决定是否轰炸加沙的一座建筑物。他们说，该软件通过评估建筑规模和审查居民名单，计算出战前每户人家中居住的平民数量，然后根据据称撤离该社区的居民比例减少这些数字。

To illustrate, if the army estimated that half of a neighborhood’s residents had left, the program would count a house that usually had 10 residents as a house containing five people. To save time, the sources said, the army did not surveil the homes to check how many people were actually living there, as it did in previous operations, to find out if the program’s estimate was indeed accurate.

举例来说，如果军队估计某个街区一半的居民已经离开，该计划就会将一栋通常有 10 名居民的房屋算作有 5 个人的房屋。消息人士称，为了节省时间，军队并没有像以前的行动那样对这些房屋进行监视，以检查那里实际居住的人数，以查明该计划的估计是否确实准确。

“This model was not connected to reality,” claimed one source. “There was no connection between those who were in the home now, during the war, and those who were listed as living there prior to the war. [On one occasion] we bombed a house without knowing that there were several families inside, hiding together.”

“这种模式与现实脱节，”一位消息人士称。“战争期间住在这所房子里的人与战前被列为住在那里的人之间没有任何联系。[有一次]我们轰炸了一所房子，却不知道里面有几户人家躲在一起。”

The source said that although the army knew that such errors could occur, this imprecise model was adopted nonetheless, because it was faster. As such, the source said, “the collateral damage calculation was completely automatic and statistical” — even producing figures that were not whole numbers.

消息人士称，尽管军方知道可能会出现此类错误，但还是采用了这种不精确的模型，因为它速度更快。消息人士称，因此，“附带损害计算完全是自动和统计的”——甚至得出的数字也不是整数。
原创翻译：龙腾网 https://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处

STEP 6: BOMBING A FAMILY HOME
‘You killed a family for no reason’
The sources who spoke to +972 and Local Call explained that there was sometimes a substantial gap between the moment that tracking systems like Where’s Daddy? alxed an officer that a target had entered their house, and the bombing itself — leading to the killing of whole families even without hitting the army’s target. “It happened to me many times that we attacked a house, but the person wasn’t even home,” one source said. “The result is that you killed a family for no reason.”

第六步：轰炸家庭住宅
“你毫无理由地杀害了一个家庭”
接受当地媒体采访的消息人士解释道，有时候，从“爸爸在哪？”之类的追踪系统向警官发出目标进入其房屋的警报到爆炸本身发生之间会存在很长的时间间隔，甚至可能导致整个家庭丧生，即使军队的目标没有击中。“我遇到过很多次这样的情况，我们袭击了一所房子，但那个人甚至不在家，”一位消息人士说。“结果是你毫无理由地杀死了一个家庭。”

Three intelligence sources told +972 and Local Call that they had witnessed an incident in which the Israeli army bombed a family’s private home, and it later turned out that the intended target of the assassination was not even inside the house, since no further verification was conducted in real time.

三名情报人员告诉当地媒体，他们目睹了以色列军队轰炸一户家庭私人住宅的事件，后来发现，暗杀的目标甚至不在屋内，因为没有进行进一步的实时核实。

“Sometimes [the target] was at home earlier, and then at night he went to sleep somewhere else, say underground, and you didn’t know about it,” one of the sources said. “There are times when you double-check the location, and there are times when you just say, ‘Okay, he was in the house in the last few hours, so you can just bomb.’”

“有时（目标）早些时候在家，然后晚上去其他地方睡觉，比如说在地下，而你对此一无所知，”其中一位消息人士说。“有时你会仔细检查位置，有时你会说，‘好吧，他过去几个小时一直在屋里，所以你可以轰炸他。’”

Another source described a similar incident that affected him and made him want to be interviewed for this investigation. “We understood that the target was home at 8 p.m. In the end, the air force bombed the house at 3 a.m. Then we found out [in that span of time] he had managed to move himself to another house with his family. There were two other families with children in the building we bombed.”

另一位消息人士描述了一起类似的事件，这起事件对他影响很大，让他想要接受采访以进行调查。“我们了解到目标晚上 8 点就在家里。最后，空军在凌晨 3 点轰炸了这所房子。”然后我们发现 [在那段时间里] 他已经设法和家人搬到了另一所房子里。我们轰炸的那栋楼里还有另外两个有孩子的家庭。”

In previous wars in Gaza, after the assassination of human targets, Israeli intelligence would carry out bomb damage assessment (BDA) procedures — a routine post-strike check to see if the senior commander was killed and how many civilians were killed along with him. As revealed in a previous +972 and Local Call investigation, this involved listening in to phone calls of relatives who lost their loved ones. In the current war, however, at least in relation to junior militants marked using AI, sources say this procedure was abolished in order to save time. The sources said they did not know how many civilians were actually killed in each strike, and for the low-ranking suspected Hamas and PIJ operatives marked by AI, they did not even know whether the target himself was killed.

在之前的加沙战争中，在人类目标被暗杀后，以色列情报部门会进行炸弹损害评估（BDA）程序——这是袭击后的例行检查，以查看高级指挥官是否被杀以及有多少平民与他一起被杀。正如之前的 +972 和本地电话调查所揭示的那样，这涉及监听失去亲人的亲属的电话。然而，在当前的战争中，至少对于使用人工智能标记的初级武装分子，消息人士称这一程序已被废除，以节省时间。消息人士称，他们并不清楚每次袭击究竟造成多少平民死亡，而对于被 AI 标记的低级别疑似哈马斯和伊斯兰圣战组织成员，他们甚至不知道目标本人是否被击毙。

“You don’t know exactly how many you killed, and who you killed,” an intelligence source told Local Call for a previous investigation published in January. “Only when it’s senior Hamas operatives do you follow the BDA procedure. In the rest of the cases, you don’t care. You get a report from the air force about whether the building was blown up, and that’s it. You have no idea how much collateral damage there was; you immediately move on to the next target. The emphasis was to create as many targets as possible, as quickly as possible.”

“你不知道你杀了多少人，杀了谁，”一名情报人员在 1 月份发表的一项调查中告诉《本地呼叫》。“只有当杀的是哈马斯高级特工时，你才会遵循 BDA 程序。其余情况下，你不必在意。空军会向你报告大楼是否被炸毁，仅此而已。你不知道附带损害有多大；你会立即转向下一个目标。重点是尽快创造尽可能多的目标。”

But while the Israeli military may move on from each strike without dwelling on the number of casualties, Amjad Al-Sheikh, the Shuja’iya resident who lost 11 of his family members in the Dec. 2 bombardment, said that he and his neighbors are still searching for corpses.

然而，尽管以色列军队可能在每次袭击后就不再纠结于伤亡人数，但舒贾伊亚居民阿姆贾德·阿尔谢赫表示，他和邻居仍在寻找尸体。12 月 2 日的轰炸中，他的 11 名家人丧生。

“Until now, there are bodies under the rubble,” he said. “Fourteen residential buildings were bombed with their residents inside. Some of my relatives and neighbors are still buried.”

“直到现在，废墟下还有尸体，”他说。“十四栋居民楼被炸，里面还有居民。我的一些亲戚和邻居还埋在那里。”